#12
Russian Daily Eyes US Role in IMF Moscow Mission Failure
Rossiyskaya Gazeta
November 29, 2000
[translation
from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
Report by Aleksandr Velichenkov
under the "Notes A Propos" rubric:
"Hint of
Sanctions Against Russia"
The IMF mission's visit to Moscow which ended last week has effectively
killed off the Fund's budget substitution loan of $1.8 billion. This means
that the likelihood of a deferral of the USSR's debts to the Paris Club,
for which Russia is responsible, will shift from the realms of the
expected to the illusory.
Consequently in 2001 the country's budget will have to pay the Club
$3.1 billion. Instead of using that money to develop the country's
economy.
It is curious that this mission's visit itself was somewhat strange.
There were no television cameras or protocol visits and the communication
was emphatically dry. Finally, there is the summary itself: "They have so
much money in Russia, let them pay." So there you have it. Even though
this financial breathing space is now far more important for us in terms
of economic recovery than it has ever been.
Is it the case, then, that the failure of the Fund mission's visit was
programmed in advance?
Against the background of these formal failures of our financial
diplomacy, which could cost our budget $5 billion, Russia's withdrawal
from the classified 1995 agreement with the United States
(Chernomyrdin-Gore) on the non-delivery of Russian arms to Iraq [as
published] was a bolt from the blue.
This event has already provoked "righteous anger" across the ocean
where we have been openly threatened with economic sanctions. The only
question is this: How do they intend to resolve this question at the UN
Security Council, where Russia has the right of "veto"?
After all, apart from the Russian arms supplies to Iraq the question of
building an oil pipeline from Iraq to the Caspian shore is already on the
agenda of our Near East diplomacy, and this could entail Russia's
withdrawal from the sanctions regime against this country.
It is obvious that these questions sharply complicate our relations
with the IMF and, consequently, with the Paris Club of international
creditors. The anti-Russian stance of the United States is also sure to
have an effect within the IMF. After all, America is the only country
which, as the main shareholder, has the right to block decisions made by
the Fund.
But has Russia been rash in denouncing the closed agreement with the
United States reached in 1995? Hardly. Such agreements operate as long as
their signatories are in power.
This is because these are in effect nothing more than gentleman's
agreements which do not have a public legal character. Neither the Russian
State Duma nor the U.S. Congress has approved or ratified it. Russia has
given notice of its withdrawal from the agreement. Furthermore, it
withdrew at the moment when an informal decision to ease the West's
relations with Iran was made at the G-8 conference in Okinawa in summer.
Russia has not withdrawn and does not intend to withdraw from the formal
international accords -- on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and
missile technologies. So what is the problem? Or do they not like Russian
business in Iran?
The subsequent development of events is already obvious. The attempts
to pressure Russia via the international financial organizations, first
and foremost the IMF and the Paris Club, will not lead to anything good
for our relations with these countries. This is not like the early
nineties, when we were forced to agree to any Western and IMF "wishes" and
recommendations. Furthermore, we were forced to agree even in those
instances when these recommendations were completely not in accordance
with our national interests.
Furthermore, the result of such attempts could be that Russia uses its
right not to pay the debts to the Paris Club at all. And we have a formal
right to do this. After all, the official, internationally recognized
entity responsible for these debts since 1997 has been the USSR
Vneshekonombank. But given that it does not have the means to settle these
debts let the international creditors declare it bankrupt in Stockholm.
Its furniture, computers, and $280,000 in incorporation capital will be
completely at their disposal.
What will happen if this is not enough? In that case it will be
necessary to negotiate whatever the stance of the United States and the
IMF. We owe the Club $48 billion and we are owed $52 billion in debt
recognized by the Club. And what do Iran or Iraq have to do with this
given that in Tehran today our arms exports have now clashed, not for the
first time, with extremely fierce competition from France and that for 10
years now the UN commission on Iraq has been granting export quotas and
contracts for the supply of output to Iraq virtually exclusively to U.S.
companies?
For the first time in all the years of the reforms, Russia is trying to
defend its right to conduct business wherever it deems this necessary.
In this context you cannot help thinking of Vladimir Putin's comment
about the strange foreign debt restructuring that is going on in our
country if every two years it is necessary to ask the creditors for more
deferrals again. And the debt still gets no smaller....
Everyone needs clarity and certainty on these questions -- not only
Russia but the West too. And a constructive basis for talks fully exists.
But the international market, including the conventional arms market, must
be open to all, not just the chosen few.
Russia has its own national interests and we are only just beginning to
understand them now as we attempt to operate independently and
intelligently. It is perfectly natural that this should displease some
people. But is this a reason to reject normal, civilized relations and
switch to threats? Russia has never rejected dialogue on equal terms:
Should we give way now just like that when the outline of the new
multipolar world are taking shape?
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