MOSCOW -- When asked what Russians think of U.S. presidential campaign, three possibilities come to mind:

1) Bush's legs;
2) Nothing;
3) Who cares.

As for the first option, it's not that Russians have an unnatural attraction to the Republican candidate's extremities. Rather, it's an indication that many Russians still remember the food aid provided by the United States during the late 1980s and early 1990s.

That assistance included massive shipments of frozen chicken legs. They were inexpensive and available almost everywhere. Many of those struggling though the last days of the Soviet Union and the first days of Russian democracy saw those chicken limbs almost as manna from heaven and appreciatively referred to them as "nozhki Busha" -- Bush's legs -- after then President George Bush.

Many here deluded themselves into thinking that "Bush's legs" were just the first installment on more substantial U.S. support for Russia's efforts to break away from its totalitarian past and join the community of democratic states.

But after a decade of failed attempts to comprehend the post-Soviet economic system, it's clear that the United States today suffers from "Russia fatigue." As a result, the Russian people's hopes for improved relations have faded, leaving them frustrated and disappointed, especially with the current administration in Washington.

Not that such frustration is anything to worry about. With the end of the Cold War, there's no reason to fear "mutually assured destruction" any longer -- just as there's no reason to any longer expect large scale, unfettered assistance from the United States.

Besides, just as in the United States, the general public in Russia is preoccupied with domestic issues and shows very little interest in foreign policy. That is why most know of and care little about the election of a new president in the United States.

Russian politicians seem to share this attitude, with two notable exceptions:

The first is the dispute between Texas Gov. George W. Bush and former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin over the alleged disappearance of billions in IMF loans. Bush's accusations have naturally turned Chernomyrdin, still an active politician and a member of State Duma, into a most active opponent of the Republican candidate.

The other instance was the recent call by a group in the State Duma who expressed their concern about the fate of democracy in the United States and suggested that the Duma should pass a law enabling Russian parliamentarians to send a non-partisan group of observers to monitor the elections.

All joking aside, it is clear that Russian political elites are taking a professional and pragmatic approach to the U.S. election.

The United States continues to be Russia's top foreign-policy priority, given its economic, technological and military predominance in the world. Leaders in Moscow listen attentively to the "Russian-policy" statements of the major candidates.

Right now, Russian foreign policy experts do not see much of a difference between Bush's or Vice President Al Gore's attitudes to Russia. Republican criticism of Clinton administration relations with Russia is viewed primarily as a tool in the presidential race.

If a Russian foreign-policy analyst were to offer the eventual winner advice for how to proceed with relations with Russia, they might suggest something similar to the Hippocratic oath taken by physicians: "First, do no harm." In other words, if the next administration does not know how to help -- or doesn't want to provide the type of help requested by the Kremlin -- then as least don't interfere with efforts by others to provide such assistance.

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#2
Center for Defense Information
The Weekly Defense Monitor
November 2, 2000

Who Will Keep The Peace In The Former Soviet Union?

Two regional security groups have emerged in the former Soviet Union. But when it comes to peacekeeping, both have a credibility problem.

By Tomas Valasek, Senior Analyst, tvalasek@cdi.org.

As Russia stepped up its efforts to deepen region cooperation through the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) framework, one group of former Soviet Republics is pulling itself away from Moscow. The defense ministers of eight CIS members met in Dushanbe, Tajikistan to sign a new Collective Security Treaty. Two countries -- Ukraine and Azerbaijan -- refused to sign on while another three -- Georgia, Moldova, and Uzbekistan -- ignored the meeting altogether. These five countries together set out to create their own security organization under the auspices of the four-year old GUUAM accord (named after the first letters of the countries' names).

GUUAM leaders have floated several ideas about future joint military activities. One involved setting up a joint peacekeeping battalion. There are plenty of regions on the member states' territories that would benefit from an impartial peacekeeping operation. Because the internal borders of the Soviet Union ignored ethnic lines, the breakup of the USSR sparked a half dozen wars by ethnic groups caught on the wrong side of the newly formed political borders. To this day, the populations of Abkhazia (officially part of Georgia), Transdniester (officially part of Moldova), and Nagorno Karabakh (officially part of Azerbaijan), live in a twilight zone of semi-independent self-rule unrecognized by the world community. The deployment of peacekeeping missions which would guarantee the safety of the populations and, more importantly, keep apart the heavily-armed ethnic communities, would be a logical part of a larger political settlement.

But GUUAM members are simply not in the position to provide truly neutral troops for a peacekeeping mission in the traditional sense because they fought on one side of the wars that led to the current state of affairs in the first place. Deploying Moldova's troops as peacekeepers in Transdniester, for example, would be akin to sending the Yugoslav army to keep peace in Kosovo. This is not a moral judgment on who's wrong or right but simply a matter of perception; the ethnic Russians in Transdniester fought a war for independence against Moldova's troops and simply will not accept these same troops back as peacekeepers. The same holds true for Azeri troops in Nagorno Karabakh and Georgian troops in Abkhazia. Without the acceptance by both parties to the conflict, peacekeepers become warriors. Under international law, Georgia has every right to deploy its troops to Abkhazia, which is a part of its territory -- as do the

Moldovans in Transdniester and Azeris in Karabakh -- but it would not be a peacekeeping operation (nor a very peaceful one).

Even if Moldova's troops were kept out and other GUUAM countries formed the mission, they would be too closely tied to the Moldova's government for the population of Transdniester to accept them as peacekeepers. This highlights the second problem in the post-Soviet world; although fought regionally, these conflicts are being used in a larger fight to determine who will have the most influence and dominate the area of the former Soviet Union. Just as GUUAM countries are trying to enlist Western support for their cause -- in this case, re-establishing control over their breakaway territories -- the separatist groups have recruited a willing Russia to their side. In fact, many social scientists argue that internal borders of the old Soviet Union defied ethnic lines precisely because Moscow was intent on creating ethnically diverse territories that would inherently weaken the regional SSR governments. Such a design also guaranteed that the minority population would call on Soviet support to protect their rights and their very existence. This past Soviet policy is paying handsome dividends to those in present-day Moscow who advocate an assertive policy in the Russian "near abroad." Russian troops have been deployed in Transdniester and Abkhazia, and Russian weapons helped the Armenian forces win the Nagorno Karabakh war. Moscow has made itself indispensable to the solution of the regional conflicts on GUUAM territory, although GUUAM members no doubt view Russia as a part of the problem rather than a solution.

For their part, the GUUAM countries have, to varying degrees, cast their lot with the West. Ukraine has generally pursued a policy of close cooperation with NATO and has signed a special partnership treaty with the alliance. Both Georgia and Azerbaijan aspire to NATO membership and have informally offered to host NATO facilities on their territory. This politicization of regional conflicts guarantees that no GUUAM country will be accepted as impartial by the Transdniestrans or the Abkhaz, who rely on Russian assistance. The pro- or anti-Russian sentiments have only deepened the gulf between the breakaway communities and the central governments under which they nominally fall. They also made it all but impossible for GUUAM countries to act effectively as peacekeepers in their own region. A joint GUUAM peacekeeping battalion could, however, deploy under NATO or other auspices in other crisis areas.

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#3
Christian Science Monitor
2 November 2000
On Kursk, a new caring Kremlin
As the recovery effort proceeds, Russians wonder if Moscow's solicitude is real change.
By Fred Weir
Special to The Christian Science Monitor

It is an operation unique in Russian military history: At great expense and amid the glare of TV cameras, the remains of sailors who perished in the Kursk disaster last August are being carefully retrieved from the frigid depths of the Barents Sea and returned to their families.

This is definitely not the norm in Russia.

Typically, the rulers of this land of soaring war memorials, with its calendar full of glorious military holidays, have left Russian dead where they lay, failed to inform anguished relatives, and discharged wounded soldiers to fend largely for themselves.

The wave of official solicitude and extra cash compensation for bereaved relatives may signal a fundamental change in the state's traditional indifference toward those who make the ultimate sacrifice for the motherland. At the very least, it sets a hopeful precedent.

"We see all this effort to do right by those who died and their families, and we hope it is not just a political ploy," says Valeria Pantukhina, spokesperson for the Mother's Rights Foundation, a grass-roots organization of bereaved parents of servicemen. "We think it is a great victory for the public, and the media, that the sailors of the Kursk are receiving proper attention. But we don't see it extending to those who fell in Chechnya, or other places."

The Kursk took 118 crew members to the bottom after a pair of unexplained explosions shattered Russia's most modern nuclear sub during war games on Aug. 12. Russian officials maintain there was a collision with another, possibly foreign, vessel, a theory dismissed by US and Norwegian experts who studied recordings of the disaster. There followed intense public criticism of the botched naval rescue mission, including the delay in accepting foreign assistance, and of President Vladimir Putin's decision to spend the first week of the crisis at a Black Sea vacation resort.

Perhaps moving to limit the political fallout, Mr. Putin later met with sailors' kin and pledged to retrieve the remains of all crew members.

Despite harsh weather conditions, Norwegian and Russian divers have recovered 12 bodies from the submarine's rear compartments and yesterday breached the outer hull in a second spot. Last week's discovery of a note on one of the victims, Lt.-Capt. Dmitri Kolesnikov, raised public outcry by disproving official claims that all of the crew had died immediately.

Four of the sailors were given lavish memorial services on Sunday, with high-ranking government and military officials in attendance. In addition, the Kremlin has decreed financial compensation of 720,000 rubles (about $26,000) to each bereaved family, plus a free apartment in the Russian city of their choice.

By contrast, the parents of a soldier who dies in the grinding, 14-month-old war in Chechnya receive just 6,000 rubles (about $215).

"The [Russian military] tradition is certainly different than what we are seeing in the Kursk episode: more money, assistance to families, respect, and official attention," says Pavel Felgenhauer, an independent military expert in Moscow. "The reasons for it are certainly political. The government and president are trying to counter criticism of their earlier behavior and have decided to buy their way out."

"When we first heard what was being given to the families of the Kursk officers, I found it a little hard to believe," says Tatiana Kruglova, whose son was killed in Chechnya earlier this year. "In no way am I saying it's wrong for those families to be treated like that. I just felt a little hurt."

Many families are never even told a loved one is serving in Chechnya until an official note arrives, informing of them of his death in action. "Sometimes boys come back in coffins, but often mothers have to travel to the military morgue in Rostov (near the war zone) to search for their own children," says Ms. Pantukhina. "There is almost no help from the military brass. One gets the impression the feelings of mothers are the last thing on their priority list."

Since the first Chechen war began in 1994, the Mothers Rights group has launched 350 "wrongful death" lawsuits against the Russian government on behalf of parents of soldiers killed there. Courts agreed to hear 19 of those cases.

"We lost them all," says Pantukhina. "Basically, the position of the state and its courts is that no one is responsible when boys die in an incompetent or unnecessary military operation."

The grim communications gap between state and citizenry on this issue is nothing new. There are still an estimated 3.4 million Soviet soldiers missing in action from World War II - known here as "The Great Patriotic War" - and there have been few efforts over the decades to ascertain their whereabouts or to assist their families.

"At the very least, our government could have renamed the category," says retired Army Maj. Gen. Vladimir Dudnik, an independent military expert. "Missing in action implies possible cowardice or desertion [in Russia]. The families of MIAs suffer in many ways from this taint, even to this day." Major General Dudnik says he tried to launch a campaign about 10 years ago to have World War II MIAs reclassified as people who died "defending the motherland in an unknown place," but found no interest in military or government circles.

The question many Russians are asking is: Will official sensitivity, generosity, and concern for those who make the supreme sacrifice extend beyond the already fading publicity around the Kursk disaster?

"All the signs are that the treatment given the Kursk crew and their families is seen by the Kremlin as a one-time concession to public opinion," adds Dudnik. "I would only agree things are beginning to change if we see this special treatment for the Kursk sailors and their families turn into new laws and military customs that affect all those who serve their country.

"As things stand, the obvious unfairness toward other bereaved families only makes our government look more capricious and arrogant than ever."

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#4
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
November 2, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
PUTIN TO DECIDE ON ARMY CUTS

Russia's President Vladimir Putin will chair a session of the Security Council in November to make the final decision on the scale and deadlines of army reductions, say informed sources in the military department. According to them, over 380 generals' posts are to be reduced in 2001-03 and the strength of the army and the navy is to be diminished by 365,000 servicemen over the same period. Of these, there will be 240,000 officers, including 30% senior officers (majors, lieutenant-colonels and colonels).

The sources also say that the defence department has signed several instructions, under which the basic reductions of over 250,000 troops are to be completed in 2001.

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#5
Moscow Times
November 2, 2000
POWER PLAY: Confessions of A Confirmed Political Junky
By Yevgenia Albats

With less than a week to go before the U.S. presidential election, I have become a political junky. The latest tracking polls and the candidates' various policy papers are scattered across my desk together with books such as Richard Neudstadt's "Presidential Power." Counting electoral-college votes is becoming an obsession.

I am also betting like crazy: I have already definitely put down more money on this horse race than I should have.

My obsession is especially ridiculous since the results won't affect my life much. Should Texas Governor George W. Bush win, his attitude toward arms control will be a boon to Russian hawks. If Vice President Al Gore wins, his rhetoric on human rights and the war in Chechnya will serve to spur on anti-Americanism here.

But even these possibilities are of little importance. As long as the price of oil remains high, the positive or negative views of the next American president toward Russia are of little importance to Kremlin politics. Thus, I am watching the race purely as a sort of intellectual exercise. And that is precisely why I am enjoying it so much.

The polls seem to show Bush with a slight lead although all the analysts agree the race is too close to call. Bush may well benefit from the people's weariness with Bill Clinton's administration, especially with the so-called "character issues" and the administration's foreign-policy failures (Russia and the Middle East in particular).

However, Gore stands to gain from the booming U.S. economy and the fear that a change of administration now may further destabilize an already shaky stock market. In fact, this widespread fear may be the deciding factor. After all, the 45 percent to 50 percent of eligible voters who actually cast ballots must be presumed to be rational people. They can calculate that the 5 percent tax cut that Bush is promising may well be overwhelmed by potential losses in their investments if the market gets too nervous watching new faces move into government.

If it turns out that the people vote for Bush nonetheless, it will mean that the U.S. middle class is not as rational as I think it is, and that it cast its vote on the basis of personality f as Russia usually does f rather than on the issues.

As a Russian liberal and an adherent of Ludwig von Mises f a German philosopher who was a passionate fighter against the bureaucratic state f I should probably support Bush, who is considered more " business friendly" and less bureaucratic than Gore. But as an intellectual, I naturally dislike any politicians who represent Big Oil. Somehow the process of extracting money directly from the ground makes them indifferent to human issues. They are the first in line to cut deals with any dictatorial regime without considering that they are enriching those whose power is based on human blood. This is, by the way, equally characteristic of Russian oilmen.

On the other hand, Gore f yes, here I am jumping to issues of personality and character f is no hero of mine either. While Clinton appears to be a living, breathing person, Gore resembles nothing more than an exhibit in a wax museum.

Since I don't like the personalities of either candidate (and, according to what I read, neither do most Americans), I can only predict that the voters will act in their own rational self-interest. Gore it is, then, by a nose.

Yevgenia Albats is an independent, Moscow-based journalist.

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#6
WPS Russia Media Monitoring Agency
www.wps.ru
WHEN WILL START-3 BE SIGNED?
27 October 2000

Moscow doesn't see any political or military reasons why Russia and America shouldn't reduce their nuclear arsenals to 1,500 warheads each.

Against the background of the flaring conflict in the Middle East, Moscow and Washington are demonstrating their devotion to the arms reduction process. Madeleine Albright's unprecedented visit to North Korea shows that the US is rethinking its relationship with that country, which it not long ago called an "outlaw nation." Pyongyang's rocket program once so concerned the US that the superpower announced its intentions to deploy an anti-ballistic missile defense system to defend itself. It is also known that even though the US has laid aside for the moment making a final decision about the deployment of a national missile defense (NMD) system (prohibited under the terms of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty), Washington has not ceased its efforts to convince Russia to agree to an amendment to the treaty which would allow NMD.

It is possible that precisely such efforts led to the mid-October meetings in Moscow between US and Russian representatives about START and the ABM Treaty. The Russian group was headed by Yury Kapralov, Director of the Foreign Ministry Department for Security and Disarmament Issues, the Americans by Assistant Secretary of State John Holum. According to sources in the Russian Foreign Ministry, the Russian side again insisted that preparations for START-3 are only possible "if the ABM Treaty of 1972 is preserved."

On the face of it, Moscow's position may seem contradictory. Russia insists on signing START-3 as soon as possible and holds that Russia and the US have "no political or military reasons not to agree to a 1,500 nuclear warhead maximum" as a part of that treaty. But given possible US deployment of the NMD system, a radical decrease in nuclear stockpiles is disadvantageous for Russia. But there is no other choice. Obviously, for economic reasons and to save on the huge costs for maintaining its ballistic missile forces, Moscow must reduce its strategic nuclear arsenals as much as possible. New strategic weapons are being produced, but only very slowly. The deployment of the new Topol-M, planned for 2000, is behind schedule. Rockets are getting too old and have to be scrapped. Thus, no matter how much Russia wants to still be a superpower, it just isn't working out. Sooner or later the level of nuclear warheads in Russian arsenals will fall to 1500-2000.

What exactly is Russia suggesting? According to official information from the Russian Defense Ministry, START-3 is to include provisions for limiting the anti-ship operations of atomic submarines and measures for control and elimination of offensive strategic weapons.

Elimination of all ocean-based cruise missiles has been proposed, as has prohibition of the design of any new types of offensive strategic weapons. Reduction of heavy bomber forces (both nuclear and conventional) to 50 planes has also been suggested.

Will the US accept these proposals? It is hard to give a simple answer to that question. Radical reduction of nuclear forces is disadvantageous for the US military-industrial complex. That alone may be the main reason why, despite Russia's ratification of START-2, negotiations for START-3 haven't gotten under way. Soon the US will pick a new president. Once this has happened perhaps the arms reduction process can be restarted. But in any case it can hardly be expected that the NMD program will be cancelled entirely. Even more: the US military-industrial complex is interested in widening the anti-ballistic missile program so that such systems would be deployed not only in the US, but worldwide. Take, for instance, the Japanese government, which intends to continue joint research with the US to create a regional ABM system for theater defense. The Japanese and American governments announce that such a regional defense system would be a "purely defensive system" and is the only way to defend Japan against ballistic missile attacks.

But Moscow and Beijing are of a different opinion. In a recent interview with ITAR-TASS Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losiukov remarked that Japanese participation in US plans to deploy a regional ABM system in North-East Asia is equivalent to American plans to deploy a NMD system, "fraught with the possibility of breakdown of all systems for limiting the growth of ballistic missile arsenals, destruction of all previous agreements and treaties, and thus destabilization of the whole system which was put together in the 70's." According to the diplomat, Russia's position on this matter is "practically identical with the position of China."

Thus, the world arms reduction process is in big trouble. Despite the mood set by Russia and the US, it is impossible to say that START-3 will be signed in the near future. The US would like to have many more warheads than Russia is proposing. Only time can tell what sort of compromise will be found. Meanwhile, if the US breaks the ABM Treaty of 1972, Russia may begin to produce intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads, may withdraw from the Treaty on Conventional Weapons, and so on. The military has already announced as much. This means a new arms race is not out of the question.

Reference

The treaty between the USSR and the US on limiting anti-ballistic missile systems (ABM) was signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972. It prohibits the creation of an anti-ballistic missile system covering the entire territory of the country, permitting deployment of a fixed ground-based anti-ballistic missile system in one strictly limited area. For Russia, as the successor to the USSR, this limited area is the Moscow Region, in the US it is the region where intercontinental ballistic missiles are based in Grand Forks, North Dakota. In each of these areas, the treaty permits an anti-ballistic missile system consisting of no more than 100 silos and 100 interceptor missiles.

The current (suspended) US plan for deploying a NMD system calls for development of a single "limited anti-missile defense system" to be deployed in a single region (as called for by the terms of the ABM Treaty). However, according to Russian military experts in fact the system being created has guidance and detection systems (including orbital systems) which make it possible "at any given moment to expand coverage to a national scale by simply increasing the number of interceptor missiles." In the words of Colonel-General Ivashov, Chief of the Defense Ministry's Department of International Military Cooperation, the system being developed would allow the US to protect an area within a radius of 3000 km., "that is, practically all 50 states." However, the ABM Treaty allows a system with a range of only up to 150 km.

Translated by Pavel Pushkin Observer of WPS News Agency

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#7
strana.ru
November 2, 2000
George Robertson: NATO and Russia have been cooperating well since Vladimir Putin's coming to power
By Stanislav Ponomarenko

NATO Secretary General George Robertson has said to journalists on the eve of his visit to Austria that the North Atlantic alliance and Russia have been cooperating well since Vladimir Putin's coming to power. In his opinion, much has changed in Brussels-Moscow relations and the changes are for the better. A year ago, he said, these relations were hard and strained. Today, however, NATO and Russia are engaged in talks on a number of difficult and even delicate issues and reach understanding. Over the past six months, he stressed, the level of intensive discussions with Russia has increased and this helps find consensus and mutually acceptable decisions.

As for NATO itself, Robertson said further, it is facing new challenges now. These are regional conflicts, the proliferation of mass destruction weapons, drug trafficking and international and organized crime. In his view, NATO's role in Europe and the world at large has changed - there is no need today to counter the Warsaw Pact. Currently, Robertson noted, NATO is playing the role of "manager" in settling and preventing conflicts.

With reference to the NATO membership issue, Robertson said the Organization's doors were open to all wishing to join it and meeting its standards. But NATO membership, he pointed out, is not a present, honor or privilege - this is an immense responsibility and a heavy burden. This is why countries such as Austria, Switzerland, Sweden and Finland should weigh all the pros and cons and decide themselves whether they should seek this membership. NATO exerts no pressure on them.

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#8
The Russia Journal
October 28-November 3, 2000
Editorial
Dead men talking

Who would have thought that the dead of the Kursk would have a chance to tell their story?

Even just a few words scribbled on paper by a sailor trapped in the darkness of a disabled submarine 100 meters below the surface is enough to reveal the sense of despair and horror those men experienced

And there is a whiff of divine justice in the fact that a message was somehow conveyed from beyond the depths of the icy Barents Sea to the Russian public - a message providing these men the chance to finally put a lie to the umpteen versions of events spun by senior Russian politicians and naval commanders.

We have lost count of how many versions have been given of the time of the accident; the cause of the explosions; the possibility of survivors; and messages from the hull, followed by their denials.

But then, just as the country had begun reconciling itself to the (false) notion that the sailors had at least died within moments due to the force of the explosion - the bitter truth, written on a note found on Lt. Capt. Dmitry Kolesnikov - was revealed.

In the immediate aftermath of the accident, naval commanders had spoken of SOS messages being tapped inside the hull. But, it seems, the spin doctors quickly understood the political damage caused to the government by the lingering image of trapped men desperately tapping for help on the hull.

Finally, First Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov began pushing the convenient myth that the messages were in fact not human but caused by the broken and twisted equipment in the submarine, reinforcing the comforting idea that the men died quickly.

It is too painful to imagine the last moments of those sailors. If they did indeed survive the initial explosion/collision, and were capable of moving from one chamber to other, it is now clear that the men suffocated to death as their commanders on the surface, hostages to their own arrogance and incompetence, refused foreign assistance point-blank.

These men could have been saved. And the nation must now ponder whether those who asked forgiveness in the aftermath of the tragedy in fact deserve it.

Against this, there has also been a glimmer of decency this week. On past behavior, it seems incredible that the naval commanders actually released the information about the note - and its damning contents - as quickly as they did. Indeed it seems almost inconceivable that this time there was no attempt to conceal evidence completely undermining the position of senior commanders and politicians.

This could point to a standing order from the top - from President Vladimir Putin himself - that there are to be no more lies or attempts at coverups on this affair.

Putin has repeatedly said he considers it important to tell the whole truth about this episode, and perhaps he wishes to be seen as something of a torchbearer of glasnost in a new Russia. Still, the president himself made inexcusable errors of judgment when responding to the Kursk tragedy, displaying a callousness in his reaction to the event when news first broke.

The death of the men on the Kursk was a legacy of a Soviet system rotten to the core - and of a mentality among Russian rulers that sees some warped prestige as far more important than the lives of their citizens and servicemen.

Perhaps the greatest tribute to these men would be if their tragic deaths finally forced a rejection of this Soviet legacy, and the adoption of a more decent, honest and accountable position toward the Russian public.

Separately, no expense should be spared in recovering the bodies of the men of the Kursk. They should be brought up from the ocean floor - as they must have dreamed of in their final horrific hours of life - and their families given a chance to give them a decent burial. They should not lie forever in those chambers of horror.

And let us spare a moment for the families of those who died - may God grant them the strength to bear the continuing shock of this disaster.

After all, more than anything else, this is a human tragedy. The unfolding drama has broader political implications - but it will also be another devastating blow to the already traumatized families.

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#9
Russian security chief: No change to Strategic Missile Troops' status
Interfax

Moscow, 2nd November: The Russian Strategic Missile Troops will remain a separate service in the armed forces until 2006, Russian Security Council Secretary Sergey Ivanov said in an interview to be published in the Friday [3rd November] edition of the "Vek" newspaper.

"A possible change of the troops' status will be considered only after 2006," Ivanov said.

However, Missile Space Defence Troops will become part of the Russian air forces within 12-18 months, he noted.

In commenting on rumours about setting up a new KGB-style superstructure, Ivanov said: "Undoubtedly, the complexity of tasks currently facing the Russian special services calls for high interaction and detailed coordination. The Committee [KGB] was a single system, while now we have a community of special services. There is no duplication, since each of them has clear tasks, they all report to the president, and their activity is coordinated by the Security Council. There is no need for a superstructure," he said.

To a question about the role of the Federal Agency of Government Communication and Information (FAPSI) in ensuring Russia's informational security, Ivanov said that FAPSI's role "will be increasing".

"The government is expected to approve a targeted programme to establish and develop a special information and telecommunication system in the interests of the state power bodies for 2001-2007, where FAPSI is defined as a government contractor," Ivanov said.

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#10
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
November 2, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
HOW SECURE IS EUROPE?
Six radical steps that Russia and the West should take
By Anatoly ADAMISHIN, ex-deputy foreign minister of Russia

Europe is more prosperous and free from external threats now than ever before in the 20th century. No wonder that so many people want to live here.

But the picture changes dramatically the further one goes away from the safest core of Europe, the European Union. The larger the distance from its borders, the less security. The security situation in the EU differs dramatically from the security situation in the OSCE countries, a considerable part of which are located far beyond the Urals, not to mention the open wounds of Kosovo or Chechnya, or the new seats of tension in Central Asia, provoked by the actions of Islamic extremists.

It is apparent that there is no common space or equal security in the common European, or European-Atlantic, home. The territory from Brest to Vancouver, as we used to say in the past, or from Alaska to the Chukchi Peninsula, as we say now, is criss-crossed with division lines, both old and, regrettably, new ones.

The states lying on this vast territory are still divided into categories. The watershed is no long ideological. The current criteria are economic welfare and political stability. But the new borders are no less painful than the old ones.

Some people might say that this is inevitable. That it has always been so and always will be. And that nations themselves are responsible for their place in the European and world hierarchy.

Indeed, this is so. However, I was directly involved in the historical changes of the late 1980s, when the Berlin Wall went down and the Cold War was breathing its last, and I still remember very well the popular sentiments of that period about the future of Europe and the world, the genuine reconciliation of Russia and the West, and the quick re-integration of Russia into the mainstream of the European civilisation.

Regrettably, confrontation stereotypes took the upper hand in the West. The idea of the common European home died in the cradle to be replaced with the enlargement of NATO. The Iron Curtain was replaced by what the European call "the Brussels Curtain," meaning Brussels as the capital of the European Union.

I am not crying over spilt milk. History cannot be turned back a year or 12 years. Missed opportunities will remain missed forever. But the question is: Can we, after that incredible flop, repeat the attempt in new conditions? Can we start moving towards a homogeneous Euro-Asian space? Homogeneous in political, economic, legal and humanitarian terms. And security for all, and not only the few chosen ones.

The advantages this movement promises are so large that we should at least give it a try.

Few people doubt that Russia is the key element in this attempt. Or rather, the Western attitude to it, as well as Russia's attitude to the West - and the East alike.

I believe that the situation is favourable for resolutely stepping up the movement towards mutual rapprochement. Russia has a new leader, who is young, strong and enjoys the largest popular support in the past few years. I think the Russian political elite is aware of the fact that the current problems of Russia can hardly, if at all, be resolved without close collaboration with the West.

And we expect the West to react adequately in this situation. We do not need half-measures or fine intentions - we have had enough of these. What we need is truly radical steps.

Here are some of them. First, we must finally get rid of the remnants of the Cold War. We must admit that we are living in a new world now, with new geopolitical outlines. But we are still playing, or rather still cannot stop playing, the games of the more than 40-year-long period of confrontation.

Second, we must launch radical nuclear disarmament. Both sides have voiced quite a few reasonable ideas on this score. But now we need the courage to implement them.

Third, Russia must be more closely involved in the processes that had been initiated by the West in the past few years, including the new role of NATO and the EU. This presupposes consultations with Russia on the essence of matters and due respect for its opinion.

If NATO determines possible candidates for admission - this must not be done sooner than in 2002 in any case - Russia's opinion must be honoured and its protest against the admission of ex-Soviet republics must be heeded.

If the EU drafts practical plans of enlargement, this should be done simultaneously with the liberalisation of trade and economic contacts with Russia. The reasoning is clear: Russia has specific agreements with some aspiring countries in the economic and financial sphere and their new status should not entail problems for Russia.

If the EU continues to develop its foreign policy and defence elements, Russia has the right to be informed of their practical contents. The integration in the sphere of security, proclaimed by the EU, should proceed in a manner that would not inspire suspicions in Russia, so that there would be no genuine threats to its national interests.

Fourth, both sides should elaborate on possibilities of Russia's admission to the economic and political organisations of the West. Many fine words had been said to this effect, but the time is ripe for signing practical agreements.

I think it is quite possible for Russia to participate in these processes, if not become a full-fledged member of the EU.

It may take 10, 15 and even 20 years to attain these goals. But we must choose the right direction now. We must set the guideline for determining many parameters of current developments.

Proceeding from this, I do not exclude the possibility that there will come a day when Russia will take part in, say, the political organisation of NATO. As far as I understand, the bloc is facing the task of transformation, too.

These goals appear virtually impossible now, as the mentality and the whole paradigm of the Cold War are working against them. But how long will we continue to prepare for past wars? How long will we refuse to see the realities of the world that has surged far ahead? I am convinced that there are no antagonistic contradictions between Russia and the West in this world that we cannot smooth over.

Fifth, we must cast a closer look at the situation in the Far East and try to find a mechanism of balancing the European and Asian security.

And sixth, the economic element of relations with the West is vital for Russia today. Regrettably, these relations still have a considerable measure of discrimination with regard to Russia, and barriers to its emergence on foreign markets, above all the markets of advanced technologies, such as services in space exploration. These relations should be based on the laws of competition, and not on such extra-economic measures as bans, boycotts, anti-dumping investigations and other "pleasantries," including the compilation of black lists of unsuitable corporations and unjustified slander campaigns in the press.

I did not invent the above six points. Their provisions are the subject of ongoing political discussions and are on the agenda of intergovernmental talks.

Isn't the time right for a breakthrough in the Russia-West direction? And isn't the EU the one who should initiate it? For we are not beginning from scratch. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Russia and the EU was signed three years ago, and the EU is truly the main partner of Russia in the trade, economic and financial spheres.

The margin of strength accumulated by the West in the economic and military spheres makes senseless all deliberations about risks, which bold steps towards Russia might entail.

On the other hand, benefits in case of success of this truly historical undertaking would be enormous and mutual.

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#11
Kasparov, the chess king who lost his crown

LONDON, Nov 2 (AFP) -
Prodigiously talented, Garry Kasparov, who lost his world crown Thursday to his former pupil Vladimir Kramnik, was the undisputed king of chess for 15 years.

His historic victory in 1985 against fellow Russian Anatoli Karpov sealed his reputation as a master-tactician and a player of killer instincts whom opponents both admired and feared.

Garry Kimovitch Weinstein was born in April 1963 in Baku, capital of Azerbaijan, then a republic of the former Soviet Union, the son of a Jewish father and an Armenian mother.

He began his chess apprenticeship at the age of six and his talent was quickly noticed and nurtured by his Soviet teachers.

After his father died in 1970, he was brought up by the family of his mother Clara Kasparova.

After notching up one victory after another in the Soviet Union, he won the 1980 world junior championship in Dortmund, West Germany, and became an international grandmaster.

In 1985, aged 22, he became the youngest world champion in the history of chess after beating his arch-rival Karpov in Moscow. The title was his own from then on.

His hallmarks were powerful ambition and fighting spirit, although in the London competition against his 25-year-old rival Kramnik, these seemed, for once, to have faded.

Dominant, eloquent, and a player of aggressive tactics, the "Beast of Baku" became one of the most admired grandmasters in the history of chess. One opponent likened playing him to being "bombarded with thought waves."

His determination to succeed on the chess board was mirrored in his meticulous preparations, including a fitness programme comprising football and lifting weights.

He was considered as the all-time number one and ranked ahead of even Bobby Fischer, the legendary American champion of the 1970s.

That status allowed him to rebel against the International Chess Federation (FIDE) and to get away with being responsible for the schism in chess since 1993, when he founded the Professional Chess Association (PCA). He became its world champion when he beat the Briton Nigel Short in London in 1993.

In October 1995, Kasparov retained his PCA world title, beating the Indian Viswanathan Anand in New York.

The PCA disappeared in 1996, and Kasparov went on to create the World Chess Council (WCC) in 1998.

A year later, Kasparov beat Karpov once again in Frankfurt, and, in December that year, beat a "world team" fielded by computer giant Microsoft on the internet.

His first significant setback came in 1997, when he lost a series of games in New York to the IBM supercomputer Deep Blue. In the final game he was overpowered in 17 moves, the fastest defeat of his career.

Passionately interested in the politics of his native country, Kasparov has successively voiced support for Mikhail Gorbachov, Boris Yeltsin and army chief Alexander Lebed, although in recent years his political engagement has been less evident.

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#12
Moscow Times
November 2, 2000
Congress Slams Aid Program Safeguards
By Yevgenia Borisova
Staff Writer

Two years after the United States agreed to help bail Russia out of a poor harvest with $1.1 billion worth of food aid, a U.S. Congress watchdog group is accusing the government of shoddily monitoring its distribution.

Less than one-fourth of the targeted regions received the amount of food aid allotted them, the General Accounting Office, Congress' investigative arm, said in a report released Tuesday.

And even though 95 percent of the wheat, corn, soybeans, rice, poultry and pork included in the aid package had arrived by June 2000, the Russian government had only collected $292 million (10.6 billion rubles) of the $309 million (11.2 billion rubles) due, the report said.

The General Account ing Office blamed the U.S. Foreign Agricultural Service for failing to systematically track payments and receive information regularly on the status of regional payments and delinquencies until May 2000.

The agricultural service was charged with monitoring the distribution and proceeds from the sales.

The Foreign Agriculture Service disputed the report Tuesday, saying that there was no evidence of fraud or the diversion of aid from its intended purpose.

The United States decided to provide 3.6 million metric tons of aid in 1998 after Russia gathered only about 65 percent of the 75 million tons of grains it needs annually. The crisis in August of that year emptied store shelves by crippling local food companies and cutting off imports.

The decision was made in November 1998, and the first shipments arrived in March 1999.

Under U.S. terms for the aid, 90 percent of it was to be sold and most of the proceeds f 18 billion rubles f was to be handed over to the Pension Fund.

The package sent to Russia was one of the largest food aid programs to a single nation in U.S. history, the General Accounting Office said in its report.

The General Accounting Office also said it had found that price-fixing schemes had been used to sell some of the aid. Investigators said they had found five such cases, and in four of them the aid was sold for below market prices.

Officials at the Chelyabinsk Food Corp., which distributed U.S. food aid in their region, have said that they had problems distributing aid because the prices fixed on meat sent to Chelyabinsk were too high.

"Prices on meat in our region were 21 rubles a kilo, and we were told to take it for 26 rubles per kilo and provide our own transportation," Chelyabinsk Food head Ivan Fyoklin said last year. "We said we don't want it, but it arrived and we did not know what to do with it. We offered it to different organizations and finally simply put in the refrigerator for more difficult times."

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#13
Russia aims to profit from spent nuclear fuel
Interfax

St. Petersburg, 31st October: Russia could reap at least 20bn dollars in the next ten years if it signs and fulfils contracts for importing spent nuclear fuel from abroad, First Deputy Atomic Energy Minister Valentin Ivanov has said.

For the purposes of concluding and implementing such contracts, amendments should be made to Article 50 of the Russian environmental protection laws, Ivanov said at the 3rd international conference on "Radioactive security: The transportation of radioactive materials" in St. Petersburg on Tuesday.

If the law is amended, spent nuclear fuel will be transported to the "wet" storage facility at the Zheleznogorsk mining chemical plant in Krasnoyarsk Territory, Ivanov said. In one to one and a half years, up to 9,000 tonnes of spent nuclear fuel could be accumulated at this facility. At the moment, the storage facilities are only capable of accommodating 6,000 tonnes.

The Atomic Energy Ministry intends to spend the first revenues from the taking of spent nuclear fuel on constructing "dry" storage facilities capable of accommodating 34,000 tonnes, Ivanov said, a project estimated as costing 2.4bn dollars.

Spent nuclear fuel is a raw material source for power engineering of the future, Ivanov said. "We are now accumulating raw materials that will be converted into fuel for future reactors after regeneration," he said.

It is estimated that 200,000 tonnes of spent nuclear fuel have accumulated around the world, including 14,000 tonnes of Russian fuel, he said. The market for such fuel is characterized by tough competition; however, marketing studies the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy have conducted in Europe give grounds for hoping for large contracts, Ivanov said.

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