#5
Dipkurier NG
No. 6, 2001
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
MOSCOW ASKS: DOES WASHINGTON HAVE ENOUGH WISDOM FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE WITH RUSSIA?
Bush Does Not Have His Russian Policy Yet but Putin Has His American Policy
By Dmitry GORNOSTAYEV
There is no crisis in Russian-U.S. relations yet. What we
are witnessing is, in fact, a pre-crisis situation. Its
peculiar characteristics do not give enough ground to see which
way the vector of the development of the Moscow-Washington
dialogue will eventually turn. The situation is very dangerous,
indeed, because the probability of negative development is very
high. However, even the manifestations of aggressiveness on the
part of the U.S., growing anti-Americanism in Russia and
Rusophobia in America do not necessarily mean that the two
countries will be back to confrontation comparable with the
Cold War period shortly.
In this article I will try to lay down Moscow's views of
the changes in American foreign policy at the present stage and
its own American policy.
Lately, Moscow has been getting many direct signals from
Washington. Since the new administration has come to the White
House the character of presenting claims has changed. Whereas
previously the U.S. was willing to search for ways out, at
present it prefers the language of ultimatums. There is no
denying the fact that rhetoric, which reminds us of the Cold
War era, is coming from Washington, not Moscow - the latter's
reaction is quite calm.
It has been known since the Ancient Rome times that being
angry is evidence of being wrong. This may be true of the
present situation. There are too many emotions in Washington
today.
Sometimes, when it points its finger, officially or
unofficially, to the Moscow's alleged (or, probably, real)
mistakes, it turns a blind eye to its own blunders. I mean not
any mistakes of an ideological character (as the issue at hand
is not whose system is better) but professional mistakes
against which no one is guaranteed.
That Moscow does not shout back does not mean that it has
no claims to Washington. It has no fewer claims to Washington
than it has to Moscow. But it prefers a different way to
present them - the way of avoiding unnecessary scandals, which
is widely spread in the civilized world.
Difficulties
It is difficult for the new Washington administration to
conduct a foreign policy. Problems that make the George Bush Jr.
Administration behave toughly with regard to Moscow are of an
objective and a subjective character. Moscow realizes this
perfectly well and conducts its American policy, taking into
consideration the administration's difficulties (I am talking
only of the foreign policy of Washington). What is more, the
White House does not notice some of its difficulties, does not
wish to notice others and tries to fight still others quite
actively.
Objective Reasons
The package of problems with respect to relations with
Russia and inherited from the previous Democratic
administration is among the objective problems that confront
the new Republican administration at present.
First. There are too many serious and complicated problems
to handle which the Bush administration is not ready to handle.
The ABM controversy, NATO enlargement and Russian debts to
Western financial institutions are unquestionably among the
most complicated problems at present. (I will deal with this
later.) Second. The new administration has not started working
at full swing yet. It usually takes quite a time since the
Inauguration Day for any new administration to start working
normally. A greater part of high- and middle-level nominations
is yet to be approved. In the State Department of the Bush
administration only two - Secretary of State Colin Powell and
his deputy Mark Grossman - have been endorsed and have got down
to discharging their duties. The rest are only the acting staff.
The chain of preparing and adopting decisions on Russia
are now as primitive as never before: John Byerley - Colin
Powell.
Byerley is the acting special State Secretary advisor for the
new independent states, including Russia. Were the State
Department system functioning normally, Powell would not have
to be involved in the preparation of decisions. He is to adopt
them and the rest is the task of the State Department staff he
heads. So, even formally the State Department does not have yet
people who should be directly involved in handling all the
details of the foreign policy concerning Russia nor the
middle-level officials who should actually elaborate
recommendations which the Secretary of State or the President
finally present as their own decisions.
Third. The U.S. does not have a serious policy towards
Russia yet. We only see certain improvisations and spontaneous
decisions based more on emotions than common sense. The first
steps of the new administration such as the expulsion of
diplomats, the declared intention to force Russia into changing
its stand on the ABM problem or withdraw from the ABM Treaty,
reception of Aslan Maskhadov's envoy and public remarks by some
high-ranking officials about an alleged Russian threat to
American interests sooner resemble the echo of election
campaign statements by Bush Jr. who promised to ensure America
a "worthy role" in the world arena but who had a very vague
idea how this could be done and what was really happening in
international affairs.
Moscow realizes pretty well that the new administration
does not have a real Russian policy yet. It also realizes that
current negative processes not necessarily reflect the line
which Washington may shape up in a few months.
Subjective Reasons
First. The world has changed but the present Washington
administration does not see this. People who have now come or,
to be more exact, who have returned to the White House, because
the backbone of the team led by Bush Jr. comprises people who
worked for his father, George Bush Sr. and earlier for Ronald
Reagan, are looking at the world, in particular, Russia,
through the prism of the Cold War. They see Moscow as an
adversary that can be potential but definitely real and
permanent and think it would be foolish not to use its present
weakness. The political development of some of the old members
of the new team stopped at the time they left the political
scene.
In the meantime, the world has changed. No one would dare
to argue that Russia has also changed radically. But proceeding
from their own experience, many of those who served in the Bush
Sr.
team do not realize this. We know the period during which they
acquired this experience. So, they need time to comprehend the
changes which occurred in the world, and those of them who will
work with Russia are also to comprehend the changes that have
happened in our country in the past eight, ten and even twenty
years.
Second. Influence of the unprecedentedly tough election
struggle. Confrontation between Republicans and Democrats was
so tough in 2000 that the winners could not but hate everything
connected with Democrats, Clinton and his policy. What is more,
the desire to put an end to the Clinton era in external policy
is even far more obvious than in internal policy.
Third. Bush Jr. is destructive as a president. Bill
Clinton was a stronger, wiser and more talented president. That
is why it is very important for Bush to show that all that has
been connected with Clinton is bad. Hence the destructive mood
of Republicans. They want first to raze everything to the
ground.
This is clearly seen in the foreign policy sphere, in
particular, their policy with regard to Russia.
Clinton was constructive and he was building a new
relationship with the new Russia, even though he made some
mistakes.
Bush is now destroying Clinton's foreign policy without
creating anything of his own. He has been destructive thus far
and, judging by many things, he is destructive at the level of
sub-consciousness. This is one of the main dangers for Russia.
Fourth. Bush Jr. is primitive and conservative in foreign
policy questions. Characteristic of his administration is a
striving to simplify decisions without going into details and
with no regard for whether they are correct or incorrect.
Simplicity is the main criterion for Bush. Such an approach
justifies itself in some respects but, at the same time, it
breeds aggressiveness. When the strongest is to make the
simplest decision, he resorts to force.
Fifth. Congress has strong influence on the President's
foreign policy. As a matter of fact, this can also be regarded
as an objective reason because the Capitol has begun playing a
very important role in shaping the U.S. foreign policy in the
past ten or fifteen years. Both in the House of Representatives
and in the Senate Republicans are very aggressively minded with
regard to Russia. Any President has to take this into
consideration, and now that Bush's own position is not very
peaceable, the influence of Congress is manifested only in the
strengthening of aggressive trends in the dialogue with Moscow.
Byerley's meeting with Maskhadov's envoy Ilyas Akhmadov is
also the result of the activities of U.S. Congress. This
meeting has not been held on the initiative of the State
Department. But Congressmen insisted from the very beginning
that Powell should meet with Akhmadov. As a result, the
contacts with the Chechen envoy became a failure for American
diplomats: Byerley's meeting with him coincided with terrorist
acts in the Stavropol territory. Small wonder State Department
spokesman Richard Boucher looked so helpless from the
diplomatic point of view when he announced a meeting with the
representative of Chechen militants and also condemned
terrorist acts in Russian towns at the same time.
Delusions and Realities
The main delusion. The new administration is sure that
Russia acts against U.S. interests. Moscow proceeds in its
American policy from the premise that Washington is acting
under rather difficult circumstances. These difficulties can
have a negative impact on bilateral relations the consequences
of which can be much more serious than the expulsion of
diplomats. But Moscow will not nonchalantly watch the current
fledgling trends to gain momentum.
Judging by numerous statements of U.S. high-ranking
officials, Washington becomes increasingly convinced that
Russia strives to conduct a policy detrimental to the interests
of the U.S. This may be not really a conviction but the desire
to persuade Americans and allies that this is really so.
Anyway, this benefits those forces that want to spoil
U.S.-Russian relations. Allegations that Russia threatens U.S.
interests are usually accompanied by another allegation
according to which Moscow has assumed a stand of confrontation
with regard to Washington. It is claimed, for instance, that
Russia's ungrounded objections to the idea of a national
anti-missile defense system, or the NMD system, and to NATO
enlargement, as well as differences over cooperation with Iran
are nothing but the desire to spite America. Such a conclusion
is a big mistake.
First reality. New confrontation with the U.S. would
contradict the national interests of Russia. Washington needs
to understand this simple truth, which is buttressed up by
numerous considerations. Suffice it to mention that Russia does
not need a new Cold War because it would further undermine its
economy, among other things.
Second reality. Russia has no plans to do any harm to the
U.S. It is not going to oppose it just for the sake of this.
The principle of a conflict with zero gain has long since
stopped being one of Moscow's geostrategic aspirations.
Third reality. Russia wants to have normal relations with
the U.S. Moscow will offer three fundamental principles of
relations with America. These principles may seem banal and
empty at first glance but this is not really so.
Predictability, constructiveness and a non-conflicting attitude
- this is how Moscow sees the basis of Russian-U.S. relations.
Washington should seemingly be interested in such a
relationship, but it has been proving to the contrary thus far.
Fourth reality. The basis of Russia's policy in any sphere
and towards any country, including the U.S., is its national
interests. Moscow stands ready to act jointly in those areas in
which its interests and the interests of the U.S. coincide.
There are quite a few of such areas. However, if there is a
threat to its interests, it will undoubtedly defend them.
Russia's Concerns
First. There should be a dialogue, not two monologues,
first and foremost. It is in the interests of Moscow to begin a
normal dialogue with the new Washington administration as soon
as possible. The first contact took place in Cairo in the end
of February between Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and
U.S.
Secretary of State Colin Powell. No follow-up steps have been
made, however. When Sergey Ivanov visited Washington in his
previous capacity as secretary of the Russian Security Council,
Americans only told him that they were not going yet to
organize a meeting between Bush and Russian President Vladimir
Putin.
In fact, such a meeting is necessary not for its own sake,
not to show that there is no confrontation between Russia and
the U.S. (though this is very important). When Washington's
Russian policy is being prepared "in its own juices," with
disregard for the interests of Russia, Moscow cannot expect
anything good from it. It is worth recalling the striving of
Bush Jr. to stay away from the preparation of important
decisions and only accept the ready recipes. In a short while
he might be so closely encircled by lobbyists that later it
would be very difficult to explain a different point of view to
him, if possible at all. Russia's position can be explained to
the American President at direct meetings with him. Hence the
need for a dialogue, not two monologues. As ex-President Reagan
used to say, it takes two to tango. The way to truth and mutual
understanding lies through frank debates, presentation of
mutual claims, bargaining and searches for a compromise.
The U.S. should agree that it does not stand to gain by
the lack of mutual understanding either. Mutual understanding
is not reduced to understanding of American interests alone.
Until this is realized, it will be really very difficult to
talk with Russia. At present, we are to continue a dialogue on
the questions on which our opinions coincide.
The Sides ought to know what to expect from each other.
This means predictability of relations. Predictability is not
always a plus factor. But obtaining information about the other
Side's probable positions in this or that situation with the
help of negotiations at the summit level, which is a cheaper
and more reliable way than doing the same with the help of
secret services, can only be for the better.
When Russia proposed the idea of a summit, Americans
answered that they in principle agreed that it was necessary.
However, they are not in a hurry to discuss its time schedule.
Russia has repeated this idea more than once and sufficiently
clearly. So, it is not going to raise it again. The ball is now
on the American side of the field.
The first personal meeting between the Russian and U.S.
Presidents is likely to take place at the Group of Eight summit
in Genoa. But, then, this may not happen and Putin and Bush
will not have separate talks in Genoa. On the other hand, they
could meet before the Genoa summit. Bush is expected to tour
Europe in June. If the two Presidents manage to coordinate
their travel schedules, they can meet in a neutral place. If
not, Russia will not lose anything and its leaders will not
take this to the heart.
Second. The absence of a compromise on questions of
strategic stability is not in the interests of either Russia or
the U.S. Strategic stability covers not only START/ABM
questions but the entire system of treaties and agreements in
the nuclear sphere.
Differences over strategic offensive armaments concern
their quality, not quantity. The Russian-American agenda has
certain positive moments that are rarely remembered. It is
similarity of our positions on strategic offensive arms
reduction (START). The approaches of Russia and the new
Washington administration are so close that given mutual
desire, the Sides will be able to agree on the quantitative
parameters of new cuts in such armaments. It is common
knowledge that Russia has already proposed the level of nuclear
warheads below 1,500 pieces for each Side. Presumably, there
should be no problems with the quantitative aspect of reduction.
Moscow and Washington have difference on another aspect,
namely, how to document such cuts. Russia contends that the
Sides need a new treaty. This has been discussed for a long
time now and the potential treaty already has a name - START-3.
Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton agreed upon its initial
parameters - from 2,500 to 2,000 warheads on each side - at
their meeting in Helsinki in 1997. Later Moscow proposed the
ceiling of 1,500 warheads and still later below the 1,500
level. The American Side raised no objection to these proposals
even after the Bush administration had come to the White House.
What is more, the proposals were called "interesting." The
problem is how to document them: whether the cuts should be
made by each side unilaterally or codified by a special
bilateral document. Russia has many questions to ask the U.S.
in this context.
The new administration is unwilling to conclude a new
document and already sends cautious signals about this to
Russia.
This, too, may be the result of the flat rejection of all that
is associated with Clinton. But the problem lies in a different
sphere. Americans are very well aware that it is difficult for
Russia to maintain the fighting capacity of its entire nuclear
arsenal. The ceilings we now offer for the START-3 treaty are a
more or less realistic level we will be able to maintain in the
next few years. American possibilities are much vaster. That is
why Washington is unwilling to bind itself by treaty-based
liabilities.
Washington proposes the following option. The U.S. will
unilaterally assume the obligation to reduce its arsenal to a
certain level (the figure does not really matter in this case),
while Russia may or may not follow suit, depending on its own
considerations. The U.S. thereby seems to demonstrate the whole
world its desire to disarm.
But unilateral obligations are not the same as
treaty-based liabilities. At any appropriate moment Washington
will be able to increase the number of its warheads to the
level it wants. Doing the same would be much more difficult for
Russia, above all, for economic reasons. This a priori puts the
Sides in an unequal situation. This will not happen if a
bilateral treaty is concluded, as it would impose legally
binding obligations on both Sides in terms of cuts in their
arsenals and in order to prevent an increase in the number of
warheads in excess of the agreed-upon levels at any time in the
future.
By and large, agreement on further cuts in strategic
offensive armaments will depend on the final solution of the
ABM problem.
Russia has a firm, clear and justified position on the
problem of anti-missile defense, unlike the U.S., which has no
coherent concept.
Differences between the two countries on the problem of
anti-missile defense are even more serious than on START
problems. The positions of the Sides are well known. (Last
month, Americans decided not to use the term "national
anti-missile defense." This does not change the essence of the
matter.
Americans think that the exclusion of the word "national" from
this term may make it sound more attractive for their allies,
as if the projected anti-missile shield can defend them, too.
In this article I use the well-known term "national
anti-missile defense," or NMD.)
Moscow is against Washington's plans to build its NMD
system because this would destroy the 1972 ABM treaty on which
the entire system of strategic stability is based. This
position is unchangeable. For Americans and their allies to
realize that Moscow will not deviate from this position I would
like to recall that under the Russian law on the ratification
of the START-2 treaty the fulfillment of this treaty is only
possible if the ABM treaty is preserved intact. If the U.S.
withdraws from the ABM treaty, Russia will have no legal right
to fulfill START-2 (which binds it to dismantle MIRVed
missiles which present the greatest danger to the U.S.).
Americans are hardly to like this.
Other strategic arms reduction agreements, including
START-1, are also linked to the ABM treaty.
Such is Russia's conceptual, sufficiently clear and frank
position, which was elaborated a long time ago. (Russia is a
far more predictable country in this sense.) This alone gives
no ground to presume that Moscow will change it. What is more,
it has its own response to the possible destruction of the ABM
treaty, which is rather cheap, compared with the American NMD
system, and no less painful and probably even more painful for
the U.S. But I will talk about this in greater detail later.
What is the U.S. position? In fact, Washington has no firm
concept of the NMD problem. There is only Bush's principled
desire to change the strategy of mutual deterrence (that is,
the cardinal idea of the ABM treaty), which has restrained the
two nuclear superpowers from starting a conflict in the past
quarter of a century, and build an anti-missile shield to
protect the entire territory of the U.S. When Bush Jr. started
his election campaign, he did not suspect how complicated this
problem really is, how many variants for its solution can be
found and what consequences it may entail. But we have already
noticed that a primitive approach to the solution of
complicated international problems is characteristic of
President Bush Jr.
By and large, there is an idea of where to go. The rest is
at the level of talk and debates. Small wonder U.S. leadership
has no consensus on how to go, how much this may cost and what
consequences this may have, because the President himself has
just realized that such problems exist. There are many ideas
but it is crystal clear that neither Bush nor anyone else knows
which of them Bush will prefer.
But the majority of these ideas are very dangerous, as
they stipulate measures ranging from the creation of an NMD
system with a space component to the same system with a naval
component.
The implementation of any of them would undermine the security
of Russia, and it is impossible to prove that such systems
cannot be aimed against our country. Americans do not wish to
see the difference between "does not threaten Russia" and
"cannot threaten Russia," though they always see this
difference when the issue at hand is their own country. The
U.S. must clearly understand that it will never be able to
prove Russia that its projected NMD is not aimed against it.
Washington is interested in preliminary negotiations with
Russia probably even more than Moscow. The U.S. needs to show
itself and the world that there has been a dialogue with
Russia, because withdrawal from a treaty is a very serious step
for which there should be not only very serious reasons but at
least a semblance that all the other variants to solve the
problem have been in vain. Americans are an incredibly
law-abiding nation psychologically. To stop observing a treaty
is too serious a decision and those who dare to make it assume
tremendous responsibility. Clinton, for instance, understood
this, and partly proceeding from such an understanding, he did
not adopt the decision to deploy the limited NMD system. No one
wants to acquire the image of a gravedigger for the most
important treaty and the entire system of strategic stability.
I will dare to presume that Bush Jr. is also unwilling to have
such an image, if, of course, he cares about the image he
conveys to the world (about which serious doubts have appeared
lately).
Russia not merely rejects such an option but offers an
alternative to it. It proposes alternative decisions and will
insist on alternative variants to solve some or other problems
the existence or threat of which allows Americans to talk about
the need for a national anti-missile defense system. It is
necessary to create a global system of control, strengthen the
nonproliferation regime, trim strategic offensive armaments and
carry out diplomatic work with those countries, which the U.S.
regards as a threat (North Korea, Iran and Iraq). If all this
does not produce the expected results, military-strategic
standby steps can be taken. NATO Secretary-General George
Robertson has received Moscow's concrete proposals in this
sphere - the creation of a non-strategic European ABM system.
The 1972 ABM treaty and 1997 Russian-U.S. protocol to it do not
prohibit the creation of such a system, as distinct from the
American NMD.
Washington should understand that, first, Russia talks about
the European ABM system as a possibility, not a necessity, only
if joint, not unilateral, appraisals show that threats really
exist and cannot be removed by any other method, and, second,
it does not recognize the existence of the threats about which
Americans talk.
Moscow will begin a dialogue with the new Washington
administration on anti-missile defense on the basis of these
ideas. If these alternatives are rejected, see the paragraph
about options of reaction to U.S. withdrawal from the ABM
treaty.
Nonproliferation. Strategic stability is also ensured by
the treaty on a comprehensive ban on all nuclear tests. The
U.S. has not ratified this treaty (actually, the Senate
thwarted its ratification), thereby confirming the existence of
plans to make nuclear tests in the future. Together with the
NMD plans this fact creates a very unpleasant trend under
certain conditions.
Americans ought to understand that non-ratification of this
treaty can have a harmful effect on another very important
document - the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. And Washington
is very concerned about the problem of nuclear proliferation.
Non-nuclear countries criticize nuclear powers for the absence
of any progress in the sphere of nuclear arms reduction. As the
latest conference on progress in the implementation of the
nuclear non-proliferation treaty showed in April 2000, the
refusal of the U.S. Senate to ratify the comprehensive nuclear
test ban treaty prompted some non-nuclear countries to obtain
nuclear weapons. The nonproliferation regime can collapse and
then the U.S. will feel many more threats than now.
America should behave with regard to Russia the way it
would like Russia to behave with regard to itself. The U.S.
often accuses Russia of military cooperation with Iran. Russia
for its part could accuse the U.S. of cooperation with Israel
in the missile sphere. Russian claims would be much more
justified.
Israel, unlike Iran, possesses nuclear weapons and U.S.
cooperation with Tel Aviv in the missile sphere is Washington's
national policy.
What is more, the U.S., which is displeased by military
cooperation between Russia and Iran, gives ground for such
cooperation. It resorts to every means to prevent access of
Russian arms to international markets. In addition, NATO
enlargement will also deal a serious blow at the positions of
Russia as an exporter of armaments and other military hardware.
This makes Russia search for contracts with those countries
decision-making in which is beyond U.S. pressure.
While accusing Russia of spreading nuclear and missile
technologies (cooperation with Iran), the U.S. facilitates the
process of nuclear and missile technologies proliferation on a
much larger scale.
Third. Ignoring Russian interest in the question on NATO
enlargement is fraught with unpredictable consequences. The
problem of NATO expansion is more serious for Russia at present
than the NMD problem. An NMD system cannot be built earlier
than in ten to fifteen years, whereas the second wave of NATO
enlargement can begin in a year. As distinct from the strategic
stability sphere, Russia does not have yet a clearly formulated
position on this problem. Two axioms are clear. One is that
Moscow has no right to veto NATO enlargement and the other that
the security of our country should be taken into consideration
in planning any changes or other processes in Europe, in
particular, such large-scale changes as a possible admission of
new countries to a military-political bloc.
The main threat to Russia is the possible admission of at
least one of the Baltic states to the North Atlantic alliance.
Another problem is that the more Russia objects to NATO
enlargement, the stronger the desire of some nations to join
the bloc.
The worst possible scenario of future developments would
be the creation of NMD against the background of enlarged NATO.
It may not be excluded that in this case some elements of the
NMD system could be deployed near Russian borders (a NMD system
with a naval component would enhance such a threat). As a
matter of fact, one of such components has already been
deployed near Russian borders. It is the Globe-2 radar complex
in the Norwegian town of Vardo.
Moscow is to elaborate its position concerning the second
wave of NATO enlargement shortly. Its response will be adequate
(as distinct from an asymmetrical response to the creation of
the NMD). Russia will elaborate a package of measures to reduce
new security challenges that the growth of the number of NATO
member countries and the bringing of the alliance much closer
to its border could create. It is difficult to say now what
exactly will happen. But there is ample ground to presume that
Russian reaction will be connected one way or another with the
Kaliningrad region, the treaty on conventional armaments and
troops in Europe and the intermediate- and short-range missiles
treaty (depending on what the U.S. will decide concerning its
NMD plans), and the country's defense concept can be changed.
A milder variant is possible but this will depend on the
character of NATO enlargement plans. The question of Russia's
membership in the political structure of the North Atlantic
Alliance may be raised (without military participation). But it
can very well happen, for instance, that Moscow's request would
be taken into consideration together with the requests of other
countries but the latter's requests would be satisfied and
Russia's request rejected.
According to one standpoint, the growing number of NATO
member countries is in the interests of Russia, as this
"withers" the bloc from the inside, making the process of
adopting decisions more complicated. This allegedly can lead in
the final count to the transformation of the alliance from a
military-political into a political organization.
Fourth. Russia and the U.S. should encourage economic
cooperation.
There is no denying the problem of Russia's external debts
and the tremendous influence of the U.S. as the informal leader
of the International Monetary Fund on the settlement of this
problem. The hard times are not very far (the end of 2002 and
2003) when Russia will have to pay back a huge sum, which is
comparable with its annual budget. The tough approach of the
new Washington administration to its policy with regard to
Russia suggests that U.S. pressure will grow. All will
naturally depend on the economic state of Russia and
effectiveness of its negotiations with the IMF before the
deadline of payments.
The situation has not been very bad lately concerning
other economic aspects of Russian-U.S. relations. Mutual trade
reached a record level of ten billion dollars last year. What
is more, Russia had a positive balance of trade with the U.S.
American investments in the Russian economy constituted 8.5
billion dollars with two-thirds of them being direct and not
portfolio investments.
However, all this is too little, compared with the level
of U.S. cooperation with other countries. Thus, U.S.-Canadian
trade exceeds a billion dollars a day and U.S-China trade is
estimated at between 60 billion to 80 billion dollars a year.
Both sides are responsible for their insufficiently
intensive economic relations. Americans impede the development
of mutual trade by imposing anti-dumping restrictions on
Russian exports. Russia has an adverse investment climate:
imperfect Russian laws concerning foreign investments, widely
spread corruption and numerous cases when U.S. investments are
made in concrete projects which flop and the money disappears.
Nonetheless, foreigners, including Americans have been
showing a growing interest in the Russian market lately. This
trend should be boosted. This is in the interests of both
countries, as business always creates a positive background for
politicians.
Conclusions
What conclusions can be drawn from what has been said
above?
First. Russia wants to have normal positive relations with
the U.S.
Our country has seriously changed and is no longer
interested in confrontation. Contrary to some claims that it
wants to drive a wedge between America and Europe, Moscow has
no such intentions - it realizes that this would be impossible.
Today's Russia is a changed country with new values. Many of
these values are absolutely identical with Western values. The
same is true of the development goals - they have been
identical for a long time now.
Second. Moscow will never trade or waive its interests,
regardless of the aim pursued.
Russian and American interests coincide in many areas
(suffice it to mention the struggle against terrorism, illicit
trade in narcotic drugs or the settlement of conflicts). At the
same time, the two countries have vast differences on the
matters of principle. These differences may not be settled by
the toughening of one's position. Any U.S. attempts to bring
pressure to bear on Russia will be refuted. Both Moscow and
Washington could only lose by such an approach, as it
contradicts their interests.
The Bush Jr. administration has not realized this yet,
because it is absolutely sure that Moscow cannot talk with
Washington as an equal with an equal.
Third. Moscow is aware of the attempts of the new
administration to lower the status of Russia but this does not
disturb it. It does not care what place it is assigned in the
policy of any country. Pressure could be the only danger, but
Russia would react accordingly.
Washington's unwillingness to have anything to do with
Russia as if it were a "special case" shows that it has really
become a normal country. Such is the only conclusion that
Moscow draws from all this. In the past, a "special case" for
Moscow in the policy of Washington and vice versa was the
result of confrontation.
Fourth. The new administration will have to take Russia
into consideration. All talk that it can very well ignore
Russia and its opinion is merely for public consumption.
In conclusion, I would like to repeat the three
principles on the basis of which Moscow intends to build its
American policy: predictability, constructiveness and a
non-conflict approach. It expects the same from the new
Washington administration. Russia has only one important
question to ask the White House in this context, namely: does
Washington have enough wisdom to conduct a constructive
dialogue with Russia?
Back to the Top
