E-MAIL DAVID JOHNSON FOR A FREE SUBSCRIPTION

CDI RUSSIA WEEKLY - #159 22 June 2001 Edited by David Johnson Center for Defense Information 1779 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 phone: 202-332-0600; fax:202-462-4559 djohnson@cdi.org   CDI RUSSIA WEEKLY HOME   ISSUE #159 CONTENTS   The CDI Russia Weekly is a weekly e-mail newsletter that carries news and analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With funding from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the MacArthur Foundation, the CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education organization.   Contents: 1. strana.ru Sophie Lambroschini Breffni O'Rourke The price of Victory. During World War II Russia lost 26 million people.   2. strana.ru Three-fourths of Russians suggest making June 22 Day of Mourning, poll   3. RIA GERMANY HARPS ON COMMUNIST CRIMES TO HUSH UP NAZI ATROCITIES, SAYS WAR VETERAN   4. RIA ECONOMIC LIBERALISATION, LONG-TERM GOAL OF RUSSIA'S GOVERNMENT   5. Christian Science Monitor Tom Collina Build US security on goodwill, not bombs   6. The Plain Dealer (Cleveland) Elizabeth Sullivan Arms-control upheaval feared if U.S., Russian discussions fail.   7. Moscow Times Pavel Felgenhauer Russia Needs Tough Love   8. Nezavisimaya Gazeta Vadim Solovyov RUSSIAN NUCLEAR-DETERRENCE OPTIONS   9. Izvestia EX-DEFENCE MINISTER SERGEYEV: "ROGUE COUNTRIES WILL NEVER BE ABLE TO ATTACK THE USA."   10. Trud Sergei Ishchenko THE DESTRUCTION OF RUSSIAN CW ARSENALS   11. AFP Pope's Ukraine visit a step forward -- or back -- on road to Russia   12. RFE/RL Andrew Tully NATO: U.S. Expects Expansion Next Year   13. UPI Martin Sieff Bush may repeat JFK's mistakes

#1 strana.ru June 21, 2001 The price of Victory During World War II Russia lost 26 million people In June 1996, shortly before the 55th anniversary of Germany's attack on the USSR, President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree declaring June 22 as Day of Remembrance and Sorrow to be marked on the annual basis. In the four years of the war, which in the Soviet Union was given the name of the Great Patriotic War, this country lost 26 million people, or 14% of the population. No other war in centuries-long history of Russia brought so much destruction, misery and death. The generation that went to the front in 1941still kept alive the memories of the First World War. But then all the WW I belligerents - Germany, Austro-Hungary, France and Russia - shared its hardships practically evenly, losing between one and a half and two million people each. Russia's WW II human losses were a tragedy on a much greater scale and higher by an order of magnitude. The Soviet Union accounted for almost a half of the population losses of all the belligerent countries. One in every four WW II casualties was a Soviet soldier. There are figures to illustrate the bitterness of engagements involving the Soviet Army. From June 22, 1941, the date of the German invasion, to May 1945, the Soviet-German front had no parallel anywhere. In 1942, it was over 6,000 kilometers long. The territory engulfed in military operations exceeded, in 1941-1945, that of 12 European states - Britain, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Germany, The Netherlands, Italy, Norway, France, Finland, and Yugoslavia - lumped together. The war rolled twice across the territory of the Soviet Union: first from west to east, then from east to west. The military operations in the Soviet-German front were distinguished by the particular intensity. The Soviet Army pursued four big campaigns and over 40 major strategic operations between November 1941 and September 1943 alone. The German losses in "the Eastern front" made up about 75% of the personnel and military equipment. 1941 and 1943 account for particularly big losses on both sides. Historians estimate that each day of fighting on the Soviet-German front entailed 8,000 Soviet casualties on average. One million Soviet soldiers died while liberating Europe. One-third of the Soviet male population, or over 31 million, were drafted into the armed forces during the years of the Great Patriotic War. Over 12 million servicemen did not live to see the Victory. More than 6 million of them perished in combat or died of wounds in hospital. Upwards of 5 million soldiers were listed as missing in action. Only one in every four Soviet POWs managed to survive the German captivity. As many as 6,000 Soviet prison camp inmates died each day. Fifteen million people were wounded or shell-shocked, with 2.5 million of them turning invalids. The fate of the younger generation was particularly tragic. Two-thirds of those who died in battle or of wounds were young men aged from 19 to 35 years. The war proved an even harsher affair as far as the civilian population was concerned, with over 13 million peaceful civilians dying in the four years of the war. A particularly hard lot befell those of them, who found themselves in the occupied territories. More than 5 million Soviet citizens were brought to Germany for hard labor. In the demographic respect, the human losses suffered in the Great Patriotic War make themselves felt up to this day. Had it not been for the war, there would have been 330 to 360 million people living in the territory of the former USSR today instead of the present-day 290 million. TOP OF PAGE    CONTENTS    TOP OF SECTION    NEXT SECTION #2 strana.ru June 21, 2001 Three-fourths of Russians suggest making June 22 Day of Mourning, poll 60% of Russians lost relatives in WWII According to a poll the All Russia Center for Public Opinion Studies (VTSIOM) conducted shortly before the 60th anniversary of Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, three-fourths of Russians (74%) are for making June 22 the day of national morning in memory of the victims of the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945) that was fought against fascist Germany. However, 15% are against it and another 6% are unconcerned. The poll also shows that 35% of respondents believe there was a chance in the late 1930s to avoid World War II, while 47% think the war was unavoidable. More than a half of Russians (58%) hold a view that the story about the unexpected German attack on the USSR on June 22, 1941, was invented in order to cover Stalin's political blunders, which were the reason why the Soviet Union proved unprepared for the war. Yet, 32% believe the attack was sudden. As is evident from the poll, families of 84% of respondents have or had relatives, who took part in the Great Patriotic War. The same query elicited a negative response from 16% of those polled. Sixty-four percent said some or other relative of theirs perished in the war (at the front, in captivity, in punitive round-ups, during bombing raids, the blockade, etc.). Thirty percent said their families had relatives missing in action; 70% replied they had none. Against that background, the overwhelming majority of Russians (86%) said they did not feel hatred for the inhabitants of countries, which were the USSR's adversaries in the war; 12% claimed they had the opposite feeling. TOP OF PAGE    CONTENTS    TOP OF SECTION    NEXT SECTION #3 GERMANY HARPS ON COMMUNIST CRIMES TO HUSH UP NAZI ATROCITIES, SAYS WAR VETERAN BERLIN, June 21. /From RIA Novosti's Alexander Polotsky/ - Nazi war with the Soviet Union was a criminal warfare since the day it broke out, Professor Gerhard Daengler, 87, World War II veteran, said to RIA Novosti. He was taking part in the Battle of Stalingrad as artillery captain. As Professor Daengler sees it, today's German rulers refer more willingly to the Berlin Wall and other crimes of East Germany than to SS and Wehrmacht atrocities in occupied Russian, Belarussian and Ukrainian areas. "I remember all too well an order read in front of the ranks in June 1941. It doomed every Soviet military officer and political propagandist POW to be shot on the spot." Not Hitler nor Himmler had signed the order but Wehrmacht commanders, who did not acknowledge ever after that army units were involved on a par with the SS in incredible atrocities in the occupied part of the then Soviet Union. "I parted ways with Hitler in the blood-stained snow of Stalingrad," says Herr Daengler. He had been previously engaged in fighting in France, Poland and the Battle of Moscow, in which "we beat a retreat to abandon our cannon stuck in the sleet." Captain Daengler was wounded several times before the Battle of Stalingrad. He was with the 6th Army, under Colonel General von Paulus' command, when it was encircled in winter between Kalach on the Don and Stalingrad on the Volga. He saw his soldiers go mad with hunger, cold and despair. Many soldiers did not flinch from cannibalism to roast liver and kidneys they slashed out of their dead comrades' bodies after they ate all cats and dogs in the area. "We shall not surrender for high strategic reasons, but the initiative has now passed into junior officers' hands," Captain Daengler heard General von Paulus say a mere three days before the Fuehrer promoted him to Field Marshal. The captain got the message, and led his unit to surrender to Russian soldiers. He will never forget Dr. Vassilevskaya, who treated him in the Russian POW camp--a Jewish woman whose family perished by the German firing squad in Kiev before her eyes. After they died, a soldier pierced her arm with a bayonet, and the limb had to be amputated. All of his surviving comrades-in-arms remember him, and write him letters opening with an address, "Dear Herr Professor Captain Daengler." TOP OF PAGE    CONTENTS    TOP OF SECTION    NEXT SECTION #4 ECONOMIC LIBERALISATION, LONG-TERM GOAL OF RUSSIA'S GOVERNMENT MOSCOW, June 21, 2001. /From a RIA Novosti correspondent/ -- Liberalisation of conditions for economic activities in Russia on the basis of clearly defined rules is a long-term goal of the governmental policy, said Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov at the 12th congress of the Russian Industrialists' and Entrepreneurs' Union. Kasyanov is sure that deep-seated disproportions in the development of various sectors and spheres of activity of the Russian economy are among the chief reasons for the heavy critical phenomena which Russia has been living through in the last ten years. At the same time, "the government cannot allow the country to plunge into the unknown without having paved the ground for reforms, mitigated inevitable risks". Kasyanov reminded that the government could begin a thorough breakup of the obsolete tax system only after creating the required conditions. They are, above all, creation of a "cushion" of profits, which let the state securely to fulfil its basic social obligations. In a bid to provide a fresh impetus in the development of domestic production the government has gone to unprecedented lowering of the profit tax rate, from 35 to 25 percent. As a result, Russia's tax legislation will be among the most liberal, noted Kasyanov. Regarding the tax reform, Kasyanov said that not all is smooth here. Particularly, "the desire for minimisation of the tax burden is inveterate" and even "superliberal" measures do not always work. For instance, as is known some companies and banks do not stop short of shirking pay of the liberalised single social tax, said the Russian prime minister. TOP OF PAGE    CONTENTS    TOP OF SECTION    NEXT SECTION #5 Christian Science Monitor June 21, 2001 Build US security on goodwill, not bombs By Tom Z. Collina Tom Z. Collina is the director of the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists. He is one of 16 scientists and security experts who co-authored the recent report Toward True Security: A US Nuclear Posture for the Next Decade. In President Bush's first meeting with his Russian counterpart, he stressed the need for a system to defend against missile attacks from so-called rogue nations. According to press accounts, President Putin was polite in his continued opposition to Bush's plan for a missile defense system. But both leaders failed to acknowledge that the greatest danger to global security comes from the same old place - Russia, and by extension, the United States. Last month, Mr. Bush stated: "Unlike the cold war, today's most urgent threat stems not from thousands of ballistic missiles in the Soviet hands, but from a small number of missiles in the hands of [rogue] states." Say that again? A handful of missiles that North Korea might acquire in the future is a greater danger than 1,000 Russian nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert? Not a chance. It is true that, thankfully, we no longer face the realistic possibility of intentional nuclear attack from Russia. And, yes, long-range missiles in the hands of dictators are a serious concern. But that threat pales in comparison to the dangers posed by a crumbling Russian empire - a mistaken launch of Russian nuclear weapons and the risk that the spread of bomb ingredients from Russia will feed further nuclear appetites. Ten years after the cold war evaporated, the US still has more than 1,000 strategic nuclear warheads on high alert - ready to launch at Russia within minutes. Russia struggles to match our quick-launch capabilities, but its early warning and control systems are deteriorating. This hair-trigger posture gravely increases the risk that a mistake in Russia could spark a nuclear war. This is not an idle concern. In 1995, Russia came dangerously close to launching a nuclear strike in response to what it thought might have been a US attack. Fortunately, Moscow was able to figure out in time that it was only an experimental rocket fired from Norway. Recognizing this danger, last year Bush said "for two nations at peace, keeping so many weapons on high alert may create unacceptable risks of accidental or unauthorized launch." He's right. Unfortunately, the Russian warheads on hair-trigger alert are only the tip of the nuclear iceberg. Moscow also struggles to control up to 20,000 nuclear weapons either deployed or in storage, as well as vast supplies of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons materials - as well as thousands of missiles. There are tens of thousands of underpaid Russian scientists and technicians who might be tempted to sell their knowledge. As the recent bipartisan study chaired by Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler warned, Russia could emerge as "a virtual 'Home Depot' for would-be proliferators." To its credit, the administration is considering reducing the US nuclear arsenal and its readiness for quick launch. Bush says he wants to lead by example, and then encourage Russia to follow suit. Such efforts should be supported and applauded. But herein lies the rub: Bush's aggressive pursuit of a national missile defense system will make it difficult, if not impossible, for Moscow to shift to a safer nuclear stance. US intention to deploy this system undermines Russia's confidence that it could retaliate against a US attack, and encourages Moscow to maintain its quick-launch readiness. Missile defense also threatens US-Russian cooperation in general, and with it, future US-funded efforts to help Moscow control its nuclear weapons, materials, and scientists. Moreover, a defense system cannot hope to intercept a mistaken Russian launch. Such a launch could involve hundreds, if not thousands, of warheads, which would be accompanied by decoys to fool the defense. The Bush administration's obsession with missile defense misses the central reality of US security - built upon and dependent on the cooperation and goodwill of US friends, allies, and even so-called competitors. The US cannot reduce the nuclear threats from Russia - both mistaken launch and loose nukes - on its own. TOP OF PAGE    CONTENTS    TOP OF SECTION    NEXT SECTION #6 The Plain Dealer (Cleveland) 20 June 2001 Arms-control upheaval feared if U.S., Russian discussions fail By ELIZABETH SULLIVAN Washington and Moscow are threatening unilateral actions that could upend the world's arms-control system should joint talks on missile defenses fail. The threats illustrate what's at stake in the negotiations, expected to start soon, although no date has been set. The talks were agreed to at last Saturday's summit in Ljubljana, Slovenia, between President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin. National security analysts caution the threats cannot be taken lightly, even though they're being made in the context of pre-talk maneuvering. President Bush's national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, warned Sunday the United States will build missile defenses "with or without Russia." That would mean a unilateral voiding of the world's first strategic arms treaty, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile accord. Russia has said such an abrogation would throw the entire edifice of strategic arms treaties into doubt. "I think you should take the threat of abrogation very seriously," said Anthony Cordesman, a senior military analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. "The administration has people who seriously advocate this course," he said. On Monday, Russian President Vladimir Putin retorted that if the U.S. proceeds with missile defenses, Russia would be forced to add multiple warheads to its missiles, significantly expanding its arsenal, and undoing a major advance in strategic-arms treaties. Cordesman rates this a realistic threat since Russia could add warheads to its SS-27 missiles at relatively low cost. Yet Cordesman said it would be dangerous to assume such a breakdown in dialogue will occur, given the probable seven-year window before missile defenses are deployed. "There is sufficient time here," he said. "The only thing that would be likely to lead to a sudden abrogation [of the 1972 ABM treaty] would be a situation where it was clear Russia was unwilling to negotiate at all," Cordesman said. Meanwhile, "a perverse courtship ritual" is at work in the lead-up to the talks, said former National Security Council official James Lindsay, now of the Brookings Institution think tank. "Both Bush and Putin had strong incentives to appear reasonable, friendly and conciliatory" at the summit, "and they were," Lindsay said. "Now that each has returned back to his respective capital, they have the reverse incentive, to emphasize that they're willing to walk away from the table as a bid both to reassure their domestic public that they didn't give anything away in Ljubljana, but also as a warning shot to the other side in the eventual negotiations," he said. But do the Russians have enough juice to influence U.S. strategic thinking? Lindsay believes they do. The proposed U.S. missile defense system is too limited to touch their huge nuclear arsenal, he said, "so there's no incentive for Moscow to sell themselves cheaply," Lindsay said. "That means Putin could walk away from the table" and force "a Machiavellian situation" where Washington would have to break the ABM treaty and suffer the political consequences. But former Oberlin College president S. Frederick Starr sees Putin "playing a very weak hand - vigorously, but in the end ineffectually." "Russia's defense budget is trivial, and will remain so," said Starr, who directs the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of the School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C. "Rather than devise a foreign policy that acknowledges this reality, Putin is trying to mask their situation with bluster." "There doesn't have to be a grand U.S.-Russia deal, because we don't have to ask their permission" on missile defenses or the ABM treaty, Starr added. Still, Leon Sloss, a national security strategist who worked under administrations stretching from Harry Truman to Jimmy Carter, said Washington had a tricky negotiating task ahead of it. Sloss believes the ABM treaty is outdated and needs to be replaced. A grand deal with the Russians could trade the building of missile defenses for overall reductions in nuclear weapons, he said. But such a deal also threatens Russia's stature. "They've desperately been trying to hang on to their great power status - and their nuclear weapons are one of the few things they have that gets them that cachet," Sloss said. If "we move ahead to build a fairly sophisticated kind of defense, it will look like we have something that they don't have," he said. "I think our job is to persuade them this doesn't serve as a threat." Then there's the question of China, which has shown no interest in arms talks because its arsenal is puny relative to Russia and the United States. Yet Putin warned Monday that China could not be left out of the strategic picture. Sloss agreed. "One of the major benefits of the arms-control negotiations we had with the Soviet Union during the Cold War was a better mutual understanding on both sides," Sloss said. "To me, that was more important than fixing some numerical limits, which in some ways were phony because we didn't get everything within the limits. But the continuous dialogue with the Russians brought us to a mutual understanding that neither party wanted nuclear war, and that we even would take steps to avoid getting into confrontations that might lead to that. Now, it would be useful to have the same sort of dialogue with the Chinese," he said. TOP OF PAGE    CONTENTS    TOP OF SECTION    NEXT SECTION #7 Moscow Times June 21, 2001 Russia Needs Tough Love By Pavel Felgenhauer Two days before presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin met last Saturday in Slovenia, U.S. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice told reporters that the summit will "not achieve anything much in substance, but the atmospherics of bilateral relations will improve dramatically." What then happened was almost identical to U.S.-Russian summits during the 1990s — known as "Boris meets Bill" get-togethers. Like Slovenia, the "Boris meets Bill" summits were also informal. Washington apparently hoped friendly relations between the top leaders would help advance issues of greatest concern to the United States, namely missile defense and the proliferation of Russian weapons and military technologies to Third World countries including so-called rogue states. But the end results were minute, while the Kremlin was given free reign to do whatever it wished at home and especially in Chechnya. Bush administration officials have stated repeatedly that they will drastically change former President Clinton's ineffective foreign policy ways. At last weekend's summit, Bush and his foreign policy team had a chance to show whether their words have any meaning. It turns out that they do not. International human rights organizations, as well as some Russian officials and generals, charge that grave war crimes committed in Chechnya have resulted in the deaths or disappearance of thousands of innocent civilians. There have even been credible accusations that some orders to attack civilians came directly from the top or may have been authorized in the Kremlin. These crimes have gone largely unpunished, and the Kremlin has denied the allegations rather than credibly investigating them. Absent a serious investigation into these allegations, it is impossible to say whether Putin himself is involved in war crimes or in a coverup. However, in comments about the conduct of the war in Chechnya and during the tragic sinking of the nuclear submarine Kursk last August, Putin has definitely made public statements that afterward were proven to be untrue. Nonetheless, Bush looked Putin "in the eye" in Slovenia and proclaimed him "straightforward and trustworthy." He even invited Putin to visit his Texas ranch this fall. Most likely, Bush and his foreign policy team believe such appeasement will encourage Kremlin concessions on major issues of U.S. concern and will reduce anti-American feelings in Russia. Perhaps they even think it will enhance the influence of liberal reformers in Russia. In fact, though, Bush gave Putin everything the Kremlin wanted from this summit and got nothing at all in return. Before the summit the Kremlin seriously worried that Russia might be purged from the G-8 group of industrialized nations and otherwise isolated because of its human rights record, the suppression of press freedom and other authoritarian measures. Now all such fears have been put to rest. It's impossible to exclude from the G-8 a leader who visits the president of the United States at his ranch. In fact, Bush gave Putin carte blanche to continue as before in Chechnya and to continue building an authoritarian bureaucratic police state. Moreover, Russia will continue to sell advanced weapons and military technologies to states that Washington does not like and to stonewall in bilateral consultations on missile defense. Russian defense and foreign policy today is determined by a small circle of Kremlin bureaucrats — Defense Ministry and intelligence community chiefs (the so-called siloviki) — without any public discussion. This group is afraid of neither American missile defense nor NATO expansion, since neither of these poses any immediate military threat. However, they will use both missile defense and NATO expansion for anti-American propaganda purposes. They are convinced that a perceived external threat will keep Russians united behind the Kremlin, while anti-Americanism abroad may keep the West disunited and encourage Western European countries to forge closer relations with Moscow. After the summit, the Kremlin has no incentive to make further concessions. This week Putin told U.S. reporters that Russia might increase the number of its nuclear warheads if the Americans go ahead with missile defense. During future "consultations," Russian officials will be even less conciliatory. Washington will press for more summits with the "straightforward and trustworthy" Putin to overcome these difficulties, but will surely get nowhere. In Slovenia, Putin more or less recruited Bush as his "agent of influence." Bush won't get away soon. Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent, Moscow-based defense analyst. TOP OF PAGE    CONTENTS    TOP OF SECTION    NEXT SECTION #8 Nezavisimaya Gazeta June 21, 2001 [translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only] RUSSIAN NUCLEAR-DETERRENCE OPTIONS Moscow is ready to revert to the nuclear confrontation period, in case it's dissatisfied with any possible ABM compromises By Vadim SOLOVYOV President Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation made a rather sensational statement, after negotiating with US President George Bush Jr. in Ljubljana. According to Putin, Russia is ready to discuss any possible amendments to the 1972-vintage ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty. That treaty has the required mechanism for its own modification, Putin noted. In fact, it has already been modified; however, we should comprehend specific aspects, he added. Official Moscow has voiced its readiness to respond to US proposals concerning the revision of that strategic stability corner stone, on which over 30 other related agreements hinge. Until now, Moscow used to say that such a revision was out of the question. True, the sides inked two protocols delimiting tactical and strategic ABM aspects in 1997. Well, Putin had precisely this in mind, while talking about the document's previous modification. The Russian President's subsequent statement is a bit surprising because Washington has been suggesting the treaty's modification for more than two consecutive years. It looks like the Russian side didn't try to comprehend their gist, brushing them aside as something unacceptable. Moscow thus made it clear that it's altering its position on the ABM Treaty; however, dialogue and compromise are possible to a certain extent. Neither Putin, nor his closest entourage know the extent of Moscow's possible concessions at this stage. All this reminds one of Boris Yeltsin's impromptu military-strategic proposals that were refuted quite often, albeit not so loudly. At any rate, Putin's proposals were not discussed behind the scenes. Quite possibly, they will soon say that the President was misunderstood. Many experts can recall such historical precedents during the Yeltsin era. The President intuitively comprehended the fact that there can be no other alternative because the sides have now become deadlocked on the revision of the 1972-vintage ABM Treaty. The United States will deploy its NMD system, no matter what; meanwhile Russia has no trump cards of its own except mere assertions concerning the inviolability of strategic agreements that were signed 30 years ago. The Russian President unexpectedly tempted Washington with a carrot, also brandishing his nuclear-missile whip. He has made it clear that, if Washington makes excessive demands, then Moscow will reserve the right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and related agreements, e.g. the key START-I and START-II treaties. In other words, he threatened that Russia might well revert to the Cold War period, even discussing the details of that possible reversion. To cut a long story short, Russia would beef up its nuclear arsenals, installing MIRVs (Multiple Re-Entry Vehicles) on single-warhead missiles; such a build-up would cost very little, he explained. The Soviet Union used to spend just 8 percent of its entire defense budget on the upkeep of the Strategic Missile Force, which accounted for 70 percent of the entire Soviet nuclear arsenal. Meanwhile the Soviet navy and air force wielded 25 percent and 5 percent of all nuclear warheads, respectively. Right now, these proportions are changing in line with START provisions; nonetheless, the ground-based component still remains more effective than the rest. The Strategic Missile Force has become more expensive nowadays; still Russia can afford to maintain such a force. Experts estimate that, even if the entire country opts for an austerity plan, the feeble Russian economy can still maintain our nuclear missile arsenals. Experts single out four nuclear-deterrence tasks, minimal deterrence, in the first place. Russia would require 1,500 nuclear warheads, spending about 17 billion roubles per year (8 percent of its entire defense budget). Second, Russia might have to prevent the United States from abrogating the 1972-vintage ABM Treaty; this would require 2,500 warheads and 20 billion roubles per year (10 percent of our defense budget). Third, Russia should be able to prevent the United States from resuming the strategic offensive arms race; consequently, its nuclear potential would be swelled to 3,500 warheads. Moreover, this country would have to spend 40 billion roubles each year (17 percent of all defense appropriations). Fourth, Russia should deter a large-scale conventional aggression; however, this calls for about 6,000 warheads and 25 percent of the entire defense budget. Russia boasts a certain science and production potential. Satan ICBMs, which were produced at the Yuzhmash factory in Ukraine, and which are fitted with 10 warheads each, have now been replaced by Topol single-warhead ICBMs (in line with the START-II Treaty). Meanwhile the West is really afraid of the former. Meanwhile each single-warhead Topol ICBM can be fitted with three MIRVs (Multiple Re-Entry Vehicles) in no time at all. Russia now wields the required number of nuclear weapons for the sake of accomplishing the fourth nuclear-deterrence objective, etc. Russian missiles keep aging all the time; meanwhile plans are in place to annually produce 20-30 Topol-M ICBMs. The Topol-M program won't be a drain on the Russian economy. If necessary, their number can be increased many-fold, provided that the relevant budgetary appropriations are forthcoming. However, Russia would then have to moth-ball its social programs. TOP OF PAGE    CONTENTS    TOP OF SECTION    NEXT SECTION #9 Izvestia June 21, 2001 [translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only] EX-DEFENCE MINISTER SERGEYEV: "ROGUE COUNTRIES WILL NEVER BE ABLE TO ATTACK THE USA" A representative international conference on nuclear non-proliferation ended in Washington on June 20. Ex-Defence Minister Igor SERGEYEV, strategic stability adviser of the Russian President, who attended it, met with Izvestia correspondent Yevgeny BAI immediately after his talk with the chief speaker of the conference, chairman of the Senate commission on international affairs Joseph Biden. The sole subject of Bai's talk with Sergeyev was the desire of the new US administration to deploy an NMD system. Question: What do you think about the new architect of the US foreign policy in the US Congress? (Prominent politician Joseph Biden took over from Republican Jesse Helms.) Can Democrats in the Senate become a kind of Russia's allies in the sphere of international security? Answer: He [Biden] is a highly reasonable, open and sincere politician. He is one of those who make decisions without haste but only after a careful consideration. Question: Did your arguments convince him? Answer: Yes, on many points. I believe he fully accepted my arguments about Russia's policy with regard to Iran. I told him that we had no reason to give nuclear weapons to Iran. This would be absurd. I know very well that the Senate is still greatly prejudiced on the motives of Russia's policy. But I said in my speech at the conference that Russia is helping Iran to build a nuclear power station in Bushehr, which is similar to the one the USA is building in North Korea. And nobody could argue against this. Question: President Putin told American journalists that if the 1972 ABM Treaty were destroyed, Russia might decide to build up its nuclear arsenal. Did the Americans ask you to comment on that statement? Answer: The point at issue is not the number of missiles. As far as I see, the president meant a different thing. He said that if the ABM Treaty were liquidated, this would result in the appearance of new threats to Russia. For if this treaty of vital significance for international security is buried, START-1 and START-2 would become useless. Because the US administration presents them as the remnants of the Cold War, too. Question: What strategy did you offer the president? Answer: We need not have 10,000 new warheads now. Instead, we need mobile and flexible strategic nuclear forces. There is no nuclear confrontation between Russia and the USA now. We should think about the system of guidance that could allow our nuclear potential to make a U-turn quickly. Question: Are you convinced by the US arguments about the threat coming from the so-called rogue countries? Answer: There are many more questions than answers now. ABM discussions are mostly senseless. As a specialist, I cannot understand how the USA can create a missile defence system that would be able to repel powerful strikes from without and yet be limited. It is like saying that this woman is half-pregnant. In what way will this system be limited? In its effectiveness? How can one fulfil three tasks simultaneously: deter a hypothetical nuclear threat coming from countries that are hostile to the USA (North Korea or Iran), preclude unwarranted missile launches from the territory of other countries, and create a nuclear umbrella for US allies? We have not agreed on the main thing: Why is the ABM Treaty no longer good? No good to whom? If we liquidate it, what would we have in its place? The Americans are trying to put the horse before the cart. I believe that the so-called rogue countries do not have the technical possibility to create conditions for a missile attack at the USA. It seems to me that at this stage we should withdraw politicians and military from the discussion of the problem and offer designers and technologists to sit down at the negotiating table. They speak the same language and would be able to create a more objective picture that politicians can. Washington. TOP OF PAGE    CONTENTS    TOP OF SECTION    NEXT SECTION #10 Trud June 21, 2001 [translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only] THE DESTRUCTION OF RUSSIAN CW ARSENALS Russia has proved unable to ensure the timely destruction of CW (Chemical Weapons) arsenals in line with its international commitments By Sergei ISHCHENKO Sadly enough, the Russian Government was forced to admit this several days ago, also endorsing a set of amendments and additions to the relevant federal program. Moscow asks the international community to allow it to put off the complete destruction of its CW arsenals, which are the world's largest, by five years, that is, from 2007 to 2012. All in all, this country will have to destroy 40,000 tons of highly effective chemical weapons, which now threaten Russia, rather than its theoretical enemies. The last CW warhead was produced in this country back in 1987; therefore one can say that the newest CW warheads are being stored for 14 consecutive years. Meanwhile countless tons of skin irritants can be found inside old reservoirs dating back to the 1950s. Their safety leaves a lot to be desired, evoking serious doubts even on the part of their owners, e.g. the high command of the Russian Defense Ministry's NBC (Nuclear, Chemical, Bacteriological)-protection units. However, it takes huge money to destroy all those toxic substances. The construction of the first stage of a CW-disposal factory in the town of Shchuchye, Kurgan region, will require $880 million. True, the US budget used to contribute a sizeable share of those appropriations until now because the United States undertakes to facilitate the implementation of the Russian CW-disposal program. Meanwhile one should keep in mind that Shchuchye accounts for 14 percent of our entire CW arsenal. Russia ratified the relevant convention on banning the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, as well as their use, in 1997. Did this country expect foreign assistance, while making that decision? Well, Russia gets ample foreign assistance at this stage. Germany, for one, has set aside $20 million, with Holland and Italy allocating another $12 million and $7 million each. Finland has furnished Russia with $500,000. Sweden, Norway, Great Britain, Switzerland and Canada are ready to set aside another $20 million. However, the Russian budget should contribute the bulk of all monies; but such monies were nowhere to be seen from the very outset. Despite the fact that the extremely important CW-disposal program was granted presidential status, it kept receiving pitifully inadequate appropriations. Only 4.7 percent of the required monies were stipulated within the framework of the state defense order during the first 12 months of that program's implementation; just about 50 percent of that sum total was eventually allocated. Similar trends persisted over the next few years. CW-disposal appropriations were increased by an impressive 500 percent this year alone because an international scandal began to loom on the horizon. Russia failed to destroy the first 400 tons of chemical weapons by the year 2000; consequently, US Congress, which was dismayed over our punctuality, froze all aid in the given field. Incidentally, the United States has already scrapped 15 percent of its CW stocks. Consequently, Russia has so far failed to build any large CW-disposal facility. Quite possibly, a CW-disposal factory will apparently be completed in the town of Gorny, Saratov region, next year. Yet another facility now being constructed with US assistance in Shchuchye, will start operating in 2004. After that, Russia would be able to eliminate its CW arsenals rather quickly, experts from the Russian Munitions Agency claim. 1 percent of our CW arsenals will be destroyed over the 2003 period; up to 20 percent will be eliminated by the year 2007. Up to 45 percent of all CW arsenals will be scrapped by the year 2008. Russia would get rid of its chemical weapons altogether by the year 2012. However, far from all officials believe in this. For example, Sergei Kiriyenko, who serves as presidential plenipotentiary in the Volga federal district, and who also heads the state chemical-disarmament commission, believes that budgetary appropriations should be trebled next year for the sake of keeping up with this modified timeframe. Consequently, 9 billion roubles would have to be set aside. However, Kiriyenko, who knows that this sum total is exorbitant, can agree to 6 billion roubles. Quite possibly, Russia might once again have to beg the global community for permission to keep its chemical dump for a while 11 years from now. TOP OF PAGE    CONTENTS    TOP OF SECTION    NEXT SECTION #11 Pope's Ukraine visit a step forward -- or back -- on road to Russia MOSCOW, June 21 (AFP) - Pope John Paul II's tour of Ukraine, which begins Saturday, will represent a major step towards his goal of visiting Moscow, but could also scupper the slim chances of such a visit ever taking place, due to bitter opposition from the Russian Orthodox church. Pictures on Russian television capture the impassioned tone of the debate: "Ukraine is not an orphan, we don't need Father Wojtyla (the pope's family name)" is the slogan on a hot-air balloon above a procession of bearded icon-toting Orthodox priests. Juxtaposed with the images of anti-papal demonstrations are those of a stern-faced Alexis II, head of the Russian Orthodox church, calling for a postponement of the pontiff's controversial pilgrimage to Kiev and Lviv. Outlawed by the Soviet Union, and all but destroyed in the course of half a century of Communist persecution, Ukraine's own brand of Catholicism has risen from the ashes since it was officially re-established a decade ago. Yet Orthodox diehards have always regarded Catholicism as a Polish subversion, ever since, at the end of the 16th century, a branch of the Kiev church united with Rome to create the so-called Uniate (or Greek) Catholics, loyal to the pope, but observing the eastern rite of Greek Orthodoxy. The June 23-27 visit by the spiritual leader of the world's Roman Catholics cannot fail to give extra impetus to the church's rebirth in Ukraine. Since 1989, to Orthodox anger, the Catholics have taken back control of almost 2,500 parishes and most of the dioceses in the western region of Galicia, where the Orthodox faithful have accused priests of seeking to convert the population. In Russia too, the post-Soviet opening of borders led to an influx of Catholic and Protestant missionaries whose proselytising zeal and perhaps greater education by comparison with their Orthodox brethren helped to win many converts. Rome and Moscow have accused each other for centuries of being responsible for the 1054 schism between eastern and western churches over doctrinal differences. But it is not just a distaste for the church of Rome that lies behind the public outcry against the pope's visit: in Russia and Ukraine, the pontiff has traditionally been seen as a representative of the much-feared and little-trusted West. "The attitude of the patriarchate can only be understood in the context of centuries of Russian isolationism and mistrust of all things foreign," explains the Russian writer Nikolai Pyregov. But few observers believe the pope's tour of Ukraine can act as a bridgehead to a subsequent Russian visit without backing from the political leadership in Moscow. "The key to the problem does not lie in the hands of the Russian church, but with the Kremlin," says Bernard Le Leannec, a French Catholic priest based in Moscow for more than 10 years. Russian President Vladimir Putin, who attests his Orthodox faith, had an audience with the pope at the Vatican last year, but refrained from inviting the pontiff to Russia in deference to the patriarch. Both Putin's predecessor Boris Yeltsin and ex-Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev had risked the opprobrium of the Russian church by inviting John Paul II to Moscow. "The pope is not NATO," adds Bernard Le Leannec. "By welcoming him, Russia could only gain in terms of its international image, show its openness, its anchorage in Europe, and bolster its role in the global community." That, at any rate, is the gamble taken by by Ukraine's scandal-wracked President Leonid Kuchma, whose largely Orthodox country is torn between the West and Russia, its powerful neighbour. "The Russian Orthodox church has always bowed to state pressure, and it will do so again if the Kremlin decides to invite the pope to Moscow," says Le Leannec. TOP OF PAGE    CONTENTS    TOP OF SECTION    NEXT SECTION #12 NATO: U.S. Expects Expansion Next Year By Andrew F. Tully Four days after U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin met in Slovenia, the U.S. secretary of state, Colin Powell, testified before Congress about Washington's policy in Europe. Much of the session focused on NATO -- expanding the alliance and its continuing work in the Balkans. Our correspondent Andrew F. Tully reports. Washington, 21 June 2001 (RFE/RL) - America's senior diplomat says he expects NATO's membership to expand by at least one member during the alliance's summit next year in Prague. And he says the three Baltic states have a fairly good chance of becoming members then. Secretary of State Colin Powell gave the assessment during more than two hours of testimony in Washington on 20 June before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He and the senators discussed a wide range of topics, but their focus was on NATO. Powell was emphatic in saying that Washington would not accept a "zero option" for NATO at the Prague meeting. "Zero option" means no expansion of the alliance. In fact, he said Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania had what he called a "pretty good chance" of being accepted if they continue making progress toward the alliance's military and political requirements. He declined to elaborate. Senator Jesse Helms (Republican-North Carolina), a senior member of the committee, said America would be abandoning its moral and strategic imperatives if it did not ensure the admission of the Baltic states -- which he called "former captive nations." Another senator asked about the prospect that other former communist states -- he specified Ukraine -- could join the Atlantic alliance. Powell said that would be possible, and that the U.S. could help such countries qualify for NATO membership. "Ukraine is a challenge right now. The government is going through some difficult times. But we've made it clear to Ukraine leaders that we believe they belong to the West as well, and we want to help them. It isn't a matter of NATO membership, but there are other ways that we can interact with Ukraine. We can help them with their economy. We can make sure that they understand what is expected with respect to human rights and democracy and accountability of everybody within a society, no matter how high." The secretary also addressed the NATO effort to end the fighting in Macedonia. He said the U.S. is trying on several fronts to help restore peace there. Politically and diplomatically, Powell said, Washington is leading the NATO effort to persuade the government of President Boris Trajkovski to go beyond mere talk about making legal and constitutional changes that would bring ethnic Albanians more completely into the country's civic mainstream. "So we are pressing that as hard as we can, because it is only through a political solution will they be able to keep moderate Albanians, Macedonians, from joining the extremists." In fact, Powell said, such changes could accomplish a further goal -- attracting the rebels to join the moderates in the nation's mainstream. NATO Secretary-General Lord George Robertson said in Washington yesterday that the leaders of the alliance are considering deploying about 3,000 troops to disarm the rebels if a peace agreement is reached. At the Senate hearing, Powell was asked if the U.S. plans to contribute to this force. He said Washington already was doing plenty to achieve peace there, and it is too soon to speak of troops as well. "So I think we are involved [in Macedonia] militarily, we are involved politically, we are involved diplomatically, and we are, I think, doing everything that has been asked of us so far. But we have not yet made any commitment of troops to the purpose of this potential disarmament mission, because we really don't see a need to make such a contribution yet." On other matters, Powell said that a U.S. missile defense system would not mean a total scrapping of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972. The secretary acknowledged that deploying the system -- or even conducting certain advanced tests -- would violate the pact. But he said the treaty did not anticipate the kind of system that U.S. President George W. Bush is considering. Powell said an amendment is all that is needed to ensure that the treaty remains intact, and that the missile defense system threatens neither Russia nor China, which object to any deployment. Powell also expressed concern about the future of Central Asian and Caspian states. "We have nations that are coming out in that part of the world with no tradition of democracy, with a tendency toward authoritarian kinds of rulers. There is great potential for instability in that part of the world -- terrorism, narcotrafficking. And we have to work with Russia to see if we can find common ways of approaching the problems of that region." Powell also cited the oil wealth in the two regions. He said Washington must make sure that the wealth from the oil and natural gas goes to the people of these nations. The secretary added that the energy being sent from these areas by pipeline must not go through areas that can choke off the flow. Meanwhile, Powell refused to be drawn into the dispute over whether U.S. President George W. Bush spoke appropriately after his summit meeting with Putin on 16 June in Slovenia. Bush described Putin as "trustworthy." Senator Helms said such a personal endorsement was not called for. Helms accused Moscow of restoring restrictions on press freedom, violating arms-control treaties, threatening the security of neighboring Georgia and Ukraine, and waging what he called an "indiscriminate" war in Chechnya. Powell disagreed with Helms' and other senators' complaints about Bush's characterization of Putin. He said the statement was in no way outlandish, and that the critics have been making too much of the American president's choice of words. TOP OF PAGE    CONTENTS    TOP OF SECTION    NEXT SECTION #13 Bush may repeat JFK's mistakes By MARTIN SIEFF, UPI Senior News Analyst UPI WASHINGTON, June 21, 2001 Presidents of the United States should beware of using soaring rhetoric. It can lock them into commitments, especially in foreign policy, they can come to bitterly regret. President John F. Kennedy in his famous inauguration speech of Jan. 20, 1961, vowed that the United States would bear any burden, meet any challenge to defend the cause of liberty around the world. Two and a half years later as he struggled with the dilemma of whether to boost U.S. military commitments to what he was already coming to believe was an unwinnable war in Vietnam, that pledge -- universally applauded at the time -- hung around his neck like an albatross. President George W. Bush may yet come to feel the same way abut his speech in Warsaw last week. Bush pledged that there would be "no more Munichs, no more Yaltas" in U.S. foreign policy. Revealingly, although no doubt unconsciously, he did not pledge that there would be "no more Vietnams." He also pledged to expand NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to include all of Central and even Eastern Europe right up to the Russian border. Like Kennedy's inaugural address, the speech won widespread and even rapturous applause. Bush's conservative supporters at home, especially in the media, were ecstatic over it. Yet the speech was the opposite of traditional Republican foreign policy, going all the way back to President Theodore Roosevelt, which has always been suspicious of sweeping, idealistic international defense commitments, especially where the conventional military capabilities to fulfil them do not exist. Before he died in 1920, TR led the principled Republican opposition to the United States joining the League of Nations on the terms insisted by then-President Woodrow Wilson. TR died before the great clash was resolved, but he posthumously won it. The United States Senate, following the lead of Roosevelt's closest friend, Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge, refused to approve U.S. accession to the league on the terms Wilson had demanded. More than 30 years later, Dwight D. Eisenhower, the first Republican president after the United States became a global superpower, made it his first priority to end the apparently unending Korean War he had inherited from his unpopular and then-discredited Democratic predecessor Harry S. Truman. Eisenhower scrupulously maintained the defense commitments he had inherited in NATO and even expanded them with exceptionally unsuccessful CENTO, or Central Treaty Organization, which was supposed to organize and stabilize the nations of the Middle East the way NATO had succeeded in Western Europe. It did not do so. But Eisenhower also approved an enormous and rapidly effective buildup of U.S. conventional military and strategic nuclear power. He recognized that America's sweeping defense commitments to NATO and around the world would only be credible if she also exercised the military muscle to back it up. Like Theodore Roosevelt, he believed with all his being in talking softly but carrying a big stick. Ronald Reagan, the patron saint of current Republican leaders, was also -- justly -- acclaimed for following this maxim. He approved an even bigger defense buildup than Eisenhower had. Widely criticized at the time, this proved to be of crucial importance in deterring and demoralizing the last generation of Soviet leaders as communism crumbled. It also enabled the United States and its allies to win the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq, which then had the fourth-largest army in the world, with amazingly few casualties. But Bush's bold words in Warsaw were not accompanied by similar tough deeds in building up America's conventional military power. On the contrary, within a week of that speech, the Washington Times newspaper reported this Wednesday that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was pushing ahead with plans to abandon the strategic doctrine that the United States military must be capable of fighting two conventional wars in different places simultaneously. It is extraordinary that Rumsfeld and Bush should contemplate such a move hardly a week after the president's Warsaw speech. For in it, Bush made clear he was expanding U.S. military commitments around the world on a scale and at a speed not seen since the United States assumed leadership of the West against the Soviet Union in the late 1940s. Expanding NATO up to the Russian border in practical terms means that the three Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia will be admitted into the alliance. Romania probably will be, too. It already has enthusiastic advocates on Capitol Hill and in the Bush administration. Yet the actual, practical military power these nations would bring to America's side is nil. On the contrary, the United States would be bound by the famous Article Five of the 1949 Washington Treaty to regard any military attack on them as an attack upon itself and to respond in kind. Also within a week of his Warsaw speech, Bush refused to approve U.S. ground troops to be sent to Macedonia to help end the growing conflict there between assertive Albanians against the dominant Macedonian Slavs. But suppose the three Baltic states or Romania or Bulgaria -- which has a 10 percent restive Turkish minority of its own -- were to be approved as NATO members. Then suppose they were to face serious internal problems with the rebellion of ethnic minorities, or the threats of pro-Russian neighbors such as Belarus or Serbia. In those circumstances, Bush would be bound to approve full U.S. military support, whether he liked it or not. That is what Article Five of the Washington Treaty is all about. Yet at the same time Bush could very likely be facing conventional military threats by China against the offshore island of Taiwan, another place the 43rd president of the United States has vowed to defend, significantly escalating the commitments he inherited from his predecessors. And then suppose that Iran or Iraq or both of them launched a new attack on Kuwait or on Saudi Arabia, at the very same time the United States was overextended in both Central Europe and East Asia. Would Bush have the conventional military capabilities to stop such attacks in their tracks or roll them back all at the same time? Not if he approves the revision in strategic doctrine that Rumsfeld is now pushing through, he won't. Yet Bush feels he has no choice but to approve Rumsfeld's revision. This is because he is being held hostage by his own policies. The president is determined to develop a strategic missile defense system that would protect the United States and her allies against intercontinental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. He is also determined to have his more than $1 trillion tax cut, which he has already pushed through Congress. (And already, Bush's own chosen experts on the Council of Economic Advisers are complaining that it was not enough.) Yet the ABM program will cost at least $100 billion and probably as much as $240 billion over the next decade, whether it works or not. So where is the money for building up conventional military capabilities to come from? The answer is nowhere. Even Bush recognizes it simply is not there. That is what makes Bush's Warsaw speech such a hostage to future events, like Kennedy's famous 1961 inaugural address. For Bush has abandoned the traditional cautious Republican statecraft of Theodore Roosevelt, Eisenhower, Richard Nixon and Reagan to rashly multiply his commitments in the style of Democrats Truman, Kennedy and Lyndon Baines Johnson. Because Truman, Kennedy and Johnson multiplied their commitments and lacked prudence, they blundered into wars in Korea and Vietnam. More than 100,000 young Americans lost their lives as a result. Those presidents found the hard way that soaring rhetoric and the favorable headlines it wins come cheap in the short term. But they can demand a fearsome price in human blood and suffering not long afterwards. The president and his policy-makers should contemplate their example. TOP OF PAGE    CONTENTS    TOP OF SECTION    CDI RUSSIA WEEKLY HOME    CDI HOME CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION 1779 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Washington, DC 20036-2109 Ph: (202) 332-0600 · Fax: (202) 462-4559 info@cdi.org