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CDI RUSSIA WEEKLY - #154
18 May 2001
Edited by David Johnson
Center for Defense Information
1779 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
phone: 202-332-0600; fax:202-462-4559
djohnson@cdi.org
The CDI Russia Weekly is a weekly e-mail newsletter that carries news and analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With funding from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the MacArthur Foundation, the CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education organization.
 

CONTENTS:
1. Moscow Times
Pavel Felgenhauer
We Still Need Arms Control
 
2. Moskovskiye
Novosti

Andrey Kozyrev
ABM - This is Our Chance
 
3. Novye Izvestia
Yuri Sigov
IS VLADIMIR PUTIN RUSSIA'S SECOND LENIN?
Igor Ivanov might have to answer this question in Washington
 
4. RFE/RL
Sophie Lambroschini
Russia: EU Summit Stresses Environment, Energy, Chechnya
 
5. strana.ru
Viktor Kremenyuk
Who is driving a wedge between the U.S. and Europe?
 
6. Program on New Approaches to Russian Security
(PONARS)

Celeste Wallander
The Multiple Dimensions of Russian Threat Assessment
 
7. The Russia Journal
Vladimir Mukhin
Soldiers worry about road to civilian life.
Pending reform means many will soon have to look for work.
 
8. space.com
Simon Saradzhyan
Despite Expertise, Russia Can't Afford Trip to Red Planet
 
9. Kennan Institute meeting report
The Prospects for a Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership
 
10. Moskovsky Komsomolets
Anastasiya Kuzina
AIDS IS A GREATER FINANCIAL THREAT TO RUSSIA THAN AN ARMY OF BUREAUCRATS.
Treatment of One HIV-Infected Person Costs the Budget $10,000 a Year.


#1
Moscow Times
May 17, 2001
We Still Need Arms Control
By Pavel Felgenhauer

Last week, a high-level American delegation came to Moscow to discuss national missile defense as part of a global charm offensive. Even before the U.S. team arrived, high-ranking Russian and American diplomats were predicting that the talks will fail: Of course, they were right: The Americans "explained" their position on NMD, and the Russian side was "not convinced."

U.S. President George W. Bush has virtually announced that he will abandon the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty because promising new anti-missile technologies have been developed, because "rogue" states such as North Korea may threaten the United States with ballistic missiles and because Russia is no longer a enemy, meaning that ABM is irrelevant and outdated. However, these arguments just are not true.

No reliable technologies of ballistic-missile interception have emerged in the last 30 years and effective NMD is as unachievable today as in 1972. "Rogue" states do not yet have any intercontinental missile capabilities and may not for years to come. In the mid-1990s, the CIA predicted that no rogue state would manage to produce ICBMs before 2010 and that there would be sufficient time to take countermeasures before one did, since usable ICBMs cannot be developed without easily detectable tests.

Bush may be correct in assuming that Russia is no longer America's enemy, but it's also surely neither a friend nor ally. Russia is still in transition from communist totalitarianism, but it is still uncertain whether the new Russia may turn out to be an authoritarian police state ruled by a nationalistic elite bent on "restoring" Great Russia.

The current No. 2 in Russia's military hierarchy — the chief of the General Staff, Anatoly Kvashnin, who commands Russia's nuclear deterrent — once told me: "We will take Westerners to visit Grozny to see how we have wiped out our own city for them to see what may happen to them."

Maybe someday Russia will join the community of peaceful democracies and then all U.S.-Soviet arms control mechanisms can be safely scraped. But today, while Russia is fighting a barbaric war in Chechnya and as long as its nuclear deterrent -- which can still wipe out the United States and Western Europe in one fell swoop -- remains under the control of generals who are, to be blunt, war-crimes suspects, Cold War-style arms control is still essential.

Authoritarian regimes are unpredictable and can become suddenly, unreasonably aggressive. The decision-making process in an authoritarian state is opaque and happens without serious public discussion (or such discussions have little effect, as is the case in Russia today). Therefore, arms control can provide a safety net that may prevent an irresponsible bureaucracy from overreacting in a crisis. But now the Bush administration seems prepared to tear this net into shreds for nothing.

The present U.S. charm offensive has fallen on deaf ears in Moscow, Beijing and many other capitals. It is hard to run an effective diplomatic offensive if most of your arguments are just wrong. Still, Bush administration officials insist there is no problem. They claim they have been deliberately "stiffing" President Vladimir Putin for some time but will now "engage" him, and Russia will cave in on NMD, tacitly agreeing to everything.

That's another totally wrong assumption. Since Putin took over in Moscow at the end of 1999, Russian policy has been set: Speak soft with Washington on ABM, but stand firm. The battle plan is to force Washington to abrogate ABM and expose the evil Americans, which will help create a multipolar world.

Now Moscow sees its plan succeeding. Anti-Americanism in on the rise, especially in Western Europe. The United States has been excluded from several influential UN commissions. Putin, for personal political reasons, wants a speedy summit with Bush and one is being organized for next month.

But no NMD compromises are in the offing. Moscow sees no need to compromise, and if Putin even wanted to cave in, he would immediately run into grave political trouble with his true powerbase — the anti-American, militaristic, jingoistic Russian elite that put him in the Kremlin.

Arms control seems doomed to collapse. Of course, impoverished Russia cannot compete in an arms race against the United States. But the temptation to proliferate military technology will grow and with it — Russian arms exports. Instead of deterring a rogue missile threat, Bush may well be bringing one on.

Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent, Moscow-based defense analyst.

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#2
Andrey Kozyrev: opposition view on Russia's NMD policy.
Moskovskiye Novosti
May 8, 2001
Article by Andrey Kozyrev: "ABM - This is Our Chance"

We lived like swine for half a century, and we'll live another the same way - that is the gist of the answer of staunch proponents of the ABM Treaty of 1972 to any ideas about creating systems to protect against nuclear and missile strikes. By banning the development of such systems, the treaty freezes the state to which the population, especially the peaceful inhabitants of Russia and the U.S. and even other countries, has been captive, doomed to guaranteed destruction!

Such a position can only be considered the foundation for keeping the world in the marasmus of the "cold war". In point of fact, the 1972 Treaty did not stop the arms race. The first reduction of strategic nuclear missiles was stipulated by START II - a 1993 agreement, i.e. the period of the radical rehabilitation of relations between Moscow and Washington. In it, the ABM Treaty was confirmed. However, that was assuming there would be a shift to subsequent measures for disarmament and a rebuilding of relations on a new foundation. Unfortunately, the momentum in those changes was lost. Moscow took 8 years to ratify START II, and in that time, a new threat emerged.

Now, not just "super" powers, but also "mini" powers, and even terrorist groups, can blackmail with mass murder. We have air defense systems. We have not created a missile defense - all of our efforts have gone into countering the U.S. and protecting the ABM Treaty. Who will be held responsible for this fixation on America? What price will the country have to pay for the inferiority complex of those in power before the States, who are on the level of "mice" who fear nothing more than a cat?

Another matter altogether is that the U.S. truly possesses gigantic financial, economic and technological resources, and therefore, for us it can be both a dangerous enemy and an indispensable partner.

We all know how difficult it would have been for Russia to maintain its status as a space power on its own. Today, with America's cooperation, we are doing something that just yesterday would have seemed fantastical - we are sending two tourists into orbit: one of our own for free, and an American for 20 million dollars. It is quite possible that the seemingly fairy tale prospects for the joint creation with the U.S. and their allies of the means for protection from nuclear and missile terrorism will also come true. The history of military affairs teaches us that if a sword appears, then the shield will be invented without fail. Nuclear bombs are already in the hands of Pakistani Generals, who are in the habit of carrying out coups, and helping the Talibs... Tomorrow they could be in the hands of Iranians. North Korea is in the missile trade...

After the recent statement by the U.S. President, there is no longer any doubt that the Americans will spend billions in order to create a missile defense shield. Russia's national interests: preserving territorial integrity, developing the VPK [military industrial complex], preventing "intellect leaks", and so forth - require that we not stand on the sidelines of this "project of the century".

It is hard to say how right those are who believe that the upcoming negotiations with Washington should be used to "jack up the price" for our agreement to ease or reconsider the provisions of the ABM Treaty. If in exchange we hope to obtain agreement for our participation in the development of new means for defense, then it is probably worth trying. However, it is important not to get "too wrapped up in the game". Otherwise, it will turn out that our main concern would be to not deny ourselves the ability to achieve the guaranteed destruction of the U.S. population, even for the sake of the dubious satisfaction of having to get ourselves killed in an arms race. For, the American President in his very first statement on the ABM theme kind of hinted at such an initiative to Putin when he recognized the advisability of cooperating with Russia. It is important to "take Bush at his word" as concerns his call to overcome the "cold war" mentality once and for all. For, the residual mutual distrust, spy mania and restrictions on exchanging technologies could be actively used by those who justifiably see Russian scientists and specialists as dangerous competitors in the fight for lucrative contracts. That is one instance when policy, especially foreign policy, is able to create either insurmountable obstacles, or concrete advantages for domestic industry. In other words, it is time to move from verbal battles and spy passions to the long, arduous battle for our "place under the sun". And we needed to start fighting for orders yesterday. For, tomorrow they will be snatched up by the Western Europeans, and even the Chinese. It is not without reason that their diplomats so measuredly oppose the U.S. and so ably placed Moscow in the role of the chief protector of the ABM Treaty.

I think a special organ should be created in the government - the State Committee for International Cooperation in the ABM Field - which would direct (for the issue here involves the most sensitive technologies) and encourage efforts in this field. We also need to get domestic business organized - this is a unique opportunity to reach the world level in more than just raw materials. Powerful state and private lobbying is needed in Washington and in other western capitals. In a word, the time has come to implement the directive of Russia's President to subordinate foreign policy to the economic and the generally real interests of the country, for pragmatism instead of outdated stereotypes.

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#3
Novye Izvestia
May 17, 2001
IS VLADIMIR PUTIN RUSSIA'S SECOND LENIN?
Igor Ivanov might have to answer this question in Washington
Author: Yuri Sigov
[from WPS Monitoring Agency,
http://www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
THIS WILL BE THE THIRD MEETING BETWEEN IVANOV AND SECRETARY OF STATE COLIN POWELL. THEY WILL DISCUSS MISSILE DEFENSE, NATO EASTWARD EXPANSION, NUCLEAR ARMS CUTS, AND MORE. THEY MAY ALSO CHOOSE A LOCATION SOMEWHERE IN EUROPE FOR PRESIDENT PUTIN AND PRESIDENT BUSH TO MEET BEFORE THE GENOA SUMMIT.
Foreign Minister Ivanov prepares for his meeting with Colin Powell

Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov's visit to Washington, which begins this evening, is a message to the United States from the Kremlin. Despite the discord, Moscow is ready to continue discussion of "problems which at first appear unsolvable" and try to arrange a meeting between the Russian and American presidents in the near future.

This will be the third meeting between Ivanov and Secretary of State Colin Powell. As before, Ivanov and Powell will probably continue acquainting each other with their respective states' official positions on the most important issues - missile defense, NATO eastward expansion, nuclear arms cuts, and a great many alleged "trifles" that poison bilateral relations every now and then.

Powell says he is prepared to listen to his Russian counterpart, but emphasizes that Washington's position is not going to change. It will also be pointless for Ivanov to object to NATO expansion - particularly since the other day all American newspapers featured a speech by Czech President Havel, in which he all but demanded that the United States should disregard what Russia says on the matter, and accept all post-Soviet Baltic states into NATO.

Discussion of the "trifles" does not promise Moscow anything good either. No matter what Russian journalists might be saying on the subject, Vladimir Gusinsky got a sympathetic hearing in Washington. Some hotheads even suggested expelling Russia from the G-8 before the Genoa summit. The international committee for the protection of journalists, in New York, branded Putin as an "enemy of free speech" (Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma is on the list too). Powell may also raise the issue of free speech in Russia during his meeting with Ivanov.

Needless to say, in Washington Ivanov will be reminded of Iran, Iraq, Libya and other places American officials never go - but Russians do.

And of course, Ivanov and Powell will discuss the prospects of a meeting between the Russian and American presidents before the Genoa G-8 summit. Theoretically, both sides agree that Putin and Bush should meet. This means that instead of persuading each other of the need for such a summit, Ivanov and Powell should choose a location somewhere in Europe for their presidents to meet.

Ivanov is packing in Moscow, not knowing what changes will be made in the Cabinet, or whether he himself will retain his portfolio in their wake. Meanwhile, various Russian politicians are making frequent trips to Washington. Representing different political parties, all of them act as one in America: informing the free world that economic growth in Russia is unprecedented, life is getting better and better, the president's popularity remains high, and the NTV network is back on air, working for the benefit of all Russia.

One smart guy known for his democratic views stunned America by saying that Putin is Russia's second Lenin - because he is the first leader since Lenin who speaks fluent German...

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#4
Russia: EU Summit Stresses Environment, Energy, Chechnya
By Sophie Lambroschini

Every six months, under each new European Union presidency, the EU and Russia hold a summit to discuss current issues of mutual interest. As the latest such meeting gets underway today in Moscow, EU officials say that, while pressing forward with positive new plans like investing in Russia's energy sector, they will not overlook the question of Chechnya. RFE/RL's Moscow correspondent Sophie Lambroschini reports.

Moscow, 17 May 2001 (RFE/RL) -- Today's European Union-Russia summit in Moscow picks up where the last one -- held last October in Paris -- left off. It returns to older, unresolved topics like Chechnya while addressing new ones like a planned energy accord.

The Paris summit was widely seen as a diplomatic victory for Russian President Vladimir Putin, who won assurances of greater EU economic cooperation without backing down from his stance on Chechnya. Today's meeting, however, is not expected to hold any major surprises.

The seventh EU-Russia summit opened with a meeting between Putin and Prime Minister Goran Persson of Sweden, which currently chairs the EU.

The talks were later to be joined by European Commission President Romano Prodi, EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana and, on the Russian side, Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov and Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov.

Sylvia Kofler, the EU's Moscow spokeswoman, summed up the summit agenda for RFE/RL:

"It is difficult to say what really will be the most important aspect. As you know, the meeting takes place every six months, so basically both sides review their relations in all areas and they will start by explaining to each other the developments in the Russian Federation and the developments in the European Union. They will discuss specific issues of EU-Russian cooperation, such as security policy dialogue, trade and investment cooperation. Of course, [they will also discuss] energy, Kaliningrad, cooperation in justice and home affairs and environment."

Solana, speaking last night on Ekho Moskvy radio, said that Russia and the EU had established a "constant dialogue." He said that he personally had met 30 times with Russian officials over the past year and that he expects a "good summit."

The EU represents Russia's largest trade partner, accounting for more than a third of Russia's imports and of its export trade. In 1999, Russia was the EU's sixth largest trading partner, after the United States, Switzerland, Japan, China, and Norway. Its rank, however, is expected to rise as bilateral trade continues to grow.

Environmental issues due to be discussed at today's meeting included the Kyoto agreement on greenhouse gases and nuclear safety. A regional nuclear clean-up pact for the Kola Peninsula -- where discarded nuclear submarines pose a contamination hazard for the whole Arctic region -- was signed in 1999 but has yet to be formally adopted because of several unresolved issues between the EU and Russia.

Spokeswoman Kofler said officials from the EU -- which was criticized last October for not being tough enough on Russia's human rights violations in Chechnya -- are also likely to bring up the topic of Russian policy in the devastated region:

"The European Union wants very much to also draw the attention of the Russian side to Chechnya, to the issue, and call again for a political solution and for access for NGOs and humanitarian organizations to Chechnya. And they will also draw the attention to media freedom, stressing very much that media freedom is an essential element of a democratic system."

Deputy Foreign Minister Ivan Ivanov said last night that Russia has "no allergy to the Chechen theme." He said Russia's battle with "terrorists" in the North Caucasus republic is no different than Macedonia's current struggle with Albanian separatists. Responding to EU criticism, Ivanov said: "These amateurs on the Chechen issue should occupy themselves with Macedonia, where the European Union is about to get its own Chechnya."

Yesterday the monitoring group Human Rights Watch called on the international community to use the occasion of the EU summit to urge Moscow to investigate a mass gravesite in Chechnya suspected of containing the bodies of civilians killed by Russian law-enforcement officers.

Plans for future cooperation in the energy sector -- an idea launched less than a year ago -- were also on the agenda for today's meeting. Although still in its initial phase, the proposed agreement may eventually have Russia increasing its natural gas and oil exports to Europe in exchange for substantial investment in its energy sector. Spokeswoman Kofler:

"You know, this energy dialogue was launched last October when Mr. Prodi met Mr. Putin and [French President Jacques] Chirac in Paris at the last EU-Russia summit. It was launched and in the meantime experts have had several meetings to try to identify the issues at stake, and at this point I would say it is kind of prospective, and too early to have anything concrete."

Russia currently provides over 15 percent of the EU's energy needs in imported fuel.

Kofler also said that any dialogue on security issues today would not include any exchange of opinion about the controversial U.S. plan to deploy a missile defense system -- an initiative that has been criticized by both Moscow and some EU members.

Deputy Foreign Minister Ivanov, however, said the topic would be on today's agenda, calling it "a question of our common security."

Commenting on Russian and EU security issues, the EU's ambassador to Moscow, Gilbert Dubois, told RFE/RL's Russian Service this week that the Russians are "eager" to learn more about Europe's Security and Defense Policy. Dubois also said he is looking forward to greater EU partnership with Russia, pointing to cooperative efforts in Kosovo in spite of what he called "differences of opinion" in certain aspects of policy there. He said: "We can imagine that in the future there will be many areas in the world where we could work together."

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#5
strana.ru
May 17, 2001
Who is driving a wedge between the U.S. and Europe?

Relations in the Russia-U.S.-EU triangle commented on by Viktor Kremenyuk, deputy director of the U.S.A. and Canada Institute, for Strana.ru

The Russia- NATO-U.S. triangle with the U.S. at the head is giving way to the Russia-NATO-EU triangle with the EU at the head. The emergence of the latter indicates that differences have arisen between the U.S. and the European Union. Putin understands that there will be people blaming Moscow for the differences.

But these contradictions are natural and Moscow has nothing to do with this. First, because a common enemy is no more and there are no stimuli for maintaining iron North Atlantic unity, which existed in cold war years.

Second, the search for a way of preserving North Atlantic unity in the 1990s has not been successful enough, though, perhaps, the Yugoslavia factor played a role in it. Europeans are not pleased with the U.S. stance, with being dragged into an absolutely unnecessary war against Yugoslavia, which created a host of problems. Now Europeans fear that the new U.S. President will say, "You make take care of those Balkans, it is a purely European problem, and we will go home." His father once said this, when the Yugoslavia crisis was just simmering.

Third, this was, to be sure, also due to the U.S. incautious attempt to publicize its wish to revise the ABM Treaty. And not so much because Europeans are so eager to support Moscow in this (they agree that the treaty has grown outdated). Rather, it is because Europeans are an object, and not a subject, in this process. They were merely notified, with no prior consultations on all the circumstances of the case. This offended Europeans. They regard such a U.S. position to be snotty, looks like a response to Europeans' attempt to build their own defense system. During recent consultations with the Americans the U.S. NMD idea evoked a very cool response in Europe.

With the war in Yugoslavia Americans sank the Euro. It is painful to Europeans, because they all were going to switch to the Euro in their calculations starting on January 1, and now the Euro cannot regain its former rate.

They consider that Americans are looking for ways of dampening their defense initiatives. And they want to build their defense proceeding from the understanding the Russia is not an enemy. At his point Europe has a temptation to improve its position somewhat by flirting with Russia.

Putin was correct to say he didn't want to drive a wage between Europe and the U.S. Because at present everything is O.K. between us Europeans, and Russia's serious bargain with Americans over strategic matters is ahead. Before the bargain is over, we should not give additional arguments to the hard-liners in the U.S. Administration.

Putin realizes that a heavy duel with the Americans is still ahead. They have not yet said finally what they are going to do with us - either they are to press us everywhere and trample our self-esteem, thereby turning Putin into nobody or they are to be generous after all. Therefore he has been trying to take a neutral position and assume on the whole a friendly attitude to all and no longer to present Russia as a Great Power. I think he is right doing so, though I am not among his supporters.

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#6
Program on New Approaches to Russian Security (PONARS)
Policy Memo Series
Memo No. 199
PONARS, 2001
The Multiple Dimensions of Russian Threat Assessment
Celeste A. Wallander
Council on Foreign Relations--April 2001

The current Russian leadership perceives five types of threats to its interests that are impacted by the outside world. Four of these are familiar from discussions throughout the 1990s: national economic and military weakness, American hegemony and unilateralism, exclusion from the most influential political and economic circles in the international system, and instability and regional conflicts around Russia's Eurasian borders. A fifth perceived threat has moved into the main rank only in the last year, and was articulated in the government's Information Security Doctrine, signed by Putin in September 2000: information can destabilize Russia's social and political scene, undermine the government's policies, and reveal the country's security secrets.

Russia's Place in the International System

The first three threats, though distinct, are closely related in assessing how the outside world is perceived in Russian foreign and security policy. Various official documents (including the national security concept, military doctrine, and foreign policy concept) state unambiguously that the primary threat to Russia's national interests is its internal economic situation, and the failure to undertake serious and responsible reform. Nonetheless, they also state clearly that opportunities to participate in international security, political, and economic forums in the international system affect whether Russia will be able to achieve its objectives for renewal and growth.

This is why, for example, Russian relations with China, India, and Iran are not merely about trading in arms for influence, but about sustaining and modernizing Russia's defense industry as a component of building the post-Soviet economy. International trade--even arms trade--is an important engine for internal economic modernization and growth. Given the link between the economy, national power, and security, Russian access to the international system is a security matter.

Therefore, the current Russian leadership views obstacles to its international access as, at best, indifference to Russian national interests and, at worst, deliberate policy to undermine its efforts to establish a sound economy on the path to consolidating its power and place in the international system. So, for example, American pressure to limit sales to Iran is not just about the loss of a given sale, but about undermining Russia's defense industries, military reform, modernization, and so on. Even Russia's emerging problems with the European Union--especially how enlargement will extend trade restrictions and visa regimes to Central and Eastern Europe--is not merely about trade, but about security and national power.

In this context, it is impossible to escape the reality that one of the main features of the international system in all its dimensions--military, political, and economic--is that American unipolarity coexists with a system of multilateral institutions (such as the World Trade Organization or WTO), regimes (such as nonproliferation), and groupings (such as the G-8) that are overwhelmingly influenced, if not quite determined, by American power and preferences. In short, Russia "wants in" for long-term national security reasons, we hold the key, and lately we have been holding the key at arm's length.

Threats Nearby

For Russia, this very modern package of national interests and elements of globalization coexists with the perceived threat of instability, primarily in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and the concrete reality of armed conflict in Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Abkhazia, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Without doubt, Russian policy in the 1990s contributed to these threats through the use of force and interference to maintain Russian influence and presence in the region.

That misguided policy was largely a result of the Russian leadership's inability to distinguish between, and prioritize, two variants of the threat: 1) the danger posed by weak, underdeveloped, and even failing states in the Caucasus and Central Asia; and 2) that posed by the erosion of Russian influence and presence with the breakup of the Soviet Union. Despite its liberal and reformist credentials, the Yeltsin leadership never quite repudiated the latter, though it sought to meet the perceived threat posed by the loss of its southern sphere inconsistently. The Putin leadership has clearly rejected disentangling the two threats, and more firmly links regional instability with Russian weakness.

In addition, two new dimensions to this threat perception complicate Russia's policy in the region: Islam and international terrorism. The Chechens' separatist war, in this context, is just one manifestation of Islamic radicalism with international ties and terrorist means stretching from Afghanistan to the Black Sea. It is crucial to understand how instability, Russian weakness, Islam, and international terrorism are linked in Russian perception. In the international context, Russia perceives the West as a potential ally against this threat, because it too has been a target. This perception is the reason Russian officials have suggested joint operations against Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. However, this could change quickly, as evidenced by the suspicion with which Western support for Georgia is held (given the Russian view that Georgia contributes to terrorists' access to Chechnya).

The New Information Threat

All this is recognizable in foreign policy analysis. The new threat--information security--adds a novel, troublesome dimension. The Russian perception that information has a strong effect on politics, and that in our globalizing world international information influences can play a large role in security is astute. However, the lesson learned appears not to be that a state cannot control--but rather that it is all the more important to control--information, especially that which complicates government policies. Instead of learning that it cannot lie about the Kursk, the Russian leadership appears to believe that you have to lie louder and more consistently, and cast aspersions on the sources of alternative information.

This perspective sets up an intrinsic conflict of interest between Russia (or at least the state) and external influences. Good information is necessary for good policy of all sorts, including those central to international economics and investment. Western firms do not want to invest in Russia without access to good information on economic performance and corporate governance. The US Congress does not want to allocate more funds for Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) without good information about how the money is being spent and what effects the programs have. By establishing the presumption that seeking good information about Russia is a threat to Russian security, the information security doctrine could insinuate assumptions of hostility and conflicting interests into Russia's engagement with the international system.

How These Perceptions Affect Russia

The result of these perceptions is an ambitious Russia that seeks access and engagement for the right reasons from the American perspective (that is, for economic reform and prosperity), but from presumptions that do not quite fit with the realities of the modern international system in an era of a globalizing economy and the information age. The Russian leadership's fundamental presumption that the US would prefer to keep Russia weak leads it to assume ill intent and deliberate US policy when problems or obstacles arise, such as desultory progress on Russia's WTO accession, or criticism of Russian trade with Iran. The very real threat of instability, armed conflict on its borders, and transnational terrorism reinforces the tendency for Russia to see larger forces at work that can be met only by force and toughness rather than long-term political and economic development.

Central to the Putin leadership's perception is that engagement with the international system and practical cooperation with the US are inescapable realities for achieving its national interests. The US is likely to be faced, in consequence, with a Russian foreign policy that is activist and assertive. Russian policy will be pragmatic in its readiness to make deals and to accept compromise in pursuit of its primary economic objectives. However, because these deals are likely to come in areas of Russian weakness relative to the US (and the international system it strongly influences), agreements will be seen as favoring the US (or the West) disproportionately. They are, therefore, unlikely to serve as building blocks for a general improvement in US-Russian relations.

This memo is derived from the author's talk "Moscow's Perceptions of the Outside World" for the conference "Russia in the International System" at Airlie House, Warrenton, VA, 21-23 February 2001.

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#7
The Russia Journal
May 11-17, 2001
Soldiers worry about road to civilian life
Pending reform means many will soon have to look for work
By VLADIMIR MUKHIN

For many in Russia, the cutback in troop strength is just a matter of numbers. Debate centers on how many should be cut and how efficient the armed forces will be after reductions.

But for others -- the 600,000 servicemen destined to lose their jobs -- it is a much more personal question.

A survey of servicemen shows that two-thirds are worried by the prospect of having to find new work after leaving the military. Many of those affected by the cutbacks will also face problems finding new places for their wives to live and work.

Out of a total 3.5 billion rubles allocated this year for military reform, 50 million rubles are earmarked for the retraining of military specialists. This may not seem like much, but as economics correspondent for the Defense Ministry newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda Col. Ivan Ivanyuk said, even this represents progress.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was only last year that the state set aside money for retraining military specialists when it allocated 24 million rubles.

"The state isn't able to find decent work for all the dismissed officers," Ivanyuk said. "I'm not certain the government will actually hand out all the money allocated for retraining. This money could end up being sequestered due to budget problems that came up at the beginning of the year and the redistribution of extra budget revenue."

At the last meeting of a government committee on social issues affecting servicemen, the chief inspector at General Headquarters, Gen. Mikhail Moiseyev, released figures showing that since 1992, more than 900,000 officers, warrant officers and midshipmen had been dismissed. Of this number, only 60,000, or 7 percent, had undergone retraining for civilian professions in Defense Ministry training centers. On paper, at least, the state is doing something for servicemen who've lost their jobs in the military through no fault of their own. Servicemen are covered, for example, by a 1998 federal employment program for 1998-2001. Another plan is for the state to compensate dismissed servicemen for the cost of training for a new profession. The government passed a decree on this last year.

There is also the government committee on social issues affecting servicemen, headed by Deputy Prime Minister Valentina Matviyenko. The committee is working on a draft federal program that aims to facilitate the integration into civilian society of servicemen dismissed between 2002-05. The committee is also drawing up welfare programs for servicemen and their families.

Former Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev recently signed a resolution to set up a coordinating council on the welfare of dismissed servicemen and their families, which will unite the efforts of the various Defense Ministry departments.

"We are seeing a proliferation of servicemen's welfare committees, but this isn't solving anything," said military sociologist Sergei Solovyev. "The country doesn't have the money and this means no matter what our intentions, only a small share of the officers will be able to retrain at the state's expense and find decent work."

Solovyev said that according to his figures, less than half the officers who come under the cutbacks end up finding any kind of other work for themselves.

"It's particularly hard for servicemen over 50 and living in small towns or in garrisons where there are many retired servicemen," Solovyev said. "It may not make us look good, but as before, most of the aid for retraining officers will come from abroad. When we withdrew our troops from Germany, the Germans gave us money to build 10 retraining centers for our servicemen. Then, other Western countries also began giving us money. Last year, foreign investment accounted for 11 million rubles of money spent on retraining. It may not seem like a lot, but it's better than nothing."

Some military experts say that more thought has to go into how to carry out retraining. Security Council expert Maj. Gen. Yevgeny Nikitenko, for example, said that retraining shouldn't become an end into itself.

"It would be simpler and more effective to create jobs in general and expand production," he said. "This way, it would be easier for our retired servicemen to see where in the economy they can be useful – and only then choose a specific profession to learn.

"As it is at the moment, we train them and they get, say, a diploma in accounting or management and then spend years looking for a place to use their skills. Only once the economy picks up will we be able to solve the unemployment problem for former servicemen."

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#8
space.com
May 14, 2001
Despite Expertise, Russia Can't Afford Trip to Red Planet
By Simon Saradzhyan

MOSCOW -- Sending humans to Mars with return tickets is technically and medically possible, but Russia cannot muster up the funds and resources necessary for such a costly program on its own, officials and experts said.

"There are no obstacles that cannot be overcome from the medical point of view. Problems exist, but there are approaches toward solving them," Anatoly Grigoryev, director of the Moscow-based Institute for Biomedical Problems, told SPACE.com.

In a statement issued to SPACE.com on Thursday through his press service, Grigoryev noted that Russia has already acquired expertise in keeping human beings in space long enough for a voyage to Mars and back.

He cited the example of the deputy director of his institute, Valery Polyakov, who spent 438 days on the Mir space station in 1994-95 to prove that human beings can endure over yearlong voyages in space. Calls to Polyakov were unanswered Thursday.

Mars 2016?

Grigoryev said the year 2016 offers the best launch window to take advantage of a favorable planetary alignment between Earth and Mars, but would not venture a guess as to whether Russia's space industry could muster the safe technology needed to send a crew of cosmonauts to Mars and back by that date.

NASA chief Dan Goldin told a symposium on the 40-year history of U.S. human spaceflight on Tuesday that human beings could reach the Red Planet 20 years from now.

According to an official at the Russian Aviation and Space Agency (Rosaviakosmos), America, the world's wealthiest country, has the resources and ability to launch a manned craft to Mars in two decades, unlike Russia, whose annual national budget roughly equals that of California.

"We don't even try to estimate how much it would cost" Russia to launch a manned mission to Mars, an official who oversees Rosaviakosmos' Mars probe program, told SPACE.com in a phone interview Thursday.

Presently, the cash-strapped agency isn't even sure whether it will be able to launch a spacecraft to Mars and Phobos in 2005 on a sample-return mission that will also transmit images of their surfaces, as had been earlier planned, according to the official, who asked not to be named.

The agency's Mars exploration program already saw one Mars-bound probe plummet back into the ocean when its launch vehicle failed in 1996.

While unable to solely finance the launch of a crew to Mars, with return tickets, Russia could shoulder some costs of U.S.-led program along with Europe, the Rosaviakosmos official said.

"We could have lowered the overall costs as cheaper, but skilled labor would remain our advantage, hopefully, even 20 years from now," said the official. As for Russia's edge on keeping human beings safe and sound in space for years, it will have evaporated by 2020, he said.

"Twenty years is more than enough for Americans to muster these technologies thanks to ISS (the International Space Station)," said the official.

Another Rosaviakosmos official, when reached by phone Thursday, questioned the very need to launch humans to Mars.

"The question is what such a mission can exactly achieve. I don't see anything that would justify the costs that would total tens of billions of dollars," said the official, who asked not to be named.

He said the federal government would have to boost Rosaviakosmos' 2001 budget of 4.59 billion rubles by 50 times if Russia were to try to send its cosmonauts to Mars in 2016.

Such an interplanetary hike is "unreal" and, thus, Rosaviakosmos should limit its Mars exploration program to trying to send a robotic probe there in the next several years, he said.

Technically feasible, financially impossible

A Russian space industry veteran said the launch of a manned craft to Mars is technically and medically feasible, but would prove to be too costly.

Konstantin Feoktistov, who helped to prepare the flight of Yuri Gagarin at the legendary OKB-1 design bureau and later flew into space himself, said he has calculated a manned mission to Mars would cost $1 trillion. "Even if the surface of Mars were covered with gems and gold, a manned mission would still be too expensive because of such a great cost," Feoktistov, who lectures on space exploration at the Moscow Bauman Technical University, told SPACE.com in a phone interview Thursday.

Moreover, such a mission would have no "realistic objectives to accomplish," according to Feoktistov, who looked into the possibility of launching a crew to Mars while working at OKB-1, now called Rocket Space Corporation (RSC) Energia.

He said OKB-1 designers started to study the possibility of such a mission back in the 1960's, but dropped these studies in the mid 1970s.

Back then, the Soviet government commissioned Energia and the Chelomey Design Bureau to look into this possibility, but refused to finance further research after both organizations concluded that the costs "would have been too great even for the Soviet Union to bear," Feoktistov said.

Feoktistov said he lost interest in manned exploration of Mars after concluding that an interplanetary ship would have had to weigh 400 tons to effectively protect six cosmonauts from deadly radiation during their two-to-three-year mission.

He said three of them would have actually landed on the Red Planet while the rest would have remained in orbit to stage a rescue operation if needed.

Feoktistov said Energia's calculations showed that such a mission would have lasted two to three years, and the spacecraft's weight could not have been significantly reduced, even if powered with electric jet engines.

Feoktistov argued that retrieval of samples from Mars and search for signs or traces of organic life on this planet could be done more easily by robotic craft. Meanwhile, setting up a colony there would be too costly because it would require building a gigantic power station to provide the energy needed to produce oxygen from carbon dioxide, which accounts for more 95 percent of the Martian atmosphere.

According to the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), a manned mission to Mars would last up to two years and would cost $40 billion or more.

Russia would not be able to implement such a project on its own, but could play an important role in designing and manufacturing both the ship and landing capsule if the United States and other Western countries decided to use Russian expertise, as they did in the case of ISS, according to a CAST statement made to SPACE.com Thursday.

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#9
Kennan Institute meeting report
The Prospects for a Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership
By Joseph Dresen

"The Prospects for a Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership" (April 11, 2001) Lecture at the Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C.

"The idea of a Russian-Chinese strategic partnership that Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Chinese President Jiang Zemin first proclaimed five years ago, in April 1996, evokes memories of the Sino-Soviet alliance of half a century ago, but it is actually nothing of the sort," stated Steven Levine, Mansfield Professor of Asia Pacific Studies, University of Montana at a 11 April 2001 panel discussion at the Kennan Institute cosponsored by the Wilson Center's Asia Program. The panel also included Aleksei Voskressenski, Professor and Head, Department of Asian Studies, MGIMO-University, Moscow, and former Regional Exchange Scholar, Kennan Institute; Jeanne Wilson, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Wheaton College; and discussant Alexander Lukin, Visiting Fellow, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies (CNAPS), Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings Institution. Rather than a relic of the cold war, the panel agreed, the strengthening relationship between China and Russia is driven by a complex set of shared interests and different priorities.

China and Russia share a mutual interest in a stable border. By the late 1990s, Moscow and Beijing had resolved a long-standing border conflict that had once threatened to engulf the Soviet Union and China in outright war. Both Russia and China are also interested in limiting U.S. influence in Central Asia, as well as maintaining political stability in these new states.

The economic forces unleashed by globalization also work to reinforce this cooperative relationship, according to Voskressenski. While benefiting from international trade, Russia and China are also concerned about lagging behind Western nations more fully integrated into the global economy. Both nations seek to mitigate the negative consequences for globalization by promoting increased cross-border trade. China benefits from increased access to Russian energy supplies and Russia benefits through greater integration of the Russian Far East into the Pacific economy. Another aspect of the economic relationship between Russia and China is one that strongly concerns the United States--Russian arms sales to China. Wilson noted that 70 percent of Russia's arms sales went to China in 2000. For Russia, these sales represent a very important source of export earnings that also keep several enterprises in Russia's defense industry afloat. China, in turn, relies on Russia for sophisticated arms and military technology, as it is cut off from arms sales from the West.

It is international politics, however, that throws Russia and China together with the greatest urgency and public fanfare. Both Moscow and Beijing view with alarm the economic, political, and military dominance of the United States in global affairs. In their eyes, Lukin stated, they are defending an international order rooted in the United Nations, where each holds veto power in the Security Council, from a United States bent on changing that order to its own advantage. NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia over Kosovo was particularly important in convincing Moscow and Beijing of the need to strengthen security ties. Both China and Russia are multinational countries, Lukin noted, and they wonder why the U.S. felt it could bomb Yugoslavia and not China and Russia, or even Turkey, for the same crime.

If the United States provides China and Russia with the strongest reason to unite, it is also the greatest source of contradiction in the relationship. Both China and Russia view their own bilateral relations with the United States as more important than their developing strategic partnership, the panelists agreed. Each also suspects the other of being willing to cut separate deals over vital security matters. Russia values China's cooperation in voicing opposition to U.S. hegemony, but it knows that China would not endanger its economic ties with the West over another round of NATO expansion. Bilateral trade between Russia and China may have reached a record $8 billion in 2000, but this figure is only 1.7 percent of China's trade volume and is dwarfed by China's $75 billion trade with the United States. China, on the other hand, is very concerned over any form of missile defense, given its limited nuclear deterrent and its desire to intimidate Taiwan with missiles based across the strait. China suspects that Russia may be willing to cut a deal with the West on missile defense that would negate China's deterrent without damaging Russia's.

Another challenge in the relationship is the reversal in relative power since the cold war. This change is evident in the demographic situation developing in the Russian Far East. Sparsely populated to begin with, the Russian population of the region is in decline. Over the border lies China, with the world's largest population and memories of territories annexed by the Russian Empire through a series of unequal treaties. If the security relationship between Russia and China is to endure as more than a reaction to the United States, they will need to come to terms with the shift in power and manage such vexing issues as the Russian Far East.

In short, the panelists agreed, the Sino-Russian relationship will fall far short of a military alliance and will be based upon independently derived assessments of their convergent mutual interests. A strong relationship between these states is a positive trend, as it promotes stability in the region and economic develop-ment. An element of that relationship will be to challenge the United States, but that challenge will be mitigated by each nation's interest in maintaining positive relations with the United States.

Joseph Dresen is program associate at the Kennan Institute.

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#10
Moskovsky Komsomolets
May 16, 2001
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
AIDS IS A GREATER FINANCIAL THREAT TO RUSSIA
THAN AN ARMY OF BUREAUCRATS
Treatment of One HIV-Infected Person Costs the Budget
$10,000 a Year
By Anastasiya KUZINA

No one believed in the possibility of an AID epidemic five years ago. A thousand HIV-infected people seemed like a drop in an ocean for a large country like Russia. Numerous long-term forecasts were made at that time. However, reality has overthrown all theoretical predictions. In the past five years the number of virus-carriers has increased by several dozen times to exceed 113,000 this year. But the real number is from five to ten times more, according to the estimates of the UN and Russian practising doctors.

The epidemic has not stopped. About 100 people become infected every day at present with 70 of them being residents of Moscow and the Moscow region. In January-April of this year 27,500 new cases were registered, increasing the total number of HIV-carriers to 113,323. The forecast for the next five years looks like a verdict. According to specialists from the Russian Federal AIDS Center, we will have up to five million HIV-infected patients by 2005. A look back and an analysis of statistics clearly show that such a number will become a reality in December 2005, regardless of our attitude.

This stands to reason that given the continuation of the present situation, one in thirty Russian citizens will be infected in five years. Taking into consideration that most of the HIV-infected are young people (90% are aged 15 to 30 years), one in ten people under 30 years of age will be a virus-carrier.

The virus as such does not require any treatment but, as time goes, HIV inevitably turns into AIDS. AIDS patients no longer die thanks to state-of-the-art methods of treatment, but treatment costs a lot of money. It takes at least $10,000 dollars a year per HIV-infected patient. The health care system no longer copes with the treatment of 400 cases. What will happen when there will be five million of them? Simple arithmetical estimates show that not only the country's health care system but the entire Russian economy will be unable to shoulder such a burden.

It was generally believed until very recently that only narcotic drug users are vulnerable to HIV. Statistics have come up with a surprise, which, by the way, could have been expected. Whereas only 6% of people got the HIV virus from their sex partners last year, their number was almost twice as large, or 10.3%, in the first three months of this year. The moment it reaches the level of 30% to 40% - which is just a piece of cake in our country - the virus previously confined within the community of drug addicts will quickly get loose in the streets all over the country.

Russians are very careless, indeed. Even the spread of syphilis has not been stopped yet: syphilis rate has grown 60 times since 1987. This vividly shows that the majority of our population are ignorant as far as safe sex is concerned.

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Additional Sources
 
Carnegie Moscow Center
 
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The Moscow Times
 
Russia Today
 
strana.ru
 
Voice of America
 
Interfax
 
AFP
 
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Christian Science Monitor
 
United States Diplomatic Mission
 
Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C.
 
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