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CDI RUSSIA WEEKLY - #160
29 June 2001
Edited by David Johnson
Center for Defense Information
1779 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
phone: 202-332-0600; fax:202-462-4559
djohnson@cdi.org
 
CDI RUSSIA WEEKLY HOME
 
ISSUE #160 CONTENTS
 
The CDI Russia Weekly is a weekly e-mail newsletter that carries news and analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With funding from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the MacArthur Foundation, the CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education organization.

 

Contents:

1. Interfax
PUTIN AIDE FAVORS SPEEDY CONSULTATIONS ON START WITH WASHINGTON
 
2. Obshchaya Gazeta
HOW CAN RUSSIA RESPOND TO NMD PLANS?
(interview with Alexei Arbatov)
 
3. Jamestown Foundation Monitor
CORRUPTION WATCHDOG RANKS RUSSIA WITH ECUADOR AND PAKISTAN
 
4. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
Kerstin Holm
Will of the People.
(re Solzhenitsyn)
 
5. Interfax
PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR COMMUNISTS SHRINKING.
 
6. The Russia Journal
Andrei Piontkovsky
America won’t fight for Russian civil liberties.
Bush has demonstrated his readiness to put geopolitics before human rights.
 
7. Carnegie
International Non-Proliferation Conference 2001

Summary of panel on Russia's Non-Proliferation Challenges
 
8. The Globe and Mail
(Canada)
Geoffrey York,
Frail Pope energized by gruelling Ukraine trip.
Presides over lengthy masses, bursts into song, and keeps on going morning to night.
 
9. Newsday
James Klurfeld
Bush Provides a New Meaning To the Phrase 'Innocent Abroad'
 
10. WPS Agency
POLITICAL FORECASTS:
Russia's domestic politics and foreign policy: the PR kingdom.
(Russian press review)

 
 
 
 
 
#1
PUTIN AIDE FAVORS SPEEDY CONSULTATIONS ON START WITH WASHINGTON

MOSCOW. June 28 (Interfax) - The slowdown in the limitation of strategic offensive armaments has a negative impact on the stability of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, Igor Sergeyev, presidential aide on strategic stability and former Russian defense minister, told Interfax on Thursday.

"The sharp slowdown in the reduction of strategic weapons, primarily in Russia and the United States, is a key reason having a negative effect on the stability of the nonproliferation treaty and other nonproliferation modes," he said. "It is the limitation of strategic weapons that is a fundamental provision of the nonproliferation treaty," he said.

"All that has been achieved in the past 10 years is an understanding on reducing the ceilings of strategic armaments of Russia and the United States to 6,000 nuclear warheads," Sergeyev said. "Attempts to lower the level to 3,000-3,500 or 2,000-2,500 were obstructed by the absence of practical prospects of the enforcement of the START-2 treaty and negotiations on START-3," Sergeyev said.

"Neither has there been any positive reaction from the U.S. leadership to the proposal of President Vladimir Putin to reduce the strategic armaments of the two nuclear superpowers to 1,500 nuclear warheads," he said.

However, he described as reassuring the readiness of Russia and the United States to launch deep cuts in their strategic armaments. "Consultations should be immediately started on the format of such reduction. Russian proposals to this end have been submitted to Americans," he said.

Sergeyev also described as positive the plans of Britain and France to freeze the ceilings of their nuclear armaments. He named as a possible advancement legally binding commitments of these members of the nuclear club and China not to increase their national nuclear arsenals in the future. "The preservation of the 1972 ABM treaty would be a powerful stimulus for such a course of developments," he said.

"The named positive tendencies so far have had a virtual nature, while the main causes for the instability of nonproliferation remain real and effective. One can hardly count on the improvement of the situation, if at least part of them are not removed," Sergeyev said.

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#2
Obshchaya Gazeta
June 28, 2001
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
HOW CAN RUSSIA RESPOND TO NMD PLANS?
Quite a few foreign mass media publications continue to voice their bitterness and disappointment because President Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation has allegedly dashed the world's community's hopes for a new era in Russian-US relations after the Ljubljana summit. In other words, Putin has made three statements over the last seven days, noting Russian readiness to beef up its nuclear forces in response to America's NMD (National Missile Defense) program. Here's what Alexei ARBATOV, who serves as deputy chairman of the State Duma's defense committee, has to say on this score.

Question: Mr. Arbatov, it turns out that Russia has undermined that long-awaited "Ljubljana spirit." One gets the impression that, instead of placing his nuclear cards on the table, President Putin should have paused for a while.

Answer: Why so? I personally believe that he should have done this earlier. Russia should have sent a clear message to the United States from the very outset. To cut a long story short, Moscow should have informed Washington that its possible decision to abrogate the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty would free Russia of any strategic arms limitation commitments whatsoever.

At any rate, this amounts to a clear-cut position.

Question: What's so constructive about this position?

Answer: The United States keeps talking about its unilateral withdrawal from the 1972-vintage ABM Treaty; however, Washington doesn't discuss mutual amendments to that treaty, as well as any joint actions whatsoever. Consequently, Russia has a moral right to talk about retaliatory measures. We are not sure that the new NMD system won't be spearheaded against Russia because we have received the new US Administration's assurances alone. This isn't enough at a time when such an issue should be settled within the next two decades.

Russia would act in line with its national interests, if it tells the United States (in case Washington unilaterally deploys its NMD system) that it won't unilaterally scale down its ground-based ICBM force (in line with the National Security Council's 2000-vintage resolution), and that it would retain an additional number of ICBMs, fitting them with MIRVs (Multiple Independent Re-Entry Vehicles) all the same.

I also think that, had Russia voiced this position from the very outset, then it would not waver in its relations with the United States; on the contrary, such a position would prevent America from playing it tough and from making any unilateral moves.

Question: Nonetheless, our President's threatening rhetoric has bolstered the arguments of those Westerners, who said that Putin should not be trusted, and who are sure that Russian authorities are unpredictable.

Answer: We are going to prune our strategic nuclear forces, no matter what, in line with a target program. Mind you, Russia has no intention of beefing up its nuclear forces in response to America's NMD program. You see, our strategic forces would be restructured in case of a unilateral US decision to abrogate the ABM Treaty.

Question: But doesn't that amount to an entirely new spiral of the arms race?

Answer: Look, Russia was the first to renounce such an arms race some time ago. The United States kept demanding for decades on end that our country scrap its MIRVed ICBMs. We agreed with US demands, after signing the START-I and START-II treaties.

However, the United States has so far failed to ratify the START-II treaty, noting that it won't abide by that "impracticable" document's provisions. Meanwhile Washington keeps wrecking the entire strategic arms limitation regime. Therefore one knows perfectly well, who is aggravating the situation.

We must restructure our strategic forces in line with the changing foreign situation. However, Russia would respond differently, in case the United States doesn't unilaterally shred the ABM Treaty, and if we decide to jointly create a non-strategic European ABM system.

Question: Would it be prudent to emphasize the NMD issue at a time when US Senate is gradually beginning to heed all those, who oppose the "Star Wars" program. The list of such opponents includes chiefs of the most important Senate foreign affairs and armed forces committees. Moreover, they say that Vice-President Dick Cheney himself also has some doubts.

Answer: I'm not sure that Congress will scrap the NMD program. The new Senate line-up largely constitutes a chance factor. Moreover, it would still be premature to say that the new US Administration has shelved its long-term plans. I'm sure that Russia's clear-cut and coherent stand on the ABM issue provides an additional trump card to those congressmen and senators, who are exhorting the Bush team to think twice, before aggravating relations with Moscow. Transcript by Boris YUNANOV.

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#3
Jamestown Foundation Monitor
June 28, 2001

CORRUPTION WATCHDOG RANKS RUSSIA WITH ECUADOR AND PAKISTAN. Transparency International (TI), the Berlin-based corruption watchdog organization, yesterday released its Corruption Perceptions Index 2001, ranking countries according to their level of corruption as perceived by businessmen and others working and living in them. Out of the ninety-one countries ranked, Russia came in 79th, tied with Ecuador and Pakistan, more corrupt than Vietnam, Zambia, Cote d´Ivoire and Nicaragua, and less corrupt than Tanzania, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Bolivia. Russia received a Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) score of 2.3 (with a score of 10 meaning total rectitude, 0 meaning total corruption). Overall, Russia's rating and ranking was a slight improvement over last year, when its score was 2.1 and it came in 82nd, tied with Kenya (see the Monitor, September 15, 2000).

This year, Bangladesh was deemed the most corrupt country and Nigeria ranked as the second most corrupt. TI stressed, however, that it was able to get data from only three independent survey sources for Bangladesh; there were ten such sources for Russia. Like last year, Russia's neighbor, Finland, was ranked the world's least corrupt nation, followed by Denmark and New Zealand. The United States came in 16th with a score of 7.6, tying Israel.

In a statement accompanying the release of the Corruption Perceptions Index 2001, TI chairman Peter Eigen noted that there were very high levels of perceived corruption in "transition" countries, particularly the former Soviet Union. "The leaders of the countries of the former Soviet Union must do far more to establish the rule of law and transparency in government," Eigen's statement read. "This is crucial to their economic progress, and to the development of an open society."

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#4
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
June 28, 2001
Will of the People
By Kerstin Holm

MOSCOW. Russian readers have expressed initial dismay at Alexander Solzhenitsyn's decision to write a book on the Jewish question in Russia, yet there has also been something akin to sympathy for an aged author who at the end of his career is unnecessarily overshadowing his achievement. In an interview for the newspaper Moskovskiye Novosti on June 19, the 82-year-old writer introduced the first volume of his latest work, "Two Hundred Years Together: 1795-1995," which portrays the history of the Jews in Russia on the basis of historical documents. The author told the newspaper he was convinced that his study refuted commentators who have accused him of anti-Semitic sentiment and that he was only too familiar with demagogical anti-Semitic Russian publicists as well as with anti-Russian sentiment among Jews.

In this light, he said, his aim had been to devote himself impartially to history, to form a precise and subtle picture and thus arrive at mutual understanding. Solzhenitsyn, who said it was important for him to have many Jewish friends, mentioned historical findings that surprised him. During the war against Napoleon, for example, Jews helped the Russian army by telling it the location at which the French would cross the Berezina River. As to the causes of the anti-Jewish pogroms a century ago by the reactionary group Black Hundreds, Solzhenitsyn said he had discovered that adherents of the anarchical People's Will movement had spurred the government into the campaign. The liberals were also partly to blame, he said, because they had condoned mob rule and allowed patriotism to degenerate into a dirty word. Solzhenitsyn said that he respected the Jewish ability to preserve national cohesion over long periods during the Diaspora.

The first volume of his work deals with Russian-Jewish history up to World War I. It portrays how Russian Jews spent the main part of the 19th century apparently avoiding institutes of further education before suddenly flocking to the universities after the reforms of Czar Alexander II, thereby laying the foundations for their impressive role in Russian culture, science and industry as well as in the revolutionary movement.

In the second volume, which is not yet finished, there will be much talk of Judaism as the driving force behind Russian revolutionary events. Solzhenitsyn ascribes this catalytic role in part to the rapid secularization that made many young Jews break with family traditions. The author also reminds his readers of the silent sabotage practiced by many Russian civil servants after the Bolshevik coup. Lenin could only overcome the paralysis of the state machine by putting people of preferentially Jewish origin in its place, he said.

Solzhenitsyn also said in the interview that even after finishing the 500-page volume he had come no closer to solving the riddle posed by the role of the Jewish people in Russian history -- something he summed up, in Russian ethno-philosophical style, as "a highly difficult, metaphysical question."

Solzhenitsyn's historiographic style is an investigation into a hidden causality in history that he sometimes calls "God's Providence." He pointed out the ironic consequences of hostile actions, such as Wilhelminian Germany's support of Lenin, German partition as a consequence of World War II, Polish support for the Bolsheviks after 1917 and the later Soviet attacks on Poland. That personified history indirectly answers harmful actions with retribution leads the author to infer that, if in doubt, one should follow God's code of conduct rather than try to set traps for others.

Solzhenitsyn belongs to that school of traditional Russian thought for which the collective substance of a people seems to be of primary importance, while the individual is only secondary. Russian-born American poet Joseph Brodsky once said that Solzhenitsyn preferred the forest while he, Brodsky, thought more highly of the individual trees. This spirit also seems evident in the writer's scandalous demand that the death penalty in Russia -- abolished in principle at the moment -- be restored for gang leaders from Chechnya. Here, Solzhenitsyn cited the will of the people, that large and hardly independent recipient of his life's wisdom.

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#5
PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR COMMUNISTS SHRINKING

MOSCOW. June 28 (Interfax) - Support for Communists by potential voters has been declining for two successive months.

If Duma elections were held next Sunday, the Communist party would receive 35% of the vote, down from 37% in May and 39% in April.

The figures were reported to Interfax by the All-Russian Public Opinion Center on Thursday and come from a representative poll of 1,600 adults conducted on June 22-25.

Only replies from those who will take part in elections and have made their choice were counted.

At the same time 23% were ready to vote for the Unity movement led by Sergei Shoigu.

Fatherland movement led by Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov got 4%. In April and May Russians expressed their attitude to the merger of Fatherland and Unity who had decided to form a union. In May 20% intended to vote for the coalition and 22% in April.

Support for the Union of Right Forces has been changing from 7% in April up to 11% in May and down to 8% in June.

Liberal Democratic leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky has the backing of 8%, up from 7% in April and May.

The rating of Yabloko of Grigory Yavlinsky slipped four percentage points from 10% to 6% in June.

In June, 4% were ready to vote for Women of Russia led by Alevtina Fedulova (5% in April, 6% in May).

The rating of Agrarians led by Nikolai Kharitonov grew to 3% from 1% in May.

At the same time 5% of potential voters intend to vote against all candidates.

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#6
The Russia Journal
June 22-28, 2001
America won’t fight for Russian civil liberties
Bush has demonstrated his readiness to put geopolitics before human rights

By ANDREI PIONTKOVSKY

The Russian-American meeting in Ljubljana couldn’t be anything but a success since no one expected any specific results to come from it in the first place. The Russian side wanted the meeting to show that Vladimir Putin is a member of the club and to nip in the bud any rumors that Russia might be expelled from the G-8.

The American administration finally agreed to the meeting, above all, to show their European allies and the Democrats in Congress that they’re not ignoring Russia and are making efforts to find mutual accord on issues of strategic stability. Even if the two presidents had disliked each other, as experienced politicians they still would have come up with some suitable words at the press conference about how useful and needed the meeting was.

As it was, the atmosphere at the press conference was more than just cordial, it was almost heart-warming. The two presidents generously heaped praise on each other and on each other’s countries.

Cordial words and atmosphere are important, of course, but they are not tangible, unlike the question of whether the two sides reached any agreement over the issue that divides them most – U.S. missile defense plans and the fate of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

Formally, the two sides came no closer in their views. Answering questions at the press conference, Putin repeated the traditional mantra that, "the 1972 ABM Treaty is the cornerstone of strategic stability." But he didn’t stop there. He also said that he saw no fundamental obstacles to reaching mutual agreement on NMD.

Overall, the atmosphere of the meeting and the statements that followed it give hope that the two sides will make a serious effort to find a compromise. Obstacles on the way will be mostly of a domestic political nature. A number of significant figures in the Republican administration would prefer to see the United States withdraw unilaterally from the ABM Treaty rather than negotiate amendments with Russia. At the same time, this would also suit influential corporate circles in Moscow, which would welcome increased tension in Russian-American relations.

But Putin will run up against another problem, too. For many years now, our propaganda has relentlessly pounded into our consciousness the idea that a U.S. missile defense system represents a tremendous threat to Russia’s security. Public opinion will perceive Russia’s efforts to find a compromise that answers its interests as a shameful retreat.

George Bush has made it clear that the future picture of Russian-American relations will depend above all on the two sides’ ability to find a common language on security issues. Bush is far less interested in Russia’s internal problems. At the press conference, Bush went beyond what protocol demanded in his unprecedented praise of Putin as a wonderful leader, whose soul he had looked deep into.

Once again, the United States and the West in general are displaying a rather inconsistent and even hypocritical approach to issues of freedom of speech and human rights. George Bush’s message was quite clear – if we can find a common language on key geopolitical issues, then the United States won’t bring up human rights issues in a way that would put Putin in a bad light.

It makes no sense for the defenders of human rights to go to Washington and speak at Congressional hearings on freedom of speech in Russia. The United States has shown itself perfectly willing to get on with "managed democracies" and with open dictatorships when it suits American interests.

If we want to fight for freedom of speech and for an end to the war in Chechnya, which is so destructive for Russia, then we have to do so here, at home. The West won’t help us, and there’s no point reproaching it for this.

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#7
Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference 2001
www.ceip.org/npp
Summary of panel
Russia's Non-Proliferation Challenges
18 June 2001

Panelists: Vladimir A. Orlov (Chair), PIR Center for Policy Studies, Moscow Maurizio Martellini, University of Insubria, Como, Italy and Landau Network-Centro Volta Nikolai N. Ponomarev-Stepnoi, Kurchatov Institute William C. Potter, Center for Nonproliferation Studies at Monterey Institute of International Studies

Vladimir Orlov, the director for the PIR Center for Policy Studies began the panel by noting that Russia and its president Vladimir Putin have placed the country at a crossroad in its dealing with proliferation threats. He pointed to such progress as the recent strengthening and streamlining of the Russian export control system and the continuing development of a variety of Russian NGOs focused upon proliferation issues as examples of a true effort to address proliferation concerns. On the negative side Orlov noted that despite evidence of violations Russia has yet to prosecute a practical criminal case regarding export control violations. He also lamented that the case of Iranian engineers at Bushir has cast doubt on the spirit of Russia's participation in the non-proliferation regime, and expressed concern that recent developments in the realm of intellectual freedom in Russia may hinder transparency and open discussion about important non-proliferation issues.

Nikolai Ponomarev-Stepnoi, the Vice-President of the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow discussed the institute's work and successful cooperation with Europe and the U.S. in attaining significant changes in materials production control and accounting (MPC&A). He also lauded the fresh fuel storage facilities in the North Sea and the Pacific and the tremendous overall improvement in the security and condition of fuel handling facilities throughout the country as evidence that much progress has been made in securing fissile materials.

In his analysis of challenges facing Russia Ponomarev-Stepnoi indicated that there exists a willingness in the nuclear sector to supply the dangerous material to those that want it and that Russia and that and the rest of the world need to begin thinking about how to promote the traditional non-proliferation regime while at the same time addressing and adapting to technological advances. Finally, Ponomarev-Stepnoi presented the Kurchatov Institute's findings that indicated the greatest threat of proliferation leading to the development of weapons of mass destruction comes from Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) rather than from Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), spent fuel, or decommissioned weapons grade Plutonium. The institute contends that LEU's open market availability and the increasing ease of LEU enrichment have made LEU a greater threat than other nuclear materials that are under strict safeguards, monitoring, and storage.

William Potter, Director for the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at Monterey Institute of International Studies provided a report card on Russia's non-proliferation performance within the past year. In terms of export controls Dr. Potter noted that the legislative basis has improved but that prosecution of violators is still dismal. Combined with what he termed the "transparent violation" of the Nuclear Supplier's Group in its dealings with India, he therefore gave Russian export controls a failing grade. In terms of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs) he noted that Russia has shown a tendency to support NWFZs only when they are in the theoretical stage and applies the brakes once their existence nears reality. He cited the Russian insistence on a redeployment guarantee in central Asia as a contributing factor in giving Russia a failing grade in NWFZ support.

In terms of NPT Article 6 support he noted Russia's strategic warhead reductions and START adherence and implementation worked toward the goals of Article 6, but were complicated by Russia's new national security concept and defense doctrine that places a greater reliance on nuclear weapons. As a result, he gave Russia a B- in this subject. He concluded his assessment by stating that Russia on the whole remains enigmatic and often demonstrates a split personality on proliferation issues.

Maurizio Martellini of the University of Insubria in Como, Italy closed the panel with a discussion about the role of the European states in combating "brain proliferation" through the European Nuclear Cities Initiative (ECNI). Martellini stressed that the ECNI has been effective for three primary reasons: its demand side approach, its emphasis upon intergovernmental and public-private coordination, and its ability to integrate itself into a broader defense conversion program. Martellini stressed that ECNI proves that effort should be placed upon creating a favorable marketplace in which scientists have a freedom of choice rather than a centralized conversion program. He concluded by pushing for integration of ECNI with debt for security swaps and further strengthening of the codified nonproliferation regime.

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#8
The Globe and Mail (Canada)
June 28, 2001
Frail Pope energized by gruelling Ukraine trip
Presides over lengthy masses, bursts into song, and keeps on going
morning to night

By Geoffrey York
With a report from Michael Valpy

LVIV, UKRAINE -- When Pope John Paul burst loudly into song in an unscripted moment this week, it was a defiant riposte to critics who suggest the frail 81-year-old pontiff should quietly retire because he cannot fulfill the physical duties of his job.

In fact, the Pope appeared revitalized by the emotions evident during his five-day tour of Ukraine, which reached a climax on its final day yesterday with a mass for more than one million worshippers in Lviv -- one of the biggest crowds he has ever attracted.

His health looks as fragile as ever. He shuffles slowly in his familiar hunched-over posture. His voice trembles and his left hand shakes constantly. Yet in his 82nd year, he is still capable of tackling a controversial and gruelling tour of a country that is a minefield of political and religious conflicts.

"He's like the Eveready Bunny -- he just keeps going and going," said Rev. Andriy Chirovsky, director of the Eastern Christian Studies institute at St. Paul University in Ottawa, who has followed the Pope across Ukraine. "The fact that he still travels around the world is amazing. He just won't give up."

The Pope seemed buoyed by the realization of his long-delayed dream of visiting Ukraine, the birthplace of Christianity in Eastern Europe and a symbolically crucial place for the first Slavic pope. The Vatican says he has been talking of his desire to visit for 14 years.

At a youth rally in Lviv on Tuesday night, for example, the Pope was utterly in command. When a heavy rain began to fall, he interrupted his speech to banter with the crowd. "Let it rain -- the children will grow," he quipped.

When the crowd cheered and chanted "We Love You" in response, he paused for comic effect and then suddenly burst into an old Polish folk song, displaying a surprisingly loud and vigorous voice: "Don't fall, rain, because we don't need you here," he sang. "Go past the mountains and forests and go back to the sky!" He later returned to the microphone to make another joke about the rain as the crowd wished him "many years."

Before his Ukrainian tour, some organizers had expected that the Pope might only read the first few sentences of some of his speeches, allowing others to finish the text for him. There was also speculation he might skip some afternoon events.

Instead, he presided over exhausting masses of three or four hours every day. He toured churches and universities, participating in several events daily from morning to night. It was his 94th foreign tour since he became Pope in 1978.

"I was incredibly impressed," said Rev. Kenneth Nowakowski, a Saskatchewan priest who helped organize the tour. "You could see he was invigorated by the crowds. If something is hurting him, he certainly doesn't show it. He is totally selfless. He is the pastor of his flock and he understands his responsibility."

The Pope conducted most of his sermons and speeches entirely in Ukrainian, mastering the language with barely a trace of his Polish accent. "It was so good for the people of Ukraine to see the Holy Father speaking to them in their own language," Father Nowakowski said.

"So many foreign dignitaries come to Ukraine and speak only through a translator and so much is lost. But he is a communicator. He doesn't need a translator."

Some analysts saw the Pope's use of Ukrainian as an implicit challenge to the Russian Orthodox Patriarch, Alexy II, who claims jurisdiction over most churches in Ukraine, yet has never given sermons or speeches in the language.

Although the Vatican has never officially confirmed it, it is widely understood that the Pope has Parkinson's disease, a progressive neurological disorder that causes his hand tremor, slurred speech and heavy shuffling walk.

He survived an assassination attempt in 1981 and an operation to remove a bowel tumour in 1992. His walking has been noticeably more difficult since 1994, when he slipped in his bath in the Vatican, broke his femur and had to undergo bone-replacement surgery. Until that year, he had carried the cross around the Colosseum and its ruins at an annual service. He now is sometimes pushed through crowds on a kind of trolley.

In Ukraine, the Pope's health occasionally seemed to flag by the end of the day. On some days, "you had to listen hard to understand what he was saying," Father Chirovsky said.

But he was surprised by the Pope's continuing strength. "His airport speech on his first day in Ukraine was better than I have seen him for months."

Others were equally impressed. "He's done better than one might have expected," said Rev. Andrew Onuferko, spokesman for the archbishop of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. "He came to Ukraine to give us whatever strength he has. He has a bright and sharp mind in a somewhat battered body."

The Vatican bureaucracy, which until last year resolutely refused to make any statement on John Paul's declining health, allowed an anecdote to find its way to the media about the Pope being asked on a flight whether he was thinking of retiring because he had trouble walking. He apparently replied, "I don't run the church with my feet."

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#9
Newsday
June 28, 2001
Bush Provides a New Meaning To the Phrase 'Innocent Abroad'
By James Klurfeld

IF YOU you had doubts about President George W. Bush's readiness to conduct this nation's foreign policy, the extensive interview he gave to Peggy Noonan in The Wall Street Journal the other day was not encouraging.

Noonan, a former Ronald Reagan speechwriter, was in the Oval Office to interview the president about a book she is writing on her former boss, but Bush talked to her about his recent trip to Europe, especially his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin. One of his more revealing comments came on the subject of NATO expansion to include not only the Baltic states that border Russia but also the possibility that Russia itself one day might become part of NATO.

Bush said Russia in NATO would be "interesting" and that part of him thought, "Why not?" though "I haven't thought about the nuance of it." Hello? "Haven't thought about the nuance of it?" The president of the United States is talking about one of the most important and controversial shifts in foreign policy of the last 50 years but off-handedly admits that he has not really thought through all the consequences of that action-which is what the nuances are? Now, of course, we shouldn't be surprised that Bush doesn't understand the nuances of a foreign-policy issue because he doesn't have much background in foreign policy, has never traveled to Russia and has never exhibited much curiosity about world events. Let his advisers take care of the nuances.

But in the Noonan interview Bush tried to make it sound as if he sized up Putin and told him what would be be right for his country. He just doesn't get all the nuances.

But nuances count. If NATO votes to bring in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, how will that affect internal Russian politics and Putin's standing there? Having lost the Cold War and status as a super power, how will the Russian people feel when the victorious alliance extends its military reach to their nation's borders? You also have to wonder if Bush recalls that it was his father's administration that made a commitment to then Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that NATO would not extend its military forces into former Warsaw Pact countries, let alone parts of the USSR, in exchange for a peaceful reunification of Germany and an orderly Soviet exit from Eastern Europe. Does Bush have any appreciation for the sense of betrayal here? And here's another nuance: How will NATO conduct its affairs with Russia as a member state? How would that affect, for instance, the situation in the Balkans where Russia's historic interest in aiding the Slavic populations is by no means coincidental with NATO's attempts to protect the non-Slavic populations? Also, if Bush has a vision for a new NATO, one that is not a military alliance but a political grouping, shouldn't the concept have been outlined before the overtures to extend the military umbrella to the Baltic states were made? Under Article 5 of the NATO charter, an attack on one member must be treated as an attack on all. That means that NATO would come to the defense of Latvia if attacked by the Russians. But, short of using nuclear weapons, Latvia is not defensible.

What's going on here? Is the Article 5 commitment real or not? Is Bush saying that NATO is no longer viable or necessary as a military organization? Does Bush understand what he is saying? Another question: The new NATO is heavily involved in the Balkans, specifically, at the moment, in Macedonia. The Bush administration says the United States shouldn't be involved in Balkan disputes because there is no vital U.S. interest there; it's a humanitarian concern. But won't extending NATO eastward get the United States more involved, not less involved, in these European disputes? Isn't there a contradiction between an Article 5 commitment to the Baltic states and Bush's reluctance to use any U.S. forces in the Balkans? There's another aspect of Bush's comments that is disquieting. Not unlike other presidents-including the one he most disdains, Bill Clinton-Bush suggests a personal relationship between himself and the Russian leader is the magic elixir that can transform mistrust into cooperation and clashing polices into harmonious agreements. But history shows the importance of personal relationships is often overrated. Franklin D. Roosevelt, for instance, thought he could do business with Josef Stalin. More often than not it's the larger interests that govern relations between nations. Not to mention that Putin, a former KGB agent, was trained to ingratiate himself.

Bush told Noonan his meeting with Putin "could be the beginning of some fabulous history." Let's hope that is true. But don't hold your breath.

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POLITICAL FORECASTS [Russian press review]
June 26, 2001
Russia's domestic politics and foreign policy: the PR kingdom

The euphoria of observers after the Ljubljana summit of the two presidents, when Vladimir Putin and George Bush were so surprisingly friendly toward each other has been rather quickly replaced by an analytical skepticism.

The media started to reflect on the results of the meeting. As it turns out, there are very few reasons for delight.

The [Vedomosti] paper speculates: "Of course, personal familiarity is very important. Everyone still remembers Bill and Boris shows of the recent past - both Yeltsin's awkward jokes and Clinton's catching laughter. It seemed the two presidents and their subordinates would never be able to offend each other... Meanwhile, it was under Clinton that the US started to develop the idea of constructing the national anti-missile defense system and to continue NATO expansion to the East." So Bush will only have to continue the activities of his predecessor, only taking into consideration all the criticism of Clinton's too indulgent - from the standpoint of the US political establishment - attitude towards Russia.

Undoubtedly, after the Ljubljana meeting, it will be easier for the US and Russian leaders to communicate, but "they hardly have any common political goals," stresses [Vedomosti].

The [Vremya MN] paper writes: "As expected, the first meeting of the Russian and US presidents brought no breakthroughs in relations between the two countries. The sensitive areas and mutual reproaches are the same, and major disagreements have not been resolved."

At the same time, President Bush stressed the intention of the US to develop the trade and economic cooperation with Russia; however, as the paper says, here the price of the issue is also of great importance.

[Vremya MN] stresses: "Further and real change of the US attitude toward Russia will demand certain geopolitical concessions from Russia: this concerns Iran, China, and relations with other Russia's neighbors."

The US needs "additional vectors" in foreign policy. On the other hand, at present the US is not interested in worsening relations with Russia, taking into consideration a number of principal disagreements on certain issues with Europe and China's becoming one of its "long- term strategic rivals".

That is why, according to [Vremya MN], "from the beginning of May it was not Putin who was seeking to meet Bush, but on the opposite." This has also been the reason for numerous "test balloons" the US administration launched, such as the rumor of the possibility to write off a considerable amount, or even all Russia's debts to the US in exchange to agreement on modification of the 1972 ABM Treaty.

However, the paper notes, if the "cost of the issue" is worsening the relations between Moscow and Beijing, Russia is likely to face an excruciating dilemma - especially if consider the recent agreement with the People's Republic of China and four Central Asian countries on establishment of the so-called "Shanghai organization for cooperation". The alliance is supposed to be clearly military- political character.

The [Moskovskie Novosti] weekly believes that after the "Goetheborg riot", which famous political scientist Alexander Yanov called "the first public demonstrative conflict in the North Atlantic alliance", Bush had no way out but to try to use Russia regardless of all expectations.

[Moskovskie Novosti] quotes the words of a French observer, which were said on the threshold of the Ljubljana summit: "We Europeans will stand between Russia and the US. We will not allow them to start another Cold War."

In reality, things were otherwise. Putin, "as if feeling that Bush's bravado is actually covering vulnerability", gave a hand to the US president: "You need the 'Russia card'? You'll get it. But remember who helped you in hard times." According to Alexander Yanov, this is the real ground for appearance of the "Brdo castle surprise".

The [Obshchaya Gazeta] newspaper with great pleasure noted that Bush's manners turned to be absolutely opposite to the data of the Russian secret services. Putin was warned that he would have to deal with a "cold, diffident man", who in addition "cannot listen to anyone".

Despite these expectations, the US president turned to be a very emotional, and rather comfortable partner, who can listen to and hear.

At the same time, the paper noted that nonetheless, Bush's viewpoints "have not changed in the least after he listened to Putin in Ljubljana".

In the meantime, the [Novoe Vremya] magazine wrote, "Bush returned to Washington being severely criticized, for US critics did not like his friendliness toward the Russian leader".

And the [Novye Izvestia] paper quoted some statements from the "Washington Post": "Evidently Bush was trying to please Putin criticizing Clinton's policies in relation to Russia, which is an unforgivable mistake of our president.... How is it possible to state that he trusts a person, who still continues the Chechen war, pressures the free media, and does not allow OSCE observers to go to the zone of the military operation?"

The Americans were most of all surprised by two Bush's statements: "I understood his (Putin's) soul" and "He is an honest man, I trust him".

"Russians have been unable to understand who Putin is for two years," the "Washington Post" was outraged, "and our president completely "understood" Putin within two hours and decided that he is worth trusting."

The "New York Times" is taken aback: "Bush must have been praising Putin for he wants to push his plans for development of the national missile defense system through by all means. That is why there is an impression that the things he publicly said about Putin in Slovenia are not what he considers in reality. Either our president is a talented actor, and ordinary American voters do not know about it as yet, or he is extremely naive, and the Russian president managed to outwit Bush."

According to [Novye Izvestia], the ABC television network has given vent to suspicions: "Because of his former occupation, Putin has never said a word of truth to anyone. Apparently, Bush has forgotten about it and swallowed the bait of the former secret agent. Of course, Putin could not politically impede our president in such a short time; however, our leader will need more caution in further contacts and a more balanced response to what the Russian president is saying and doing."

The paper also refers to the opinion of US political scientist Richard Cohen: "George Bush has an apparently inflated self-worth... He is extremely self-confident, I would say opinionated, and this is likely to do serious harm to further contact with Russians."

According to Mr. Cohen, during the meeting with Putin, Bush acted as "a baseball team coach, assuming that he had counted everything correctly and that the relations will keep developing according to his scenario. However, things may turn out quite the opposite."

Actually, only a week after meeting with George Bush, and at the end of negotiations with Austrian President Thomas Klestil, Vladimir Putin gave an official explanation of what Russia's possible response to the development of the US national missile defense may be.

According to the Russian president, if the US withdraws from the 1972 ABM Treaty, Russia will "have a legal right to equip Russian missiles with three, four, or five warheads instead of one warhead" (a quotation from the [Vremya Novostei] paper). Putin also stressed that this was just an option for further action, the cheapest and the most effective.

Thus, Moscow has broken its three-month silence concerning "Star Wars". According to [Vremya Novostei], lately there has been a sort of moratorium on this topic, which was initiated directly from the Kremlin: Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov forbade his subordinates to talk freely about "our response to the US militarists". Now the president has broken the moratorium himself.

However, the paper notes we should appreciate that President Putin rejected the suggestion of the Russian military: to restore "nuclear trains" to combat routes, to resume flights of strategic bombers with nuclear weapons to the air borders of the "potential enemy" and voyages by Russian submarines loaded with cruise missiles to the US coast.

They say the military even mentioned the possibility of withdrawing from the treaty on restriction of medium-range missiles and placement of a corresponding group of forces in Russia's western regions. As we have already mentioned, these suggestions were rejected.

However, the president's words were more than enough. As the [Vremya Novostei] paper notes, "there has been nothing like this for about 15 years... Evidently, the personal meting of the Russian and US presidents finally destroyed the earlier illusions of both countries about a possible compromise."

Nonetheless, according to the [Kommersant] paper, the US accepted the statement of the Russian president rather calmly: in particular, Secretary of State Colin Powell believes that Russia "will never choose this option, as soon as they add up the cost of reinforcing their arsenals".

In fact, [Kommersant] notes, we do not even have money to pretend that we have a strategic balance with the US. By 2010 the service lifetimes of all Russian ICBMs will have expired, except for 26 Topol- M missiles. In order to restore the arsenal, Russia will have to deploy 30-40 missile systems annually. However, the paper notes that even in time of Igor Sergeev, when the missile forces had the priority for funding, the defense industry could not produce more than ten Topol-M missiles a year. And the new leadership of the Defense Minsutry intends to first of all develop the general-duty forces. That is why, according to [Kommersant], "even is Moscow will seriously decide to increase the number of nuclear warheads on Topol-M missiles, it is hardly likely to considerably influence the situation in the world." Several dozens of new Topol-M missiles will be unable to balance even the 736 US monoblock intercontinental ballistic missiles, that are permitted by START II." And if Russia withdraws from the treaty, the US will have a chance to increase its ground grouping.

The paper concludes: "Moscow simply has no chances to win another weapon race".

Meanwhile, the [Novaya Gazeta] paper believes there is one more, no less important aspect of the meeting of the two presidents in Ljubljana. The paper's political observer Andrei Piontkovsky also paid attention to the "unprecedented and not demanded by the protocol praises" Bush was showering on Putin. However, in his opinion, it is much more important that the incumbent US president is much less concerned about Russia's interior issues than about the necessity to find a common language with Russia in the national security area. "Bush's message was clear enough: if we come to mutual understanding on key geopolitical issues, the US will not draw the attention to the issue of human rights in an unpleasant for you, Mr. Putin, aspect. Such an inconsistent, if not hypocritical approach of the US and the West on the whole toward the issues of the freedom of speech and human rights has been resumed."

On the other hand, in accordance with the logic of the author, if (based on Russia's latest statements) the West fails to find a common language with Russia in the security field, it is very likely to resume its interest in the issues of freedom of speech and human rights. Thus, the topic of human rights is likely to be used once again as a tool in big-time politics. This is a very popular trick - for instance, Boris Berezovsky uses it very often and quite successfully: recently he announced the establishment of a political opposition to the current regime in Russia on the basis of the human rights movement.

[Kommersant-Vlast] has reprinted an article from the Orenburg regional newspaper [Yaik] which says that the tycoon's concern with human rights is of a selfish nature. For instance, recently the Civil Liberties Foundation set up by Berezovsky decided to support minors in detention, allocating $1 million for this campaign. The newspaper notes that this money would be enough to provide breakfasts for 20,000 Russian children who have not committed any crime. The newspaper also states that cases of children fainting from hunger are not rare now, especially in rural areas.

Henri Reznik, a well-known Russian lawyer, has explained Berezovsky's "selective" love for children. He has stressed that not only adolescent criminals will get money as a result of this campaign: a lot of lawyers will get jobs, since minors in detention will get qualified legal aid thanks to Berezovsky's money. Thus, "links between civil activists and lawyers will be fortified," which is certainly very helpful for the tycoon. The newspaper has also stated that thus measure will activate 163 regional public organizations set up within Berezovsky's foundation. "Tomorrow these public activists may easily set up a party, if their sponsor wants them to."

There is no doubt that Berezovsky will certainly want to set up a party of his own. Last week the newspapers [Izvestia] and [Kommersant] published Berezovsky's interview given to an [Izvestia] correspondent Elmar Guseinov in Paris. As has turned out, the first version of the interview published by [Izvestia] did not appeal to the interviewee because it was abridged. [Kommersant] immediately published the complete version of the interview. Thus Berezovsky has made practically all people interested in politics pay attention to his words. First people read in [Izvestia] that the "zigzag trajectory of Russia's current development is a result of too rapid reforms." On the other hand, this "zigzag" is a result of "short-sightedness of the current president who is trying to flirt with the crowd" and who wants to cater all strata of the society. In other words, Berezovsky considers that Russia may become an authoritarian country with liberal economy.

In two days readers could find out from the interview published by [Kommersant] that Berezovsky is engaged in creating the right opposition aimed and countering the aforementioned "zigzag."

Berezovsky does not conceal that he is fighting against Putin personally. In particular, he announced in his interview, "If Putin were left-oriented, I would have set up the left opposition with the same fury, since the key point for a liberal state is existence of the opposition in principle."

Besides, the reader found out from the [Kommersant] article that Berezovsky does not view media as the main instrument of the politics. He said, "A different time has come. In my opinion, the state's fight for media as a mechanism of political influence is erroneous." Berezovsky is sure that in the next elections it is not media that will play the leading role. In his opinion, it will be more important to "reach everyone." Then Berezovsky quotes Aleksander Kwasniewski, who won the presidential election in Poland because he had "traveled around the whole country." He also put forward an analogous example of Italian President Berlusconi, who practically did not use media in his election campaign.

Berezovsky drew readers' attention to the fact that currently the government often loses regional elections despite its influence over a lot of media. He makes the conclusion that the president's ratings are "a soap bubble." He considers that people are aware of the government's intentions, even if the government does not call any particular candidate its protege. "People understand it and act in defiance of the government's will."

Therefore, Berezovsky is sure that "Putin's political age will not last long" (this phrase was also omitted in the [Izvestia] version).

Meanwhile, it is not only Berezovsky and his supporters who threaten Putin's presidency. [Novoe Vremya] magazine reports surprising rumors scaring civilians. "A conspiracy is being prepared by state security services. Evil KGB agents want to deprive Putin of power by any method possible." The president is said to be a stranger to them, because he worked for only a year as head of the Federal Security Service (FSB), he is "the protege of Yeltsin's team, and used to be a member of Sobchak's team." The magazine considers that there is no point in discussing this rumor, since Putin had worked for the KGB before he joined Sobchak's team. However, the magazine believes that this "foolish rumor proves that the Russian public consciousness is in a very curious state now." This state is an outcome of activities of media, whose power has been questioned by Berezovsky.

[Novoe Vremya] says, "The media mole is digging without a break for rest. Every day detailed privatization sagas and stories about luxurious life of the top-ranking bureaucracy are published. This blind beast has undermined the very chance of social concord." The magazine notes that it is impossible to construct public consensus on the president's high rating. "These ratings show that people stake their hopes on the new president. Meanwhile, the grapes of wrath are ripening." People's love for the president may vanish as quickly as it appeared. "However, people do not want to part with their beloved leader: they want to justify him in any possible way. That is why such rumors appear."

It is clear that this behind-the-scenes monster is unlikely to come out on stage, since he actually does not exist. However, people are obviously looking forward to "tightening the screws", being tired of a decade of chaos. At the same time the nation does not want its beloved president to perform this shabby operation. "People realize that tightening the screws will not bring any good even to those who began to love the president for his merciless anti-corruption plans." So people "will have to give up their love for president, although they do not want to."

Vitaly Portnikov, an observer of the newspaper [Vedomosti], states that the current rumors about threats to Putin's life are connected with the current slight decline of Putin's rating. Portnikov notes that in the Yeltsin era, media were saying that it was necessary to reduce the Federal Service of Presidential Guards (FSPG) inflated by Korzhakov. However, the old FSPG has turned out to be too small for Putin. At the same time the increase of the FSPG does not cause people's indignation, since people see that the president is extremely popular and therefore should be thoroughly protected.

In reality, as Portnikov considers, these awkward PR actions only harm the president. "There is no need to make a Russian Kennedy out of Putin." Reports about attempts at the president, indeed, can return popularity to the president, but this mainly concerns non-democratic states. Russia is not a country with a dictator regime, and Putin's rating is now low yet. In this connection [Vedomosti] supposes that "PR structures close to the Kremlin base their policy on some different information from that they publish."

[Subbotnik-NG], a weekly supplement to [Nezavisimaya Gazeta], asserts that the "open and obtrusive demonstration of measures for protection of the president appeared in the post-Soviet period. Before that, guards were inconspicuous in order not to undermine the idea of unity between the Party and the people." Bodyguards appeared in the Gorbachev era, to show that Gorby was a serious reformer risking his life for the sake of ideas.

As the article says, such unusual propaganda moves were invented by Alexander Yakovlev, one of the ideologues of perestroika. This proves that even at that time authorities were aware of the importance of the image.

At the same time, oddly enough, even now politicians do not always care about their image. The weekly [Zhizn] writes about methods of Coordinator of the Fatherland-All Russia Duma faction Farida Gainullina, a former basketball player. When she raises her hand, this means that the faction should vote for this or that document. If the faction should vote against it, Ms. Gainullina crosses her arms: in basketball this sign means that the time is up. If she moves her hands round above her hand, this means that deputies may vote as they like.

Unity deputies use simpler signs: "for" is expressed by one raised hand, and "against" is expressed by two raised hands.

The Union of Right Forces and Yabloko use gestures of ancient Romans: if deputies should vote against a document, the coordinator shows a thumb turned down, and deputies should support a document, he turns his thumb up.

The Communist coordinator raises his hand if other members of the faction should vote for this or that document. If they should vote against it, he makes some movements above his head that resemble movements of a whip when a rider drives his horse on.

Although Russia calls itself a democratic state, the concept of "party discipline" is no less important now than it used to be in the time of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This is a case when PR loses its importance.

>Mavra Kosichkina

(Translated by Arina Yevtikhova and Kirill Frolov)

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