#13
BBC Monitoring
Russia sets new priorities in policy on Transcaucasus - newspaper
Source: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moscow, in Russian 11 Jan 01
Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent visit to Azerbaijan was indicative
of Russia's foreign policy priorities in the Transcaucasus. According to an
article in the Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Russia is no longer
bound by the Yeltsin legacy of better relations with Armenia than Azerbaijan
nor by Yeltsin's agreement to reduce Russia's presence in the region.
Instead, the newspaper discerns a new pragmatism that accepts deteriorating
relations with Georgia and seeks instead a rapprochement with Azerbaijan,
largely engineered by Russia's oil chiefs. It is a rapprochement in which
Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev has also played a part. The following is
the text of the report, published on 11 January; subheadings have been
inserted editorially:
When the new Russian leadership started talking last spring about the
possible introduction of visa arrangements with a number of CIS countries,
putting forward as an argument in favour of this step the transparency of
borders for the spread of international terrorism, the countries that were
primarily in mind were Azerbaijan and Georgia. Russian Federation Security
Council Secretary Sergey Ivanov then set off to clarify the positions of
these states. He had not even left Baku before Azerbaijani President Heydar
Aliyev clearly and definitively stated in a Nezavisimaya Gazeta interview
that there would be no visa arrangement between Russia and Azerbaijan (see
the 20 June 2000 edition of Nezavisimaya Gazeta). This was unambiguously
confirmed on Tuesday, 9 January 2001 by Russian Federation President Vladimir
Putin, who was in Baku. To all intents and purposes it can be said that,
following Putin's visit to Azerbaijan, Russian policy with regard to the
countries of the Transcaucasus (or the Southern Caucasus, as we can now
fashionably dub this region, following Eduard Shevardnadze's example) has
determined where its priorities lie.
Yeltsin's personal preferences determined Russian policy in Transcaucasus
During the years of Boris Yeltsin's rule a great many things were determined
by the personality factor. Thus, it was known that Boris Nikolayevich did not
like Heydar Aliyevich. He just didn't like him - and that was that. And,
conversely, for some reason our president did like Levon Akopovich
Ter-Petrosyan, president of Armenia, which is not entirely friendly with
Azerbaijan. Those personal preferences and antipathies were superimposed on
the geopolitical situation of the mid-nineties, which included the
Azerbaijani elite's ongoing desire to build the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, the
flourishing of Western-oriented oil consortiums, the clouding of the Western
public mind with not entirely accurate reports about huge reserves of Baku
oil, the traditional Armenian-Russian sympathy, the successful formation of a
military-political partnership between Moscow and Yerevan, political games by
the influential Georgian president under the vague but gripping slogan "Let
others do what they like, we're joining NATO", the outbreak of the Chechen
War and so forth. The highly complex picture of Russian-Transcaucasus
relations reached its zenith in the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe's Istanbul Summit (hastily declared a success for Russia), whose
main result was Yeltsin's agreement to the demand for an immediate (on a
historic scale) removal of any Moscow presence in the Transcaucasus. The time
has now come to revise this part of the Yeltsin legacy too.
Of course, it will not be possible to revise everything in Russia's favour.
It would seem that the withdrawal of Russian military bases from Georgia is
something that has already been decided and paid for by the EU and NATO. It
is merely a question of timing and Moscow is now trying to delay the process,
coercing Georgia with visas and the threat of economic pressure. But it is
currently clear that Georgia, which has never been an ally of Russia's since
the time it gained its independence, has ceased to even be considered as
such. It is clear the Kremlin has decided no longer to draw attention to a
virtual bugbear in the shape of a NATO that is moving towards the shores of
the Black Sea and has quite soberly calculated the real amount of possible
Western support for Georgia as being very, very insignificant. The losses for
Moscow from a deterioration of relations with Tbilisi are correspondingly
small, and they could even in time (if our current pragmatism is consistent)
turn into an advantage.
Anti-Russian moves in Armenia met with "wait and see policy" in Moscow
There is one other element of the Yeltsin legacy - the consistent
deterioration, unnoticed by Russian diplomacy, in its relations with its
seemingly eternal ally, Armenia. Paying scarcely any attention to the very
acute domestic political, economic and demographic processes in Armenia,
Moscow has unexpectedly encountered, first, the complete removal of
pro-Russian politicians from the Armenian politician scene and then,
bafflingly, "arm's-length treatment" on the part of Armenian diplomacy.
Without fully having determined where it stands, the Kremlin is holding
long-drawn-out and semi-secret consultations with Armenian political figures
who are not of the first rank, sometimes expressing its dissatisfaction to
Yerevan in the form of purely protocol-style measures. A great many things
may be clarified by Vladimir Putin's upcoming official visit to Yerevan in
May, but it cannot be ruled out that, prior to this, the Armenian president
will be received at top level in Washington by George Bush. At any rate, so
far Russian policy on Armenia can be described as a restrained, wait-and-see
approach.
Oil pushes Moscow and Baku closer together
Returning to Azerbaijan, we can say that Vladimir Putin has enshrined what
was achieved over the past year by the aforesaid Sergey Ivanov, as well as by
LUKoil boss Vagit Alekperov and Semen Vaynshtok, head of the Transneft
Russian state company. Alekperov has from the very outset participated
actively but on a relatively small scale in virtually all Azerbaijani oil
projects. And Vaynshtok devoted his main attention throughout last year to
the modernization of the Makhachkala-Novorossiysk oil pipeline. The Russian
oil men are sceptical about the possibility of building the Baku-Ceyhan oil
pipeline, quite realistically assessing Azerbaijan as having no alternative
to using Russia for the transit of its hydrocarbon raw materials. In an
interview to the magazine Ekspert just before the new year, Vaynshtok stated
bluntly that what is good for Transneft is good for the state, and he
assessed the objective anti-Russian option of the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline as
an uneconomic project.
The results of Putin's trip to Azerbaijan are already being assessed in both
Moscow and Baku as positive. It can be said without undue exaggeration that a
new Russian policy line has been drawn here by the Security Council's Ivanov
and by the oil men Alekperov and Vaynshtok. No figures on such a scale with
an interest in strengthening Russo-Georgian or Russo-Armenian ties have as
yet been found. In this connection we can speak of pretty good prospects for
Russo-Azerbaijani relations - there are influential figures who have a
personal interest in this. Moreover, Moscow is now cautiously trying to
change the international backdrop, which had hitherto developed not in its
favour in the Transcaucasus. This is shown by the recent statement by a
ranking Russian diplomat about the possibility of Russia's becoming an
associate member of the EU-sponsored TRACECA [Transport Corridor Europe
Caucasus Asia] project, which the Kremlin and Smolensk Square [Foreign
Ministry] had previously "snubbed".
Azerbaijani president played "strong hand" in friendship with Russia
At the same time, Heydar Aliyev has played a very strong hand, demonstrating
his political talents for the umpteenth time. At the necessary moment for
Azerbaijan he stopped irritating Moscow with his support for the Chechens,
pinning all the blame for it on the opposition; having become convinced of
the ultimate futility of playing games over incomplete or unbuilt oil
pipelines, he has returned to the realistic Russian option; and he has saved
his country the no less than 500m dollars a year that is received from
Azerbaijanis working in Russia. No less strong for Aliyev is the domestic
political impact - he has managed to organize relations with Russia, which is
very important to the overwhelming majority of Azerbaijanis. Knowing Heydar
Aliyevich, there can also be no doubt that he has got Moscow to tacitly give
up its equally tacit - but real, let's make no bones about it - support for
Ayaz Mutalibov, a possible contender for the presidency in Baku. And the
level of Aliyev's hospitality, which is something of which Vladimir Putin is
also now aware - is renowned even in the Transcaucasus, which is rich in this
sort of tradition.
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