Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev is a lame duck. For almost a year now, he has been removed from any serious national security decision-making. Rumors of Sergeyev's impending ouster have been swirling. However, Sergeyev is still in office because the Kremlin has not yet decided on a successor. As long as President Vladimir Putin remains undecided, Sergeyev stays as a caretaker.

Part of the problem is that this decision involves not just naming a new defense minister, but also defining some serious changes in the organization of the ministry and the overall military command structure. Although Putin has already publicly endorsed the idea of appointing a civilian defense minister, it remains unclear what powers such a figure would have and whether he would have any operational control over the armed forces.

The General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (which today is part of the Defense Ministry and, formally at least, under Sergeyev's command) has put forward a reform plan that would make it fully independent. The Russian General Staff was modeled after the German Imperial General Staff at the time of World War I. This structure not only fully controlled all military operations, but in fact was Germany's real government. Today Russia's generals want to form a "civilian" Defense Ministry that will only supply the military with men and arms, while the armed services themselves would be under the operational command of the General Staff, which in turn would report directly to the president as commander-in-chief.

For all practical purposes, the General Staff has already emancipated itself from most controls and is already virtually independent. Last year Putin made the present chief of the General Staff - General Anatoly Kvashnin - a full member of the Security Council. Putin has also given Kvashnin the right of direct access to the Kremlin, bypassing the defense minister.

In recent years, the increasingly independent Kvashnin has on several occasions imposed on the country decisions that have greatly damaged our national interests. In June 1999, he bypassed Sergeyev and - after getting a nod from President Boris Yeltsin - marched a column of paratroopers through Serbia into the Kosovar capital Pristina to steal a march on Western peacekeepers.

At the time, this move was very popular in Russia, and many believed that the West had been snubbed and Russian influence in the Balkans enhanced. Today it is obvious that Kvashnin's bravado only heightened Western suspicions and did not bring Russia any advantage. At present Russian influence in the Balkans and throughout the former Yugoslavia is virtually zero. Moscow spends millions of dollars keeping thousands of peacekeepers in Kosovo and Bosnia for no good reason. Russian soldiers did not prevent the displacement of Serbs and Gypsies from Kosovo, and even the practical experience of serving alongside NATO troops is almost fully lost as contract peacekeepers leave the ranks as soon as they return home.

The same year the war in the Balkans ended, Russian troops moved into Chechnya. In October 1999, Yeltsin and Putin (then the prime minister) approved changes in the overall plan of operation that sent Russian units across the Terek River into southern Chechnya to "wipe out the terrorists." Today many Russian generals and politicians believe that this change of plan was a major disaster that has led to the present bloody and costly stalemate. The initiative to go for immediate full victory in Chechnya that backfired so painfully came again from Kvashnin and his generals. Putin and Yeltsin only approved it, most likely not fully understanding what they were doing.

The General Staff, like its German predecessor, has been the center of aggressive militarism for decades. During the Cold War, it accelerated the arms race by grossly overestimating Western military capabilities. In the end that arms race killed the Soviet Union.

Nowadays the same General Staff is spreading its influence into the Russian government. Last week state television reported that Kvashnin was taking part in an important meeting to select a new Chechen prime minister. Such activities are a far cry from "operational control of the military." Instead of enhancing civilian control over the military, the appointment of a "civilian" defense minister may only stimulate Russia's traditional scourge of extreme militarism.

Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent, Moscow-based defense analyst.

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#2
BBC Monitoring
Putin criticizes pace of military reform in Russia
Source: Russian Public TV, Moscow, in Russian 1200 gmt 18 Jan 01

[Presenter] The Russian army should be strong and professional and its main task is strategic deterrence and preventing aggression.

Vladimir Putin stated this today at a meeting in the Kremlin with the higher command staff of the Russian armed forces. Andrey Baturin reports:

[Correspondent] ... The president, as commander-in-chief, summed up the results of work done by all power-wielding departments and put new tasks before them.

[Putin] The main tasks - strategic deterrence and preventing aggression, including on the territory of the North Caucasus, - are being carried out successfully at the moment.

[Correspondent] In the president's words, today's meeting is taking place at a landmark time, and not only because a new century and a new millennium have begun.

[Putin] Today we are modernizing our military organization with the aim of strengthening the state.

[Correspondent] Vladimir Putin thinks that now is a time for decisive actions and steps, and first and foremost this concerns military reform, which, according to the president, is clearly not being conducted at the right speed.

[Putin] First and foremost, the pace of reform is lagging behind. Decisions that directly influence the quality of combat training are being carried out inefficiently and not fully. The military and technical re-equipping of the army and fleet is being delayed.

[Correspondent] This year, Vladimir Putin stressed, special attention will be paid to the military budget and also to those social problems in the military which have become chronic. The president then spent time talking about the work of each individual power-wielding department.

[Putin] Reductions to the number of the most dangerous public crimes is a direct result of the work of the Russian Interior Ministry. One can say - I repeat once more, despite all the problems that also exist in this sphere - all the same, it has become more peaceful on the streets of towns.

[Correspondent] The FSS [Federal Security Service], the Emergencies Ministry, the Foreign Intelligence Service and FAPSI [Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information], the Tax Police and border and railways troops received a good appraisal. In other words, the president is pleased with the work of the power-wielding departments and the way they coordinate their actions, which Vladimir Putin considers to be a token of successes in this sphere.

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#3
The Russia Journal
January 13-19, 2001
Cold War winners take it all
By Alexander Golts

Analysts close to the Kremlin made no secret of their satisfaction upon learning the names of the new U.S. president's foreign policy and security team. Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice all have worldviews forged during the Cold War.

Moscow sees these politicians as primarily concerned with global defense issues - one area where Russia still manages to maintain a high status. The hope is that the new Washington team will treat Russia as an equal and that the two sides will sit down at the "great chess board" like in the good old days, and make a few exchanges - Russia installs separating warheads on its Topol-M missiles while the United States gets to extend its missile defense system.

With Washington still assembling its team, it's the perfect moment for Russia to put its best strategy together on the board. This explains why Russia has announced its intentions to sell arms to Iran and why President Vladimir Putin visited Cuba - both clear signs of support for countries that worry Washington. At the same time, the Russian armed forces held maneuvers with strategic bombers close to U.S. borders and Russian fighter planes simulated an attack on the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk.

But in their eagerness to put the past back on the agenda with Washington, Russian strategists are forgetting that the members of George W. Bush's team see themselves as the victors in the Cold War and intend to turn this to maximum advantage. Bush hasn't even officially taken office yet, and his team is already conducting aggressive reconnaissance.

A sensational article appeared in the Washington Times early this month, citing intelligence sources saying that Moscow had deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad Oblast. The article was written in such a way as to be easily disproved.

For starters, equipping 70-100 km-range missiles with nuclear warheads makes no sense in this region as there are no important military sites within range. What's more, all tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn from Russian military units over a year ago and put into storage.

Given the lamentable state of the armed forces at present, it's unlikely that Army commanders would order the risky operation of getting the warheads returned. Finally, the article misnamed the type of missile involved, calling it "Toka" - in reality it is called Tochka.

But despite these holes, anonymous representatives in the Pentagon confirmed that deployment of nuclear weapons had taken place. Poland and the Baltic states began to call for immediate inspections in Kaliningrad Oblast. This meant that despite the absurdity of the accusations, Moscow couldn't just brush them aside, and found itself having to issue an official denial at the highest level. Statements by the Baltic Fleet command and even the Defense Ministry weren't enough; denial had to come from the president himself.

This was what the Americans wanted. From a legal point of view, the agreements signed by Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush Senior on withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Europe carry no more weight than the agreements between Al Gore and Viktor Chernomyrdin on not supplying arms to Iran.

Moscow has already pulled out of the agreement banning arms sales to Iran and Russian diplomats have repeated that if the United States deploys a national missile defense system, Russia will consider itself free of its nuclear weapons commitments. Russian officials have indicated in the past that a possible response to U.S. missile defense plans could be to deploy tactical nuclear weapons close to the borders of America's European allies.

It is now clear that the Bush administration sees deployment of a national missile defense system as one of its main priorities. But to make a decision, Bush needs to work out just how far Moscow is willing to go to oppose the United States. By raising in the press the specter of Russian nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad, Washington has forced Moscow to vigorously deny plans to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, while avoiding any direct confrontation with the Kremlin.

Were Putin now to respond to U.S. national missile defense plans by deploying nuclear weapons in Europe, he would appear to be violating his own promises, not only to the United States, but also to the western European countries with which he is trying hard to build up good relations.

All of this only goes to show just how much more experienced Bush's people are at playing the games Moscow has been dreaming of. The article in the Washington Times is a clear lesson in this respect.

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#4
Segodnya
January 17, 2001
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
KREMLIN PONDERS AMELIORATING STANCE ON ABM
By Oleg ODNOKOLENKO

In February, Munich will host a security conference that will be the venue for the first military-strategic dialogue between Russia and the United States. Conspicuously, the forum will be held against an uneasy background: the new Administration has already announced there is no alternative to the deployment of a national missile defense (NMD) system.

The Kremlin will be represented by Security Council secretary Sergei Ivanov and Duma international affairs committee chairman Dmitry Rogozin. Whoever represents America nominally, Russia's primary opponents will be VP Richard Cheney, state secretary Colin Powell, defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld and national security adviser Condoleezza Rice who are all ardent proponents of an NMD. They have been the ones to talk George Bush Jr. into promising 6 billion dollars to the Boeing Corp. to continue NMD research even before the president elect occupied the White House.

Is there something that Russia can come up with to counter the American NMD? Generals of the Russian missile force are suggesting a variety of military and technical solutions. The rumor in the defense ministry corridors is that Russia will design an 'asymmetrical weapon of retaliation.' This newspaper possesses data to indicate that the plan of structuring and developing the armed forces in 2001-5 that Vladimir Putin was expected to sign this past December has been suspended - to be improved with allowance for the 'new nuclear reality.' In this context, some analysts close to the Kremlin are visualizing another epoch of nuclear confrontation and another cold war as a 'new reality.'

But other Russian analysts still discern a possibility of coming to an agreement with the US. Moreover, the Russian side has been insisting for years that a 100% secure ABM is unfeasible in principle. And if it is, why not agree to a sensible update of the 1972 ABM treaty? Russia has no instruments it can make America 'change its mind' with. Suggestions to ameliorate Russia's stance on NMD have already been presented to the Kremlin. This newspaper has learned that the president has perused some of them.

These suggestions have been commented on by General Alexander Piskunov, MP, a participant in effectively all nuclear talks with the US in the past ten years.

"The expensive control and inspection commitments devised way back in the 1980 amid an atmosphere of suspicion in bilateral relations, are still in force. Also, agreements feature by far too many details and secondary limitations. They have to be radically amended with allowance for the new realities. Now that new people have come to power in both Russia and the US, the two countries can conclude new agreements to replace the 1972 ABM treaty - on the basis of the common understanding of the need to preserve the non-proliferation regime. A new nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty can be concluded for a long period of time - 25 years and more - and provide for the involvement in it of other nuclear haves - Britain, France, China. A quantitative limitation of 500-600 warheads without specifying their basing mode and means of delivery will be needed.

"The treaty may incorporate agreements on a strategic ABM intended to ward off solitary unsanctioned launches, if the USA is so hell bent to have it.

"This is not important; what is important is that the treaty should spell out the sides' commitment to maintain the non-proliferation regime. Until these agreements are concluded, our future is vague.

"To start with, there have appeared new nuclear haves and the 'old' nuclear powers can do nothing about it, because the negotiations on security guarantees to non-nuclear states have been procrastinated for decades. That's why everybody gets the weapons it can get...

"Secondly, the process of nuclear weapons reduction and limitation has been deadlocked. At first, Russia could not ratify the rather cumbersome START-2 treaty - it was ratified after the deadline. The problem of ABM had come up by that time. Russia agreed with the USA to separate a tactical and a strategic ABM systems in exchange for a new treaty, START-3, and firmly stated that the 1972 ABM treaty was inviolable. At the same time, the United States appreciated the senselessness of building a tactical ABM system and approached the stage of work that could violate the ABM treaty. This is why it is insisting that the agreed commitments should be reviewed. Such is the story. I have already described ways to address this problem.

"One should possess wild imagination to discern the scenario of a nuclear attack on the part of the USA under the protection of its NMD. Predicting environmental and technogenic consequences of such a scaled nuclear attack for the attacking side is absolutely impossible. They are likely to be catastrophic. But ABM would certainly malfunction in such circumstances and would fail to fend off a reciprocal or a reciprocal-preemptive blow. ABM can only be efficiently used to ward off solitary missiles, for which reason it does not affect strategic stability. We do not have to fear an American NMD system."

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#5
U.S. CANNOT BUILD EFFECTIVE MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM - RUSSIAN MILITARY

MOSCOW. Jan 18 (Interfax) - "Neither the current, nor future programs for the development of national missile defense systems can guarantee a state against a nuclear-missile strike," Russian Defense Ministry experts told Interfax on Thursday, commenting on statements about U.S. plans to develop such a system, made by future U.S. Secretary of state Colin Powell.

But if Washington makes the decision to create a national missile defense system, "Moscow will have nothing else to do but to develop means of overcoming such a system and equip their strategic nuclear forces with such means," they said.

"We are prepared to make all the necessary estimates jointly with American experts and show them that technically an effective missile defense system cannot be created," the military said.

"Russia has already developed and tested means of counteracting such systems," they said.

The new missile complex Topol-M, recently supplied to the Russian armed forces, can counteract any missile defense system. "There are other projects that will allow Russia to save its nuclear parity with the U.S., if Washington unilaterally withdraws from the ABM Treaty," experts said.

They said Russia has obtained information that Washington plans to "make unilateral amendments to the ABM Treaty and then produce them to Russia as an accomplished fact."

"But Russia will never agree to review the ABM Treaty, as this would upset the global strategic balance," they said.

Military-diplomatic sources have told Interfax that Moscow is ready to propose new initiatives in the area of strategic stability which will be announced, however, only when official talks on the preservation of the ABM Treaty begin with the new U.S. administration.

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#6
BBC
18 January, 2001
Analysis: The road back to suspicion?
By Russian affairs analyst Stephen Dalziel

The arrest in New York of Russian politician Pavel Borodin is only the latest in a series of incidents which have soured relations between Washington and Moscow.

Tension has risen over several episodes in the dying months of the Clinton administration - and incoming president George W Bush has already annoyed the Russians, by claiming that much of the last decade's US aid to Russia has not reached its target.

Moscow appears to be genuinely shocked and angry about the arrest of Mr Borodin.

He had gone to the US in his capacity as the State Secretary of the Union State of Russia and Belarus, to attend the inauguration of Mr Bush as the 43rd President of the United States.

But when he stepped off his plane in New York, he was arrested under a warrant issued by the Swiss Prosecutor's office.

The Swiss want to question Mr Borodin over the issuing of contracts to two Swiss firms for the refurbishment of the Kremlin and other government buildings in Moscow.

Whatever the rights and wrongs of the Borodin case, the Americans' decision to arrest him serves to underline the poor state of relations between Washington and Moscow on the eve of the Bush presidency.

Late last year came the first conviction for espionage of a US citizen in Moscow since the 1970s.

Edmond Pope was sentenced for spying to 20 years in a strict regime labour camp.

Spy trial

The Americans claimed that the charges had been trumped up, which seemed to be supported by a number of aspects about the case.

Almost immediately after Mr Pope's sentencing, he was pardoned and freed by the Russian President, Vladimir Putin.

It is not the only issue to have dented trust between the two capitals, which for so many years faced each other as the world's two superpowers.

America has accused the Russians of putting tactical nuclear weapons into the enclave of Kaliningrad - rumours strenuously denied by the Russians.

The Kremlin is angered, too, by the announcement by the Bush administration that it intends to go ahead with the creation of a missile defence system.

Bush attack

Moscow says that this violates the terms of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty which Washington and Moscow signed in 1972.

Mr Bush, meanwhile, seemed determined to show Moscow that he means to conduct tough business, with his remarks in an interview with The New York Times last weekend.

Russians of all political persuasions want to be allowed "to fashion" their own future, without outside interference

He complained that, under the Clinton administration, too much of the $2.3m of US aid sent to Russia since 1991 had not been spent on improving democracy and the market economy, the purposes for which it was intended.

And he said also that it was difficult for the US, "to fashion Russia".

That remark was at best careless.

Russians of all political persuasions want to be allowed "to fashion" their own future, without outside interference.

The Russian Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, suggested that, if Mr Bush wanted to conduct a dialogue with Moscow, he would be better to do it directly, rather than through the newspapers.

But the combination of missiles, spies, Mr Borodin's arrest and Mr Bush's comments suggests that the new era in US politics could be marked by a return to many of the old ways of hostility and suspicion in US-Russian relations.

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#7
US defends arrest as ex-Kremlin aide appears in court

NEW YORK, Jan 18 (AFP) -
The United States on Thursday defended the arrest of a former Kremlin official here, who appeared in US District Court to defend against possible extradition to Switzerland where he faces charges of money laundering.

Russia has formally protested the arrest of Pavel Borodin, who was taken into custody late Wednesday as he arrived at New York's John F. Kennedy international airport to attend US President-elect George W. Bush January 20 inauguration.

Russia's ambassador to the United States, Yuri Ushakov, has also demanded Borodin's immediate release.

State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said US authorities were operating legally under the terms of an extradition treaty with Switzerland and added Borodin did not have or claim diplomatic immunity.

"He was traveling to the United States with a regular, non- official passport and a business visa," Boucher told reporters.

"We don't have any record or indication that he was accredited to any embassy, consulate or to international organization in the United States, and thus, he would not be immune from arrest."

"We have obligations in terms of legal cooperation with others that when somebody shows up without any immunity or diplomatic status and he is subject to arrest, we have an obligation to carry it out," Boucher said.

Russian officials in the United States confirmed Borodin entered the United States on an ordinary passport, but the confidant of former Russian president Boris Yeltsin claimed diplomatic immunity and denounced his arrest as politically motivated.

Borodin, 54, holds a largely ceremonial post as chairman of an informal Russia-Belarus union and senior officials in both Moscow and Minsk have decried his detention.

Borodin, who stepped down last year as head of the Kremlin's property division after Vladimir Putin took office, was accused by Swiss firms of taking bribes, a charge he has denied.

Last year, a Swiss investigating magistrate indicted five people and issued the arrest warrant for Borodin, accused of taking kickbacks from construction companies to ensure they were awarded renovation contracts worth more than 10 million dollars.

He concealed the kickbacks in two fictitious corporations, according to the indictment.

In US District Court in Brooklyn, Borodin said he was prepared to face authorities in Switzerland, Russian Consul-General in New York, Pavel Prokofiev, said.

Borodin's New York lawyer Raymond Levites said the accusations against Borodin had been investigated and dismissed by the Russian prosecutor general and Swiss authorities were presumably aware of that.

Asked about Borodin's mood, Levites said, "his mood would be what yours would be. Last time I looked, nobody likes to be in jail."

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#8
Russia: Analysis From Washington
-- The Nationality Question And Russian Foreign Policy
By Paul Goble

Washington, 17 January 2001 (RFE/RL) -- A Russian foreign policy analyst has urged Moscow to use its nationality policies at home to promote its foreign policy goals. But he has warned that the Russian government must at the same time take into consideration certain foreign policy challenges when dealing with its domestic ethnic minorities.

Writing in last Saturday's "Nezavisimaya gazeta," Igor Igoshin argues that those who view Russia's numerous ethnic issues as a purely domestic affair are deeply mistaken because "a number of foreign policy goals critically important for Moscow are connected in the closest way with the nationality question," the term Russians have used since the 19th century to denote interethnic issues.

Igoshin identified four such foreign policy issues. Two of these involve situations in which he argues the Russian government can use ethnic issues to promote its own agenda. And two of which confront Moscow with challenges it can only meet if it understands their implications for domestic interethnic relations and responds appropriately both at home and abroad.

The first of these issues, Igoshin says, involves "the support of the Russian-language population in the former Soviet republics." This is in the first instance a moral and ethical requirement because these people who were native to Russia were "practically thrown to their fates" in the early 1990s. But, he adds, "this problem has another side as well." The Russian-speaking communities in many of the former Soviet republics form "a significant portion" of the population -- in Latvia, for example, some 34 percent in 1991. Such diasporas, Igoshin suggests "are capable of becoming a serious internal political factor in former Soviet republics which will have a positive influence on the relations" between these countries and Russia.

He pointedly notes that there are "many such examples" of diasporas having this effect: "The Jewish community of the U.S., which is much smaller in size, has exerted through pressure on the government the most powerful support of Israel over the course of several decades." Russian-speaking groups abroad, Igoshin says, are fully capable of playing the same role in what he calls "the near abroad."

Moreover, the use of such groups in this way, he suggests, is something Russia can do "despite the widespread view" of its foreign policy weakness. Russia's economic presence, its ability to direct the flow of goods across some countries but not others, and its ability to conduct propaganda, Igoshin argues, give Moscow the ability to have an impact on Russian communities abroad and through them on the governments of the countries in which they live.

The second of these issues, again one where Moscow can use its ethnic policies to promote its interests, involves the possible unification of Russia and former Soviet republics into a single state such as its ongoing efforts to form a new union state with Belarus. Obviously, Igoshin says, not all countries of this region are interested. Those that are are likely to become more so, he continues, if Moscow recognizes that "the nationality question is one of the capstones" of such a process.

To the extent it acknowledges this fact, Igoshin argues, "a most important task for Russia is the formation of conditions which will assist the further improvement of relations between the peoples of Russia and the states with which unification is really possible. Igoshin does not draw the obvious corollary that Moscow will have less interest in doing that with groups whose co-ethnics outside of Russia are not interested in unity.

The third area where Russia's nationality question takes on a foreign policy dimension, albeit a more defensive one, concerns what Igoshin calls "the sharpening of tensions in the southern direction," the rise of Muslim groups which threaten Russia's interests in Central Asia and the Caucasus. He says that this threat to ethnic harmony within Russia is potentially so great, as Chechnya has already shown, that Moscow must be prepared to counter it even with non-diplomatic means including the actions of special services, military actions, and so on. Failure to do so, Igoshin says will mean that it will be "simply impossible to defeat national extremism in Russia" itself.

And the fourth area he identifies is also one in which Igoshin argues nationality policy must play a role: countering what he suggests is "the extraordinarily complex problem" likely to arise in Russia's Far East. "The active resettlement into Siberian regions of representatives of neighboring states with more dense populations" -- by clear implication, the People's Republic of China -- presents a threat to Russian control. Indeed, he suggests that this influx of outsiders could lead to a situation captured by the old Soviet anecdote about a future BBC report that there has been "a stabilization of the situation on the Finnish-Chinese border."

On the one hand, Igoshin's argument is little more than a revival of an early Soviet approach in which the nationality question was always linked to colonial issues and a restatement of the frequent observation in other countries that foreign and domestic politics are inevitably interrelated -- especially as societies become more open.

But on the other hand, the appearance of this argument in such explicit form now suggests that Moscow is increasingly open to the possibilities of using ethnicity to promote its goals and also increasingly concerned that others may use ethnicity against Russia itself.

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#9
Russian Troops in Chechnya Acting With "Total Impunity"

MOSCOW, Jan 18, 2001 -- (Agence France Presse) Russian forces in Chechnya act with "total impunity" due to a lack of will by the authorities to crack down on war crimes, senior monitors from the Council of Europe charged on Thursday.

Russian officials were "not willing to investigate the mass killings and the crimes" committed by the security forces, said Rudolf Bindig, the German co-leader of a delegation that returned from a two-day trip to Chechnya on Wednesday.

"There's still total impunity in Chechnya," he told AFP.

Bindig and his colleague Lord Frank Judd of Britain will present a report to the Council of Europe's parliamentary assembly (PACE) ahead of a key debate at the Strabourg-based forum next week.

PACE is set to debate whether to reinstate Russia's voting rights at the 41-nation assembly during its January 22-26 winter session.

Last April, Russia became the first Council of Europe member to have its voting rights suspended following a slew of reports charging human rights abuses by federal troops serving in Chechnya.

Judd said on Thursday he had noted some improvements in the legal system in the strife-torn republic, in particular the creation of 10 regional courts presided by Chechen judges.

But he said there was "still a significant gap" between the number of alleged violations referred to Vladimir Kalamanov, the Kremlin's human rights envoy to the region, and the number of cases sent by Kalamanov to the courts.

The monitors regretted that no Russian troops had been prosecuted for three massacres of civilians in and around the Chechen capital Grozny a year ago despite eye-witness reports that federal soldiers had been responsible.

Judd also called on Russian authorities to organize elections in Chechnya, which he said should be conducted without interference from Moscow or else they would be "completely counter-productive."

The holding of elections was an essential step towards rebuilding security and stability in Chechnya, he noted.

The delegation was due to leave Moscow later Thursday.

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#10
Christian Science Monitor
January 18, 2001
On Kenny and Chechnya
By Cynthia Scharf
Cynthia Scharf worked as a journalist in Moscow from 1990 to 1993. She currently works for the International Medical Corps.

'Kidnapped in Chechnya," the newspaper headlines scream. I want to scream, too. Kenny Gluck is not a news story to me, nor is his abduction on Jan. 9 some kind of obscene "lesson" in how humanitarian aid workers should not expose themselves to the extreme dangers of strife-torn regions.

Rather, my friend Kenny is a man who knew the horrible risks involved in bringing aid to the suffering, on all sides, in the Russian breakaway region of Chechnya, and accepted them in the service of speaking truth to power.

Kenny's affection for Russia runs deep. He first went to Russia in the summer of 1990 when my husband and I asked him to participate in a conference in Moscow. In preparation, he eagerly consumed grammar texts and Russian novels.

When he arrived, he took to the streets and never looked back. Kenny had come expecting to stay three weeks. He stayed, off and on, for 11 years.

Kenny and I worked as English-language editors for the Soviet Union's first independent news agency, Postfactum. We "went native," each living on a $20-a-month salary. We purposefully avoided the expatriate life, and instead toughed out the cold, rude winter of 1990.

Kenny and I worked long hours at Postfactum. Amid the stench of cheap cigarettes and body odor, we gladly joined in that heady experiment known as free thought in a still-closed society.

Our Russian colleagues were young and full of the incandescent energy that comes from knowing that what one does matters, very much. Kenny worked harder than anyone, and did it with a quiet selflessness that highlighted his mastery of irony and black humor, two staples of the Russian cultural diet.

Our boss was a Russian liberal intelligentsia writer named Gleb Pavlovsky. I was proud to work for him - then. Today, he is one of President Vladimir Putin's top public-relations advisers and one of the cynical powers behind the throne.

In an ironic twist, Mr. Pavlovsky, the author of those long articles on democracy and human rights that Kenny and I used to edit, now leads the Russian government's rhetorical charge against Chechnya.

The years passed. We moved back to the United States. Kenny stayed and quit journalism to become a humanitarian relief worker. Years later I asked him if he missed journalism. He became pensive for a moment and then shook his head: "No. I was tired of visiting war zones and other hellish places and not doing anything about it except watching people suffer. If I was going to continue going to these places, I wanted to do something to help." And help he did, in Tajikistan, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Liberia, Afghanistan, and Chechnya, both during the first war and now this one.

I last saw Kenny this summer in Moscow, where I was helping the aid organization I now work for set up its program in Ingushetia. I had not seen Kenny for some time and sought out his companionship and advice. The former was wonderful, as always; the latter, darkly disturbing.

Kenny warned me, as he warned all humanitarian aid staff coming to Russia, that working in Chechnya (and the neighboring republic of Ingushetia) was statistically more dangerous than any other humanitarian assignment in the world. He spoke from experience.

As the northern Caucasus director for Doctors Without Borders, Kenny knew the grim facts by heart: Between 1996 and 1998, there were never more than 40 expatriate aid workers in the Chechnya/Ingushetia region at any given time. Of this number, eight were assassinated.

More than 20 expats - half of all those in the area - were kidnapped for periods longer than a few days, some for several months. A dozen more were held at gunpoint for hours at a time. Hostages had been subjected to beatings, repeated rapes, and psychological torture, including mock executions.

Kenny and I spent many hours last summer talking about the hows and whys of the atrocities committed by both Chechens and Russians. Kenny's assessment of the future was sobering. It was only a matter of time, he thought, before there would be another violent incident involving aid workers.

Kenny knew all the risks, and he, more than anyone else, took all possible precautions. He also knew none was foolproof.

I received an e-mail from Kenny some 10 days before he was kidnapped. In his usual self-deprecating way, he wrote from Moscow that he yearned to go elsewhere. He was tired and sickened by what he had seen in Chechnya.

But in typical Kenny fashion, his goal was not to return to the safety and comfort of America, but to go to another troubled corner of the world: Iraq or Colombia.

As I reflect on his message, I can't help thinking Kenny knew deep in his gut that time might be running out on him in Chechnya. Still, underneath his worldly exterior, I saw a man who retained an innocence at his core, and who held on firmly to the belief that good exists in all of us.

Today I cry for Kenny. But I also cry for the thousands of faceless, nameless people he will no longer help inside Chechnya. In kidnapping Kenny, his captors have taken hostage the hopes of all of us.

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#11
Dipkurier NG
No. 1
2001
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
NEW ROUTES OF RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY
By Dmitry GORNOSTAYEV

The new year and the new century have drawn in numerous problems from not only the previous year but the previous century too. The soldering and sometimes blazing up and burning Middle East, the still ready to ignite Balkans and the fuming Afghanistan represent just a few hotbeds of tension that will continue to disturb the international community. Through centuries Russia has struggled in the smoking Caucasus. Moreover, Russia has a lot of foreign policy problems. It tried to sort out the lot that has sharply increased after the USSR's collapse in the nineties. For different reasons, Russia was unable to realize which parts of this lot it needed and which should be thrown out as ballast.

Russian President Vladimir Putin does not appear to have launched a new foreign policy course. He is maintaining a visible continuity. However, Putin introduced the imperative of "pragmatism" into the foreign policy. It has taken shape almost immediately. Today pragmatism means a revision but not so much in a sense of rejecting former priorities or determining the new ones. An inventory is underway of foreign policy steps that were made during the latest Russian, Soviet and even Imperial periods. It is an ambitious task and Putin and his team might be unable to cope with it. But this work should doubtless be started.

It became obvious last year that the revision was begun. This tendency was proved by a series of foreign trips that lifted a taboo of the Boris Yeltsin's era from the development of relations with North Korea, Cuba and Mongolia. In some places Putin realized that so much had been lost that we were not really welcome (for instance, in Cuba). In other places he saw that losses could be recovered (for instance, in Mongolia). It was important to find out what and to which degree we needed and were able to attain in these countries. Moscow made an important and symbolic step in defecting from the Gore-Chernomyrdin memorandum that restricted arms and military hardware supplies to Iran. The priority (if somewhat exaggerated) is to work where benefits can be drawn in the economic, scientific or military spheres.

Certain major Western countries happened to be at the other extreme. The United States during Bill Clinton's presidency made plenty of amiable gestures but direct investment and growth of bilateral turnover never happened. Many people are still under the impression that the United States gave us money and helped us in every way. France and Russia shared positions on many international issues and maintained decent economic ties. However, Paris was so carried away by criticizing Russia on the Chechen issue that the relations have almost relegated to the zero level.

The third group is just as illustrative. Putin has visited Japan, Canada, Italy, Germany, Spain and Britain, i.e., the countries that are broadening economic ties with Russia and invest in its economy instead of engaging in political intrigues.

Important regions that have a huge potential for economic cooperation with Russia and are interesting as far as pragmatism in international affairs is concerned have been left out of the three foreign policy directions. We are talking about the Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America. Moscow is likely to step up its efforts in these directions this year (and make sure it does not ignore the last year's priorities).

Putin started this year with a visit to Baku. It proved once again that the former stereotypes of the Kremlin policy within CIS were discarded. As for the countries outside CIS, Putin plans to visit Austria in the first half of February. It is probably prompted by his liking of the German language and mountain skiing. The main motive is different because Austria is acting as a link between the Western and Eastern Europe. Visits (and probably tours) to Eastern European countries are likely to follow suit. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov is working in this direction and preparation of Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov's visits is underway. This dynamics can be easily followed (and projected to the president's level) via the foreign minister. Ivanov conducted successful visits to Poland and Romania late last year. He visited Hungary in mid-January and is due to travel to Slovakia and the Czech Republic in late January - early February.

Over the past few years Russia's relations with these countries were not particularly successful. Nether Moscow nor the Eastern European leaders (probably to a larger degree) were able to shed historic complexes. These countries have become aware of changes in the Kremlin which freed its foreign policy of ideology. They are prepared to enter a new stage of dialogue with Moscow and build relations on pragmatic and mutually advantageous terms. The traditional ties that were established in times of COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) should be taken into consideration. Eastern European leaders cannot fail to realize that Russia's market is just as vast as the Western European one. Currently Russia is almost the only supplier of energy sources. But Russia also should realize that Eastern Europe is not a region of secondary importance (compared with the West). Russia should view it as one of its top priorities.

Russian companies have shown much interest in the neighboring region. LUKOIL and Gazprom acquired share packages and whole enterprises in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania. A number of investment projects have been drafted.

The importance of relations with these countries has been boosted by their pending accession to the European Union. It is crucial to work in the triangle of Russia-EU-Eastern Europe. Some of the future issues can be settled today notably the visa regime and the comprehensive EU restrictions that Russia must comply with. They must be negotiated with Eastern European countries and the European Union. Applying the trilateral format would make sense.

Cooperation will probably be revived with Latin American countries. For purely economic reasons these ties were in effect frozen simultaneously with Russia's relations with the Eastern Europe. The Kremlin played host to several high-ranking officials from Latin America last year. Putin accepted invitations to visit Argentina and Brazil. Ivanov will probably prepare the president's visits during a large Latin American tour planned for spring.

This foreign policy schedule is just a tentative forecast. Real life makes changes in any plans. However, the revival of cooperation in the regions that are likely to yield dividends should be continued. Cuba and North Korea have become the symbolic milestones that indicated new aspects of Russia's foreign policy. In addition to symbols, efforts must be made in other directions.

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#12
CENTRAL ASIA-CAUCASUS ANALYST
January 17, 2001

CENTRAL ASIA-CAUCASUS INSTITUTE
THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY--SAIS
WWW.CACIANALYST.ORG

THE CIS AND ITS POWER STRUCTURES
Professor Stephen Blank
AUTHOR BIO: Prof. Stephen Blank is a Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013. The views expressed here do not in any way represent those of the U.S. Army, U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Government

Surprisingly few, if any, "transitologists" have addressed the role of the power structures -- police, military, and intelligence organs - in the CIS and their relationship to political developments there after 1991. This omission is particularly dangerous as many CIS members confront internal insurgency, e.g. Chechnya or the IMU in Uzbekistan, perceive threats from Afghan based Islamic fundamentalism that Russian leaders charge is an international conspiracy, or face enormous internal threats from the pervasive corruption and undemocratic domestic behavior of these agencies.

BACKGROUND: The omission to address the role of the power structures is strange given the crucial role of military and police organs throughout Soviet history and the critical role political theory assigns to those organizations in generally constituting state power. Across the CIS these threat assessments and the pervasive failure of virtually all post-Soviet regimes to institute effective, civilian, democratic controls over these organizations represent shared genetic aspects of the post-Soviet transition. This neglect impedes our understanding of the dynamics of post-Soviet transitions, making it harder to understand political and military trends in these states.

In Russia, Central Asia, and Transcaucasia we see politicization of the armed forces and police as instruments to suppress opposition, creation of new military organizations to suppress domestic threats, recurring internal wars -- frequently ethnic in origin -- the rise of paramilitaries and/or private security firms, widespread corruption and criminality throughout these agencies, etc. Likewise these armies' brutal conduct, e.g. Russian forces in Chechnya, eclipses even Serbian conduct in Kosovo. Such behavior naturally breeds still more resistance and displays the gruesome effect of these phenomena and the brutalization of military life upon soldiers and their victims.

This transition began in 1989 in Tbilisi, continued through the KGB provocations of 1990 in Baku, the Soviet KGB-military coups of 1991, and Yeltsin's habitual resort to coups in 1993 and 1996 (to oust Alexander Lebed) and consideration of coups against political opponents in 1996, 1998 and 1999. Similarly, most Central Asian and Transcaucasian transitions have been by coups or we have seen repeated plots to assassinate political leaders in Uzbekistan, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, and against Russian President Putin in Ukraine. Often, as in Georgia and Azerbaijan, there is strong evidence of external involvement, generally by Russian intelligence forces who themselves suffer from these pathologies.

IMPLICATIONS: This widespread resort to violence and internal war is not surprising. For the failure to institute democratic controls over the power structures inevitably engenders the following likely outcomes: politicization of those agencies on behalf of domestic or foreign aspirants to power, i.e. constant possibilities of coups d'etat, pervasive corruption that steadily undermines the fabric of legitimacy and consent upon which any government in power must rest, authoritarianism based on repression of dissent, and most ominously a constant tendency towards internal war.

Obviously the threats posed by this democratic deficit grow as we approach periods of succession in Transcaucasia and Central Asia, especially as many of these states have no clear constitutional guidelines for succession. And where such guidelines exist, the institutions that should enforce them are quite fragile and susceptible to pressure. These internal weaknesses of already vulnerable states heighten their susceptibility to domestic coups or to external machinations. At a time when Russia employs all the instruments of power, prominently including police, military, and intelligence forces, to restore its hegemony over these states, the dangerous relationship of the power structures to the state and society should generate serious concern abroad.

President Putin has already tried, with some success, to replace leading officials in CIS power structures with pro-Moscow figures who will not democratize or reform these agencies, but corrupt them further on Russia's behalf. Thus Sergei Ivanov, Secretary of Russia's Security Council, urged the Russian-Belarussian group of forces in Kaliningrad to undertake "specific measures [that] had been envisaged with regard to the obvious necessity of strengthening the verticality of power, especially in the Kaliningrad region." One can easily extrapolate from this to his and Putin's goals for Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Central Asia. And clearly an elite having this outlook sees those states' sovereignty and Russian democracy as encumbrances to be gotten rid of.

CONCLUSIONS: Surprisingly few, if any, "transitologists" have addressed the role of the power structures -- police, military, and intelligence organs - in the CIS and their relationship to political developments there after 1991. This omission is particularly dangerous as many CIS members confront internal insurgency, e.g. Chechnya or the IMU in Uzbekistan, perceive threats from Afghan based Islamic fundamentalism that Russian leaders charge is an international conspiracy, or face enormous internal threats from the pervasive corruption and undemocratic domestic behavior of these agencies.

Any analysis of CIS governments that omits this critical dimension of these agencies' relationship to the state and society and the manner by which they are or are not controlled is fatally flawed. Without accurate insights into those relationships and controls we cannot get a clear picture of trends towards democratization, or the new states' internal and external security environments. Absent that understanding, we lack the means to forestall the inevitable crises that will ensue if the status quo continues undisturbed. Here as elsewhere throughout the CIS, "business as usual" is a bankrupt policy whose ultimate ending is not stability but perpetual crisis and war.

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