Moscow, 27 December: Russian President Vladimir Putin is at the top of the list of Russian politicians whom people called "the man of the year". When asked which politicians they would name the man of the year, 43 per cent of Russians named Putin.

This follows from the results of an all-Russia poll conducted among Russian cities and villages by the Public Opinion foundation in late December (1,500 respondents were polled).

Putin leaves the other politicians, who were among the ten most frequently named politicians, far behind.

For example, Sergey Shoygu (the emergencies minister) got 4 per cent of the votes; Gennadiy Zyuganov (Communist leader) and Vladimir Zhirinovskiy (Liberal Democratic Party leader) got 3 per cent of the votes each; Aman Tuleyev (governor of Kemerovo Region) and Mikhail Kasyanov (prime minister) got 2 per cent of the votes each; Yevgeniy Primakov (leader of the Fatherland - All Russia faction in the State Duma), Grigoriy Yavlinskiy (Yabloko faction leader), Gennadiy Seleznev (Duma speaker) and Boris Nemtsov (one of the leaders of the Union of Right Forces) got 1 per cent of the votes each.

This is the second time that Putin has become "the hero of the year", and the results of the voting are almost the same: in 1999 he was named by 42 per cent of the respondents, and in 2000 by 43 per cent.

The first time that Shoygu made the list of the ten most popular politicians was last year, and now he ranks second on this list.

Yevgeniy Primakov (who ranked first in the 1998 rating and second in 1999) came in seventh.

Boris Yeltsin (the first president of the Russian Federation), Yuriy Luzhkov (Moscow mayor), Sergey Kiriyenko (presidential envoy in the Volga Federal District), and Sergey Stepashin (the current head of the Audit Chamber) are no longer among the ten most popular politicians. Boris Nemtsov (who was named the politician of the year in 1997 and whose popularity then sharply dropped) is now back on that list.

Gennadiy Zyuganov, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, leaders of traditional Duma factions, rank the same as they did last year.

Back to the Top


#2
Segodnya
December 29, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
PUTIN - LIBERAL, GREAT-POWER DEFENDER, DEMOCRAT
The President's Ideological Portrait in the Eclectic Style

Now that PUTIN's first year in the presidential post is over, Segodnya correspondent Svetlana OFITOVA asked representatives of the political beau monde to speak on his political and ideological features. The political elite is far from unanimous in assessing Russia's second president. An eclectic portrait has appeared. However, everybody agreed on one thing: Putin's ideology is appropriate for the current moment, therefore, it is susceptible to change.

Boris NEMTSOV, the Union of Right Forces faction leader in the State Duma:

Our president has unique communication abilities. Putin reveals a new side of his personality when he meets different people. When he talks to me, he turns rightist, when he meets Zyuganov, the leftist side appears. (By the way, Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov refused to answer the questionnaire.) I do not think that Putin himself knows what kind of person he really is.

Bashkortostan President Murtaza RAKHIMOV:

Putin is an excellent president. He is young, promising and sympathetic. He must be helped. Putin's political views have doubtless been democratic. Up till now. We'll see what happens next. We live in Russia and it is an unpredictable country.

Anatoly LUKYANOV, chairman of the Duma Committee for the State Structure, Communist Party member:

A lot of Putin's foreign policy decisions can be supported, notably relations with China, North Korea and Cuba. In his domestic policy Putin took steps aimed at strengthening the statehood. They should be supported if they do not lead to an authoritarian rule. Putin made an important move by halting a fight with parliament that Yeltsin had waged. Putin is trying to improve relations with lawmakers. However, members of Putin's entourage are ahead of him here and attempt to maintain their own factions, their own relations. If Putin accepts Gref's economic policy, it can only be implemented with the help of a guillotine.

Regarding ideology, Putin spelled it out in an interview for foreign mass media: he pursues a reasonable liberal policy. I think "humanitarian liberal" was the way he put it...

Vladimir RYZHKOV, independent deputy:

The reply belongs to history. It will become clear many years after he steps down from the presidential post. We've seen just the initial steps but a response to them was not made. Putin has so far strengthened his presidential power. We do not know how he will apply this power. He is close to conservatives and advocates tough authority. He is not much of a democrat and he is skeptical about democracy. I cannot give a precise definition but it seems to resemble Gaullist ideology.

Boris GRYZLOV, chairman of the Unity Party's political council:

Prior to Putin, the format was "seven plus one." This format turned into "eight" after the meeting in Japan. Therefore, our president is at least an equal participant in the eight [industrialized nations' club]. This is a major breakthrough in foreign policy. This person has successfully promoted the idea of strengthening the vertical power. Our country cannot do without this. A democracy must not be turned into an anarchy. Our president guarantees controllability. He is also a guarantor of the democratic changes that our country is expecting. His political views are conservative.

Alexander DZASOKHOV, North Ossetia president:

Putin keeps his word and accomplishes his actions. He has a strong political will, he is constantly focused on the key issues. Putin does not suppress those who surround him and they let him work. Ideology? A process of political determination is underway worldwide on the centuries' threshold. Our country is seeking an ideology. Putin is probably with those who defend the great power spirit and statehood. It is an ideology, too.

Back to the Top


#3
Trud
December 26, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
ARE WE GETTING OPTIMISTIC?
Lyubov PYATILETOVA

We keep complaining about growing prices and wages that are lagging behind them, yet deep inside we know that in fact the departing year was not that bad. "Moreover, an incredible number of Russians (36%) regard it as the best in the past five years," says Anna Petrova, a researcher from the Public Opinion foundation.

The figure was acquired during a national poll of 1,500 rural and urban dwellers and a poll of 600 Muscovites held on the same day. It turned out that Russians are even more optimistic about their future: 47% of the respondents think the coming year will be better still for the country as a whole. Personally, only 32% hope for a better future for themselves, 36% think their life would be as good as this year, and 32% think it would be worse.

Interestingly, 51% of the respondents could not name the main world events of 2000, 12% mentioned the presidential elections in the USA, 9%, the sinking of the Kursk nuclear submarine, 8%, the Sydney Olympics, 5%, the election of Putin, and 4%, the operation in Chechnya.

But they had no problem in naming the main event of this century in Russia: 23% said it was the Second World War, 9% think it was Yuri Gagarin's space flight and the 1917 revolution, 6%, the collapse of the Soviet Union, 3% the Chernobyl tragedy and the invention of the computer and the Internet, 2%, the A bomb, and 1%, the election of the 43rd US president.

Back to the Top


#4
Sects and religions in Russia face day of reckoning

MOSCOW, Dec 29 (AFP) -
Thousands of Islamic and Protestant groups, along with dissident Christian Orthodox faiths, are at threat after failing to win registration under a controversial Russian religion law.

Two months ago, the Russian foreign ministry said that just over half of the estimated 17,500 religious groups in Russia had been registered on the government's list of authorized faiths in time for the new year.

"This law contravenes the Russian constitution, which proclaims the equality of religions in Russia," said Alexei Marchenko, a Moscow representative for the Church of Latter Day Saints (Mormons).

The Salvation Army, a Protestant charity, says the 1997 law on religions that comes into effect Monday, is not only unconstitutional for penalizing foreign missionaries and certain Christian minorities, but also arbitrary.

"We are registered with all the regional authorities, except in Moscow. In the capital, they rejected our demand on the pretext that we are a subversive military organisation. It's absurd," Colonel Kenneth Baillie of the Salvation Army protested.

With a flock numbering 100,000, the 1,400 Baptist communities implanted in Russia face the same problem. The Pentecostalists, for one, saw their publications banned in the central Volga town of Penza.

The situation is even tougher for the Jehovah's Witnesses, who have been taken to court four times since 1996 and denounced for their "aggressive proselytism" by Russia's Orthodox Church.

"In North Ossetia, we obtained all the necessary authorizations, bought a venue which we had started to repair, and when everything was ready we were thrown out without any reason," said senior church figure Yaroslav Sivulsky.

The Mormon official pointed out the Orthodox church was one of the heaviest backers of the religion law -- criticized by both the Vatican and Washington -- accusing it of censoring Russians' faith.

"The Orthodox church wants to have an ideological monopoly in Russia," Marchenko said.

Small churches of religious organizations recently implanted in Russia who have not been able to register are likely to be downgraded to "groups."

This means they would lose their right to hold services in public places, distribute literature, own property or invite foreign guests, according to Russia's Law and Religion Institute.

"The Orthodox church has never condemned the many acts of violence which our missionaries have suffered from in the name of Orthodoxy," fumed Marchenko, whose Mormon church has 11,000 members in Russia.

Weakened by years of repression, the Orthodox church has looked with anxiety as sects and religions have begun to spread on its canonical territory.

In 1997, then President Boris Yeltsin, who publicly associated himself with Alexis II, promulgated the law declaring Russia's five traditional religions to be Orthodoxy in first place, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism and Judaism.

But even for these religions, groups do not automatically receive the right to register if they are from dissident persuasions.

The Orthodox Renaissance Church, founded by priest Gleb Yakunin, was one religious group denied registration.

"These sects are trying to divide our people," Russian Orthodox Patriarch Alexis II says in justification, pointing out that they had greater financial resources than traditional religions in Russia.

Russian Interior Minister Vladimir Rushailo said earlier this year he was "concerned" about the expansion of sects in Russia, adding that the situation threatened national security.

Back to the Top


#5
RIA Novosti - Moscow Diary,
December 28, 2000
MOSCOW'S DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY PEAKS IN 2000
By Sergei KARAGANOV, Ph.D. in History, deputy director of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences

The year 2000 has doubtless been Russia's most successful year in foreign politics over the past decade. At the beginning of the year Russia was a semi-isolated country faced with a threat of a cordon sanitaire on its borders. Moscow's relations with most leading countries either worsened or stagnated. Constructive dialogue with the United States was interrupted, relations with Berlin and Paris became colder and all contacts with NATO were discontinued. The European Union intended to review its policy for closer relations with Moscow.

The situation changed radically with Vladimir Putin's coming in power. Moscow has sharply stepped up its diplomatic activity. Putin held dozens of important meetings and talks with foreign leaders. He convinced them that the new Russian leadership was sincere in pursuing cooperation and resolution of major international problems. Along with his realism and flexibility, Putin displayed adherence to principles and a strong decisiveness in defending Russia's national interests. Putin became a major world leader and strengthened Russia's authority.

Putin's participation in the G-8 summit in Okinawa was an outstanding diplomatic success. His prior visit to North Korea partially brought it out of an international isolation. Putin demonstrated that the U.S. assertions about a threat from North Korea were groundless. North Korean leader Kim Jong-il expressed readiness to "freeze" the nuclear missile program. Thus the U.S. plan to create the national missile defense system in 2000 was derailed. U.S. President Bill Clinton had planned to announce the beginning of a deployment of the national missile defense structure in Okinawa. Clinton kept silent about the subject due to the new circumstances. Furthermore, Russian diplomats succeeded in drawing the international community's attention to the United States' possible defection from the 1972 ABM Treaty between the USSR and the USA. Moscow convinced even Washington's allies that the plan posed a threat. Most of them ceased to support the U.S. missile defense plan.

Putin's visits to Germany and France gave a positive impetus to bilateral relations. Moscow's ties with the European Union revived. European leaders have realized that major European problems cannot be resolved without Russia. It resumed contacts with NATO. NATO Secretary General George Robertson visited Moscow in February and commented on the thawing relations. A lot of difficult steps are yet to be made but the important thing is that both sides realize their necessity.

Russian diplomats passed the Yugoslav "test" with honours. Moscow did its best to prevent a dangerous development of events in the friendly country in the wake of the Yugoslav presidential election. The Russian leadership acknowledged the legitimacy of Vojislav Kostunica's victory. However, Moscow did not support the Western officials' requests for handing over Slobodan Milosevic to the International Tribunal. So, Moscow won the adherents of Kostunica and Milosevic over to Russia's side.

A new escalation of tension in the Middle East proved the importance of Russia's participation in the Arab-Israeli peace settlement. Washington's attempts to oust Moscow from this process resulted in the deadlocked talks. The Israeli and Palestinian leaders realized that it was a mistake to expect U.S. diplomats to rectify the situation. They turned to Russia for assistance. Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and prominent Israeli politicians Benjamin Netanyahu and Shimon Peres visited Moscow recently. Putin had several telephone talks with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak.

Putin's visits to Cuba and Canada at the end of the year wrapped up Moscow's diplomatic activity in the outgoing century. Russia demonstrated a desire to resume the thoughtlessly broken ties with one of its most reliable partners on the American continent. Relations with Havana were reviewed and given a new impetus. Talks in Canada continued its dialogue with the West. Moscow understands the importance of these relations.

The scale of Russia's foreign policy initiatives displayed in 2000 indicates that Moscow will promote them at the beginning of the next century. The multi-directional diplomatic activity proves that Moscow intends to broaden cooperation both with the West and the East.

Back to the Top


#6
BBC Monitoring
Russian TV sees far-reaching design behind American ABM plans
Source: Ren TV, Moscow, in Russian 1730 gmt 26 Dec 00

[Presenter] Russia has several options open to it if the USA unilaterally dumps the ABM Treaty, Russian Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev said today [26 December]. [omitted: known facts]. Here is a special report by Aleksandr Beloglazov about the history of Russian-American confrontation on this issue.

[Correspondent] Some people do not like to remember the fact that the creation of ABM systems was initiated by the Soviet Union. [omitted: historical background]

They in the United States say that the [planned new US] ABM system, unlike the Star Wars programme, would not protect America from a massive nuclear strike that only Russia can deliver. It is designed to safeguard the USA from a single attack or a non-sanctioned [missile] launch. This is why they in Washington do not understand the indignation of the Russians. The ABM system is [said to be] merely a preventive measure against certain countries that are eager to join the nuclear club.

At the same time, the tough Russian position on the ABM Treaty has serious grounds.

Under the plan outlined by the Bush Administration, two ABM bases would be established in the US territory, one in North Dakota and the other in Alaska. The base in North Dakota would protect America from a possible nuclear strike by Qadhafi's unpredictable Libya, the Iraq of the militant Saddam Husayn, or by Iran and Pakistan. The base in Alaska must provide protection from North Korea.

This is what they say in Washington. Anyway, the implementation of this plan objectively would be a blow for Russia as well. The control and interception system based in Alaska would be able to destroy Russian missiles launched from Northern Fleet submarines and part of the land silos immediately after launch.

[Aleksey Arbatov, captioned as deputy chairman of the State Duma Committee on Defence] If Russia wanted to ensure it did not run up against any undesirable situation, that would be very easy. If Russia merely deployed multiple warheads on existing land-based ballistic missiles, the preservation of its deterrent potential could be guaranteed 100 per cent.

[Correspondent] Exactly this is most likely to happen. At least, Russian Strategic Missile Troops C-in-C Vladimir Yakovlev says that Russia is ready to take adequate measures and even to increase the number of warheads on missiles deployed on combat duty. Military experts add that the Topol-M ballistic missile could provide an adequate response. No ABM system can stop it, because this modern missile has a combination-trajectory flight path. It chooses the route to the target on its own. It is very difficult to predict its ballistic trajectory.

However, the Americans are unlikely to give in to such reasoning. They will be persistent in seeking their goal. Maybe, there is some hidden meaning beyond what is obvious. However unusual it would be, some experts believe that the next American step could be complete nuclear disarmament. Russia would have no choice but to follow their example.

The US intelligence services are persuading the US Administration that Russia's claims of being a Great Power are based on its nuclear weapons alone.

America's allies, too, do not want to completely eliminate their nuclear arsenals. Nuclear weapons make them, to some extent, America's equal partners.

The United States has big odds in the creation of [conventional] high-precision weapons. This is why Bush has proposed that Russia sharply cut the level of strategic [nuclear] forces and their combat readiness. This is happening against the background of the creation of the ABM system.

[Yevgeniy Myasnikov, captioned as expert from the centre on the problems of disarmament] I have the sense that the Americans want to deprive us of the opportunity to deliver a massive [nuclear] strike. If they do this, we shall be able to respond with just a single strike. This is what the national ABM system is being created for.

[Correspondent] The USA is planning to deploy about 100,000 high-precision weapons in the next decade. Thus, they have found a proper replacement for nuclear arsenals. So far there are no agreements relating to this kind of weapons. Russia has been caught in a trap set by the Americans. All our diplomatic efforts are being expended on the ABM problem. Meanwhile, America with its [conventional] high-precision weapons is preparing for life in a non-nuclear world with might and main. Nothing can stop it except another Great Depression, but it seems that we would have to wait for it very long.

Back to the Top



#7
Moscow Times
December 23, 2000

Putin Kept Russia on Its Toes in 2000 By Sarah Karush
Staff Writer

What a difference a year makes - or does it?

As Russia marches into 2001, it has a vigorous president, a re-structured parliament and a new old anthem. The dealmaker who a year ago stage-managed political life has recast himself as a dissident and gone into exile. A once-powerful opposition force is now a Kremlin ally, while two historically warring liberal factions have begun a courtship dance.

But while some of the actors may have changed roles and the orchestra has struck up a Stalin-era tune, the tragicomic plot remains essentially the same. Little has been done to stamp out corruption or strengthen the legal system. Regional bosses continue to have almost unchecked power - despite a much-ballyhooed Kremlin campaign to rein them in. The conflict in Chechnya rages on, with the death toll inching up daily.

In his first year in the Kremlin, President Vladimir Putin has consolidated power, creating the conditions necessary to make big changes in the way the country is run. But, despite radical talk and a wealth of legislative initiatives, he has been slow to upset the status quo. His main project - restoring federal control over the country's 89 regions - was weighed down with concessions to the governors by the time it made its way through parliament.

Some had higher hopes for Putin. State Duma Deputy Vladimir Ryzhkov said he was disappointed that the new president did not take advantage of his broad support, loyal parliament and an economy boosted by high oil prices to push through real reforms in areas like land ownership, the military and labor law.

"I'm afraid that there will not be such favorable conditions next year," said Ryzhkov, who was booted from the pro-Putin Unity faction this summer because his views did not always conform to those of the party leadership. "He wasted these favorable conditions on virtual victories."

The year began with an early presidential campaign, forced by Boris Yeltsin's surprise resignation on New Year's Eve. (Yeltsin Hands Power to 'Heir', Jan. 5, 2000.) Yeltsin had given his chosen successor a head start by quitting at a time when Prime Minister Putin's approval rating was soaring - thanks to his tough rhetoric on Chechnya and his image as a hands-on, no-nonsense leader.

Condensed into two and a half months, (Presidential Vote Scheduled for March 26, Jan. 6, 2000.)a quarter of the time usually allocated, the race felt like a symbolic effort from the beginning. Even as he declared his candidacy, Yabloko leader Grigory Yavlinsky said nobody could even hope to beat Putin.

As acting president, Putin said he did not intend to campaign. That didn't stop him from taking a whirlwind tour of the regions - including a ride into Chechnya on a fighter jet. Ultimately, voters got a sense of Putin's personality, but not his politics: He refused to reveal his platform, saying only that he favored a strong state. Candidate Putin was a convenient blank slate, and liberals, nationalists and communists all pinned their hopes on him.

The only intrigue in the race was whether Putin would be able to win in the first round or be forced into a run-off. His ultimate first-round victory, with 53 percent of the vote, came at a price. An investigation by The Moscow Times revealed widespread fraud in the March 26 election. Were it not for creative vote-tallying, ballot-box stuffing and bullying by local bosses, Putin would not have won in the first round. (See Election Fraud special report.)

Battling the Governors

The first-round victory was seen as a broad mandate for Putin to restructure the government and pursue reforms.

After his inauguration in May, Putin set about strengthening the "vertical line of power" - his term for centralized authority over the far-flung and independent-minded regions. His first move was to carve the country into seven federal districts and appoint a representative to each one to help him keep an eye on the governors.( Putin to Tighten Grip on Regions, May 18, 2000.)

The presidential representatives have Putin's ear, but no legal authority. Other measures against the governors seemed to have more teeth. Within three months, the Kremlin shepherded a federal reform package through parliament.

One of the new laws in the package created a mechanism for removing regional leaders who ignore federal laws, governing according to their own rules.

But so far, Putin has not used this powerful new weapon. Instead, he has opted to change federal laws to accommodate the governors. In November the Duma passed a bill in the first reading that would give some of the most controversial regional bosses the right to run for a third term, something strictly prohibited in the current law.

The Kremlin's new levers have also failed to prevent regional mismanagement. As winter began in the Far East, tens of thousands of people had no heat. Only after weeks of protests and visits by Moscow delegations did officials begin to address the problem. But 4,500 people in Primorye are still without heat in their homes, Interfax reported this week.

Some predict the Kremlin may begin to take more action in the regions a year from now - by jailing its least favorite governors. Another law in the package deprives governors of their seats in the Federation Council and the immunity from prosecution that comes with them.

But aside from stripping them of their immunity, it is unclear what the law accomplishes, since it allows them to appoint their representatives to the chamber. Governors worried about losing their bully pulpit in the capital needn't be concerned: They will be able to gather regularly in the new State Council, advising the president on key issues.

"The federal reform in many ways did not live up to expectations," said Vladimir Pribylovsky, head of the Panorama think tank.

Crackdown on the Press

At the beginning of the year, the latest war in Chechnya was already five months old. Eager to keep the correct spin on the war in the run-up to the election, Kremlin officials told the media they had an obligation to support the war effort and not to give air time to the rebels. They backed up the threat by temporarily excluding privately owned NTV - the only national station to offer somewhat critical reporting on the war - out of the military press pool.

More ominously, Radio Liberty reporter Andrei Babitsky was detained in late January. He was held incommunicado, traded to masked men who Moscow officials said were Chechen rebels and finally allowed to escape after five weeks in captivity. (Missing Babitsky Surfaces by Phone, Feb. 26, 2000.)

For many who were still giving the new administration the benefit of the doubt on press freedom, the spring's events erased all illusions. In May, the offices of Media-MOST, NTV's parent company, were raided. A month later, Media-MOST owner Vladimir Gusinsky was arrested. After three nights in jail, he was released, but the government's battle for control of his empire continued. (Gusinsky Charged, Released From Jail, June 17, 2000.)

This month, Spanish authorities arrested Gusinsky, who has been living abroad, on an Interpol warrant. NTV director Yevgeny Kiselyov has warned that the Kremlin has a plan to liquidate the station on New Year's Eve.

The Media-MOST fight has outraged liberals - even those, such as Irina Khakamada and Boris Nemtsov, who had supported Putin. For some critics, it has confirmed fears that Putin's KGB past would catch up with the country.

For one thing, they point to the government's information security doctrine, adopted in September. Journalists fear the doctrine and its emphasis on the "security threat" of misinformation and foreign influence in the media may serve as justification for more attacks on the non-state press. Many liberals are also disturbed by the rise of KGB and military officers to top posts in Putin's administration.

"We are moving away from our basic values, away from the Constitution, in which rights and freedoms are the top priority, toward the state and state interests," said Duma Deputy Sergei Yushenkov. "We are seeing a return to the 'bright past.'"

Divorcing the Family

One question on analysts' minds a year ago was what Putin would do about "the Family," the group of Kremlin insiders thought to be effectively running the country? When Putin was appointed prime minister in August 1999, he was considered a member of the Family and his appointment a product of its influence.

Putin has distanced himself from tycoon Boris Berezovsky, the man who for most people came to symbolize the family's backroom influence.

Berezovsky, who says he bankrolled the campaign of the Unity party in last year's Duma elections, says he is being persecuted by the regime he helped create. Like Gusinsky, he remains abroad and says he has been pressured to give up his stake in government-controlled ORT television. Prosecutors have resumed their investigation into alleged corruption at Aeroflot and have sought to question Berezovsky in the case.

But Putin has been unable or unwilling to shake the Family's influence completely. He re-appointed Prosecutor General Vladimir Ustinov, who is considered close to the Family. Ustinov has used his powers selectively, targeting Gusinsky but closing the Mabetex corruption case, which touched the interests of Yeltsin and those close to him. Family member Alexander Voloshin remains Putin's chief of staff, and Mikhail Kasyanov, another Family friend, is prime minister.

Still, when it comes to influence over the president, the Family faces competition from two groups - economic liberals and so-called chekisty, former security officers and military men.

Rumors have been circulating about Kasyanov's imminent replacement. Voloshin reportedly clashed with Putin over the adoption of the Soviet-era anthem. Some analysts think an eventual break with the Family is inevitable.

A Teflon President

Putin's high approval ratings have barely budged since his election. According to a poll taken this week by the All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion, or VTsIOM, 68 percent of Russians approve of his performance as president. The age-old formula of "good tsar, bad boyars" seems to be at work; only 38 percent approve of the government?s performance.

Not that there hasn't been bad news this year. In Chechnya, for instance, an average of 200 servicemen a month lost their lives from October 1999 to October 2000. New casualties are reported almost every day.

"At the end of the year, the country is no longer counting its dead," Yavlinsky said in an interview on NTV this week. "The country is no longer paying attention to the hundreds of people who are dying weekly, monthly, in the North Caucasus."

Even Putin's slow response to the tragic sinking of the Kursk submarine this summer has failed to damage his reputation. His initial decision to continue his vacation and his reluctance to accept international offers for help earned him scathing criticism in the media but failed to damage his approval rating in the long term.

"He was able to wiggle out of the situation," Pribylovsky said.

Politically, 2000 was Putin's year, and the country's major parties have struggled to redefine themselves in the new era. The Communists, who not too long ago were leading an impeachment drive against Yeltsin, have seen their familiar nationalist rhetoric taken over by Putin. In response, they have cozied up to the new administration, forming strategic alliances with pro-government factions in the Duma.

"The Communist Party has opted to take a reserved line in relation to Putin," Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov said this month at the party's congress. "Let him try to prove that his intentions are serious."

The Union of Right Forces, or SPS, which supported Putin during the election, has been distressed by the attack on NTV. Still, the party continues to sit on the fence, saying it is not yet clear which direction Putin will take.

But in a sign that they have reservations about the new order, SPS leaders have started building a coalition with Yabloko, the only party planted firmly in the opposition. Mortal enemies in the Yeltsin era, the two liberal factions have been pushed into each other's arms.(Bill Would Wipe Out 90% of Parties, Dec. 14, 2000.)

Perhaps Putin's most striking achievement this year was to drive his enemies either off the field or onto his team. But not everybody is impressed.

"The political class is weak," Ryzhkov said. "It wasn't very hard to do."

Back to the Top



#8
The Russia Journal
December 23-29, 2000
Blaming generals masks military's deeper problems
By Alexander Golts

By a strange twist of circumstances, just when the budget was finally approved by the State Duma last week, the Military Prosecutor's Office laid charges against Col. Gen. Grigory Oleinik, the financial head at the Defense Ministry. Oleinik is accused of having cost the state almost half a billion dollars by "overstepping his authority."

But what about the billions of defense dollars the state stands to lose anyway? During the battles over the budget, one of the main criteria used in assessing this or that defense program was how difficult it would be to steal the allocated money.

There's no question that theft in Russia's armed forces has reached a grandiose scale. But it wouldn't be right to lay the blame entirely at the feet of a demoralized officer corps.

The whole system of relations between the state and the armed forces incites theft. The state channels over a quarter of its income into defense, but exactly how this money is spent is shrouded in secrecy. Not only the military brass, but government officials at the highest levels are eager to get their hands on the defense budget.

Oleinik was not accused of misappropriation, but of "overstepping his authority," and this is not just chance. According to the most probable version of events, Oleinik was by no means chiefly responsible for the disappearance of hundreds of millions of dollars.

The whole incident took place in December 1996. At that time, the state was desperately looking for extra income, and the Tax Ministry discovered that Gazprom owed the treasury $450 million but didn't have the resources to pay.

Several Cabinet ministers then came up with a plan to get hold of the money. The Defense Ministry transferred the needed sum to Gazprom, and a Ukrainian company that owed money to Gazprom agreed to cover its debt by supplying building materials. The Ukrainian company, however, didn't keep up its part of the deal, and the Defense Ministry never got its outlay back.

Oleinik, of course, was not born yesterday and had to have known that he was putting his signature to an absolutely illegal document. But at that time, he'd been in his job only a month and knew what would happen if he refused to carry out the order from above.

This all indicates another problem - commanding officers in the armed forces are to this day in a situation like that of serfs, having to carry out any orders coming from their bosses, even illegal ones, if they want to keep their chance of climbing the career ladder. They know, too, that it's better not to tire the top brass with complaints about lack of money to feed soldiers, purchase fuel supplies and so on. The Army still lives on the principle of stealing to survive.

Sooner or later, any regiment commander comes to the conclusion that the only way to get money is to use his soldiers as slaves. Sooner or later, the commander starts renting them out to the local grain-processing plants or state farms.

Of course, the commander knows he's breaking the law, and if he's caught, he knows he'll never be able to prove that he spent the illegally earned money not on himself, but on the soldiers. Since he's going to have to steal anyway, then, he starts siphoning money into his own pockets and soon becomes a banal criminal.

So long as reform of the armed forces hasn't begun, allocating state money for combat preparedness or new arms purchases is more or less a senseless enterprise. Without a transparent reporting and accounting system, the money will just disappear without a trace.

Back to the Top



#9
Christian Science Monitor
December 29, 2000
In Russia, never too young for tax collection
By Scott Peterson
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

In post-Soviet Russia, where tax evasion has become an art form, a new generation of very young, elite tax enforcers is learning to do more than inspect account records.

"The tax policeman protects his country, prevents crimes and thievery, and collects tax for state coffers," recites cadet Alyosha Rodionov, a short-haired 11-year-old with dark-brown eyes.

Juli Grigoryan may be best at chemistry, but the uniformed 14-year-old can't wait to begin marksmanship classes next year. "I will do it with pleasure," she says.

If you thought IRS agents were a hard-nosed group, meet Russia's next generation of tax enforcers, training at the newly opened Third Moscow Tax Police Cadet Corps academy in Moscow. Despite the name, it is the first of its kind.

Hand-to-hand combat is part of the regimen here, along with a host of martial arts, but so is etiquette, as the school aims to create an elite "dynasty" of defenders that will persuade Russians to respect and pay tax to their cash-strapped state.

Tax police already have a tough reputation: A series of high profile raids in the past year by commandos wearing black ski masks and carrying assault rifles has turned the tax police, for many Russians, into the most feared arm of government.

"Society has a negative attitude to the tax police, who have inherited the niche once possessed by the KGB," says Yevgeny Wittenberg, head of the Russian Independent Institute for National and Social Issues. "Russians are not fans of paying tax. It is a relic of the Soviet mentality, when the oppressive state cheated its citizens," he says.

Tax officials say that while crusading to restore the primacy of the state in Russians' lives, they are also trying to create a "kinder, gentler" image. The moves fit into a broader campaign by President Vladimir Putin, who has promised to impose a "dictatorship of law."

A new tax code comes into effect on New Year's Day, designed to bring more people, and some of Russia's large "gray economy" into the often-ungainly tax system. Mr. Putin said on Sunday that the "reasonable" 13 percent flat tax was "necessary ... with the goal to increase the level of trust toward the state."

The Russian Orthodox Church has even appointed the Biblical St. Matthew - a tax collector before becoming a disciple of Jesus - as patron saint of tax police.

The tax showcase, however, is the well-appointed school in Moscow for 160 budding tax enforcers, where old-style martial arts mix with new methods.

In the gym, cadets strap on padded gloves, body protection, and facemasks. Wrestling, judo, and kick-boxing are de rigueur. There is also "fighting without rules." Marksmanship classes begin in the New Year. The curriculum also includes choir, drama, and even etiquette. Students address each other as "comrade cadet," and visitors are met at the door by a boy-guard with a nightstick.

"Our ideology is respect for state power," explains director Vyacheslav Romaikin, a veteran of the Soviet war in Afghanistan. "We instill in their consciousness the rules of the state, such as the obligation to pay taxes."

Military-clad pupils here, boys and girls alike, are orphans, the children of military and intelligence officers, or of those who died in government service. The school motto is: "With faith and truth, we follow the law." Every morning, Mr. Romaikin says, teachers remind the students: "You are unique pupils of the best tax-police cadet corps. You must be the best in study, discipline, and sport."

To help dispel the negative image of the current tax police, officials say the force may soon be renamed the more benevolent-sounding "finance" police. "Black masks and automatic guns are only the most visible part of our work, but it is only 1 percent of our whole work," explains a tax-police spokesman, who asked not to be named. "Most of it consists of paperwork, analytical research, and examination of financial documents." High-profile raids, he says, have now been abandoned because of "negative public opinion."

Twice as many criminal cases were launched in 2000 as in the previous year. In the first quarter of this year, tax collections were one-third higher than the target sum.

Analysts say it will take decades to instill a tax-paying attitude in Russians, even though the state now is so poor that remote areas of the far east are increasingly without heat in winter months. Russia's huge military is collapsing, and most state-run health and education systems - the tax police school is a notable exception - have been gutted.

For the past decade, seemingly arbitrary and constantly changing tax laws have eroded official credibility and made Western investors wary. At one point, businesses were supposed to pay 1.09 rubles of tax on every ruble earned.

"Mass nonpayment in Russia is a result of wrong reforms in the 1990s," says Anvar Amirov, with Panorama, an independent Moscow think tank. "The new code is at least transparent, and avoids double and triple interpretation."

Still, he says, it is more profitable for the tax police to go after big companies than to scrutinize the receipts of 1,000 smaller ones. Cracking down on Russia's oligarchs - elite and influential tycoons - is considered key. But raids on the holdings of media magnate Vladimir Gusinsky, who was detained in Spain Dec. 12 on a Russian extradition order, are seen as politically motivated. Mr. Gusinsky was close to former President Boris Yeltsin but has fallen out with Putin.

Jumping into the tax system chaos, instructors hope, will be the true-believer graduates of the tax police school. Last fall, the list of applicants to get a spot was very long.

Instructors say that military training enables pupils to defend themselves, and to "counter evil" by "defending the weak."

"Those best able to fight have the best intellect," says martial-arts teacher Constantine Semyonov, a former Soviet tank driver. "Don't think we are just fighting. We talk a lot about its meaning, its spiritual aspects, and self-discipline. It's an inseparable part of education."

Other courses, too, are geared toward creating well-rounded enforcers. Singing in the choir means "understanding what it is to be part of a hierarchy," says director Romaikin. Lessons in world history show "that people have always had to pay taxes, and how law defines the life of society." Etiquette classes, he adds, recognize that not all tax enforcement will be done staring through the eye-holes of a ski mask, and that the "ability to listen and speak to people, without imposing on them," will be important.

Back to the Top



#10
Russians to sing praise to wisdom of ancestors in new-old anthem

MOSCOW, Dec 28 (AFP) -
Russians will be singing praise to the wisdom of the ancestors to the tune of the Soviet anthem, according to a text of the nation's new hymn published Thursday in a respected Moscow business daily.

Vedomosti printed what it claimed was the chorus approved by a Kremlin commission and due to be signed into law by President Vladimir Putin in time for national broadcast at the stroke of the new year.

"Glory to our free Fatherland, a secular union of fraternal peoples; to the wisdom of the people inherited from their ancestors, glory to our country, we are proud of you," says Russia's new anthem, according to Vedomosti.

The official text is being kept under wraps, leaving Russians to wonder what words will now be song to a Communist anthem that once hailed Stalin, Lenin and "unbreakable union ... united and mighty."

Somewhat predictably, Russia's liberal press cried foul Thursday over the Soviet-era anthem's reintroduction, especially the pace at which the Putin-sponsored bill was approved by parliament.

The familiar tune replaces the 19th century melody written by Mikhail Glinka and selected by Putin's predecessor Boris Yeltsin -- but it has not been a popular choice.

The newspaper Sevodnya criticized the fact that the Soviet-era song was imposed by the powers-that-be, and the people were not consulted.

"The anthem remains the Soviet anthem and not that of Russia," according to Kommersant.

And the Vremya NM paper criticized the "precipitous" nature of Putin's decision and deplored the fact that "the guarantor of the Constitution has given society an object lesson in how not to respect the rule of law".

The paper also indicated that an earlier version of the lyrics referring to the flight of an eagle had been revised because it was considered that a two-headed eagle -- the tsarist symbol adopted by the new Russia -- could not actually fly.

Izvestia reported that one of the country's most celebrated choirs, that of the musical academy, directed by Viktor Popov, had already begun to rehearse the words.

"The new musical arrangement is much softer" than in Soviet times, the paper claimed.

Back to the Top



#11
Russia: Analysis From Washington -- 'The Greatest Political Mistake'
By Paul Goble

Washington, 28 December 2000 (RFE/RL) -- Moscow's dispatch of Soviet troops to Afghanistan 21 years ago this week was "the greatest political mistake" whose consequences continue to plague both Afghanistan and the Soviet successor states, according to the last Soviet commander there.

Gen. Boris Gromov, who heads a Russian veterans organization, said on Wednesday that "the dispatch of Soviet troops into Afghanistan was not justified either politically or militarily." And he called on everyone involved "to concentrate efforts on overcoming that error" by helping Afghanistan, former Soviet soldiers who served there, and their families.

Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev's decision to send troops to defend what he believed was a communist government in Afghanistan was a key act in the overreach which many analysts point to as presaging the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union itself. It helped to reenergize Western opposition to Soviet communism.

When Moscow was finally compelled to withdraw from Afghanistan eight years later, many throughout the Soviet empire became convinced that Moscow would eventually be forced to leave their lands as well, a conviction that helped to power national movements in Eastern Europe and the non-Russian Soviet republics.

But as Gromov makes clear, the 1979 invasion continues to have an impact in Afghanistan, in Russia and other post-Soviet successor states, and in defining international relationships between Moscow and the rest of the world.

The continuing consequences of the Soviet invasion are most obvious in Afghanistan itself. The actions of the Soviet troops there destroyed much of the social infrastructure of traditional Afghan society, opening the way both to vastly expanded drug production and to the rise of the Taliban movement which rejects modernity in the name of a radically traditional Islamist politics.

Drugs produced in Afghanistan continue to destabilized both Iran and the countries of Central Asia. In both places, leaders have invoked the dangers of drugs to justify their own authoritarian approaches and to win the sympathy and support of governments further away.

But even more dramatically, the Taliban movement has become the latest symbol of Islamist politics, especially because of its willingness to provide sanctuary for accused terrorist Osama bin Laden. Increasingly, this distinctively local movement has been portrayed by some as a threat to the entire world and used to justify patterns of cooperation.

In Russia itself, the consequences are perhaps less obvious but equally profound. On the one hand, and not unlike in the United States after Vietnam, most Russians concluded from the Afghan conflict that they must never fight again unless they are certain of their aims and capable of winning any conflict they enter with low casualties on their own side. Indeed, that Afghan model helps to explain Moscow's current approach in Chechnya.

And on the other hand, the bitter experience of the Afghan fighting has divided Russian society, with many now viewing that war as an exemplar of what was wrong with the old Soviet system and others drawing the opposite conclusion, deciding that the opening up of Soviet society under Mikhail Gorbachev was responsible for a defeat that Russia must at some point avenge.

Finally, the impact of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan continues to rumble through the international community. Two decades ago, Moscow's actions prompted the United States and other Western countries to change their approach to the Soviet Union, not only boycotting the 1980 Olympics in Moscow but also adopting the harder line exemplified in U.S. President Ronald Reagan's denunciation of the USSR as "an evil empire."

Now, that invasion and the disastrous consequences it had for Afghanistan are having just the opposite effect, prompting a new kind of cooperation between Moscow and Washington. Last week, the two countries worked together in the United Nations Security Council to impose new sanctions on the Taliban to force it to hand over bin Laden and to stop supporting terrorism.

Not surprisingly, this new cooperation between Russia and the United States has outraged the Taliban. Its leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, said this week that "the United States and Russia want to destroy good Muslim people all over the world." And on the occasion of the Muslim holiday of Eid-ul Fitr, he urged the followers of Islam to "stay united against these cruel intentions."

But even the vast majority of Muslims who are appalled by the Taliban's actions are concerned about this new cooperation against an Islamic state, seeing it as an example of what Harvard University's Samuel Huntington called "the clash of civilizations" and portending more conflicts between the West and the world of Islam.

Twenty-one years ago, Brezhnev assumed that Soviet forces would soon put things right in Afghanistan. Instead, that action continues to transform the world a generation later.

Back to the Top