#1
Russia: Analysts Assess Kremlin Reshuffle
By Jeremy Bransten and Sophie Lambroschini
Russian President Vladimir Putin yesterday made substantial changes in his government, replacing the interior and defense ministers -- among other cabinet officials -- with close personal associates. Putin said the moves would advance plans for military reform and what he called the "demilitarization" of Russian public life. RFE/RL correspondents Sophie Lambroschini and Jeremy Bransten spoke with analysts who assess the new cabinet line-up.

Prague, 29 March 2001 (RFE/RL) -- Analysts say President Putin's government reshuffle yesterday further consolidates his grip on power. But they are uncertain about whether this will mean significant changes in Russian government policies.

Putin himself emphasized that the two top people at the Defense Ministry, as well as the head of the Interior Ministry, will now be civilians.

"As you see, in key positions in military bodies, civilians are appearing. This has been done deliberately. It is a step towards the demilitarization of Russian society."

But analysts say the reshuffle promoted people closely associated with Putin, while officials associated with former President Boris Yeltsin were downgraded. They point out that although new Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov is now a civilian, he had previously served for 20 years in the Soviet and Russian security services -- where he was a colleague of Putin -- rising to the rank of general in the KGB.

Ivanov is seen as Putin's most-trusted ally, precisely because of bonds formed during their joint KGB work.

Michael McFaul, a senior analyst at the Washington-based Carnegie Endowment, notes that Vladimir Rushailo's replacement as interior minister by Boris Gryzlov -- who heads the pro-Kremlin Unity faction in the Duma -- is also important.

"It's a further consolidation of Putin's power over ministries where he previously did not have his people in place. Both the interior appointment and the appointments at the Ministry of Defense -- these are now loyalists to Mr. Putin. Rushailo, especially, was a holdover from [businessman Boris] Berezovsky's clan, so that's a big change and important in terms of Putin's consolidation."

McFaul says the new line-up can be seen as a more modern government, one in which ministers are appointed due to political loyalty instead of shady financial interests. As an example, he points to the ouster of Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeny Adamov, who had been plagued by a conflict-of-interest scandal related to his commercial work.

"I do believe it's a kind of modernization of the way the government is run. It's not a bunch of fiefdoms, as it was the last couple of years. And it's the same with the Ministry of Atomic Energy. Each one of these ministers, basically, was an autonomous agent. Now you're seeing a much more political government and you know, I think that's a good thing, not a bad thing."

Speaking to RFE/RL last night, opposition Duma deputy Sergei Ivanenko, of the Yabloko faction, pointed to another sign that Putin is succeeding in imposing his own team. Ivanenko noted that despite the major changes, Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, who is regarded as a Yeltsin-man, was left completely out of the picture yesterday.

"In essence, this is a government of Putin, who is in reality the government's head. He directly controls all of his ministers and in this sense the fact Kasyanov was not mentioned once today is very revealing."

But will the change in government mean a change in policy? Putin clearly implied sweeping changes. He said yesterday that the reshuffle was prompted by the situation in the North Caucasus and the need get on with a long-awaited military reform. Yet all the officials responsible for waging Russia's latest war in Chechnya are still in place, albeit in different posts.

Moscow-based defense analyst Francoise Deauce sees some hope that new Defense Minister Ivanov can shake up the military.

"He is someone who is outside the armed forces, who has a lot of authority -- notably from his [earlier] posts inside the security services -- and so maybe he can impose decisions on the army that it might see as going against its interests. In other words, he may be capable of fighting the corporatism of the military institutions that until now was largely responsible for braking successive attempts at military reforms since 1991."

Stephan De Spiegeleire, a senior policy analyst at the RAND Europe policy think-tank, is more pessimistic. He says the equation is very simple: until the war in Chechnya is ended, no significant reforms can be expected, no matter what appointments Putin makes from his inner circle.

"Let's face it: the fundamentals around this are that, economically, Russia is in no position to make any kind of a change -- whether it's inspired by the KGB or anything else -- with a military budget of $8 billion that continues to be cannibalized by this war [in Chechnya]. There isn't really very much room for anybody to start behaving in a radically different way."

By contrast, the United States' annual military budget is close to $300 billion.

It is noteworthy that newly named Defense Minister Ivanov indicated today there would be no "revolution" in military reforms, adding that any changes would be gradual. Military reforms such as streamlining and reorganizing the army, strict reduction of personnel, and the introduction of a professional rather than conscript army have been announced for the past decade as indispensable to cut costs and adapt to new realities. But they have never been implemented.

Analysts say that while yesterday's moves indicate Putin is strengthening his hand, the reshuffling of a few key cabinet members will not in itself guarantee meaningful reforms. Divisive factions that existed in the upper echelons of the Russian government and the military before Putin came to power still exist. Analyst De Spiegeleire argues that Putin may have a harder time imposing his authority on the machinery of government than his predecessors, as he still lacks their political power base.

"The infighting that's going on -- that has been going on for a very long time -- hasn't stopped just because Putin came in. There may be some different interest groups that are involved right now but the main fact that -- also within the military -- there are some clans that keep fighting is not going to change by the mere appointment of Ivanov. Unlike previous leaders of Russia, or the Soviet Union, who grew up as first [communist party] secretaries and had a huge cadre of people around them, Putin doesn't have it."

President Putin has often been a man of bold words, and those words yesterday appeared to be reinforced by political action. But whether this will now translate into a new course for Russia is still too early to forecast.

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#2
Putin moves to consolidate power, leaving fate of government
in doubt

MOSCOW, March 29 (AFP) -
The future of Russia's liberal economic team and Yeltsin-era prime minister were in doubt Thursday after President Vladimir Putin finally moved to consolidate power one year after winning election by placing trusted allies in key military posts.

"According to some information, the decree dismissing Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov has already been prepared and will be announced within the week," the Izvestia daily said in summing up a mood of uncertainty hanging over Moscow.

Putin surprised the nation Wednesday by overhauling the unwieldy Russian military command that he inherited from his mentor Boris Yeltsin and promising to introduce more "eye-catching" changes in the coming days.

Putin's decision to place the former hawkish Security Council secretary Sergei Ivanov in charge of the defense ministry in place of Marshall Igor Sergeyev has two immediate consequences.

Analysts said it first shifts much of the decision-making process to the defense ministry from the secretive Security Council where Ivanov -- one of Putin's most trusted advisors and himself a former KGB agent -- ruled supreme.

But it also removes one of Kasyanov's most frequently-mentioned potential successors, and while few doubt that a shift at the top of the Russian government is imminent, few can say who can be named the new prime minister now that Ivanov has been given a different job.

Speculation was running rampant among analysts and in the press. Investors for one agreed that the current liberal team headed by economy chief German Gref and Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin is best left untouched.

"Attention is now focused on Putin's throw away line ... signaling further 'eye-catching' appointments. Does this mean the economic ministers? We hope not, and also we think not," the United Financial House said in a note.

Some meanwhile pointed the figure to other hold-overs from the Yeltsin era, who are linked to the so-called "Family" of relatives and secretive aides that supposedly took all the key decision of the past.

"The Russian media have widely speculated that Kasyanov will get the axe," the Anton investment house said. "We suspect that Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov may also face such a similar fate. Like Kasyanov, Ivanov is a Yeltsin holdover ... and his performance is less than stellar."

The changes introduced so far have actually raised few eyebrows save for one -- the appointment of the little-known Boris Gryzlov, who heads the pro-Putin Unity faction in parliament, as Russia's new interior minister.

At least one Western analyst labeled the decision as "bad."

"President Putin is looking to use the power ministries to increase influence over the Duma. He is using Gryzlov to tie the two together," Renaissance Capital said, noting this will limit the chamber's ability to check on the executive.

Analysts further agreed that the days when competing Kremlin teams made politics in Russia if, perhaps, more lively but clearly less effective were coming to an end.

"Putin is getting rid of the era of weak government, when presidents had to balance their ministers out," said Yury Korgunyuk of the INDEM think-tank.

"Putin has other resources. He has the Duma's support and convincing popularity in the electorate. He has received a mandate, and is finally starting to use it."

Others noted that Putin may have waited a year before making his move as part of a secret agreement not to touch his government that was struck before his election with the people who helped bring him to power -- the Yeltsin clique.

"It was inevitable that Putin would one day become his own man and not be influenced from the outside," said Andrei Piontkovsky of Moscow's Center for Strategic Studies.

"Now he places people who are absolutely loyal to him in key positions. This is natural on the part of any Soviet or post-Soviet leader."

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#3
Moscow Times
March 29, 2001
Love for President Strong but not Blind
By Ana Uzelac
Staff Writer

Opinion polls show that President Vladimir Putin enjoys the support of about 75 percent of Russians. But the love is not blind: A year after his election, people have greater doubts about Chechnya, the lack of a clear economic policy and the president's ability to raise their standard of living.

According to a poll conducted early this month by the All-Russian Center for Public Opinion, or VTsIOM, respondents' biggest disappointment was Chechnya, with support for Putin's policy in the war-torn region dropping more than threefold - from 24 percent in October 1999, when Putin was prime minister, to a mere 7 percent as of February.

The number of people who said they were "very worried" by the president's inability to end the fighting in Chechnya more than doubled since last March - rising from 22 to 48 percent. The survey also showed a marked decline in respondents' belief that Putin would be able to end the war at all, down from 30 percent last June to 20 percent in February.

All of the cited polls were conducted using a standard sample of 1,600 respondents throughout the country, VTsIOM said on the Polit.ru web site, where it posted the results.

Less dramatic, but still noteworthy, was the disappointment in Putin's economic policies: In comparison to last June, the number of people who believed Putin could raise their standard of living dropped by February from 26 to 17 percent, while the number of those who "have no hope" of seeing the standard rise grew from 10 to 15 percent.

Over the same period, the number of those who feel Putin can "lead the country out of crisis" dropped from 27 percent to 20 percent, while those who are unhappy with "the lack of a clear political line" grew from 5 percent in October 1999 to 12 percent in February.

Although the number of respondents who believe Putin is closely linked to the entourage of ex-President Boris Yeltsin rose since October 1999 from 16 to 26 percent, so has the number of people who attach no significance to this affiliation - from 17 percent a year ago to 27 percent now.

Despite the disappointments, Russians generally still like their president. About 61 percent believe Putin is "doing everything possible to fulfill his electoral promises." And the ranks of those who consider him the guarantor of stability in Russia grew from 10 percent in October 1999 to 15 percent. So did the number of those who find Putin "outwardly pleasant" - from 10 percent in October 1999 to 16 percent.

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#4
The Russia Journal
March 24-30, 2001
Carnegie Analysis
New friends, enemies as stage changes
Russia should turn to cooperation with Europe before it's too late
By Alexander Golts

All analysts sometimes find themselves in situations where instead of feeling proud for having correctly predicted events, they would rather have been wrong.

Readers of The Russia Journal perhaps remember how just after Moscow announced it would resume military cooperation with Iran, I suggested that the United States would respond by sharply cutting back its financing of security programs with Russia.

No sooner did Iranian President Mohammad Khatami end his visit to Moscow, than the U.S. administration announced it was cutting by 10 percent the $80 million it gave to Russia each year to help maintain its nuclear arsenal in a safe state. True, the Kremlin hopes to make at least $300 million a year from deals with Iran, but so far, no contracts have been signed.

Meanwhile, Russia's dealings with Iran are not causing just political damage. The material damage is also apparent now. Security Council Secretary Sergei Ivanov didn't have much success in persuading Condoleezza Rice and Colin Powell that Moscow had good and fair reasons for developing contacts with Iran in the military and atomic sectors.

We now seem to be witnessing the death throes of the "multipolar world" concept thought up by Yevgeny Primakov. This concept became the foundation of countless doctrines and policies that, put into plain language, all came down to establishing Russia in one way or another as leader of an anti-American coalition of states. In this way, Russia would justify its right to play a significant part on the international stage.

Moscow obviously hoped to put together a strong coalition to oppose U.S. plans to deploy a National Missile Defense (NMD) system. But this coalition isn't anywhere in sight. After Colin Powell visited Europe, the United States' NATO allies toned down their misgivings about NMD; after all, Powell promised that they too would be protected by the system.

China, which until recently had most consistently opposed NMD plans, has also become more moderate of late. An official Chinese representative said that Beijing continues to oppose the idea of a regional missile defense covering Taiwan, but takes a far more neutral stand toward creation of a strategic missile defense.

So, the only result for Moscow after two years of political campaigning has been to isolate Russia. Moscow's only allies today are countries like Iran, designated "rogue states" by the United States. Just recently, Russia still had a chance to put to good use the special relations that the former Soviet Union built with countries like Iraq, Iran, Libya and North Korea.

Russia could have become the civilized world's representative in these marginalized countries. Russian representatives could have persuaded the leaders of these unstable countries to renounce attempts to blackmail the rest of the world with their missiles and nuclear programs. This was what happened when President Vladimir Putin visited North Korea and got Pyongyang to promise to give up its missile program.

But the more anti-American Russia's foreign policy becomes, the more Russia finds itself looking to build up ties with the "rogue states." And now, the Kremlin is trying to blackmail the West with the threat to sell modern weapons to these countries. This can only lead to Russia's increasing isolation.

But even now that relations with the United States look to be at a low, Moscow still has a good opportunity to secure itself a decent place in world affairs. The United States can afford to follow policies that isolate Russia, but the countries of Europe have to live with Russia as their neighbor.

European Union enlargement will bring a united Europe right up to Russia's borders, and to ensure their own prosperity, these countries will have to find ways of cooperating with Russia. It's a sign of things to come that with Poland and the Baltic States seeking to join the EU, European countries have begun to pay more attention to the Kaliningrad Oblast.

Russia is an essential partner for European integration in security matters. European forces will be required to regulate conflicts that NATO does not want to become involved in. U.S. forces would not be involved in all operations, but they are the foundation for any military planning.

Although Russia's armed forces have their weak points, they still have the ability to move troops around fast in emergencies. It will take the Europeans another decade to build their own military-transport helicopters, and in the meantime, they could be interested in the Russian A-70 helicopter. Russian military transport subdivisions could be integrated into EU quick-reaction forces. The Europeans will also be interested in using Russian space communications and intelligence.

But for Moscow to work with the EU in this way, it would have to abandon attempts to use cooperation with Europe as a way of driving a wedge between Europe and the United States. Moscow urgently needs to realize that a "negative agenda" - when opposition to this or that country becomes the foundation of foreign policy - is a dead-end strategy. It would inevitably turn Russia into something more than a rogue state - a continent locked in complete isolation.

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#5
US Department of State
29 March 2001
Excerpts: Domenici Says Russian Nuclear Stockpile Serious Threat
(Senator calls for attention to Russian safety, security issue) (1380)

Washington -- Republican Senator Pete Domenici, chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, told a gathering of nuclear security experts March 26 that "Russia's nuclear stockpile is the most serious national security threat we face today."

He quoted the Bush administration's national security advisor as saying that U.S. security is threatened more by Russia's weakness and incoherence than by its military strength. "This suggests immediate attention to the safety and security of Moscow's nuclear forces and stockpile," he said.

In a speech written for delivery to the Nuclear Security Decision-makers second annual forum in Albuquerque, New Mexico, the senator also discussed problems facing the U.S. Nuclear Stockpile Stewardship Program -- a program that validates the soundness of the U.S. nuclear stockpile in the absence of nuclear tests.

He also emphasized that the new U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) should be made part of "an integrated national approach to our entire nuclear deterrent."

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#6
Jamestown Foundation Monitor
March 29, 2001

RUSSIAN LAWMAKERS WEIGH IN ON ATOMIC ENERGY MINISTRY. Russia's powerful Atomic Energy Ministry (Minatom) suffered an important and unexpected defeat last week when the Russian State Duma postponed discussion and a vote on a controversial package of legislation which would permit the ministry to import into Russia some 20,000 tons of spent nuclear fuel. Lawmakers had overwhelmingly approved the nuclear import legislation during a first reading of the bills in December, and expectations were that the legislation would receive the same sort of support in a second--and possibly an immediate third--reading scheduled for March 22. Had those votes gone as anticipated, the nuclear waste import legislation would have needed only the approval of the Federation Council and President Vladimir Putin. As it is, Minatom and its supporters, which have argued that the importation of spent nuclear fuels could earn Russia more than US$20 billion, will likely gear up for passage of the legislation in early April, when the rescheduled hearings on the bills are to take place.

Russian commentators struggled in the aftermath of the March 22 vote to explain how and why Duma deputies, who gave such overwhelming support to the nuclear waste import legislation last December, had suddenly and at the eleventh hour reversed course and voted in just as overwhelming numbers for a postponement of the hearings. They pointed to several factors, including the strong fight which Russian environmental groups and some deputies from the Yabloko and the Union of Right Wing Forces had waged against the bills. These groups argued that Minatom's plans would wreak enormous environmental damage on Russia and threatened to turn the country into the world's nuclear waste dump. They also sharply disputed the economics of the project, arguing that nuclear waste import would not generate the enormous profits Minatom projected. Perhaps more important, critics of the plan also charged that the nuclear waste import legislation failed to provide for proper oversight of the revenues which would be flowing to Minatom. They warned that Minatom would likely use money made from the project not, as it has claimed, to clean up existing Russian nuclear facilities, but instead--at least in part--on projects aimed at upgrading nuclear weapons or building new ones. The critics' case was probably aided by the emergence of evidence earlier this month indicating that Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeny Adamov, an aggressive proponent of the nuclear waste import project, may have engaged in improper business dealings (Moscow Times, March 21-22; Strana.ru, March 21; AFP, March 22; AFP, March 5). Adamov exited unexpectedly from the scene yesterday, a victim of Putin's government reshuffle. It is unclear what his departure will mean for the future of the nuclear waste import bills.

But the evidence accumulated by the nuclear waste import project's critics may not, in any event, have been decisive in the March 22 vote. Some Russian sources pointed to two other critical developments. One was a March 14 letter from Richard Stratford, director of the U.S. State Department's Office of Nuclear Energy Affairs, to the Russian Nuclear Information and Resource Service. In the letter, which was released to the public by the Ecodefense environmental group, Stratford indicated that the United States would block "any transfer to Russia of power reactor spent fuel subject to U.S. consent rights." The decision, reportedly a result of Washington's objections to Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran, is crucial because the United States currently controls about 90 percent of the world's spent nuclear fuel market. Washington could therefore effectively doom Minatom's nuclear waste import project by blocking potential client states from sending their fuel to Russia (Moscow Times, Bellona.no, March 23).

The nuclear waste import legislation appeared to encounter still another barrier on March 22, and this one was particularly unexpected. According to several Russian sources, word began filtering down to Russian lawmakers just before that vote that the Kremlin may have reversed--at least temporarily--its earlier support for the project. That reversal may have been a result of the Stratford letter, but the newspaper Segodnya suggested that it might also have been the result of concerns within the presidential administration that approval of the nuclear waste import legislation could hurt Putin's image in the West. If that is true, the Kremlin's response was confused: The presidential representative to the State Duma, Aleksandr Kotenkov, joined with ultranationalists after the March vote to suggest that critics of the nuclear waste import project were working on behalf of Russia's international rivals abroad. Nevertheless, a switch in the Kremlin's position may be the best way of explaining why so many Duma deputies, including those affiliating with the pro-presidential Unity party, voted to postpone consideration of the nuclear waste import bills (Segodnya, Izvestia, March 23).

Equally unclear is whether the Kremlin's reported reversal is but a temporary one, and whether the leviathan of political support which had been building behind the nuclear waste import legislation will reemerge come early April to steamroll those opposing the project. That it may be difficult to turn "people power" into an effective tool against the nuclear import bills was suggested last week when the Russian Supreme Court rebuffed environmental groups. In a ruling handed down on March 22, the court upheld a decision by the Central Election Commission last year to throw out approximately 600,000 of some 2.5 million signatures gathered in favor of conducing a nationwide referendum on the nuclear waste import project. Russian law requires the gathering of 2 million signatures across sixty regions to initiate a referendum vote. Environmentalists have said that they will appeal the decision to both the Chairman of the Russian Supreme Court and to the European Court on Human Rights (Moscow Times, Bellona.no, March 23).

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#7
Rights ombudsman wants alternative to "brutal" draft in Russia

MOSCOW, March 29 (AFP) -
With a decade at least before Russia abolishes the military draft, the country's top human rights ombudsman is fighting a lonely battle to allow Russians to opt for alternative civil service.

Russia's new defence minister, Sergei Ivanov, the first civilian to hold the post, cautioned Thursday that he would not rush reforms to pare down the bloated 1.2-million-strong armed forces to a leaner, better-funded force.

The United States had taken 10 years to move from a conscript army to a fully professional force, he noted.

For the 400,000 mostly teenage recuits who are conscripted every year to serve 24 months in the Russian armed forces, this means no immediate prospect of an end to their brutal treatment in the ranks of the military.

"Servicemen suffer human rights abuses in the army," lamented Oleg Mironov, presidential human rights representative, who is backing a law to allow conscientious and religious objectors to refuse the draft.

"We must live according to European standards and pass this law. This will prove that we are on the road to democracy and respect of our own constitution and international norms," he told AFP.

The Russian constitution guarantees the rights of citizens to opt out of military service for religious and ethical reasons, Mironov said. Civil service existed in several ex-Soviet republics: Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Moldova and Ukraine, he added.

Under the privately-sponsored legislative proposal, Russian objectors could serve their two years working instead in hospitals or in relief or social work.

"President (Vladimir) Putin is a modern politician, he is a lawyer by training. He cannot be against a law that is is line with the constitution," the human rights ombudsman said.

But as Mironov conceded, the Russian military hierarchy is deeply opposed to the measure, which could reduce the number of conscripts by a third or more, because they fear they will no longer have enough manpower.

"The military is against it becase they already have difficulty in enforcing the draft," he said.

The State Duma lower house of parliament's defence committee head, former general Andrei Nikolayev, has come up with his own proposal which would allow objectors to serve in non-combat roles in the military.

But they would have to serve three rather than two years, and would still be within the ranks of the armed forces.

Moreover, under the plan -- which he told AFP had the backing of the defence ministry -- every objector would have to prove the validity of his case to a special commission.

In the decade since the collapse of the Soviet Union, poor training and plummeting wages have sent morale to rock bottom, and the culture of violence has grown steadily worse.

Of the 3,000 non-combat deaths each year, 28 percent are suicides, say servicemen's support groups.

One victimised recruit who fled his unit, 19-year-old Alexei, said he had suffered beatings by older servicemen as often as four times a week and was plagued by constant nightmares.

"They used to come for us at any time of day or night. They would get drunk and have some fun, they would force us to do disgusting things. If we didn't agree they would beat us," he said in a broken voice.

"They beat me with their fists and boots, up to five of them at a time," Alexei added.

Valentina Melnikova, head of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, which campaigns tirelessly to improve soldiers' conditions, said her organisation received constant cries for help.

"The officers treat the soldiers very cruelly. It's systematic abuse, not just a few isolated cases. I once heard a colonel say soldiers are just dirt, so what if they are killed, they'll send us fresh ones," she told AFP.

A national survey published last month showed that 69 percent of Russian families shudder at the thought that their loved ones might have to serve in the armed forces.

Only 10 percent of those questioned favored retaining compulsory military service while 84 percent wanted it abolished.

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#8
BBC Monitoring
Russia: Moscow struggles to recruit healthy conscripts for
military service
Source: Ekho Moskvy radio, Moscow, in Russian 1400 gmt 29 Mar 01

If the plans of the Russian Defence Ministry's new leaders to create a professional army do come to fruition, this evidently won't be in the near future. The minister himself, Sergey Ivanov, says the process must be gradual and it is impossible to say how many years it will take. Universal military service is to be retained and no law on alternative service has yet been adopted.

In Moscow today the city conscription commission discussed the problems that arise with the selection of conscripts for the armed forces. The military commandant's office is complaining about the poor state of health of Moscow's young men. The capital's chief military commissar, Mikhail Sorokin, has said that various ailments mean nearly a quarter of young men of conscription age are unable to carry out military service although he also said there were no perceptible problems with recruitment numbers.

[Sorokin] Generally, this isn't a problem in Moscow but the quality's poor. This is linked above all to the health of the recruits, linked to various circumstances, diet and ecology, above all, which affects the development of diseases. It is most important that people are not frightened by the difficult situation in the North Caucasus. Whatever we may have said, the war is not of the same intensity as it was last year and I should like to say that this year, since November, no-one from Moscow has died in Chechnya. These fears are linked not just to the war but to the public mood, above all, and attitudes to military service. Our troops are delighted by the attitude of the country's leadership - it's changed towards us...

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#9
Izvestia
March 28, 2001
THE FRIEND OF MY ENEMY
Russian-American relations resemble a marketplace quarrel
Author: Georgy Bovt, Alexander Shumilin
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
THE US ADMINISTRATION HAS RECEIVED ILYAS AHMADOV, AN ENVOY OF CHECHEN SEPARATISTS, AT A HIGH LEVEL AND TALKED WITH HIM FOR THREE HOURS. MOSCOW IS OUTRAGED AT THIS ACTION. BUT AHMADOV USED TO BE RECEIVED BY THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION TOO, AND MOSCOW ONLY MADE TOKEN PROTESTS THEN.

Russia's relations with the US can hardly be called relations now, to say nothing of diplomatic relations. They are more like a marketplace quarrel. The two countries cannot respond appropriately to each other, and do not have appropriate topics for discussion. Only mutual reproaches are left, and state officials of both countries are working on coming up with new accusations. Americans expel 50 Russian diplomats. Russians expel the same number. On March 27, the names of the first four were given to the US Embassy in Moscow. Besides, Russia has told the US to pay the rent for the ambassador's residence, Spaso House. On March 27, John Burley, the State Department's special aide for the Newly Independent States, pointedly spoke with Ilyas Ahmadov, an envoy of Chechen separatists. It is worth noting that Ahmadov was received after the series of horrific bomb blasts in the North Caucasus. The Russian Foreign Ministry has called this meeting immoral.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Alexander Yakovenko said: "Having formally received an envoy of Chechen guerrillas, the new US administration has decisively shown whose side it is on in the international battle against terrorism."

The Clinton administration used to arrange such meetings too, but at the time these meetings only brought diplomatic protests from Moscow. But now Moscow's reaction is mostly outrage. This is the worst possible outcome in diplomacy. It seems that the State Department is not sure it is right either: the report on Burley's meeting with Ahmadov took a long time to appear. Preliminary press releases were vague, and said something about its purely informational nature. Ahmadov allegedly "informed" the US administration about problems of human rights in Chechnya and explained that Maskhadov's "government" has nothing to do with the recent terrorist acts.

But why did the conversation last for three hours? Michael Hurley, Press Attache of the US Embassy in Russia, said, "We think that issues of regulation in Chechnya should be resolved by means of negotiations." He has admitted, however, that the Chechen conflict is Russia's domestic affair. But the US believes that this problem should be solved by means of intermediaries. Anatoly Adamishin, former deputy foreign minister of the Russian Federation, explains the current tension in Russian-US relations by the fact that "the Bush administration is only adapting to the world's realities." This adaptation is made by putting pressure on Russia's most vulnerable spots. Moscow is sure that Washington is conducting a policy of double standards. The Russian government does not want to tolerate the fact that the US often contacts various separatist groups.

The US administration has met with representatives of the Irish Republican Army, Yasser Arafat (whom the US also called a terrorist until recently), Milosevic, etc. However, American diplomats have not condescended to General Aidid from Somalia, Osama bin Laden, representatives of Hammas from Lebanon, or drug traffickers from Columbia.

But all the subjects neglected by the State Department are "other parties" in some conflicts too.

At the same time, Abkhazian separatist Ardzinba has been received in Moscow, although Moscow recognizes Georgia's territorial integrity. Besides, different visa regimes have been introduced on borders with different parts of indivisible Georgia.

At present, the US is said to be undergoing a reconstruction of foreign policy. two influential groups are said to be rivaling. The first one is led by the Pentagon. It is for radical actions without reference to European allies and for intensification of pressuring on Russia. the other group is the State Department. This group is said to be more sensible. Vice President Dick Cheney is the umpire between them. He is said to be no less influential than the president. Ahmadov was received by the "moderate" State Department. When there is disagreement within a nation's elite, it leads a lot of unnecessary propaganda moves. At present, it's fashionable in the US to dislike Russia. It is said that Russians are corrupt, they cannot reform their economy, and they befriend bad regimes. As a result, the war between embassies has begun and Ahmadov was openly received by the US administration. The next step is international sanctions. The US is certain to find reasons for them.

By the way, in Russia there are also two foreign policy centers. One of them is headed by Foreign Minister and the other by Security Council Secretary Sergei Ivanov. The Foreign Ministry fears to take any action, for some reason. Besides, this competition between the two centers paralyzes the search for a means of preventing a new cold war. However, only ordinary citizens will see the outcomes of the cold war. It is they who will have to pay more taxes for "adequate resistance." It is they who will suffer even more in foreign consulates, begging for a visa.

But there will also be certain forces for which a cold war will be profitable. The government can dare a great deal when the country is "besieged by enemies."

Presidential aide Sergei Yastrzhembsky:

Washington justifies this unfriendly action toward Russia by its intention to learn Ahmadov's opinion about the situation in Chechnya. I'd like to note in this connection that the so-called "foreign minister of Ichkeria" visited Chechnya most recently in October 1999. Therefore, he can hardly be aware of the actual situation there. At the same time, Washington is not interested in the position of Ahmad Kadyrov, the legitimate head of Chechnya. When he was on an official visit to the US, not a single state official received him. As for Ahmadov, he did not say anything new.

Vladimir Lukin, Deputy Speaker of the Duma, former Russian ambassador to the US:

Ahmadov's reception by a representative of the State Department is a link in the chain of events. This link characterizes the new style of the White House. However, I wouldn't exaggerate the importance of this event, since the Clinton administration used to receive Ahmadov too, and at the same level. Besides, this gentleman has also been openly received in France.

There are two alternatives for Russia. The first option, the "heroic" one, is to find some terrorist close to bin Laden, and receive him in Moscow. The second option, the wise one, is not to pay attention to this event. Russia's primary task is to create a favorable climate in the country, in order to continue economic reforms.

(Translated by Kirill Frolov)

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#10
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
March 29, 2001
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
THE PRESIDENT'S RATIONAL MAGIC
"Lonely Hero" Image Can Let Putin Down By Igor BUNIN, director-general of the independent Political Technologies Center Foundation

Social analysts who are close to the Kremlin say that President Vladimir Putin's stable high popularity rating is "magic" and "inexplicable." If it is "magic," it is very peculiar, indeed, as it has quite a rational base - the state of public consciousness.

A series of quality sociological studies (focus groups) conducted by the Political Technologies Center on the eve of Putin's "anniversary" explain the nature of his high rating. The main thing is that Russians have acquired relative stability. The August 1998 events have already become history, pension and wage arrears have been reduced to the minimum and the size of pensions and wages of public-sector employees is on the rise, albeit slowly. Practically no one thinks in real earnest any longer about possible unpopular reforms (above all, housing and communal reforms).

Society perceives Putin as a "new man in town" and the antipode to the "old-timer" - Boris Yeltsin, who is incredibly unpopular. Yeltsin's irresponsibility (from his promise "to lie down on rail tracks" to a continuous change of premiers in 1998-1999) is a favorable background for Putin's pointed "responsibility for everything." Yelstin's weakness and passiveness in the last years of his rule accentuate Putin's energy and vigorous activities inside the country and abroad. Yeltsin's readiness "to adjust to the West" only highlights Putin's strong state philosophy and desire to uphold national interests whether the U.S. and the international community as a whole like this or not and Yeltsin's distancing from the problems of "ordinary people" underlines Putin's "fatherly" concern about Russians.

The latter is of importance from the standpoint of the peculiarities of the Russian President's image. In the minds of the people a military leader who was also a tough head of state has been replaced by a kind and caring patron who is "responsible for everything" and makes all the necessary decisions (according to answers given by opinion poll respondents). The ten years of "unlimited freedom" have only buttressed up the striving of Russians who have become destitute as a result of the reforms for paternalist relations, when it is only enough to heed the leader without trying to understand the complexity of big-time politics and when the regime demonstrates concern about "ordinary people" and does not forget that they exist. That is why the lack of "grandeur" and other traits that are typical of the Monarch do not impair Putin's image. Their absence is made up for by character traits that bring the President closer to the man-in-the-street - humanity, decency and desire to work.

The President has felt these sentiments and is following in their wake. His meetings with "ordinary people" in Siberia, interview on the Internet in the beginning of March and conversation with newspaper editors last week - all this only accentuates the image of a "human" and "kind" President. But the image of a military leader is not forgotten forever. It has only been removed to the background and can return if the need arises.

It is clear from answers by respondents that when searching for the scapegoat to explain the failures of the authorities people, as a rule, never point to the President. What is more, they flatly reject any criticisms of him. They blame U.S.

President George Bush for a rift in Russian-American relations, accuse the poor work of Saudi riot police for the death of a flight attendant of a hijacked plane and criticize the government because it did not insist on the arrival of the Alfa group to Saudi Arabia. But the President acted impeccably, in their opinion.

What about Chechen terrorism manifested in the plane hijacking or a series of bomb explosions in the Northern Caucasus (last Saturday)? What about the continued activities of separatists in Chechnya? Materials of the focus groups show that the majority of the members of these groups do not think that complete "peace and reconciliation" in the Northern Caucasus can happen in the near future. Putin is commended for the establishment of Russian control in the territory of the mutinous republic and the troop withdrawal from Chechnya, which has begun, regarding this as a sign of some kind of "pacification." Nobody has ever expected anything more than this. The bomb explosions arouse indignation with terrorists and it is very unlikely that any reproaches will be addressed to the President in this context. By the way, blame for the explosion in Moscow's Pushkin Square last year was placed on the government and local authorities, not the President, by respondents of polls conducted at that time.

Only a shocking event can "undermine" society's trust in the President. The death of the Kursk submarine was such an event last year. But even then society did not attack Putin as fiercely as it would attack Yeltsin. The answers of respondents sooner conveyed little disappointment and hope that the President would correct his mistake. The public at large regarded Putin's blitz visit to Vidyayevo as a "sign of such a correction" and the heavy guns of criticism were re-targeted to unpopular media tycoon and oligarchs in general. The Kursk tragedy is now firmly in the shade of public consciousness. None of the members of our focus groups even remembered it and the President's rating was completely restored.

Having such support, the President can afford to do many of the things Yeltsin could never do. Putin, for instance, can have a feud with Media-MOST. Trust in journalists has sharply fallen and the President's supporters approve of the proposals to introduce censorship. He would probably be able to give away to the Japanese two South Kurile islands in the foreseeable future, if he succeeded in explaining the nation that it is necessary, say, for the creation of a Russian-Japanese counterbalance to Americans who are so much disliked by Russians.

Cognitive dissonance will for a long time be decided in favor of positive appraisals for Putin, because a negative attitude is associated with the loss of social stability, national identity and confidence in the future.

Are there any potential threats for the President in such an idyllic situation? The data of sociological research conducted by our Center suggest at least two such threats. The first is that the President is alone; in the opinion of our respondents he has no efficient team. The second is the absence among the public of a clear idea wherever such a popular President has been leading the nation. Russians have trusted him thus far and are ready to wait for quite a long time - Putin still has his credit of trust.

But the period of waiting is finite. If the economic situation changes and the feeling of stability and general (relative) wellbeing begins to grow weaker, trust in the President will be confronted by serious tests that will be even more meaningful than the critical case connected with the death of the Kursk.

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#11
Duma Leader on Small Business Development in Russia
Trud
March 23, 2001
[translation for personal use only]
Interview by Vladislav Vorobyev with Duma Vice-Speaker Irina Khakamada:
"Let's Look Into It. Irina Khakamada: After All, We're All Lefties"

The other day, the minister for antimonopoly policy, Ilya Yuzhanov, stated that high taxes and impudent bureaucrats were preventing small business from developing in Russia. The government has already developed a draft law on debureaucratization. But, of course, this is not quite enough for the full-fledged development of entrepreneurship. What more is needed? The vice-speaker of the State Duma, Irina Khakamada, shared her thoughts on this score with the readers of "Trud"

["Labor"]: What concretely is preventing Russian small business from standing firmly on its own two feet?

[Khakamada] They've been trying to build economic democracy in Russia for 10 years now. The result is obvious: zero progress. I feel that in our country we are observing a chronic, fluid economic crisis due to the fact that the attitude of government and a part of the State Duma toward small business is erroneous. The majority of politicians perceive this sphere of the economy as a taxpayer on a par with big firms. That is, when we speak of equal economic conditions of development for all enterprises, we're actually killing small business. From my perspective, its stimulation must be placed in the category of the state's strategic priorities. After all, the goal and objective are obvious: the creation of new jobs. It's primarily a matter of a social function, and not about providing the budget with money. Since small business simply can neither pay large taxes nor maintain an expensive accounting department.

In all countries that have successfully conducted economic reforms for the good of the people, this statement has already become not simply a rule but an axiom. The main objective of such states is to stimulate small business in order for it to propagate and to provide the labor force with maximum mobility. In the event that a large number of small firms is operating in the country, any of us will be able to find work for himself at any time. Everyone knows that it's not so easy to get into a big firm. Try going there right off of the street and getting work. The chances are minimal. Everything's the other way around in small business...

[Trud] And so the government decided to take notice of the development of small entrepreneurship in Russia...

[Khakamada] In principle, nothing is changing for the time being. True, some federal programs are being adopted; however, literally kopecks are being allocated for them. Although there is progress all the same. Ninety million was allocated in the budget for the development of small entrepreneurship. But it's one thing to write this line item in the budget, and it's quite another to really receive funds. It turns out that small business is a obligatory object that the government is forced to heed. But it never did become a priority area of economic policy.

[Trud] What must the state and in particular the government do in order to stimulate the development of small business?

[Khakamada] First of all, it must systematize all legislation as much as possible, re-examine it and create a model of the legalization of income. Meanwhile, it's necessary to develop a stimulating taxation system, to adopt a fundamentally lower rate, taking into account regional distinctions.

Secondly, the authorities must understand that in order for small business to function normally, it must be covered with some "fat." Therefore, a "tax holiday" must be introduced for two years at a minimum. This is where the objections crop up: In that case, they'll start laundering money through these firms, and nothing will accumulate in the budget. But, after all, it's all being laundered as it is, but meanwhile there still aren't any jobs.

Indeed, this is a very fundamental issue. All who govern us must understand that stable small business means the creation of a middle class and the formation of a commercial tradition of doing business and the solution to the problem of youth employment. And only lastly must we think about the collection of any budgetary taxes from these firms. Right now, our politicians' psychology is quite different: how they can pick them clean and how they can shake them by the scruff of the neck.

[Trud] And why, in your opinion, doesn't the bureaucracy's psychology change?

[Khakamada] Our economic and political elite was formed in the conditions of a transition period in Russia. Right now, all of the efforts are being focused on the development of large entrepreneurship. The elite doesn't perceive small business as an adequate, civilized partner. But society itself is developing faster. It's all a matter of competition, which forces us to progress.

There is no competition in the political elite. Pardon me, but after all, we're practically reshuffling one and the same deck. If new people do get in there, then it's a matter of solitary ones. Now I, for example, came from small business and made a career in politics. And what? Like a white crow. All of the ideas involving the development of small business in Russia that the government is now examining were proposed by me back in 1997. We must restrict licensing, regularize inspections (how many times may one inspect and based on what criteria), simplify the instructions that now take up yards of paper, create conditions for a single registration at one window, and develop mortgage lending. But back then all of this was perceived with hostility. Now we're finally starting to move slowly.

[Trud] You recently stated that if small business in Russia were to receive a green light, then we would acquire a surprisingly diverse, enormous number of talents.

[Khakamada] Indeed, in the 21st Century, individual technologies and in general individuality will gradually go to the forefront. Look at Europe. An enormous number of individual stores and small restaurants. The same thing is occurring in Asian countries. Russia is still a European country. Let's recall our merchant class. Each individual store was like a song. Each restaurant had its own history. That's our culture. After all, we're "lefties." It's easier for us to shoe a flea than to create a standard enterprise. Unfortunately, we've forgotten this tradition. The Soviet Union killed it. It destroyed individual human initiative. Namely small business is called upon to regenerate what was lost. Even now, when you go into a small private studio, you notice right away that the quality is different and the service is at a higher level. They've started valuing the client once more. Of course, Russia also needs big businesses, but we're not forgetting about big business, and it's small business that we're neglecting for the time being.

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#12
Russian expert warns against militarization of space
ITAR-TASS

Moscow, 29 March: Maj-Gen Vladimir Belous, Professor at the Academy of Military Sciences, speaking here on Thursday [29 March] at a news conference dealing with the military and technical aspects of the US plans to establish a National Missile Defence (NMD) system and possibilities for Russia's actions in response, said he believed that the deployment of NMD would inevitably lead to militarization of outer space.

"There are no technologies in the world so far to fight intercontinental ballistic missiles without orbiting combat weapons," he said.

"The militarization of outer space would upset all international agreements on the peaceful uses of outer space and would actually lead to the dismantling of the 1972 antiballistic missile defence treaty. Besides, the orbiting of weapons would be conducive to a race of offensive nuclear arms and would lower the threshold of responsibility in making major decisions about the use of military force. This is why Russia would have to look for adequate responses to future challenges. It has such a capability," the scientist emphasized.

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