#11
Moskovsky Komsomolets
July 10, 2001
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
NO MORE SUPERPOWERS IN THE 21ST CENTURY
What are the probable results of the strengthening of China?
How will the status of Russia and America change"? Zbigniew
BRZEZINSKI, national security advisor of an ex-President of the
U.S., and Yevgeny PRIMAKOV, ex-Prime Minister of Russia, offer
their answers to these and other questions.
Question:
Could we say that China has completely replaced
Russia as America's main adversary in the world?
Zbigniew Brzezinski:
No, it would be incorrect to say so.
The U.S. does not regard either China or Russia as its "main
adversary."
Yevgeny Primakov:
No, I do not think so at this stage.
Time will show what will happen in the future.
Question:
The political and economic might of China does
not accord yet with the size of its population. When will China
reach the peak of its might? How will the line-up of forces
change on the world scene after that?
Z.B.:
In the next twenty years China will be an
increasingly important regional power but not a world force
yet. Its progress is very impressive, indeed, and it may
continue. Even now the Chinese economy is five times as big as
the Russian economy.
Depending on the way you count, it is the world's third or
second economy.
Y.P.:
This will undoubtedly happen this century, probably,
in its first half. But there will never be a new situation when
two powerful world forces will vie with each. No one will
dominate on a unilateral basis, either.
Question:
A greater part of the second half of the 20th
century was an era of global confrontation between the USSR and
the U.S. Can the 21st century become the time of a big conflict
between America and China?
Z.B.:
I doubt that a big conflict between America and
China is possible. For many years to come China's development
will be far behind that of the more advanced societies. This
will curtail Chinese pretensions. What is more, China to a very
high degree depends on world trade in its southern ports. It is
more likely that Chinese influence will grow in the North and
the West.
Y.P.:
I do not think this will happen. The future is sure
to confirm the correctness of our forecasts that the world
system will be multi-polar. Even if China and the U.S. become
the strongest poles of the future world order and there are
some differences between them, they will be connected and
mutually deterred by many things, as ever.
Question:
Hardly any country has thus far been able to
stay a world superpower for more than a hundred years. Could
China take over America's role of the main global force?
Z.B.:
I think the concept of the superpower will
eventually become obsolete. That is why in my works I have
called the U.S.
"the first, sole and, probably, last superpower".
Y.P.:
No country is a superpower any longer. I do not
think China would be able to become a superpower in the future.
A superpower is a category, which has been obliterated together
with the Cold War era. It is only possible to compare the
qualitative indicators of different countries. In this context,
the hierarchy can change.
Question:
Some members of Russia's elite say in private
conversations that in a long-term perspective Russia has only
one choice - to become a junior partner of either America or
China. Do you agree with this?
Z.B.:
This wording is probably too harsh and too acute.
The best choice for Russia would be to become connected one way
or another with the Euro-Atlantic community based on an
expanded European Union and NATO. In that case Russia can be an
important partner.
Y.P.:
I categorically disagree with this. Russia has an
independent role to play. Due to its history, potential and
possibilities, it cannot be the one led by others.
Question:
China suffers from the surplus of population and
the shortage of land. Russia's problems are just the other way
around. Does this mean that Chinese expansion is inevitable?
Z.B.:
It is not inevitable at all. Everything depends on
whether Russia dares to have close ties with the most modern,
advanced and powerful force in the world - the Euro-Atlantic
community.
Y.P.:
It is a very complicated question. Indeed, we are
two very different powers. What is more, many of Russia's
scarcely populated territories are precisely in the regions
adjacent to China. Under these circumstances, a great deal will
depend on how prudent our migration policy will be.
Question:
The number of illegal Chinese immigrants keeps
growing in Russia's Far East. Are there any ways to effectively
block this wave?
Z.B.:
The U.S. Mexican experience makes the affirmative
answer to this question rather unlikely.
Y.P.:
It is first of all necessary to create social
conditions for the movement of Russian settlement to the
regions that are close to China. It would also be worthwhile to
think of conditions for dosed and goal oriented immigration to
these regions of people from neighbouring countries.
We should also study the experience of other countries.
About a million people come to the U.S. from Latin America
alone each year. Many of them are only seasonal workers. But
specialists who are needed and people who prove to be good
workers soon get advantages such as, for instance, the Green
Card.
Question:
In 1969 the Chinese attempted to seize part of
our territory by force. Can anything of the kind be repeated in
the future?
Z.B.:
The Chinese believed they were not seizing Russian
lands but were regaining what had always belonged to them.
Y.P.:
I do not think that a conflict like the one on
Damansky Island can happen ever again.
Question:
How do you appraise Moscow's present policy
toward China and to the U.S.? Should anything be changed?
Z.B.:
In my opinion, Moscow's attempts to bring pressure
to bear on America by playing the card of Russian-Chinese
alliance are childishly naive.
Y.P.:
Nothing should be changed. We ought to go on with a
diversified foreign policy designed to maintain good relations
with China and the U.S. alike.
Question:
Some experts have estimated that in fifteen
years China's military might could be equal to the U.S.
military potential. How real is an armed conflict between these
two countries?
Z.B.:
I think this analysis is absolutely incorrect.
Y.P.:
A comparison of the countries' military might is not
sufficient to draw the conclusion about a possible armed
conflict. The experience of the past shows that reaching the
same level of military might can, on the contrary, stabilize
their relations.
Question:
What are the strategic goals of China's leaders
concerning Russia? How do they envisage the future role of
their country in the world arena?
Z.B.:
China can become a very important regional power
with a growing role in the world only if its economic growth
continues and democratization of its political system begins.
Y.P.:
It would be more appropriate to address this
question to the Chinese leaders.
Question:
What are the main internal threats to Russia,
China and the U.S.?
Z.B.:
The main threat to these three countries is
international stability.
Y.P.:
Separatism is the main threat to Russia and China.
The U.S. does not have an internal threat on such a scale.
Question:
Is Russia's unprecedented decline in the 1990s
of a temporary character or can it lose for ever the status of
a great power, just as Spain lost such a status in the 17th
century?
Z.B.:
Its present decline can be temporary. But there is
no ground to expect Russia to regain the status of a great
power, comparable with that of the USSR in its time, in the
foreseeable future. The Soviet Union's status was an illusion
in many respects. It simply happened that Soviet rivalry with
the U.S.
buttressed up by nuclear weaponry and prompted by dogmatic
ideology coincided with a decline of power in European
countries, China and Japan. If Russia becomes a country with a
successful market economy and stable democracy, it can also
become a prominent regional power. But this might not happen in
the next few decades.
Y.P.:
I am sufficiently optimistic in this respect. And my
optimism is not prompted by street patriotism. Developments
show that Russia's Western partners look forward to its
participation in world processes. Even when weakened and
economically inferior to other countries, Russia, nonetheless,
remains a partner playing a priority role.
Question:
How do you appraise the current situation in
Russia? Do we continue to slide downhill pell-mell or has the
process of our recovery begun?
Z.B.:
The situation is contradictory. A certain level of
social and political recovery has already been reached, but
there is no democratization on a political plane. Nostalgia for
the imperial status distracts the attention of the country's
leaders from the truly important questions. The war against
Chechnya, for instance, contaminates Russian politics and
tarnishes your image abroad.
Y.P.:
Recovery has already begun. This does not mean,
however, that we will continue going straight ahead. There can
be some rolling back and even backward movement. There is a
chance, but whether it will be used or not is a big question.
Question:
Mr. Brzezinski has the reputation of an
anti-Russian personality in our country. Is such an image
legitimate?
Z.B.:
Those who are outspoken and do not beat about the
diplomatic bush are often regarded as enemies. There is not a
single anti-Russian statement in my works. I wrote about
Russians as the people who probably suffered more than any
other people did in the 20th century. I think that the Soviet
system was immoral and criminal. I am sure that now that the
empire established by czars is dead the Russian people have a
much better outlook for the future. Do such views make me a
Russo-phobic person?
Y.P.:
Together with Zbigniew I have recently taken part in
a Round Table organized by the French parliament. He started
his statement approximately as follows: "Primakov used to
regard me as an agent of imperialism. Once, when he was the
foreign intelligence chief, he invited me to a lunch. And we
had a very nice lunch together!" I think the evolution
described by Brzezinski has really taken place. "But even when
I invited you to a lunch, I did not regard you as an agent of
mine," I joked back at him.
Question:
How effective has Putin proved to be as the
leader of Russia? What are his mistakes and his achievements?
Z.B.:
His main achievement is the feeling of greater
stability. His main weak point is insufficient attention to
democracy, the lack of a serious foreign policy and his
anti-Chechen obsession.
Y.P.:
I think Putin has already proved the effectiveness
of his course, which serves the interests of Russia. It goes
without saying that he is breaking away from the group of
people who promoted him as Yeltsin's successor. He now makes
many things that are directly opposite to the course Yeltsin
pursued. Putin's difficulties are largely due to the fact that
many people from his inner circle are insufficiently
professional. But some Kremlin professionals work against the
President.
Question:
Is the period of frosts over in Russian-American
relations? What were the root causes of cooling in these
relations?
Z.B.:
The causes for the cooling are some of the things
which Russia did not very long ago and which I have already
mentioned. In addition, the delusions of the Clinton
Administration as to how far Russia has gone on a course to a
genuine democracy and market economy had their role to play.
Y.P.:
No one can guarantee that the period of frosts is
over. The four seasons of the year keep following one another
but summer can be cool and rainy and winter can be warm. I
think there were two causes for the cooling. One was the
momentum of the American election campaign, when the new
Washington Administration rejected all the positive things
worked out by its predecessors. The other was that the
political course of the new Administration was not shaped at
once. Bush Sr. with whom I met in Athens not very long ago,
reminded me that in his time it took from four to six months to
shape a Russian policy.
Question:
Will the 21st century be more tranquil than the
previous century?
Z.B.:
Probably, it will. But all depends on how prudently
all - the Russians, Chinese, Europeans and the others - will
act.
Y.P.:
Yes, it will, with God's help.
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