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CDI RUSSIA WEEKLY - #148
6 April 2001
Edited by David Johnson
Center for Defense Information
1779 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
phone: 202-332-0600; fax:202-462-4559
djohnson@cdi.org
The CDI Russia Weekly is a weekly e-mail newsletter that carries news and analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With funding from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the MacArthur Foundation, the CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education organization.


CONTENTS:
1. Voice of America
David Borgida
Analysis: US-Russia Relations
(Interview with Mike McFaul)
2. Baltimore Sun
Derek Chollet
U.S.-Russian ties depend on Putin
3. strana.ru
60% of Russians view Putin's first year of presidency as successful
4. Moscow Times
Pavel Felgenhauer
Must Realism Be Arrogant?
5. AFP
Battle for Russia's embattled NTV broadcaster heats up
6. Nezavisimaya Gazeta
Vitaly Tretiakov
THE DEFENSE OF NTV.
Several thoughts on the slogan
"Hands off NTV!"
7. Christian Science Monitor
editorial
Chemical Arms Crossroads
8. Jamestown
Foundation
Monitor

PUTIN EMPHASIZES EUROPEAN OVER U.S. TIES
9. Interfax
DUMA FIGURES COMMENT ON ABSENCE OF EVALUATION OF RUSSIAN-U.S. RELATIONS IN PUTIN'S MESSAGE
10. Eskpert
Yevgeny Verlin
CONTINENTAL
SELF-SUFFICIENCY.
Russia emphasizes the European direction in its foreign policy
11. RFE/RL
Frank Csongos
Russia: U.S. Considers Defense Policy Reorientation.
12. Financial Times (UK)
Yuri Luzhkov
Kosovo, the west's Chechnya.
13. Washington Post
Richard Cohen
Insulting Russia

#1
Voice of America
Analysis: US-Russia Relations
David Borgida
Washington
5 April 2001

Last month, the U.S. and Russia expelled diplomats suspected of being spies from their respective capitals. Can Washington and Moscow still work together to address such trouble spots as the conflict in Macedonia? For some insight, VOA's David Borgida talked with a leading analyst of the U.S.-Russia relationship.

NARRATOR: President Bush on the expulsion of suspected Russian spies.

PRESIDENT BUSH "It was the right thing to do."

NARRATOR: U.S. National Security Adviser Condelezza Rice.

CONDOLEZZA RICE "The Russian military presence was out of line with what should be a very fruitful and excellent relationship."

NARRATOR: Central Intelligence Agency Director, George Tenet, on Moscow arms sales.

GEORGE TENET "It is increasingly is using them as a tool to improve ties to its regional partners . . . China, India and Iran."

NARRATOR: All three articulating what White House spokesman Ari Fleischer calls a new "realism" in US foreign policy. Whatever the term, the foreign policy rhetoric from the Bush administration on the spy scandal seems tougher, and blunter.

ARI FLEISCHER "The way it was handled was meant to send a signal to the Russians--they did it very openly, very much 'in your face' -- to try to set a different tone in U.S.-Russian relations."

NARRATOR: Michael McFaul of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace says the Bush team rhetoric represents a marked departure from the previous administration.

MICHAEL MCFAUL "I think it's fair to say that Clinton took engagement with Russia very seriously--it was the number one priority--after all, at this time in the first months of the Clinton administration, they were getting ready for their first overseas summit and it was with Boris Yeltsin. That's not even on the agenda for the new Bush team."

NARRATOR: Michael McFaul is hopeful the U.S.-Russia relationship will improve in the long term. But he warns--don't expect diplomatic cooperation in the immediate future. Especially to bring an end to the violence in Macedonia.

MICHAEL MCFAUL: "The day that we expelled the Russian spies, our troops were together side by side, with the Russians in the Balkans. There's no reason why that can't continue. But to do so requires some modicum of engagement between the two sides and right now neither side has really stepped up to the plate, if you will, and decided we're going to make this an important part of foreign policy."

NARRATOR: That "modicum of engagement," as Michael McFaul calls it, could come this July, when President Bush has face to face talks with President Putin at a scheduled meeting of the Group of Eight industrialized nations in Italy.

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#2
Baltimore Sun
April 5, 2001
[for personal use only]
U.S.-Russian ties depend on Putin
By Derek Chollet
Derek Chollet, a research associate at George Washington University's Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, served in the State Department from 1999 until this year.

WASHINGTON -- The latest escalation of the spy-versus-spy game between the United States and Russia -- marked by dueling expulsions of intelligence agents from Washington and Moscow -- may be the latest sign of a tougher, more competitive approach by the Bush administration toward Russia. Bush officials assert that, unlike former President Clinton and his team, whom they say were blindly "romantic" about Russia, their actions are part of a policy rooted in "realism." White House spokesman Ari Fleischer recently invoked the word at least 10 times to explain the new approach toward Russia.

The problem with such claims of a new "realism" is that they don't reflect reality. Indeed, the Bush administration's Russia policy remains virtually identical to the one Mr. Clinton left.

For example, note how President Bush reacted to the arrest of suspected spy Robert Hanssen. After receiving recommendations from the CIA, FBI and Justice Department, he acted decisively and expelled Russian intelligence agents.

President Clinton would have done -- and did -- the same thing. After Aldrich Ames was arrested in 1994, he kicked out the head of Russia's intelligence branch in Washington -- the most senior and, arguably, the most important intelligence official Russia had on American soil. Some believe that the scale of the recent expulsion was excessive, but it seems justified given the damage that a counter-intelligence specialist like Mr. Hanssen has likely wrought.

Such continuity exists in other areas -- from the position on Chechnya to concerns about weapons proliferation. Indeed, the biggest change in U.S.-Russian relations over the past year has not been caused by the transition from Mr. Clinton to Mr. Bush, but by the transition from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin.

Since Mr. Putin emerged, there has been a distinct chill in U.S.-Russian relations. Under Mr. Yeltsin, the United States and Russia always approached problems with the assumption that even with their differences, they could be solved.

Russians worked with us on arms control, in the Balkans and swallowed hard and accepted NATO expansion. When the chips were down, "Bill and Boris" would get together and work things out.

But there never was a "Bill and Vlad" relationship. In the last year of the Clinton administration, Washington was frustrated in its attempts to convince Russia to preserve a free press at home, moderate its policy toward its neighbors, end the bloodshed in Chechnya and curb the proliferation of dangerous technologies to rogue states.

And it got nowhere in its effort to get Russia to agree to changes in the 1972 ABM Treaty, which are needed to allow development of a national missile defense.

The problem with these policies was not their "romanticism" about Russia -- if anything, each reflected hard-headed realism about American interests -- but that they presumed that Mr. Putin, like Mr. Yeltsin, would be a willing partner.

Today, the choice for partnership rests less with Washington than with Mr. Putin and the Russian people. So far the signs are not good. But the United States needs to be careful not to overreact: In the effort to distance himself from Mr. Clinton's foreign policy, President Bush is in danger of pushing Mr. Putin further into a corner and creating a self-fulfilling prophesy.

We must make clear to Russia that we will support it as long as it remains on the course Mr. Yeltsin first charted -- toward democratic reform at home and cooperation abroad. That's not to say we shouldn't act if Russia veers from this course, as it has in the Hanssen case. But we must express hope that Russia can tap all the good things in its history to become a positive force in the world.

Now that's a policy for both romantics and realists.

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#3
strana.ru
April 5, 2001
60% of Russians view Putin's first year of presidency as successful

The majority of Russians (60%) consider that in the first year of his presidency Vladimir Putin had more achievements than setbacks and only 14% of the citizens think otherwise.

The supporters of Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov were most critical of the president's first year performance: every third Zyuganov supporter (33%) considers that Putin made more mistakes.

The results of the poll were released today (April 5) by the Public Opinion Foundation that conducted the nationwide poll of 1,500 urban and rural respondents on March 31.

56% of the respondents answered an open (no prompting) question as to what they considered Putin's most outstanding accomplishment in his first year as president.

11% of the respondents consider it to be raising pensions; 9% - timely payment of pensions, grants and budget employees' salaries; 6% - positive changes in the situation in Chechnya; 5% - stabilization in general, political and economics; 5% - foreign politics, enhancement of Russia's prestige in the world; 4% - positive changes in the economy, declining inflation, rejection of foreign aid; 4% - consolidation of federal authority; 3% - better moral-psychological state of society, growing social optimism; 2% - bringing things into order, discipline, strengthening of the army, power structures.

41% of all the respondents agreed to answer an open question as to what they considered to be Putin's most serious setback.

More often (14%) the respondents considered his main setback was the inefficient action of the authorities and power structures in Chechnya ("inability to stop the war"). In second place was the disaster with the Kursk submarine (7%). Here the respondents noted both the sinking of the sub as well as the president's actions during the catastrophe. Another 4% view growing prices and the possibility of a new crisis to be the president's main setback. 3% of the respondents regard continuation of Yeltsin's policy and working together with the associates of the first Russian president as being among Putin's main drawbacks. And 2% consider his main failure was his inability to stop terrorism ("he allowed the killing of people in terrorist acts").

66% of the poll participants agreed to voice their opinions on what they thought were the president's main goals, his objectives.

Most respondents consider the president's main goals are the following: to raise the standard of living for the population, to ensure the country's wellbeing - 41%; to strengthen Russia's statehood and to consolidate society, to ensure Russia a high international status - 8%. But 1% of the respondents believe that the president does not have any definite objectives ("he does not know what he wants"). A similar share of the respondents (1%) maintains that Putin wants "to lower the Iron Curtain."

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#4
Moscow Times
April 5, 2001
Must Realism Be Arrogant?
By Pavel Felgenhauer

The ousting of Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev and his replacement by President Vladimir Putin's right-hand man, Sergei Ivanov, has generated some hope that meaningful military reform will get underway at last. But this hope of reform will be unlikely to improve U.S.-Russian relations at all.

In February, Ivanov surprised an international security conference in Munich with an uncompromising speech that denounced Western plans to further expand NATO as well as America's intention to deploy a national missile defense. Ivanov announced that the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is a cornerstone of international security and that it forbids the deployment of any NMD. Ivanov added that abrogation of the ABM Treaty would begin a new arms race, including an arms race in space.

U.S. President George W. Bush has stated that NMD is a national priority and has announced his intention to proceed no matter what Moscow says. This position contrasts with that of the Clinton administration, which also wanted to deploy a limited NMD but recognized the need to negotiate with Moscow changes to the ABM Treaty. Bush's administration seems to be characterized by a tendency toward unilateralism and particularly a desire to withdraw from the existing network of international agreements in order to gain a free hand in foreign affairs.

Several months ago the Kremlin hailed Bush's election victory. The political elite believed that a Republican administration would be "realistic" and be accommodating to Putin and his party of Kremlin "realists." However, it now appears the Kremlin got more realism from Washington than it bargained for. Quite realistically, the Americans consider Russia a weak nation that is getting weaker with each passing year. Of course, they are unwilling to seriously negotiate on strategic matters or make any significant concessions to such a country. Last month Ivanov met with Bush's national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, in Washington and the meeting did not go well. By all accounts, both sides agreed to disagree and parted.

Bush wants to create a "robust" missile defense: a system that would include not only land-based interceptors, but also sea-, air- and space-based interceptors ready for forward deployment near the territory of any potential enemy and capable of shooting down missiles at their boost stage immediately after take-off. This means that Clinton's offer to renegotiate the ABM Treaty is off the table, because it would mean forfeiting this robust option.

Evidently, the best Moscow can hope for now is an open-ended proposal that would allow the United States to deploy land-based interceptors that are already under construction and allow development of non-land-based systems with an understanding that they will also by deployed as soon as ready. Such a proposal is, of course, not a modification but a demolition of the ABM Treaty.

At the same time that it is destroying the ABM Treaty, the Bush administration also seems intent on undermining offensive arms-control agreements by announcing a unilateral cut in U.S. strategic warheads that means the end of the START arms-control process. A unilateral arms reduction may be a good public relations exercise, but it will also remove all binding international limitations on U.S. weapons - meaning that America will be equally free to unilaterally build up its arsenals at any time.

The ABM Treaty issue is not the only sign of the Bush administration's unilateralism. Last week, Bush announced the United States is withdrawing from the Kyoto agreement on greenhouse gas emissions. It's also clear that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which would ban nuclear testing altogether, will never be ratified under Bush. The United States seems enchanted with its status as the world's only superpower and is ready to completely disregard the opinions of its closest allies - to say nothing of Russia. Instead of global leadership, the United States is demonstrating arrogance and unpredictability.

The Kremlin, in turn, is acting no less irresponsibly by providing excuses for U.S. hawks to ruin international security. Moscow's efforts to occupy the moral high ground on arms control or the 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia have been invalidated by atrocities committed in Chechnya and Russia's eagerness to sell modern weapons to states like Libya, Cuba and Iran. Russian enthusiasm for sharing sensitive technologies with anyone who has cash is one of the main U.S. excuses for pushing ahead on NMD, a step that will only produce more proliferation.

Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent Moscow-based defense analyst.

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#5
Battle for Russia's embattled NTV broadcaster heats up

MOSCOW, April 5 (AFP) -
The battle for Russia's only independent national television station, NTV, heated up Thursday with the intervention of US media mogul Ted Turner as a "white knight."

NTV is trying to fight off the takeover by state-controlled Gazprom which liberals say threatens the future of free speech in Russia.

And the network warned Thursday that Gazprom may start releasing its own version of "false NTV" news over the network's airwaves from one of the television studies in Moscow's Ostankino centre.

Turner announced late Wednesday that he had reached agreement with NTV owner Vladimir Guzinsky to acquire his stake in the television station, providing a much needed cash injection for the heavily indebted network.

Turner did not mention the value of the transaction by Turner Ventures International, an investment group that he heads, but the Washington Post put it at 225 million dollars.

But Turner said the deal also needed the accord of Gazprom, which owns 46 percent of NTV and which installed a new board on Tuesday with the support of a minority US shareholder who holds 4.5 percent of the station.

"We look forward with enthusiasm to finalizing an agreement with Gazprom and Gazprom-Media that will ensure the ongoing independence of NTV," Turner said in a statement.

"In earlier negotiations with Gazprom, we both agreed that no one party should have control of NTV and we are pursuing that course," he said.

Representatives of both sides were scheduled to have talks Friday.

Turner will be acquiring Gusinsky's 49.5 percent stake in NTV, although 19 percent of this has been frozen by Russian courts because of a disputed shares-for-debt deal between Gazprom and the heavily-endebted NTV holding company Media-MOST.

Gusinsky is currently in Spain awaiting a court decision on a Russian extradition request to face fraud charges.

Meanwhile in a sign of growing protest, a member of Gazprom-Media's board of directors said he was resigning in disgust at Gazprom's strong-arm tactics used to enforce the takeover.

He referred to pressure put on a court in Saratov, in Russia's Volga region, to annul its ruling declaring Tuesday's shareholders' meeting unlawful.

"Gazprom-Media's PR campaign has collapsed," Anatoly Blinov, a lawyer, told Izvestia newspaper, adding that the forcible takeover "could spark massive acts of protest, not against what is done but how it is done."

In Moscow, some 400 NTV journalists and other staff kept up their round-the-clock vigil at the Ostankino broadcasting centre in the north of the Russian capital.

The NTV reporters refuse to accept Gazprom's sacking of their general director, respected journalist Yevgeny Kiselyov, and say they will not obey the new management. Gazprom appointed US financier Boris Jordan as new station director.

They and liberal supporters, including former Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev, have branded the takeover as a bid to stifle freedom of expression by silencing one of the Kremlin's most vocal critics.

Jordan said in an interview Thursday that he counted on reaching an amicable agreement with the NTV staff.

"NTV staff are talking to us. The negotiations are tough but they are taking place. And within time we can reach an accommodation with the journalists of this television station," he told Izvestia.

For the second day running, NTV cancelled all programs other than hourly news broadcasts, with viewers only granted a temporary relief the night before for a European Championship soccer quarter-final match.

The station posted across the screen e-mail messages of support from some of its 100 million viewers, scattered across the republics of the former Soviet Union.

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#6
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
April 5, 2001
THE DEFENSE OF NTV
Several thoughts on the slogan "Hands off NTV!"

Author: Vitaly Tretiakov
[from WPS Monitoring Agency,
http://www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
THE CONFLICT OVER THE MEDIA-MOST HOLDING AND ITS MAJOR COMPONENT, THE NTV NETWORK, SEEMS TO BE APPROACHING ITS FINAL STAGE. NTV - ONCE A PRIVATE TV COMPANY LIKE MANY OTHERS IN RUSSIA - HAS ALL BUT BECOME AN OPPOSITION PARTY. IF IT IS DESTROYED, THIS WOULD BE A BLOW TO FREE SPEECH AND OPPOSITION IN RUSSIA.
Wishing NTV's journalists and executives lots of luck with their problems

Another scandal was sparked. I have written about the conflicts over NTV before; I'm not going to repeat myself. Only two points should be emphasized. Firstly, the Kremlin is playing against NTV for political reasons (even though all financial complaints against the TV network are well-founded). At the same time, it is not out to do away with free speech in Russia. In fighting NTV, the Kremlin fights it as a kind of opposition party - and Vladimir Gusinsky as its founder and owner. Secondly - and unfortunately - NTV owners, executives, and some journalists have done their best to alienate other journalists, who mostly sympathized with NTV. Their constantly repeated and persistent assurances - not entirely correct, to put it mildly - that NTV is the most decent, the most professional, the most incorruptible, and the boldest company in Russia, and the only free and independent media company, and that anyone who doesn't share its opinions, or even criticizes NTV, is an incompetent on the Kremlin's payroll - all these assurances have finally had their effect.

All the same, it is impossible not to respond to the latest developments, even though I believe we all have a moral duty not to interfere.

And yet, it is impossible not to respond.

In my view, NTV is not something that must be destroyed. NTV is not a problem for the state or the authorities.

Over the last two years, and particularly over the last two months, NTV - once a private TV company like many others in Russia - has all but become an opposition party, with an anti-government bias typical of any opposition worth its salt. It is no coincidence, after all, that proto-party Yabloko revives as a political force only when it can rely on NTV airtime.

Because of that, the destruction of the NTV network in its present form will damage freedom of speech in Russia, in two ways. Firstly, the field of political competition among national networks will be considerably reduced. Secondly, the NTV/Yabloko political opposition party will be deprived of millions of viewers, and therefore of influence.

The destruction of NTV in its present form will essentially mean destruction of opposition in Russia (all opposition apart from the Communists, who have a strong classic party to rely on). And it's not good for the state to have the internal opposition destroyed. It means that we should resist even those who may disagree with the views and opinions of the opposition, but advocate democracy. Only from this angle, therefore, all professional politicians can support the slogan "Hands off NTV!" But all "honest and decent" people have the right not to support the slogan. This is a matter of political taste and preference.

What should NTV staff and journalists do?

(The following are not recommendations, just some thinking aloud, for the benefit of readers.)

An individual may be decent and honest, but can't demand that everyone behave identically.

Firstly, teamwork is great; but it doesn't mean people can't have their own opinions.

Secondly, NTV owners and executives who are employees at the same time are not exactly in an equal position with all the rest. Their conditions are entirely different - some of them could easily resign now and have enough money for the rest of their lives, while others will struggle to make ends meet a month from now. Moreover, NTV likes to say that all its journalists are TV stars. NTV is so fond of saying this that it might even have convinced itself. But fame will help only the truly famous. Many others will be left all alone with their problems.

In general, there are four ways out of this situation. First: Unanimous resignation. This would immediately create a colossal problem for the government, and for the new NTV management. In this case, NTV will be finished; but it will go down with all guns blazing. It will become a legend, which is better in any case than dull reality.

Second: Everyone stays on and continues working, showing that enemies of free speech have come to the TV network. This is also a worthy solution, one that implies real professionalism.

Third: Everyone stays on and feeds the conflict for propaganda purposes. This is what a political opposition does, and this is what NTV has started to do.

Fourth: Everyone comes to terms with the new management, but an agreement is reached on principles of professional activities. Moreover, these principles are made public. This would benefit all media outlets; but it would be a professional solution, not political. Although politics and journalism may overlap every now and then, they are not absolutely identical.

On a personal level, I wish all NTV journalists victory and a worthy solution to their dilemma.

Hands off NTV! I mean it, I really do. And as I see it, this slogan applies to the new and old management teams alike.

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#7
Christian Science Monitor
April 6, 2001
Editorial
Chemical Arms Crossroads

Four years ago the world took a needed step toward greater peace and sanity. Eighty-eight nations signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, which called for the destruction of all chemical weapons by 2012. Since then, the countries joining the pact have swelled to 174.

The agency formed to monitor compliance with the agreement, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, has conducted more than 850 inspections at 408 production and storage sites. Thousands of tons of the weapons have been destroyed, including 7,000 tons of American chemical ordnance. But that's only a quarter of the US total. It's a big and expensive job.

And the biggest part of it resides in a country where bureaucratic sludge is still plentiful but government money is in short supply - Russia.

Russia's arms depots hold 40,000 tons of chemical agents, shells, and warheads. Under the convention, Russia was supposed to have eliminated 1 percent of its supply by last April. It missed the deadline.

The Putin government vows to move ahead this year, and has earmarked $105 million for the task. The full bill for destroying Russia's chemical weapons is estimated to top $5 billion. Clearly, Moscow will need international help, which has been slow in coming. The US had been ready to contribute $888 million, but Congress last fall froze those funds because, reportedly, many members doubted that the expense fulfilled US national-security interests.

How can there be any doubt that the destruction of Russia's chemical arsenal - thus ensuring some of it won't filter into the hands of terrorists - is in the interest of the United States, to say nothing of the rest of the world?

The agency set up by the convention would check whether money given Russia was effectively used. But that agency, disturbingly, has warned that its own funding is falling short.

The Bush administration, which is reported to be reviewing its arms-control options, and Congress should do more to make sure that the means are available for this giant task.

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#8
Jamestown Foundation Monitor
April 5, 2001

PUTIN EMPHASIZES EUROPEAN OVER U.S. TIES.  The state-of-the-nation speech President Vladimir Putin delivered on April 3 was noticeably short on foreign policy matters, but appears nevertheless to have fueled further speculation that an important shift may be taking place in the Kremlin's posture toward the outside world. Indeed, perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of Putin's remarks in this regard was not what he said, but what he did not. As numerous Russian and foreign commentators noted, the Russian president did not mention the United States, or relations between Washington and Moscow. The omission was undoubtedly intentional, suggesting that the Kremlin is prepared to assume at least a posture that downgrades ties with Washington as a response to the Bush administration's pointed policy of deprioritizing relations with Russia. Putin underlined the point further, moreover, by including a specific reference to Moscow's hopes of drawing closer to Europe. His remarks suggest that Russian foreign policy under Putin will continue a pattern of differentiating between the United States and its NATO partners, thus permitting Moscow to continue pursuing friendly relations with the "West" while simultaneously remaining noncommittal with regard to Russian-U.S. ties.

None of this, of course, was explicit in Putin's remarks. But in the very brief section of his speech devoted to foreign affairs, the Russian president did speak of the importance Moscow is attaching to the future strengthening and "normalizing of partnership relations with the European Union." And he described a "course of integration with Europe" as "one of the main directions" of Russian foreign policy. Putin's emphasis on ties with Europe was all the more interesting because it represented the lone reference in Putin's speech (Belarus being the only exception) to relations with a specific foreign partner. That is, the speech not only included no mention of the United States, but also made reference neither to Russia's relations with China and India--Moscow's main Asian partners and a cornerstone of its foreign policy--nor to the "Asian direction" in Russian foreign policy overall. These omissions were also of interest, both because the Kremlin has in recent years generally stressed the degree to which its foreign policy is "balanced" between East and West, and because this week's address comes in the run up to a Russian-Chinese summit meeting at which Putin and Chinese President Jiang Zemin are expected to sign a lengthy friendship treaty. Most analysts see closer relations between Moscow and Beijing as a calculated response to their mutual troubled ties with Washington.

A pronounced "Western" orientation in Putin's remarks was also evidenced by the relatively large amount of attention he devoted to relations between Russia and NATO. He did appear to suggest that Moscow is prepared to continue mending fences with the Western alliance, but only on the condition that NATO observe what Moscow claims are the conditions set out in the 1997 agreement that established formal relations between the two sides. Indeed, the Russian president used his brief foreign policy remarks to restate earlier Russian charges--related to the alliance's air war against Yugoslavia--that NATO had violated international norms by using force without the authorization of the United Nations. "Our position," Putin said, "is clear: The only organization empowered to sanction the use of force in international affairs is the UN Security Council." Putin's remarks in this regard were certainly nothing new, but it is interesting that this was one of the themes he chose to highlight in an address which devoted such scant attention to foreign affairs.

In more general terms, Putin also pointed in his State-of-the-Nation address to the new importance that economic considerations are being accorded in the formulation of Russian foreign policy. That is a theme Putin first highlighted during a well-publicized speech to Russian Foreign Ministry personnel on January 26. On that occasion, he called for Russia's diplomats to place greater emphasis on the promotion of Russia's economic interests abroad, and said it was necessary to create operating conditions for Russian firms overseas which are at least no worse than those which foreign firms face in Russia (see the Monitor, January 28). Putin's remarks this week followed similar lines. He said that Russian diplomacy should "serve the interests of the Russian economy: to counter discrimination against domestic producers; to guarantee the maintenance and optimal use of Russian properties overseas (a comment presumably aimed primarily at the CIS countries), and to accelerate work on Russia's entry into the WTO (World Trade Organization) under acceptable conditions (Russian agencies, Strana.ru, April 3; The Guardian, Izvestia, April 4).

While there is little doubt that Moscow is making a genuine push for a major upgrade in its relations with the European Union, it seems unlikely that the Kremlin's intent to downgrade ties with the United States is as serious as might be suggested by Putin's April 3 speech. Indeed, Moscow has made clear repeatedly since the Bush administration came to power that it is anxious to establish contacts with the new administration and that it hopes to resume negotiations on arms control and other important issues. And despite the rebuff that the Kremlin has thus far received from Washington, there is little reason to believe that Moscow will deviate too far from this path. This is because, on the one hand, it is obviously in Moscow's interests to have cooperative relations with the United States. But it is also because the Kremlin appears determined to appear before Europe as a "reasonable" and pragmatic partner, and to put on the Bush administration the onus for deteriorating Russian-U.S. ties. It seems likely that Moscow hopes in that way to exploit concerns within the EU over the more confrontational policies that the current U.S. administration has adopted on a number of fronts, and to turn these concerns to Moscow's advantage.

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#9
DUMA FIGURES COMMENT ON ABSENCE OF EVALUATION OF RUSSIAN-U.S. RELATIONS IN PUTIN'S MESSAGE

MOSCOW. April 4 (Interfax) - Duma members have offered different explanations for the absence of an assessment of the state of Russian- American relations in President Vladimir Putin's message to the Federal Assembly.

"Silence is a statement in itself," Vladimir Lukin, deputy speaker representing the Yabloko party, told Interfax on Wednesday. He said that the foreign policy priorities named in the message are related primarily to CIS and European countries. "Though I am an expert in U.S. studies, I recognize that relations [with the CIS and Europe] have priority over ties with the United States," he said. On the other hand, in order for Russia's relations with the CIS and European countries to develop "more or less normally, a decent constructive relationship with the United States is necessary," he said.

Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the vice speaker representing the Liberal Democratic Party, in a Wednesday interview with Interfax accounted for the absence of a description of Russian-U.S. relations primarily to the fact that the U.S. stance still remains unclear for Russia.

America has not yet decided whether it is going to embark on the road of the cold war "and this will be one situation or it will try to build a normal relationship with us and this will be another situation," Zhirinovsky said.

I his opinion, the American attitude will become clear by the summer, he said.

Speaker of the State Duma Gennady Seleznyov believes that President Vladimir Putin in his address to the Federal Assembly quite consciously omitted the topic of Russian-US relations. "We don't understand the policy of President Bush towards Russia yet, as his administration has behaved very inconsistently," Seleznyov said in an interview with Interfax.

At the same time, Seleznyov said he is confident that "the U.S. is interested in a normal development of cooperation, just like we are." Andrei Kokoshin, a prominent representative of the Fatherland All Russia faction, said in an interview with Interfax that he approves of the fact that Putin said nothing about Russian-U.S. relations in his address to the Federal Assembly.

Kokoshin noted that the main priorities of Russia's foreign policy are now relations with the CIS countries and the European Union. At the same time, he stressed that Russian-U.S. relations at the moment "leave much to be desired and it will take time to seriously sort them out."

Kokoshin noted that the Russian Foreign Ministry expresses "certain cautious optimism" about Russian-U.S. relations. However, the new U.S. administration "has recently taken a number of actions and made a number of statements that were unpleasant for our country," he said.

Nikolai Ryzhkov, an independent Duma deputy and former prime minister of Russia, believes that Putin consciously omitted this topic in his message. "I think he did not want to court Americans and bow to them, but going at them will involve too much trouble," the deputy said. He noted that Russia still "greatly depends on the West not only economically, but also politically, particularly on the U.S., which today actually rules the world," he noted in an interview with Interfax. Alexei Mitrofanov, a prominent representative of the Liberal Democratic Party, believes that the president was absolutely right not to mention Russian-U.S. relations in his address to the Federal Assembly.

Mitrofanov noted in an interview with Interfax that "since the times of Gromyko [a former Soviet minister of foreign affairs] it is believed that three-fourths of our foreign policy is concerned with U.S. relations. It is totally wrong and it should not be this way today. The less attention we give to Russian-U.S. relations and the more attention we give to relations with our countries, the better it will be for us," Mitrofanov said.

He believes that if the Russian administration keeps emphasizing Russian-U.S. relations, then by doing so it will "exalt the U.S. and indirectly stress that it really is the number one country in the world."

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#10
Eskpert
No. 13
April 2001
CONTINENTAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY
Russia emphasizes the European direction in its foreign policy

Author: Yevgeny Verlin
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
EUROPE UNDERSTANDS RUSSIA'S PROBLEMS AND THE CHALLENGES OF TRANSITION. THE UNITED STATES, AS A NATION, CANNOT HAVE THIS AWARENESS AND UNDERSTANDING. HENCE THE ATTEMPTS TO CUT THE KNOT WITH A SINGLE STROKE; HENCE THE DRAMATIC SHIFTS FROM ROMANTIC EXPECTATIONS TO MILITARY SOLUTIONS AND BACK AGAIN.

Moscow has a chance to show some dignity. To be more exact, more dignity than Washington with its new administration has been displaying. What with all the scandalous rhetoric from the White House, Pentagon, and other American institutions, Russia can diplomatically retreat and determine its own position in this inexorably-changing world, a position appropriate to its capacities and interests.

It certainly seems that this is what the Russian president is doing. His "asymmetric" verbal response was revealed in the episodes with the spy scandal, the US decision to expel Russian diplomats, the detention of Pavel Borodin, and so on. "Everything will be all right," is the underlying motive of Vladimir Putin's infrequent and crisp statements on relations with the United States.

Moscow's clear reluctance to over-dramatize certain situations (including the meeting of Maskhadov's emissary with officials of the State Department) raises hopes that there will not be another Cold War.

If the US is really out to drive Russia into a corner, Russia has some room for maneuver. Actually, this "room" is a rather large continent called Europe.

George W. Bush started off by strengthening his own "CIS". His first summit and first trip abroad were to Canada and Mexico, US partners in the North American Free Trade Agreement. Putin has been doing approximately the same thing. He emphasizes improving contacts with neighbors on the post-Soviet territory, Europe, and Asian partners (Korea, China, Vietnam, Iran, and Japan). In every given episode Russia's motives are different. On the whole, however, its actions are based on the dominance of specific (but sometimes all too pragmatic) economic interests and considerations of national security all along its state borders.

The US says it has invested about $50 billion in Russian reforms and democracy throughout the 1990s, with nothing to show for it. Moreover, it does not even know exactly how the money was spent. These accusations are not entirely unfounced. On the other hand, who could really expect to change Russia in such a short time, after 70 years of communist rule? West Germany invested much more money over the same period in East Germany, a country much smaller and initially more advanced than Russia, and no one knows how much more money will have to be poured into it.

Unlike the United States, Europe understands Russia better - or at least honestly tries. Apart from our common "European" past, some other factors play a role here as well. They include a better awareness of the problem of separatism and its dangers, a better understanding of the problems of transition and the difficulties of overcoming the legacy of totalitarianism, etc.

The United States, as a nation, cannot have this awareness and understanding. Hence the attempts to cut the knot with a single stroke; hence the dramatic shifts from romantic expectations to military solutions and back again. As an individual and as a politician, Bush is the product of the American provinces, a kind of "red belt" in the United States. He will have to master the art of shaping his policy (with regard to Russia in this case) on the basis of correct evaluation of the situation - not reflexes and emotions. In any case, Moscow cannot become a strategic partner of the United States in the near future. US interest in Russia is ascribed solely to our capacity to pose a threat, direct or indirect, to the US.

Given this situation, Russia is shifting toward Europe in its foreign policy. Putin's meeting with European Union leaders in Stockholm confirms it.

The new EU-Russia agenda includes implementing the Cooperation and Partnership Agreement, dialogue in the energy sector, dialogue on defense and security issues, support for Russia in its aim to join the World Trade Organization, the TACIS program, assistance in the Kursk salvage operation, handling spent nuclear fuel, and many other projects and programs. All this shows that Russia and the European Union have actually found the areas where their interests coincide, and are therefore prepared to move toward strategic partnership relations.

All this is taking place against the background of the US reducing even the minimal amount of assistance to Russia, which Washington itself considered of paramount importance for its own national security only recently (assistance in providing safe storage for nuclear waste, and employment for specialists in the nuclear energy sector, to prevent them from seeking jobs in North Korea, Libya, etc).

Europe needs Russian reforms and modernization more than the US has ever needed them, because Russia is closer to Europe. At the same time, Russia is more important for Europe. Europe needs Russian natural resources and energy. The problems of Russia and other post- Soviet states pose a more serious threat to Europe than to the United States, because Europe cannot isolate itself from Russia by iron curtains or missile defense systems.

It is only natural that our reaction of "isolation" from the United States should be based on our own self-sufficiency. This does not mean creating a multi-polar world in the form we believed possible in the mid-1990s. We cannot form our own center in the foreseeable future. Perhaps we are better off without it. At the same time, going out of our way to assist the appearance of centers antagonistic to the US would be counter-productive. The West disapproves; which creates serious obstacles for us in obtaining investment, technologies, and so on.

These days, there is only a "capitalist commonwealth" around the world, in the form of military-political and economic alliances and unions. Whether critics like it or not, it is stable because it is based on fundamental values and on effective economic principles. All attempts to form alternative geopolitical alliances are mostly based on mutual recognition of the rules of international communication with a special emphasis on resistance to "international dictatorship" (that means "American" of course). From this point of view, all these alliances are strictly temporary.

For example, although the importance of our contacts with China understood and recognized, cooperation with China won't earn us even a tenth of what we may gain from cooperation with the West. Neither Russia nor China are investors on the global market, and our economic contacts are mostly restricted to bartering our raw materials for their cheap commodities. Arms sales to China are a vital component of our strategic partnership, but the long-term advantages and disadvantages remain unclear as yet.

Beijing's current geopolitical stratagem may be described as follows: "Rely on the North [strategic alliance with Russia - Aut.], neutralize the West [remove sources of animosity and tension in India and Central Asia], and expand into the East and the South [which can mean both economic and military expansion]." For Russia, it may be phrased as follows - rely on the West [build up relations with Europe, the main source of investment], neutralize the East [remove the existing and potential threats from Asian neighbors], and expand into the South [restore positions on post-Soviet territory].

If Russia is aware of its true national interests, this will help it formulate a basis of relations with the United States - no longer a relationship between equals, but one which must be made mutually beneficial.

The present situation - in which Moscow and Washington are no longer friends, but not yet opponents - is not irreversible.

(Translated by A. Ignatkin)

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#11
Russia: U.S. Considers Defense Policy Reorientation
By Frank T. Csongos
The U.S. Defense Department is undertaking a comprehensive military review aimed at meeting post-Cold War challenges around the globe. One proposal reportedly under consideration would reorient the focus of U.S. military involvement from Europe to the Pacific. The new strategy is still being formulated and to be presented to President George W. Bush. Our Washington correspondent Frank T. Csongos reports.

Washington, 5 April 2001 (RFE/RL) -- The administration of President George W. Bush says it is assessing American military doctrine and the weapons systems needed to protect U.S. interests around the globe.

U.S. officials say the review is under way at the Defense Department. One key proposal said to be under consideration is reorienting the focus of U.S. military involvement from Europe to the Pacific.

Advocates of this policy say that with the collapse of the Soviet Union a decade ago, Europe no longer faces a Cold War-type military threat. They say China -- with the world's largest population and a potentially huge economic market -- represents the greatest opportunity and challenge to America for the next 50 years.

Officials are reluctant to discuss publicly the specifics of the military review. But at a briefing this week the Defense Department's chief spokesman Admiral Craig Quigley provided the following perspective:

"The Pacific is very important. I mean, If you just look at the Pacific Command's area of responsibility, it is our largest unified command in the U.S. Department of Defense. You've got dozens of countries in that part of the world. We have very strong economic ties to that part of the world. Some of our strongest friends and allies in the world are in the Pacific region. So it's a very important part of the world to us."

Officials say Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's closely guarded study of military policy will guide the administration as it seeks to fulfill Bush's campaign pledge to improve the quality of the U.S. armed forces.

Andrew Marshall, the veteran Defense Department official running the strategic review, reportedly made the following key points to Rumsfeld:

The Pacific Ocean is the most likely theater of major U.S. military operations. China is becoming more powerful and Russia less so. This would require a reorientation of a half-century-old defense policy that focused on keeping the peace in Europe and deterring the Soviet Union.

Operating more effectively in the Pacific will require an additional emphasis on long-range power projection. That means greater attention to airlift capacity of troops and firepower.

Huge aircraft carriers are expensive and vulnerable. One alternative would be to start designing a new, smaller carrier that is less vulnerable to missiles. President Bush told a joint session of the U.S. Congress in February that America must disregard as no longer relevant Cold War military doctrines. Bush repeated his call for developing a missile defense system aimed at rogue nations such as Iraq and North Korea and possibly Iran. Both Russia and China oppose the idea.

Edward McCord is a professor of history and international affairs at George Washington University in Washington. He told RFE/RL that the Bush administration believes the threat to America comes from Asia, and is acting accordingly. "They want to have some kind of focus, and if it's an enemy, that actually is more beneficial also for policy reasons, I think -- to have somebody that you can point to as a threat in some ways. And China is seen as a threat, you know, both strategically and economically."

McCord says he does not believe that such a policy is realistic. First, he argues, the U.S. does not face the same kind of military threat that it did during the Cold War. And on the economic front, he says, Japan is more of threat than China. "I don't think China's either our strategic partner or our strategic competitor. I don't think those are actually useful terms."

McCord says that it would be a mistake if the Bush administration decides to focus so negatively on China. He says this would confirm the worst fears of the Chinese that the U.S. is trying to keep their country from achieving its economic and strategic potential. He said the Chinese would view the American attitude this way: "We realize that China is a danger to us, a threat to us because they're getting powerful. We don't want anybody else powerful in the world, except ourselves, and that we'll do anything we can to keep them back."

"The Wall Street Journal," an influential American newspaper specializing in business affairs, reported 3 April that Bush now finds himself in the awkward position of how best to deal with China.

The newspaper said that on one side stand strong national security advocates. In the other are advocates of improved business relations with China.

The first group, says the newspaper, views China as an expansionist power with a growing military and a resolve to eclipse American influence.

To the Beijing-friendly business lobby, it says, China is a lucrative market and manufacturing site, and just as important, a country where economic progress is making old security worries obsolete.

The tension between the United States and China over an American reconnaissance plane stranded on a Chinese runway, and the fate of its 24-member crew, has underscored the fragility of Sino-American relations. It is yet to be seen which camp, if any, the Bush administration will embrace.

(Washington correspondent Andrew F. Tully contributed to this report)

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#12
Financial Times (UK)
5 April 2001
[for personal use only]
Kosovo, the west's Chechnya.
By YURI LUZHKOV
The writer is mayor of Moscow

Two years have passed since Nato launched its military operation against Yugoslavia. Under the guise of protecting Kosovar Albanians, Nato inflicted an exemplary punishment of bombings and blockades. Rarely were dissenting voices allowed to intrude on western public opinion.

At that time, I called Kosovo another Chechnya. I see now that if I erred it was in being over-optimistic. In 1999 there were already signs of Kosovo's "Chechenisation". There was mass hostage-taking along ethnic lines and there was religious intolerance - the Kosovo Liberation Army was even forcing Catholic Albanians to leave. Serbian monasteries were destroyed and priests were kidnapped.

Almost all the Serbian population has now been expelled from the region of Kosovo. Almost all the historical monuments have been ruined. We profess shock at the destruction of Buddhas in Afghanistan but we have allowed history to be destroyed in the very centre of Europe.

Why is this cultural destruction occurring? Because it does not suit the Kosovars to have evidence exposing them as relatively recent arrivals in this land. In much the same way, Chechen rebels regularly destroy evidence that the plains of Chechnya were settled by the Cossacks of the north Caucasus.

Macedonia is now becoming the victim of the very Albanians whom, until recently, it had supported under pressure from Nato. Out of Nato's bombs a cancer has grown and it continues to spread. Some people in Nato must have thought the Albanians could be easily pacified. Their attitude must have been: they already have a state, Albania - let them annex to it all the territories where Albanians have settled. They must also have thought: they have military forces - let them have the terrorists of the KLA as well. That will culminate in a Greater Albania. True, it will be big and bloody - but it will still meet the legal norms making it admissible to the United Nations.

That attitude is wrong - it will not be the end. Many rebellious Albanians will never settle for a peaceful life. Their country is the poorest in Europe. Driven by political or economic forces, they will spread across the continent, forming a network of desperate sellers of arms and drugs. As a result, Europe will encounter its own clash of civilisations: a majority operating by 21st-century legal and ethical standards will confront a minority with far more ancient standards and yet with modern arms at their disposal.

To avoid a new battle of Poitiers, or of Vienna, Europe should analyse the situation in Pristina. In doing so, it may find Russia's sad experience in Chechnya to be of considerable help. The war in Chechnya began when some former Russian leaders thought a tank regiment could solve a local failure in their nation-building. With Kosovo, Nato thought a bombing campaign could rid them of one Serbian leader. An insignificant aim was pursued with enough force to shatter the calm of an entire region and leave thousands of dead and injured.

The Kosovars have taken the Chechen experience into account - and reproduced it diligently. In Chechnya, the mono-ethnic path was clear by the end of the Soviet period. A significant portion of the non-Chechen population was forced out before the revolution led by Djohar Dudaev. This greatly assisted the second, outright separatist stage.

The same has happened in Kosovo: Serbs were already being squeezed out during the peaceful times under Tito. But Kosovo has never belonged to the Albanians. Indeed, Tito invited many of them as part of his plan to create a Balkan federation.

It seems that now nobody is ready to resist the Kosovar brigands. At least when Yevgeny Primakov was prime minister of Russia, he turned his aircraft around in mid-flight, abandoning a trip to the US, to protest against the bombardment. But soon after that, Russia was not even prepared to insist on its own sector of control in Kosovo, which would have saved some of the Serb population from exile.

With Serbia humiliated and Russia "contained", Nato alone must now answer for the Kosovo settlement. Perhaps that is why it has suddenly remembered the existence of the Yugoslav national army, which it was accusing of all possible sins just two years ago.

The Yugoslavs can bring real force to bear. Their motherland is at stake and they alone must save it. There can be no hope of relying on a transatlantic uncle.

Russia has lived through this situation. Israel has also lived through it. Now it is the turn of Yugoslavia. The rest of Europe must understand. As in medieval times, the question is not one of comfort but of survival.

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#13
Washington Post
April 5, 2001
[for personal use only]
Insulting Russia
By Richard Cohen

Here we go again. The Chinese, like the Japanese before them, are feeling in dire need of an apology from Washington. The Japanese wanted one for the appalling sinking of their fishing trawler by an American submarine, and now the Chinese want one for their failed bump-and-run on a U.S. spy plane. One apology was demanded for our negligence while another is being demanded for their negligence. The Orient, as it used to be called, can really seem inscrutable.

On the other hand, the United States can really seem arrogant. If the two accidents have anything in common it is the sense you get that both Japan and China approach America with something of a chip on their shoulder. They recognize they are dealing with a superpower -- and they don't much like it.

You can understand. It's not just that Japan was once a superpower itself or that China sees itself as virtually synonymous with civilization. It is also that both countries feel they have to put up with what might be termed pushy American behavior. Never mind that examples of that sort of behavior are rare; the fact remains that it takes very little for either nation to get its back up. Think, for a moment, how we would react if a Chinese spy plane collided with one of ours and had to make an emergency landing at LaGuardia -- about the only way to get in nowadays. I shudder at the thought.

But the Bush administration has proceeded thus far as if feelings should play no role in foreign policy. Of course nations are not people, and in international relations, self-interest is supposedly all. Yet the Chinese really do get furious at being treated as less than an equal by the United States, and Japan really does get hurt when it is taken for granted.

What's true for these countries is doubly true for Russia. China, at least, is a country on the ascent. It is richer, more powerful and becoming more engaged with the world. Russia, however, simply ain't what it used to be. Not only is the old Soviet (or czarist) empire gone but so are the economy, the military and even, on a given day, the ability to heat the schools.

Such a country might suffer from excessive, exaggerated pride. Such a country might insist on a respect it can no longer simply earn. Such a country might seethe at being disrespected, not just because it was once held in awe but because the disrespect is not a calculated slight but a true reflection of reality.

And yet the Bush administration has treated Russia with calculated disdain. It signaled right at the start that it was in no hurry for the president to meet with -- or even talk to -- Vladimir Putin. Since then, it has done some blunt talking. Paul Wolfowitz, the Pentagon's deeply conservative political commissar (deputy defense secretary), characterized Russian arms sales to Iran this way: "These people seem to be willing to sell anything to anyone for money."

Wolfowitz is not necessarily wrong. His content is fine. His tone is something else again. It's dismissive. But Russia remains a nuclear power and a vast country. Why insult it? Why rub its nose in its shabbiness, its impotence?

It's always possible that Russia might respond with humility and gratitude and thank the United States for forcing it to come to terms with reality. On the other hand, there is just the remotest chance it will get its back up, brush itself off, puff itself up and try to reclaim some of its lost glory. One way to do that is to tell George W. Bush to shove off.

Bush is right on the substance of how he's dealing with the Russians. He is wrong, though, on his approach -- the atmospherics. He seems aloof, contemptuous (the TV sneer) and he talks as if America's interests will always be paramount -- and too bad if you don't like it.

No one much likes this approach -- not the Europeans when it comes to global warming, not the South Koreans when it comes to how to deal with the North, not the Russians when it comes to missile defense and not, as we just learned, the Chinese when it comes to spy planes poking around their neighborhood. It turns out the Orient is not that inscrutable after all. Like anywhere else, a little respect goes a long way.

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Additional Sources
 
Carnegie Moscow Center
 
The Jamestown Foundation
 
The Moscow Times
 
Russia Today
 
strana.ru
 
Voice of America
 
Interfax
 
AFP
 
BBC Monitoring
 
Christian Science Monitor
 
United States Diplomatic Mission
 
Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C.
 
Russian Federation