#1
Jamestown Foundation Monitor
May 3, 2001

U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE PLANS ELICIT MIXED SIGNALS FROM MOSCOW. Russia joined with a host of other governments around the world in giving a cautious welcome yesterday to U.S. President George W. Bush's Tuesday speech laying out U.S. missile defense plans. The caution in Moscow was reflected, as was the case in many other foreign capitals, in words of praise for Bush's assurances that the United States would consult with its allies--and with Russia--as it moved forward in the development and deployment of a shield against ballistic missiles. But the soundings out of Moscow and other foreign capitals contained some skepticism about the seriousness of Washington's intentions to consult seriously on these issues. Officials in Russia and elsewhere were likewise cautious in their response to Bush's condemnations of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Foreign and domestic critics of the Bush administration's missile defense plans have argued that U.S. abrogation of the 1972 accord could unleash a new nuclear arms race and lead to a more general destabilization of the international security environment. Russia in particular continues to maintain that the ABM treaty is the cornerstone of the international security system, and Russian officials have in the past uttered dark warnings about how Moscow might respond if the United States were to violate the treaty.

One aspect of Tuesday's speech which clearly pleased Moscow and surprised some observers was the positive approach Bush took to improving relations between Russia and the United States. He acknowledged differences with Russia in the area of arms control, but called for a new Russian-U.S. relationship based on "openness, mutual confidence and real opportunities for cooperation, including the area of missile defense." Perhaps, Bush said, one day "we can even cooperate in a joint defense." Bush gave further credence to the perception that Washington is shifting toward a friendlier stance vis-a-vis Moscow by phoning Russian President Vladimir Putin several hours before delivering his speech and telling him, among other things, that he would "love to meet him" before an upcoming Group of Seven summit meeting this summer. And though Putin was the last of a group of foreign leaders Bush contacted prior to the speech, the Russian president responded positively. He affirmed that Russia is prepared to join with Washington in discussing major cuts in strategic arms. At the same time, however, Putin reportedly insisted on the importance of maintaining the ABM treaty.

Bush's suggestion that the United States intends to resume arms control negotiations of some sort with Moscow, and that cooperation between the two countries might eventually be possible in this area, is an important development for several reasons. For one, it will help the Bush administration to quiet European demands--aimed at both Washington and Moscow--that the United States and Russia hold good-faith consultations on the question of missile defense and nuclear arms reductions. Indeed, the Kremlin's own pointed calls since Bush's inauguration for a resumption of Russian-U.S. arms talks have presumably been intended at least in part at portraying itself to the Europeans as a more reasonable and accommodating partner than Washington. And the Bush administration's ability to get the Europeans peacefully on board any future deployment of a U.S. missile defense system may depend ultimately on whether European leaders believe that Washington has done enough to accommodate Moscow (and Beijing).

But the Bush administration's apparent shift toward friendlier ties with Russia is probably even more important from a narrower Russian perspective. That is, aside from the public relations side of the equation, the Kremlin sees the resumption of Russian-U.S. talks on key arms control issues as a validation of its own special status. The talks, if they do take place and Moscow has its say, will move Russia back toward a more central position in a key area of international security, and will provide a high-profile forum for Moscow to push its own views on the ABM treaty and nuclear arms reductions. That thought was reflected in the comments of unnamed sources close to the Russian government yesterday, who were quoted as saying that Bush's speech is being seen as a "signal of the resumption of Russian-American consultations on questions of strategic stability as a whole, and of strategic arms reduction and missile defense in particular." Beyond that, the Kremlin is undoubtedly hoping that improved relations with the Bush administration will also open the way to Russian-U.S. consultations on a variety of other international issues, including international efforts to deal with tensions in the Middle East, the Balkans and on the Korean Peninsula (Reuters, AP, May 1-2; The Guardian, The Times [London], AFP, Russian agencies, May 2; International Herald Tribune, May 3).

An end to the Bush administration's policy of cold-shouldering Moscow could also have an impact on increasingly warm Russian-Chinese relations. Indeed, it is perhaps no accident that the first signs of a thaw in Washington's approach to Moscow came during the recent U.S.-Chinese spy plane row. As numerous commentators in Russia and elsewhere have suggested, the Bush administration's missile defense policies and more generally confrontational posture toward both Beijing and Moscow have tended to push those two countries ever closer together diplomatically. Their intention to further upgrade that relationship was exhibited over the weekend during a visit to Moscow by China's foreign minister, and is expected to be formalized with the signing of a new friendship treaty during a Russian-Chinese summit in July (see the Monitor, May 2).

But, diplomatic niceties aside, there are clearly underlying tensions which persist in relations between Moscow and Beijing, including their differing views toward U.S. missile defense plans. Russian objections in this area center most forcefully on strategic missile defense and on Washington's potential exit from the ABM Treaty; China shares those concerns but is most opposed to the potential deployment of a U.S. theater missile defense system in Asia. A resumption of Russian-U.S. talks on the missile defense and ABM issues could raise Chinese suspicions about Moscow's real goals and motives. Suggestions that Russia might be granted a role in the building of a U.S.-European missile defense system--a policy that some believe could buy Putin's support for terminating the ABM treaty--could also serve to further exacerbate tensions between Moscow and Beijing.

But Russian objections to abrogation of the ABM treaty, whether they are real or intended primarily to wrest concessions from the Bush administration in other areas, are nevertheless likely to remain the central conflict in any arms control consultations which do take place between Washington and Moscow. That was the message conveyed indirectly yesterday by Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, the only Russian government official to provide an official comment on Bush's address. Ivanov welcomed Bush's offer to consult with the allies and with Russia and reiterated Moscow's readiness to agree to major cuts in strategic weapons. But he also said that it is impossible to view the ABM Treaty in isolation from other strategic arms control issues, and underlined that Russia remains committed to retention of the ABM accord. The same sort of message was voiced indirectly yesterday by what were described as Russian "military-diplomatic sources." Putting their own spin on Bush's speech and related developments in Washington, they suggested that the U.S. administration understands the importance of the ABM accord to Russia and would not unilaterally withdraw from the treaty. "Moscow has received signals from Washington that there are forces in the American administration which understand the negative consequences of the United States taking unilateral decisions about leaving ABM and deploying a national missile defense system," the sources said. Given the criticism that Bush leveled against the ABM treaty during his Tuesday speech, that is an assertion which seems likely to be tested in the weeks and months to come (Reuters, Russian agencies, May 2).

Back to the Top


#2
strana.ru
May 3, 2001
Aleksei Arbatov: "The Americans do not know themselves what they want from ABM"

State Duma's Aleksei Arbatov thinks the statement George Bush made yesterday is a turn towards a more attentive and respectful attitude to Russia.

The thing is George Bush did not say yesterday that the United States was withdrawing from the ABM Treaty. He said the Treaty was outmoded and the United States would conduct negotiations on its revision or on giving it up altogether - this possibility exists as well. Formally, however, the U.S. did not say it was pulling out of the Treaty.

The positive moment is that unlike previously, when there was talk about unilateral actions, Bush said he would hold negotiations and consultations with other countries and allies - both with China and other states. That is, there will be an attempt to find a coordinated solution, particularly with the member states of the ABM Treaty, which are only five - U.S.A., Russia, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.

Russia has given to that what I consider as a quite sound reply: Russia is prepared to have negotiations on the matter, we do not regard the ABM Treaty as outmoded, but we are open to negotiations with the U.S.A. We also have interests of our own, particularly in what it concerns offensive strategic weapons, and if we reach a compromise, a package solution of all issues related to both antimissile defense and strategic offensive weapons may be attained.

Russia has its program of further development of the strategic nuclear forces, which is geared to the observation of the ABM Treaty. If we come to terms with the United States on a revision of the ABM Treaty, it is likely we will not have to apply any additional measures in the military area. Possibly we will come to terms on a revision of the ABM Treaty, which will enable the U.S. to deploy such a system for the defense against third nuclear powers while Russia for its part will be given the right to certain offensive arms, which are currently banned under the START-2 Treaty.

All of this is currently at the political level, not the level of concrete talks, when positions are clearly specified. The thing is the Americans still do not know themselves what concretely they want from the ABM Treaty, what amendments to make, what matters should be revised, or in general whether to raise the question about the Treaty's abrogation. Because they are yet to shape their antimissile defense program. When they shape the program, it will become clear to them which clauses of the ABM Treaty bind their hands. And then they will be able to raise the question about its revision.

As far as the situation with China is concerned, relations have become aggravated between the United States and China, which is a fact. Tensions are being stoked not only by the U.S. but also by China. It starts making threatening gestures in the direction of Taiwan while the U.S. in the new Administration has taken a tougher position. It said it would not allow China to solve the problem by force. I think we must not prod China in this matter either, we are not interested in the problem being solved by force either. Unlike Chechnya, Taiwan has long been de facto an independent state with a much advanced economy, with considerable investments. We also have some sort of economic relations with Taiwan.

As far as I can understand, Putin and Bush came to terms over the phone yesterday that they would hold a bilateral summit before the G-8 meeting in Genoa. Very much the right thing to do. It is also a positive shift, because some time ago the President of Russia addressed the same proposal to the United States and received quite a scornful reply to the effect that it did not see it as necessary. A number of other negative statements was made in respect of Russia, scornful and occasionally even hostile ones. What Bush said yesterday marks an absolutely clear turn to a more constructive, attentive and respectful attitude to Russia. It seems to me, it is a definite shift.

Yesterday's telephone conversation between the Presidents of our countries was calm and constructive. Our position has shifted as well. And so have the positions of both the U.S.A. and Russia, but so far only at the level of grand political declarations. The United States said it would not act unilaterally, would hold negotiations and seek agreement. The Russian side stated that it was ready to conduct negotiations, that it did not reject out of hand any possibility of negotiations on the ABM Treaty.

But one must be quite cautious about such important historic treaties as lie at the base of a huge system of arms restrictions and reductions, which has taken shape in the world over the last 30 years. They should not be broken just like that. Amendments might be introduced to the Treaty only where it is really necessary.

Back to the Top


#3
strana.ru
May 3, 2001
Sergei Rogov: Americans are seeking ways to achieve total superiority in military sphere

Comment on George W. Bush's statement on NMD has been contributed to Strana.Ru by the Director of the Institute for United States and Canada Studies, Sergei Rogov.

Bush's statement is a declaration of political intentions of the American leadership to change the rules of the game that had evolved during the Cold War years - rules that determined strategic stability in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and today between the United States and Russia. Bush is trying to create the impression that the United States will by all means deploy a national missile defense (NMD) shield, and that this question allegedly is not open for discussion.

But at the same time, he is avoiding to offer any details of the NMD plans. Nothing is clear about the deadlines, the composition or structure of the American NMD. In reality, the USA will be able to begin deploying some kind of anti-missile systems only at the end of the given decade, and moreover, that process will drag out for many years. That is why Bush's announcement should be viewed as a kind of psychological attack.

Russia must prepare itself for a very complicated period of a diplomatic dialogue with the United States on all these questions. It should not be ruled out that it will be possible to reach a compromise and to come to terms on a new regime that would regulate strategic offensive and strategic defensive weapons in the course of the next 10 to 15 years. It will hardly be possible to preserve the status quo. But even so, confrontation is by no means inevitable. However, judging by everything, the dialogue that may develop between Russia and the United States after the meeting between Putin and Bush can last for quite a long time. That is why it would be premature to hurry with conclusions, to give in to panic and announce the beginning of a new cold war.

It would also be premature to speak today about the strategy of the George W. Bush administration simply because so far on the majority of questions, the new American administration is avoiding any kind of specifics. Nonetheless, the style of the administration can already be seen quite vividly. I have in mind the very vociferous and tough declarations with the help of which the American administration is striving to get concessions. And this style was reflected in the American president's pronouncements at the National Defense University when he spoke of the NMD as a question that had already been resolved. But when it comes to concrete problems, here the Bush administration is acting very cautiously.

In the ideal, the United States would like to have a free hand in order to get rid of any kind of restrictions on American offensive and defensive weapons systems. I have in mind restrictions that are stipulated in international legal documents as mandatory for fulfillment, such international treaties, since many in Washington today consider that arms control agreements are a unilateral concession on the part of the United States since neither Russia, nor China nor any other country is capable of creating a symmetrical threat to the United States. And so the Americans are seeking ways of getting a free hand so as to gain even greater superiority in the military sphere.

Back to the Top


#4
Boston Globe
May 3, 2001
US missile-shield advocate faces a new selling job
By Kevin Cullen, Globe Staff

BRUSSELS - Alexander ''Sandy'' Vershbow, the Brookline native and career diplomat who was named Tuesday to be the next US ambassador to Russia, has spent the last two years trying to convince Europeans that creation of a missile defense system is inevitable. It would be his job to do the same in Moscow.

There remains considerable international skepticism about the proposal to create a system to protect the United States, and perhaps some of its allies, from attack by rogue states, but the reaction in European capitals to President Bush's ringing endorsement of the concept was relatively muted yesterday. In part, that was testimony to Vershbow's success as US ambassador to NATO in convincing the European allies, especially Germany and France, that US plans to push ahead are serious.

Vershbow declined comment yesterday, saying through a spokeswoman he could not discuss the Russian post while his nomination is pending before the Senate. But in an interview two months ago, he argued that the momentum for some form of missile defense is irresistible, sentiments that would explain why a Republican administration would feel comfortable handing the crucial Moscow post to a diplomat who rose to prominence under a Democratic administration.

While some have warned that the US plan will upset the balance of shared risk to nuclear attack and restart the Cold War arms race, the Bush administration has softened the opposition by holding out the prospect of extending the missile shield's coverage to allies, including Russia.

Opposition to the US plan remains fierce in Russia and among left-wing parties across Europe, but the left-of-center governments that hold power in 13 of the European Union's 15-nation bloc have been noticeably less antagonistic since the Bush administration took charge in January. Joschka Fischer, the German foreign minister and former left-wing radical, has repeatedly told his European peers they are wasting their time trying to dissuade the Americans.

Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain indicated yesterday that he would risk the wrath of leftist skeptics in his Labor Party to back the US plan.

George Robertson, the NATO general secretary, said Vershbow has been able to convince most of the European governments that they would be better off trying to influence the scope and nature of the system, rather than calling for it to be shelved.

"Sandy's been on this for the last two years, and it has sunk through with most of the allies,'' Lord Robertson said in an interview last month. ''The Russians are another story, but there are signs they are beginning to listen."

For Vershbow, who was born in Brookline and raised in Newton, taking George Depthula's Russian class at Browne & Nichols School has finally paid off.

Vershbow, whose father still lives in Newton, became intrigued by Russian culture and politics, majoring in Russian and Eastern European studies at Yale University. He joined the State Department in 1977 and in 1988 became the last director of its Soviet affairs office. Under President Clinton, he was director of European affairs at the National Security Council, in charge of preparing for NATO enlargement and getting the Russians to look more warmly at their former Cold War enemies.

President Bush announced Vershbow's nomination on the same day that he made his first major defense policy speech, reaffirming his administration's plan to go ahead with perfecting a national missile defense system. The Russians say it would violate the antiballistic missile treaty the Soviet Union and United States signed in 1972.

One of Vershbow's main jobs in Brussels was to convince the European allies that the United States was serious about going ahead with a plan dubbed ''Son of Star Wars,'' after the Reagan administration's satellite-based plan that never got off the ground.

When NATO's Robertson visited Moscow in February, Russian officials handed him an alternative plan, which he described as ''vague'' but significant because the Russians acknowledged that they face threats from the same sort of rogue elements that the White House cites as the main justification for building a multibillion-dollar defense system.

Vershbow agreed with Robertson that the debate over missile defense has shifted from ideology to questions of capability.

"We've turned a corner," Vershbow said. "There may be more corners to turn as we go down the road. But the Russians have changed the debate by admitting there is a threat..."

While Clinton was ambivalent about missile defense, the Bush administration's determination to press ahead has led most European governments to conclude that it is unrealistic to simply oppose the system, Vershbow said.

"With Bush, they know we really mean it," he said. "The Bush administration has stressed that this is a long-term process, that there's time to work together. They've emphasized working with the allies, and maybe working with Russia if they are serious."

As US ambassador to NATO since January 1998, Vershbow has seen firsthand that former Cold War enemies can become allies. In 1999, three former Soviet bloc countries - the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland - became NATO members, and they have been more supportive of the missile plan than traditional allies.

Vershbow has not relied exclusively on policy arguments to win converts. In Brussels, he and his wife, Lisa, were well known for their collection of art at Truman House, the official residence of the NATO ambassador, and regularly hosted a cabaret troupe, the Boston Musical Theater, led by Lisa Vershbow's mother, Charlotte Kaufman, who teaches at the New England Conservatory.

The troupe's drummer is the ambassador himself. He said he became close to Andras Simonyi, Hungary's former ambassador to NATO and a blues guitarist of some note, "because we'd jam together."

"Policy is one thing," Vershbow said. "NATO's secret weapon is the collegiality of the council allies." He hopes for a repeat performance in Moscow.

Back to the Top


#5
Russia: Analysis From Washington
-- A Looming Proliferation Threat
By Paul Goble

Washington, 3 May 2001 (RFE/RL) -- Falling salaries among Russian scientists working on nuclear weapons and missiles represent a looming proliferation threat, according to a study by an American think tank.

That is because, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace said in a report released this week, many of these underpaid specialists may now consider selling nuclear materials or even offering their own services abroad.

Prepared by Russian social scientist Valentin Tikhonov, who was able to gain access to areas still closed to Western scholars, the Carnegie study reports on surveys conducted in eight Russian cities, five of which specialize in building nuclear weapons and another three which are involved in the production of missiles and missile-related technologies.

According to the Carnegie report, 62 percent of all workers in the enterprises in these cities make less than $50 a month, with more than half of the scientists involved reporting being forced to take a second job to make ends meet. Almost nine out of ten said they had suffered a decline in their standard of living, and a majority felt their salaries were only a third or half of what they should be.

Because of the precipitous decline in their incomes, the report suggests, at least some of the scientists may be tempted to sell off some of the nuclear materials to anyone with the money to buy. And at least some of the nuclear and missile scientists said they would like to work outside of Russia, raising the specter that they might sell their services to rogue states interested in developing a nuclear missile capability.

If the scientists either sell nuclear materials or offer their services to rogue states, the report says, this would exacerbate "the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation" around the world. If they do both, that could represent one of the most serious proliferation threats of all time. And to prevent that, the Carnegie report urges that both Moscow and the West work together to increase the salaries and job satisfaction of the scientists involved.

At the very least, it says, "the Russian government and associated experts have a responsibility to understand the particular social and economic problems that beset these specialists at a time when Russian reforms are evolving" because "the better these trends are understood, the more effective targeted programs to address current circumstances will be."

What makes the Carnegie report so disturbing is that it comes after almost a decade of efforts both by Moscow and by Western governments and especially that of the United States to try to prevent any leakage of nuclear weapons, equipment, or personnel out of the countries that emerged following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Beginning almost immediately after 1991, the U.S. successfully pushed for the return of all Soviet nuclear weapons to the Russian Federation. It promoted the dismantling of nuclear weapons and the denaturing of nuclear materials. And it provided assistance through the Nunn-Lugar program to sustain Russian nuclear scientists and thus dissuade them from selling their services to rogue states.

Since 1991, the so-called Nunn-Lugar program -- named for U.S. Senator Richard Lugar and former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn -- has helped destroy some 5,000 nuclear warheads as well as weapon materials and delivery systems.

Throughout this decade, the Russian government has continued to insist that it has complete and effective control over nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, and nuclear and missile scientists. So far, there is no evidence that Moscow has lost control over the weapons, but there has been leakage of at least small amounts of nuclear materials and some nuclear and missile scientists seeking higher-paid work.

The Carnegie report suggests that there may be more leakage of both in the near term unless something more is done to address the income needs of the Russian scientists. And its conclusions are likely to prompt at least some Western governments to consider extending more assistance to prevent the flight of nuclear fuel and nuclear scientists to countries like Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.

But precisely because the Carnegie study calls into question much of the optimism at the core of most earlier investigations into this matter, its findings are likely to spark a new debate in both Moscow and the West about just what is the best way to prevent proliferation at a time when the major nuclear powers are cutting back their programs while some other countries are seeking to acquire such weapons.

And in that debate, some are certain to call for a new round of disarmament talks, while others are likely to insist that the Russian government must take steps to control the situation with its nuclear scientists if it wants to be taken seriously. But as the Carnegie study reminds, while this debate is taking place, ever more Russian nuclear and missile scientists will be reconsidering just what their options are in the post-Cold War environment.

Back to the Top


#6
Gusinsky compares fight for media freedom in Russia with
Warsaw uprising

WASHINGTON, May 3 (AFP) -
Russian media mogul Vladimir Gusinsky, wanted by authorities in Moscow who are dismantling his independent press outlets, on Thursday compared the fight for media freedom in Russia with the 1943 Warsaw ghetto uprising.

In April, Russia's state-owned natural gas monopoly, Gazprom, took over NTV -- the country's last independent television station -- and forcibly replaced its management.

The company then closed a newspaper and a respected weekly that were also part of Gusinsky's Media-MOST group.

Speaking here about the rebellious decision by a group of some 350 former NTV journalists to start up a new independent television station in the face of the state clampdown, Gusinsky compared their efforts with the Jewish Warsaw ghetto uprising during the Holocaust.

In that 1943 uprising, 750 ghetto fighters fought against German troops and staved them off for nearly a month before the rebellion was quashed and the captured Jews were either shot or sent off to killing centers or concentration camps.

"Maybe it's not exactly a parallel story," Gusinsky told a small breakfast gathering at the US Congress, "but everybody has to do what they are supposed to do."

"I think journalists ought to honestly do their work -- those who are not afraid and those who can do it. And those who make journalists' work possible, they have to continue to do their work (despite the pressure)," he said.

"One thing I can tell you with complete confidence: All journalists that moved to the new company, they made this decision because they have a clear understanding of their role and obligation to the people of Russia," he added.

But he acknowledged that the decision to stand independent was not one everyone could take.

"Since there are certain signs in Russia of a movement backwards, journalists get afraid, and certain journalists have decided to take a certain conformist, more friendly position" toward those in power, he said.

Gusinsky was freed by Spain's highest court in April after it rejected an extradition demand from Moscow on fraud charges, ruling they were politically motivated.

Russian officials have denied accusations that the takeover of Media-MOST's various outlets is a clampdown on media freedom, insisting it is largely a result of Media-MOST's financial problems.

Back to the Top


#7
gazeta.ru
May 3, 2001
US Press Freedom Group Names Putin As Enemy of Press for 2001
By Svetlana Nesterova, Lisa Vronskaya

Since the early days of his presidency Russia's reticent leader with dark KGB past Vladimir Putin has never really expressed any special fondness for mass media. And on May 3 the US-based Committee to Protect Journalist (CPJ), an international organization for defence of freedom of press in the world, issued a statement, which may as well shatter last thin hopes for presidential respect towards mass media forever.

Especially, since it is no secret that Russian president is very touchy and does not like to be criticized.

On Thursday, the Committee to Protect Journalist named the Ten Worst Enemies of the Press for 2001, "focusing attention on individual political leaders responsible for the world's worst abuses against the media", and Vladimir Putin happened to be one of them.

Another human rights media watchdog Reporters Without Borders issued a list of 30 names of state leaders, responsible for oppressing media freedoms, and, naturally, Vladimir Putin's name is on that list as well.

According to the executive director for the Committee to Protect Journalists Ann K. Cooper, the Russian president was recognized an enemy of free press for actions aimed at imposing centralized control over the mass media, suppression of criticism and elimination of independent press.

"Since taking office last year, Vladimir Putin has presided over an alarming assault on press freedom in Russia. The Kremlin imposed censorship in Chechnya, orchestrated legal harassment against private media outlets, and granted sweeping powers of surveillance to the security services. Despite Putin's professed goal of imposing the rule of law, numerous violent attacks on journalists have been carried out with impunity across Russia. In an ominous and dramatic move this April, the Kremlin-controlled Gazprom corporation took over NTV, the country's only independent national television network. Within days, the Gazprom coup had shut down a prominent Moscow daily and ousted the journalists in charge of the country's most prestigious newsweekly. Despite Gazprom's insistence that the changes were strictly business, the main beneficiary was Putin himself, whose primary critics have now been silenced," the CPJ statement reads.

It is worth noting that even though Vladimir Putin's name was included in the list of the worst enemies of media freedoms for the first time, nevertheless, he won the honorable fifth place therein. And here is how the list looks:

1. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
2. Charles Taylor, President of Liberia.
3. Jiang Zemin, President of The People's Republic of China.
4. Robert Mugabe, President of Zimbabwe.
5. Vladimir Putin, President of Russia.
6. Carlos Casta?o, Leader of The United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).
7. Leonid Kuchma, President of Ukraine.
8. Fidel Castro, President of Cuba.
9. Zine al-Abdine Ben Ali, President of Tunisia.
10. Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia.

Ukraine's Leonid Kuchma is the only European leader listed as the worst enemy of the press for the second year in a row, whereas Belarus' Lukashenko escaped the "honour" since he had successfully done away with disobedient media outlets since long ago. But then, Reporters Without Borders included his name in their list of media enemies.

Naturally the true reason why Putin's name emerged on the list of the Worst Enemies of Press is the scandal surrounding recent dismantling of Vladimir Gusinsky's media empire, first and foremost, the story of NTV takeover.

In a special open letter to the president of Russia, published on April 30, 2001 on CPJ official web-site, CPJ's executive director Ann K.Cooper claims that state takeover of news outlets threatened freedom of press in Russia.

"The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) is deeply concerned about the takeover by Gazprom-Media of news outlets previously owned by the Media-Most company. Gazprom-Media is a subsidiary of Gazprom, a state-run gas monopoly," the letter reads.

US State Department, too, issued several alarmed statements concerning the situation surrounding Media-Most.

Back to the Top


#8
Christian Science Monitor
May 3, 2001
US quickens China-Russia thaw
Chinese news agency warned yesterday that US missile shield
plans could start an arms race.
By Robert Marquand
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

When President Richard Nixon helped "open China," part of the aim was to counter any alliance between the archrival Soviets, and China. Jokes and friendship toasts between then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Chinese officials in the 1970s always included verbal jabs at Moscow.

In reality, mutual suspicions and animosity between Moscow and Beijing then were so thick that a "Sino-Soviet" alliance never materialized. Yet today, a struggling Russia and a rising China are now exploring a wide range of cooperative ties, including closer military relations. The White House announcement Tuesday to design and deploy a nuclear missile shield could accelerate this emerging comity.

In fact, by proposing to cut nuclear weapons stockpiles and abandon the traditional concept of nuclear deterrence, the Bush administration may be introducing the most significant geopolitical change since World War II.

The US plan comes at a time when relations between the "Bear" and the "Dragon" are in their "most intensive phase in decades," according to a Russian Foreign Ministry statement. Already, more than half of Russia's growing arms exports are to China, a nuclear weapons state that sees its deterrent as devalued by the prospect of an effective missile defense in the US.

Yesterday, China's Xinhua state news agency warned: "The US missile defense plan ... will destroy the balance of international security forces and could cause a new arms race."

Early this week, Russia and China announced a longterm "friendship and cooperation treaty" to be signed when Chinese President Jiang Zemin visits his counterpart, Vladimir Putin, in Moscow this July.

With the US threatening to withdraw unilaterally from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, the keystone of cold-war arms control, the message received in Moscow is that Russia is no longer considered a strategic equal, but rather a second-tier nuclear power such as Britain, France, or China.

"Our leaders have great difficulty accepting this, but the impact upon them is purely psychological," says Andrei Piontkovsky, director of the Center for Strategic Studies, an independent Moscow think tank. "We still have over 1,000 nuclear missiles, which would be more than enough to overwhelm the missile shield the Americans are contemplating. Russian leaders should relax and concentrate on the positive elements of Bush's message, such as the suggestion to slash strategic offensive weapons."

Should China and Russia overcome their differences, geopolitics would be significantly altered in the Pacific-Asia region, an area described by Ashley Tellis of the Rand Corporation as "poised to become the new center of gravity in international politics in the 21st century."

A serious Sino-Russian power block could in time challenge the US strategic and military role in the region, backed by the US Pacific Fleet, which for many years has provided security in East Asia. For that reason, the US missile plan is already raising the level of concern among states like Japan and South Korea, experts say.

"There is some reluctance and some concerns, particularly [regarding] China," says Masahi Nishihara, the president of the National Defense Academy in Yokosuka, Japan. "But China will expand its nuclear positions anyway; they're simply using American support for Theater Missile Defense [TMD] as their excuse for expanding it."

The US considers a smaller-scale shield for Japan as necessary to defend it, and US forces based there, against a North Korean missile threat. China considers a TMD shield as the first step in the remilitarization of Japan. It also worries that Taiwan might get such a shield, according to Thomas Bickford, an Asia security specialist at the University of Wisconsin.

Already, China purchases an estimated $2 billion worth of Russian military hardware annually, intelligence reports say - and China may be negotiating secretly to purchase Russian "stealth" destroyers that would give its small navy the capability of sinking US aircraft carriers.

In practical terms, experts say, Russia and China have many embedded layers of distrust to get past before building a real alliance. Moreover, Beijing may need to buy weapons from Moscow, but most of its future talent goes to college in the United States. And US firms like Ford, which last week signed a multibillion dollar agreement to build a new plant in central China, continue to invest here.

"For all the talk of Sino-Russian comity, it's hard to see the Dragon and the Bear entering into a close alliance. There's just too much geopolitical strain between them," says Richard Baum, China specialist at the University of California at Los Angeles. "Still, the more frosty grows the relationship between Washington and Beijing, the more appealing will a cooperative strategic partnership appear.... Left to their own devices, China and Russia would never form a close alliance; but with the US pushing China relentlessly into an adversarial relationship, the Russian Bear must be looking a bit more benign to Beijing's leaders."

Relations between the US and China have been rocky for months. For most of the first 100 days of the Bush administration, Beijing officials have wondered whether the Bush team's early hard-line position of a "China threat" was simply campaign sloganeering - or if it signaled a new confrontational approach.

Chinese leaders are cognizant of a pro-Japan emphasis in the new White House and have spent considerable diplomatic capital to correct what they now feel is a clear pro-Taiwan tilt by the US.

Beijing treats its policy of eventual reunification with Taiwan in almost orthodox religious terms. Last week's multibillion dollar US arms package for Taiwan, including submarines, was blasted officially. Beijing is still not certain how to read Bush's statement that the US would "do what it takes" to defend Taiwan. Such a comment goes far past the so-called "strategic ambiguity" that most US leaders have relied on in dealing with US-China-Taiwan relations, with the US keeping both sides deliberately unclear about how far the Pacific Fleet would go to assist Taiwan, if it were attacked.

In Russia, official and independent experts alike are unhappy about the implications of a US missile shield. "This is going to drive Russia and China together," says Pavel Felgenhauer, a strategic analyst in Moscow.

Most experts don't consider China's current nuclear capability threatening enough to require a missile shield deterrent. The People's Liberation Army is thought to have 10 to 20 intercontinental missiles (each with only one warhead) at "Base No. 54" near the town of Luoyang, in central China's Henan province. How quickly the Chinese plan to expand their nuclear arsenal is unclear.

Washington's stated purpose for the shield is to use it as a deterrent against "rogue states" like North Korea, and secondarily to possibly defend allies.

In this sense, should the US develop missile-shield technology, and should Taiwan be protected by it - a shield could counter some 300 short- and medium- range missiles now reportedly deployed by the Chinese across the 90-mile strait separating the mainland from Taiwan.

Some experts who predict a missile- shield program will create problems for the US around the globe say the strategic calculations made by military planners looking at the future capability of other states don't always account for the short- term feelings and atmospherics that also play into how history is made.

Supporters say leadership requires making bold and controversial decisions. The technology has advanced since the idea was first proposed under former President Ronald Reagan, and it's better to prepare now for a missile threat, than wait until it's too late, they say.

Staff writer Ilene R. Prusher in Tokyo, and Fred Weir in Moscow, contributed to this report.

Back to the Top


#9
Moscow Times
April 28, 2001
Nation 45th in Competitiveness
By Maxim Trudolyubov and Mikhail Overchenko
Vedomosti

Russia is no longer considered the least competitive country in the world.

Over the course of last year, Russia surpassed Colombia, Poland, Venezuela and Indonesia to take 45th place in terms of its competitiveness, according to a poll of business leaders conducted by the International Institute for Management Development, or IMD.

The Economic Development and Trade Ministry said the country's higher ranking demonstrates that attitudes toward Russia are changing.

Every year, the IMD business school in Lausanne, Switzerland, compiles a ranking of countries' competitiveness. This year, the list includes 49 countries, two more than last year. The purpose of the list is to demonstrate to what extent countries help their business leaders achieve greater competitiveness on the domestic and international markets. Countries are rated not only by objective economic factors, such as the rise of gross domestic product, but a long list of criteria that includes:

o 68 criteria for economic activity that evaluate macroeconomic indicators;

o 84 criteria for government performance, including general policies, tax policies and protection of investors;

o 60 criteria for effective business management, including profitability, responsibility and innovation;

o 74 criteria for infrastructure, measuring to what extent local, technical, scientific and human resources meet business needs.

In addition, IMD used statistics received from international organizations, national and private institutes and data compiled from a survey of 3,678 directors of large and medium-sized companies in the countries studied.

The Economic Development and Trade Ministry said the IMD survey could be used to gauge world opinion. "We keep track of such data," said Deputy Minister Arkady Dvorkovich. "It might not be entirely objective, but it's an indicator of attitudes toward us. Russia's position will continue to improve if the measures we propose are implemented."

However, the government does not study the country's competitiveness in its own analyses. "The rise in exports — that's the rise of our competitiveness," said Alexander Pakhomov, head of the Economic Development and Trade Ministry's trade policy department.

Using exports as an indicator, Russia ranks high. It's fourth in the world for the growth of exports and is second for its positive net trade balance. Moreover, Russia comes out on top in some categories. It has the highest correlation of the value of exports to the value of imports and the lowest cost of electrical energy for industry. Over the past year, the government achieved the greatest reduction of its state debt among the countries surveyed, with a 30.8 percent drop, not taking into account inflation.

Russia could perform much better if it targeted those areas where it particularly falls behind, said Suzanne Rosselet, who was responsible for the methodology used in IMD's research. If Russia brought results in its 20 weakest areas up to the IMD study's average, the country's rating would rise to 39.

Russia's weaknesses, in IMD's opinion, include the highest foreign debt as a percentage of GDP at 85.6 percent, the highest level of energy consumption at 62.7 kilojoules per dollar of GDP, the absence of a mechanism to protect foreign investment, and drug and alcohol abuse.

The ratings rose the fastest among countries that focused on government performance and effective management of infrastructure, Rosselet said. Finland and Sweden, for example, are increasing their competitiveness through large investments in new technology.

Hong Kong, significantly, improved its rating by returning to sixth place — the position it held in 1999 — from 12th place in 2000. Like Russia, Hong Kong achieved its higher ranking through an improved macroeconomic rating. Last year, Hong Kong's GDP rose 10 percent.

The institute's specialists warn that this year, the arrangement of power could change, given that the United State's economic slowdown and the current economic crisis in Japan will have a negative impact on other countries.

"The year 2000 was a year of economic excess, 2001 could be the year of the economic hangover," the report states.

"The United States and Japan create 46 percent of the world's gross national product," said Professor Stephane Garelli, director of the project. "A worsening economic situation in those countries could hurt every country in the world."

Japan's rating has fallen for the past 7 years. For eight years until 1994, Japan held first place. But the country is being undermined by the reluctance of its authorities to undertake reforms that would allow it to overcome stagnation. The Americans, who have held first place since 1994, are not in danger of losing their position.

"The leading countries have created conditions not only for attracting investment, but also the best minds," Garelli said. "The U.S. has been the most active in this area. From 1994 to 1999, they 'imported' 124,000 Indians, 68,000 Chinese, 57,000 Filipinos, 49,000 Canadians and 42,000 British citizens, all highly educated. In the race to increase competitiveness, the struggle is waged for bytes and minds."

Back to the Top


#10
Program on New Approaches to Russian Security Policy Memo Series (PONARS)
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~ponars/memos.html
Memo No. 188
PONARS, 2001
The United States and the Unipolar Delusion:
Implications for US-Russia Relations
By Ted Hopf
Department of Political Science
Ohio State University--March 2001

Who would have predicted that 10 years after the disappearance of the Soviet Union, US defense spending would remain at levels characteristic of the Cold War? Or that the United States would lead a campaign to push the borders of the military alliance designed to fight the Cold War, NATO, ever closer to Russia's borders? Or that the energy reserves of Central Asia and the Caucasus, and the routes by which they reach Western markets, would be understood by Washington as strategic assets that should be denied to Moscow, for fear of Russia's growing influence on Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan? Or that the United States would relentlessly pursue the deployment of ballistic missile defense, despite the opposition of not only China and Russia, but also its own NATO allies? How can we explain this Cold War behavior in the absence of a Cold War enemy?

There are three parts to a possible answer. The first two--expectations for absolute security and the conception of security as necessitating a world that looks like America--are features of American political strategic culture. The third part concerns the military-industrial complex and its associated discourse of American hegemony that dominates domestic politics in the United States today. In identifying these possible causes for the continuation of the Cold War after the disappearance of Washington's only rival, I suggest how Russian foreign policy might be crafted so as to both avert the dangers emanating from America's unipolar delusion, and help gradually do away with the delusion.

American Delusions of Absolute Security

Georgi Arbatov, writing in 1971, put his finger on one half of the story: American political culture celebrates the myth of absolute security. Situated for centuries behind perfect oceanic defenses, the United States, quite unlike its Asian and European counterparts, experienced only the most trivial threats of invasion and occupation. This state of security grace has come to seem natural to Americans, who for more than 200 years have unilaterally provided for their own security, with no reliance on others to stave off threats to the American homeland. This helps to explain Ronald Reagan's love affair with SDI ("Star Wars"). It also explains the fact that the end of the Soviet threat has not ended America's embrace of a weapons system whose fundamental logic was rejected for decades by American nuclear strategists, whose proscription was trumpeted as a great victory over Soviet plans for nuclear superiority at the time, and whose deployment threatens to alarm allies and provoke putative enemies into a real, not illusory, arms race. In a very real sense, the resurrection of Star Wars is an effort by Washington to escape the unavoidable consequence of the nuclear revolution: US security is forever in Moscow's hands.

American Universalism

Over fifty years ago, Louis Hartz and George F. Kennan, quite independently, wrote important books in which they argued that the United States and its people are afflicted with a very troubling and consequential case of self-righteousness. This deeply-held collective belief in the superiority of American political life does not in itself imply a crusading, proselytizing foreign policy. Indeed, as both scholars point out, self-satisfied isolationism is equally consistent with this political culture as demanding that all the world accept the American way of life, "or else." But what this culture does imply, according to Kennan and Hartz, is an American foreign policy that, once engaged, adopts a universalizing mission to remake the world after its own image. Indeed, without other states just like the United States, Americans do not feel secure: their absolute security is threatened.

If one combines the American quest for absolute security with its equally strong conviction that all the rest of the world naturally wants to become the United States, it is possible to explain how US policymakers, apparently sincerely, assert that NATO's expansion to the East can worry only states with revisionist agendas in Europe. For example, an unnamed White House official on March 15, 2001, claimed that only "those who intend to blackmail us" could object to deployment of ballistic missile defenses. In other words, since the United States is obviously a peace-loving power, who can object to its deployment of defenses or the expansion of the defensive NATO alliance, other than states interested in the insecurity of others? One might note that this was precisely the attitude of Soviet policymakers in the 1960s and 70s, during the period of self-encirclement.

The Military-Industrial Complex Lives, and Votes

A most important part of American behavior in international affairs has been, and remains, the place of the military-industrial complex in American political and social life. This complex accounts for a very large percentage of the US economy. What is important, however, is that its vital parts--its bases, plants, and shipyards--are strategically located in areas of the country that evoke intense political support from Southern and conservative Senators and Representatives.

As important as this material stake in the continued production of arms and armies, is the cultural and social stake in the continued reproduction of the Cold War in popular culture and discourse. The production of the military cannot be equated with the production of any other government program or private entrepreneur, because it materially reinforces the insights of Arbatov, Hartz, and Kennan. The military is the physical embodiment of American superiority, unilateralism, and pretensions to universalist values.

The Unipolar Disease

The Soviet collapse left the United States in a position of splendid unipolarity. How it has behaved in this position can be explained by its domestic political culture of absolute superiority and security. From the Russian perspective, this outcome has meant mostly bad news. Washington continues to insist on unilaterally advancing its own conceptions of global security, while demanding that other states (like Russia) either become like, or forever remain existential threats to, the United States. The symptoms of this malady are many, but they share the common thread of unilateral exercise of American power with only the lowest priority given to others' interests. A partial list includes NATO expansion, ballistic missile defense (BMD), the continual bombing of Iraq, the war in Kosovo, management of the global arms trade, and the pipeline politics in Central and Southwest Asia and the Caucasus, which are largely directed against Russia and Iran.

While American unipolarity has made the world a less attractive place for many states, Russia included, we should not exaggerate: the United States does not even imagine directly infringing on Russian territorial integrity or sovereignty, as it is conventionally understood. But that does not imply that Russia should welcome the continuation of US hegemony. The good news is that US unipolarity is a declining asset. Because of its fetish for unilateral and absolute security, America (seemingly congenitally) rejects any broadening of its hegemonic management to include true multilateral co-determination--whether with Europe, Japan, China, or Russia--of the international security environment. But this kind of unilateralism, while temporarily perhaps meeting Americans' cultural need for absolutism in foreign affairs, conceals the fact that US authority is slowly and surely being eroded by these actions.

In fact, it could be argued that we are witnessing a race between the gradual disappearance of America's unipolar moment through: 1) its growing loss of authority among other states in the world, including its NATO allies and Japan, not to mention Russia, India, China, Iran, et. al.; and 2) America's provocation of another power, say China or Russia, to confront it. In other words, US actions may create a self-fulfilling prophesy (a world that looks a lot like the Cold War it seems to have never ended prosecuting). Or, the US might wake up to the fact that it dominates the globe, and realize that sharing hegemonic management of the globe with others, including Russia, will preserve that position of dominance far longer than will its unilateral assertion. Moreover, the promised gains of such a long-term arrangement are vastly greater than the meager rewards from getting a pipeline to pass through Turkey rather than Russia.

How Russian Foreign Policy Can Help Cure the Disease

The cure for American unipolarity is definitely not the emergence of another pole, or collection of poles. Multipolarity will only increase the interventionist and militarized tendencies of American foreign political culture. Rather, Russia's best bet is to help, as subtly as possible, to expose the illegitimacy of US unilateral policy in international affairs. This means not confronting the US, but rather demonstrating--both through its own adherence to principles of international law and common practice, and by couching all opposition to US actions within that normative framework--that Washington is acting without any legitimacy in the world.

The following is a list of maxims that might guide a Russian foreign policy based upon enduring unipolarity, while working to hasten its end:

Continue on the road of economic and political reform. Russia's domestic economic and political reforms should aim at restoring Russia's material basis for great power status;

Do not ally with others. This will only vindicate American Cold War logic;

Ignore Washington; embrace Europe. As far as possible, deal with Europe on questions of global politics;

Undermine the legitimacy of unipolarity. Through its own actions--both at home (in Chechnya, for example) and abroad (in relations with Iran, for example)--Russia should scrupulously adhere to multilateral (that is, European) understandings of good conduct;

Work to reduce threats to the United States. Russian efforts to get North Korea, Iran, and Iraq off the American list of "alarming" states (used to justify BMD, among many other unilateral absolutist security policies) could undermine the very basis of US strategy;

Be Russia. Continue to resist America's universalist export of itself; and

Be ironic. Russia--realizing that neither fundamentally undermines Russian security--should point out the absurdity of NATO expansion and BMD, and invite the devotion of yet additional US resources to these illusory goals.

Back to the Top