#11
World: Former CIA Heads Urge Post-Cold War Shift
By Robert McMahon
With the end of the Cold War superpower alignment and the proliferation of
new technology, the U.S. intelligence community is moving to recast its
capabilities. At a panel discussion this week, four former CIA directors said
terrorism and cyber-crime have replaced the former Soviet Union as the major
nemesis to the United States and its allies. RFE/RL correspondent Robert
McMahon reports.
New York, 28 May 2001 (RFE/RL) -- The U.S. intelligence-gathering community
is facing a markedly different world than the one defined by the Cold War
superpower relationship.
Four former directors of Central Intelligence who served before, during, and
after the collapse of the Soviet bloc say the United States now needs to
shift its focus to threats such as terrorists, cyber-crime, and the spread of
missile technology.
The recommendations come only weeks after President George W. Bush ordered a
review of the country's intelligence system which could result in sweeping
changes. The four former directors spoke at a panel discussion last week (23
May) hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations, a New York-based think tank.
They reviewed how successes and failures in intelligence work over the years
could shape the future work of U.S. spy agencies.
James Woolsey headed the Central Intelligence Agency, or CIA, during the
first two years of the Clinton administration. He says the top issue facing
the U.S. intelligence community is helping the National Security Agency keep
pace with technological changes.
The agency is responsible for eavesdropping on electronic communications
worldwide. But it faces difficulties because of the growing use of
fiber-optic cables, which are difficult to monitor, and the heavy volume of
digital telephone traffic.
Woolsey says it is also important for intelligence services to help defend
against threats to national security originating in new technology.
"Your [that is, the intelligence services'] problem is the vulnerability of
your infrastructure and your networks and your computers. Because encrypting
things doesn't protect your computers. Your computers are vulnerable to
hackers and denial of service and viruses and all the rest coming in for all
sorts of reasons, criminal terrorist and perhaps asymmetric warfare."
Stansfield Turner was director of Central Intelligence for President Jimmy
Carter in the late 1970s. He says any review of intelligence should examine
the working relationship between the U.S. military and intelligence
communities to make sure they adapt together to the changing threats.
"In the post-Cold War age, the military requirements, while growing in
quantity for the military, are of less critical nature to the country,
whereas other threats like terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and
ecology and so forth are growing in importance."
The former intelligence directors say U.S. spy agencies have proved very
effective at collecting information during the past 50 years. But the
analysis of that information, they say, has sometimes been faulty. Woolsey
joined the other directors in noting that the failure to predict the collapse
of the Soviet Union was due to neglect of very clear signs that the Soviet
economy was in irreversible decline.
"They were not good at drawing the political implications of the economic
doldrums that the Soviet Union continued to collapse into, and as a result
they were not as quick in the judgment that the Soviet Union was going to
come apart. "
A more recent failure involved the testing of nuclear weapons by both India
and Pakistan in 1998, which caught U.S. officials by surprise. John Deutch,
who directed Central Intelligence in 1995 and 1996, said analysts should have
seen the political changes in India leading toward the detonation of an
atomic weapon.
But Deutch says the way the U.S. intelligence community shares information
and analysis could have contributed to its failure regarding Indian nuclear
tests. He said during his time with the agency, there were widespread leaks
of intelligence information. He said this politicized the process of
intelligence gathering, preventing thorough analysis and discussion on a
number of issues.
"There was a natural tendency to look at it as being more of a political game
rather than really trying to find where the evidence was leading and I think
that the issue of leaks is what stops the kind of thorough exchange of
analysts' information and wisdom that is really needed to make this a
successful operation."
William Webster, who was director of Central Intelligence from 1987 to 1991,
said one example of a successful use of analysis was the identification of a
chemical weapons facility in Libya in the late 1980s. Although described by
Libya as a pharmaceutical factory, Webster said the evidence assembled proved
overwhelmingly that it was a weapons facility. He said that evidence was
presented to German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who responded by cutting off what
had been considerable German input to the facility.
Webster and the other former directors said the United States has been more
and more sparing in its use of covert operations in recent years. But they
predicted that presidents will want to retain it as an option in the event of
a serious diplomatic or military crisis.
Despite well-known failures with covert operations in Cuba, some of the
directors pointed to Afghanistan -- believed to be one of the largest such
operations ever conducted -- as a success. Webster dismissed some suggestions
that U.S. activity in Afghanistan in the 1980s involved training future
terrorists. He said alleged terrorists such as Osama bin Laden -- now living
in Afghanistan -- were not trained by the CIA. Webster said the main
objective of the Afghan operation -- to undermine the Soviet military there
-- was successful.
"It was in my view one of the two major factors in precipitating the end of
the Cold War. The impact of getting the mujahideen properly equipped to drive
the Soviets out of their country, under such circumstances that it was
painful to their military and to their political structure, had a very
serious impact inside the Soviet Union and was well worth the effort. "
All four former directors said China should be a main focus of future U.S.
intelligence activities. They stressed the need to gauge China's public
opinion and monitor its economic signals. They said China presents many more
puzzles, on issues such as arms proliferation, than Russia.
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#12
The Baltic Times
31 May 2001
Russia must not be left out as Baltics reach NATO goal
NATO Parliamentary Assembly Secretary General Simon Lunn was in Vilnius this
week for the first assembly meeting in an Eastern European country. Mark
Taylor of The Baltic Times caught up with Lunn for a brief interview. /.../
The Baltic Times:
Which one of these candidates is most ready for membership
in the alliance?
Lunn:
I don't think that's a good thing to speculate on, because we then turn
this process into something it shouldn't be. I've traveled in all three
Baltic countries. I have connections with each of them. I have probably had
the longest relationship with Lithuania, but I think that each country has
made considerable progress, and of course each is different, with different
characteristics.
Each country has made very good progress and I know that when people look at
countries for the next round of enlargement these countries will have done
very well. They will be considered well up the list of the nine countries
being considered for membership.
All three Baltic countries have made tremendous progress in reforming their
armed forces, and they have all made contributions to NATO missions in
southeast Europe, which are very much appreciated. Each of them is showing a
willingness to share the tasks of the alliance as well as share in its
values. /.../
TBT:
How are the concerns of Russia being addressed by the alliance, and how
do you respond to criticism that they are not being addressed enough?
Lunn:
There are two issues. There is whatever grievance Russians have with
the situation in the Baltic countries.
First of all, the issue about the Russian-speaking populations is for the
individual countries here to sort out. It's my knowledge that bodies such as
the Council of Europe and the OSCE have in fact said that they believe that
the situation for the Russian-speaking population meets their standards. I
think the Baltics have been given a clean bill of health.
On the other issue, the broader strategic issue about whether it's correct
for countries that were once part of the Soviet Union, albeit unwillingly, to
be a part of NATO, or is it a step too far. Obviously, we have to persuade
the Russians that this is an unacceptable view. To say that the Baltics, in
any way shape or form are in their sphere of influence is obviously
unacceptable.
It is quite clear that countries have a right to choose the alliances they
belong to. We repeat that again and again to the Russians, but then we have
to go one step further because if they are not understanding that message
then the message that we must say is that NATO is no longer an organization
with the mission it had during the Cold War. It is an organization with a
mission of collective defense, but collective defense is an entirely
different thing today.
NATO has adopted very new missions in terms of trying to develop stability
and security in other parts. Russia should be a partner in that and NATO has
made great efforts through its founding act. We have made great efforts to
develop partnerships with the Russian Parliament since 1990 and 1991. They
have attended these meetings and obviously we have still not succeeded in
convincing the political bodies in Russia that NATO is not a threat. We know
that very well.
However, they should feel that countries on their borders that feel secure
are much better than countries who don't feel secure. Baltic countries should
also understand that Russia is a partner, not the eternal enemy./.../
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