#9
Jamestown Foundation Monitor
April 26, 2001
RUSSIAN ARMS SALES: THE PUSH IS ON. Russian press reports published over
the past month have highlighted what they say is a new push by the Kremlin
to diversify the country's arms export client base. Current estimates place
total Russian arms export revenues for last year at between US$3.68 billion
and US$4 billion. That is a gain over the 1999 figures, which Russian
sources put at approximately US$3.4 billion. Those sales have gone
overwhelmingly to India and China, however, which over the past decade have
been by far the largest purchasers of Russian military hardware. According
to one report, Russian arms exports to India and China last year amounted
to approximately 90 percent of Russian arms exports overall. Given that
arms exports to these countries are not expected by Russian experts to
remain at these high levels over the medium and longer term, Moscow now
faces the urgent task of finding new customers for its military hardware.
If Russian reports are to be believed, this need will take Russian arms
merchants to the far corners of the globe, where they will seek not only to
renew military-technical cooperation with former Soviet client states, but
also to peddle arms in earnest for the first time to a host of Asian,
African and Latin American countries. With respect to Latin America, this
policy could bring Russian arms into the backyard of the United States, and
exacerbate tensions between Moscow and Washington. More generally, Moscow
is said also to be willing to consider arms dealings with countries
considered by the United States to be "rogue states"--another move likely
to set Russia and the United States at odds.
And the push could be an aggressive one. Russian sources have long made it
clear that a restructuring of Russia's arms export hierarchy, which
President Vladimir Putin launched late last year, is aimed to a significant
degree at improving the sector's ability to peddle weapons abroad. And one
top Russian defense official, Boris Kuzyk, director of the New Programs and
Concepts industrial holding company, has said recently that Russian defense
firms could increase the total value of their exports to US$6 billion if
they clawed their way back into markets lost after the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Kuzyk called for building a long-term foundation for Russian
arms sales by maintaining cooperation in this area with China and India
while also stepping up military-technical cooperation with Iran, Egypt,
Algeria and Syria. In a new book published by a group which includes Kuzyk,
Russian authors reportedly argue that the export of arms is one of the sole
niches in the world high technology market in which Russia can compete in
effectively, and that the government should therefore invest in the sector
accordingly.
Other analyses of likely Russian arms export policies point to a new push
by Moscow to sell arms in Africa and Asia. One report suggests that in
Africa, the targeted markets are Nigeria, Angola, Libya and South Africa,
while attention in Asia will be focused on South Korea and Vietnam. It was
with this strategy in mind, the reports observes, that Russia's president
used a host of recent bilateral meetings to push arms deals with the
leaders of Nigeria, South Korea and Vietnam. Those deals have not been
finalized, but could provide a significant boost to Russian arms export
efforts.
Moreover, according to articles published in recent days, Moscow has
launched a new push this month to increase arms sales to Latin American
countries. This effort is apparently keyed to the LAD-2001 arms fair near
Rio de Janeiro in Brazil, where the Russian state arms trading company
Rosoboroneksport intends to display a wide variety of Russian weaponry,
including helicopters and fighter planes. According to one Russian source,
sales to Latin America currently total between US$80 to US$140 million per
year, and make up only 3-4 percent of total Russian arms sales. Russian
arms experts suggest that the region could become fertile ground for
Russian arms dealers, and point especially to what they say have been
promising talks with Brazil, Argentina and Chile. Moscow also held arms
talks earlier this month with Venezuela during a visit to Moscow by that
country's Defense Minister. Moscow apparently sees tensions between
Venezuela and the United States as a potential opening for sales of Russian
weaponry to Caracas (The Russia Journal, April 6; Nezavisimaya gazeta,
April 21; Vremya MN, April 18, 24; Reuters, April 17; Military News Agency,
April 18).
Whether these stepped up Russian efforts to peddle arms will bear fruit is
another question. Poor organization and a failure to control competing
interest groups have hampered Russian arms sale efforts over the past
decade, and the degree to which the Kremlin recent reforms are successfully
at rooting out these problems will help determine Russia's future success
in the arms export arena. But those were not Moscow's only problems, and
the others may be harder to overcome. They center particularly on the
government's financial difficulties, which have constrained its ability to
invest in the development of new military technologies while simultaneously
precluding it from offering attractive credit terms for arms purchases. The
last has been a particularly serious impediment to increased arms sales.
The Russian government's currently more healthy fiscal situation could help
to overcome some of these obstacles, but is no guarantee that Moscow will
make inroads into what has been a contracting and increasingly competitive
international arms market. But the stakes for Russian arms producers is
high: Procurement and research and development funding in Russia is set to
rise only modestly over the next few years, which means that the survival
of many of Russia's hundreds of defense concerns could depend in large part
on their ability to make money abroad.
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#10
Transitions Online
www.tol.cz
A Most Ingenious Paradox
Russian media may be facing a contradictory new era: more independence, less
freedom of expression.
by Alexei Pankin
Alexei Pankin is the Russian editor of Sreda media magazine in Moscow and a
member of the TOL advisory board.
MOSCOW--The more one tries to take an objective look at the Russian media
scene, the more one has reason to believe that he or she has developed a bad
case of multiple personality disorder.
On the one hand, we witnessed a year-long struggle of the authorities and
their proxies against the privately owned Media-MOST empire and its banner
national television station, NTV. The campaign included criminal cases raised
and dropped by the Prosecutor General's Office, raids by masked men on
Media-MOST headquarters, arrests, property and bank account seizures, dubious
court decisions, and finally, a hostile takeover of the station by its
government-controlled shareholder, Gazprom. All those actions would seem to
indicate that the Putin administration--in a striking departure from the
attitude of Yeltsin's regime--is hostile to freedom of the press and is
silencing the voices of the opposition. In many of Russia's regions, the new
approach in Moscow has been interpreted as a clear signal, and local
governments have now adopted a similar stance on their own local media.
Yet, on the other hand, the very same administration has done quite a lot to
lay the ground for the economic independence of the media. Since March 2000
the level of tax deductions for advertising expenditures has been raised
twice--first from 3 to 5 percent, and then up to 7.5 percent of a company's
turnover. That approach has stimulated growth in the advertising market and
expanded the media's revenue base. It also represents a sea change from the
years of Boris Yeltsin, when tax benefits were given directly to media
outlets, enabling them to save rather than to earn.
Another revolutionary step was taken just this month with the formation of
the Media Committee. Initiated by the Press Ministry, the Media Committee
consists of representatives of broadcast companies, professional
associations, advertisers, and advertising agencies and is intended to
establish control over the process of producing television ratings. If the
committee is able to work out a unified system of audience measurement that
is acceptable to all competing interests, it would make the market
considerably more transparent and help advertisers optimize their ad
spending. In the past, all such initiatives have been successfully torpedoed
by Video International, the near-monopolist on the television ad sales
market.
Nowhere does the duality manifest itself better than in the debate over
foreign ownership of the Russian media. The majority of the world's
free-market democracies do not have "information security doctrines," but
they do have rather strict limitations on the rights of foreigners to own
broadcast media. Russia, though, has an information security doctrine, but no
limitations on foreign media investment. Several weeks ago, however, when
bills were introduced in the State Duma that would have limited the foreign
ownership of Russian media, high-ranking government representatives publicly
opposed the move.
It's no wonder that--unless you choose to take a clear cut pro- or
anti-government, or pro- or anti-NTV stance--your head begins to spin.
"The present administration does not see freedom of the press or the
government's role in ensuring it as a priority. I would note, though, that
conflicts between the state and the media generally arise when media owners
attempt to play an independent role in public politics, says Yevgeny Abov,
member of the board of the World Association of Newspapers and one of
Russia's most respected newspaper managers. "Otherwise, the state doesn't
take an interest in the press. And one more observation: Whenever editors try
to handle the business side of media, it doesn't work. Yevgeny
Kiselyov--NTV's star presenter and general director--is the best example. All
the same, even without the help of the state, the media market is becoming
more civilized. The number of qualified managers is growing, and new,
interesting products are appearing--products that are oriented toward the
consumer rather than just serving as PR."
But the chaos of coexisting contradictory trends is usually a sign of
transition--a sign that says the current system is in crisis and a new one is
about to take shape.
The main feature of the existing system is that media in Russia have not been
shaped as businesses. During the glasnost era, journalists adopted an
egocentric view of themselves as missionaries, for whom expressing whatever
they had on their minds was by far more important than satisfying the
information demands of their audience. Economic support for them in the
Yeltsin era was provided either by different branches of the government or by
the national or local oligarchs. It was a kind of supply-side media where
pluralism and diversity had little to do with public demand, consumer
purchasing power, or the volume of the advertising market.
In other words, freedom--or rather pluralism--of the press was based on a
shaky foundation of official tolerance, not on the strength of the media
enterprises. That has changed under Putin, who does not seem to be tolerant
of criticism, and simultaneously, seems to be immune to pressure from the
media. He gave a push, but the system collapsed by itself because it was not
viable.
Still, there are at least two encouraging signs. One is that a close
observation of the situation of the media in Moscow and in the regions
indicates that while pressure is applied evenly, those media outlets that
were originally launched as businesses--catering to the volume of their
markets and possessing sound financial management--are withstanding this
pressure quite successfully. Second, irrespective of how intolerant the Putin
administration may be of criticism, its commitment to building a liberal
economy in Russia will force it to gradually create a friendlier business
climate for the media.
Russia may be entering a paradoxical period when it is going to have a more
independent media--just with less freedom of expression.
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#11
Itogi
No. 16
April 2001
STAR WARS: EPISODE 2001
Russia is better prepared for Star Wars than is usually believed
Looking at missile defense plans in Russia and the United States
Author: Oleg Odnokolenko
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
MOSCOW SHOULD TRADE ITS CONSENT TO REVISION OF THE ABM TREATY FOR
PERMISSION TO OUTFIT TOPOL MISSILES WITH MIRVS. IN ORDER TO SEE AND
RECOGNIZE THE ADVANTAGES OF REVISING THE ABM TREATY, WE SHOULD FIRST
ADMIT THAT THIS IS NOT A "CORNERSTONE OF STRATEGIC STABILITY".
Sergei Ivanov, recently appointed defense minister, has not given
any reason to believe that he wants the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty of 1972 revised. It means that if the Americans encroach on the
"cornerstone of strategic stability" and go ahead with a national
missile defense, Russia will retaliate. The response is promised to be
"asymmetric", i.e. cheap but effective. Deputy Prime Minister Ilya
Klebanov elaborated on this subject recently by saying that "the
answer was not planned when the United States declared its intention
to set up a missile defense system, but it had included in the theory
of creating strategic missile systems."
Former defense minister Igor Sergeev, for example, did his best
to promote his pet Topol-M system. This ICBM can carry three warheads
at once (with a total force equivalent to 22 Hiroshima bombs) and
maneuver during the ballistic part of its trajectory, baffling any US
missile defense satellites. Vladimir Dvorkin, Director of the 4th
Research Institute of the Defense Ministry, Sergeev's ardent
supporter, and acclaimed "trend-setter" in the ballistic missile
sphere, hints that making a Topol-M one stage shorter would turn it
into an analog of the medium-range Pioneer missile. Another General
Staff senior officer went even further along these lines. He openly
said that if Washington created a missile defense, Moscow would
withdraw from the treaty on short- and mid-range missiles and promptly
restore its group of such missiles. That general was publicly
reprimanded for this openness. It turns out, however, that the general
revealed only part of what the Kremlin has in store for the Americans.
The General Staff has worked out around three dozen retaliatory
measures. Whenever needed, Moscow will challenge the United States on
the ground, on the seas, in the air, and in space. Satellite orbits
will be "mined" (attack satellites would be disguised as ordinary
communications satellites), various anti-satellite systems would be
used, space debris would be actively used (at a velocity of 15
kilometers a second, an ordinary bolt will pierce tank armor), and so
on.
Professor Vladimir Belous, Director of the Center of
International Strategic Surveys, has no doubts that space warfare will
become inevitable if and when the United States withdraws from the ABM
Treaty. He considers that the proposed US national missile defense
does not guarantee interception of all warheads in the final and
ballistic parts of their trajectories. Warheads will evade
interceptors in the final part of their trajectories because they are
equipped with a range of evasive measures. A missile will maneuver.
Just try to distinguish it from chaff or decoys at a velocity of up to
3 kilometers a second. There will be many more decoys deployed in the
ballistic part of the trajectory. Warheads may both maneuver and fly
within a target imitator. Of course, it is possible to deploy an anti-
missile with nuclear warheads against all this, but electronic
equipment will fail in this case, and the "friendly" combat control
system could be no exception.
That is why destruction of ICBMs in the active part of the
trajectories (between the launch and disengagement of warheads) is
universally viewed as the most reliable means of missile defense. Both
the warheads and hundreds of decoys are destroyed at once. Moreover,
it is much easier to hit a huge ICBM than a combat block two meters
long...
Belous emphasizes that in order to be able to hit ICBMs at all,
the Americans will be forced to establish a space component of the
missile defense system - tracking satellites, space battle platforms,
and so on. Creating a truly effective missile defense system
necessitates an arms race in space, and that is why Russia should
stick to the ABM Treaty and thwart all attempts to revise it, Belous
says. However, there is the question of Washington's attitude to
Russia's opinion on the matter.
Washington may decide to go ahead and ignore the Kremlin. Well,
the Space Forces were formed this year on the president's orders, an
amalgam of what used to be the Missile-Space Defense and Military
Space Forces in the recent past. Their absorption by the Strategic
Missile Forces several years ago is recognized as a mistake now.
President Putin made it clear at the celebrations of Space
Exploration Day in Zvyozdny that defence capacity and the use of space
were two closely-related concepts. The hungry generals of the
military-industrial complex can be optimistic about their future now.
As far as they are concerned, Star Wars is guaranteed budget funds and
a chance to implement the most fantastic projects.
By the way, Russia is much better prepared for Star Wars than the
United States. Colonel Grigori Kisunko came up with the idea of
guaranteed interception of a warhead in the late 1950s, and the first
successful intercept test was actually done in the Soviet Union on
March 4, 1961, forty years before the Americans managed it.
In the 1960s, the Soviet Union was the leader in designing
shuttle-type spacecraft. Project Spiral originated in Artyom Mikoyan's
design bureau. Herman Titov, cosmonaut and future deputy commander of
the Military-Space Forces, was not exactly involved in the project,
but even that helped when the Buran was built years later. Moscow
assumed, quite correctly, that the Space Shuttle could be used as a
space bomber. That is why the Buran is an analog to what the Americans
planned, but an automatic analog. That makes it more expensive. These
days the Buran is an attraction in Gorky Park...
Titov received the Lenin Award for his participation in the
Zenith missile system tests. Its automatic launch was what attracted
the military so much to the "booster of the 21st century". The Zeniths
were expected to be able to take satellites into orbit all on their
own, without being manned. Even the most apocalyptic option was not
ruled out - automatic launches when everything on Earth was already
destroyed. The missile exits the hangar on its own, gets to the launch
pad, and launches...
The Almaz, the world's first space battle platform, was built
with Titov's participation as well. Titov once commanded the Cosmonaut
Team, its members trained in reconnaissance missions for the Defense
Ministry from the space station. The Almaz allegedly had a cannon
which was to be used in space...
At least, maneuverable warheads were actually tested. Only one
country, the Soviet Union, could afford it. Two testing grounds, at
Kapustin Yar and Lake Balkhash, were used for this. The Soviet state
planners alone knew how much money was spent on the so-called Zinger
curve (the curve guided combat blocks were supposed to follow). In any
case, the amount must have been astronomical...
The Americans were the first to initiate the Strategic Defense
Initiative. In doing so, they opted for Hollywood-like fantasies
instead of fantastic expense. Even so, their innocent pranks in space
(innocent compared to the Soviet space projects, that is) cost almost
$60 billion.
In the last years of his life, Titov (sometimes jokingly referred
to as the "major space militarist") admitted that not all space
spending had been justified. Indeed, some space projects were pursued
only because their architects commanded respect and could pull strings
in the Kremlin. Other projects were provoked by the Americans - and
the arms race in space completed the economic collapse of the Soviet
Union. These days, Star Wars is coming back, with the decision of the
US administration to create a missile defense system...
Skeptics who distrust the Americans and their real intentions
point out the following. The Americans will need thousands of
satellites in order to monitor all Russian silos and launch pads.
Perhaps even more than that. No one knows for sure, because no one has
done the sums. But even when a satellite detects and reports a launch,
the Americans lack the technical means for its destruction in the
active part of the trajectory. More time is needed to achieve this.
Even a preventive strike does not guarantee a complete and final
victory. At least one ICBM will cross the ocean in the direction of
the American coast in any case. It follows that the most effective
missile defense method the Americans can use nowadays is a commando
team - elite soldiers discovering an ICBM somewhere in the taiga and
blowing it up.
Exotic weapons (like lasers) deployed in space are another
hypothetical option for destruction of enemy ICBMs. And yet, this
particular option will be too expensive, even for the wealthy United
States
If Russia is foolhardy enough to allow itself to be lured into
Star Wars, resistance to Washington's plans to deploy a missile
defense will be a considerable headache. The Americans launch their
military satellites from F-15s, Russians from the ground. Entering the
plane of the enemy satellite's orbit immediately is impossible due to
Russia's geographic position. Actually, this process could take days.
Responding to any politically incorrect gesture in space with a
strike with MIRV-tipped ICBMs (like the Satan) is much easier. MIRVs
will surely pierce any missile defense system and reach their targets
within half an hour. Under START II, however, all Russian "heavy"
ICBMs should be decomissioned and dismantled by 2005. Their production
is beyond restoration now, because the Yuzhmash plant was left to
Ukraine. In any case, officers and generals say that trading amendment
of the ABM Treaty for the right to equip mono-block Topols with MIRVs
is a possible solution. Provided parity is maintained, of course. It
would be really cheap and effective.
In order to see and recognize the advantages of revising the ABM
Treaty, we should first admit that this is not a "cornerstone of
strategic stability", because it has never taken into account the
interests of all nuclear states, even at the time it was signed. The
nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty could be viewed as such, but
that treaty is no longer valid. India and Pakistan have tested nuclear
weapons. This means that Moscow and Washington have to start
negotiations all over again and reach some sort of agreement. Perhaps
the meeting of our presidents in Genoa will provide a chance for such
an agreement. Otherwise, Star Wars will become a grim reality.
(Translated by A. Ignatkin)
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