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Issue #121 | September 29, 2000 | ||||
Edited by David Johnson The CDI Russia Weekly is a weekly e-mail newsletter that carries news and analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With funding from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education organization. To receive a free subscription, e-mail David Johnson at djohnson@cdi.org Contents CDI Russia Weekly-#121 29 September 2000 Edited by David Johnson Center for Defense Information 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW Washington DC 20036 phone: 202-332-0600; fax:202-462-4559 djohnson@cdi.org The CDI Russia Weekly is an e-mail newsletter that carries news and analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With funding from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education organization. CDI Russia Weekly web page (with archive): http://www.cdi.org/russia/ Visit CDI's web site: http://www.cdi.org Contents: 1. NOW AVAILABLE! CDI's Issue Brief "National Missile Defense: What Does It All Mean?" 2. Moscow Times: Simon Saradzhyanm, Lopsided Army Cuts Show Kremlin Fears. 3. Jamestown Foundation Monitor: MOSCOW STRUGGLES WITH DECISIONS OVER LOST SUBMARINE KURSK. 4. gazeta.ru: Nuclear Materials Controls To Be Tightened. 5. RFE/RL: Paul Goble, Fighting Corruption. 6. Washington Times: Amos Perlmutter, Policies steering Russia to corruption. 7. The Globe and Mail (Canada): Geoffrey York, Bolshoi dancers revolt over firing of leaders. 8. World Socialist Web Site: Vladimir Volkov, The battle for control of state television. Russian President Putin tries to break Berezovsky's grip. 9. BBC MONITORING: RUSSIAN BALKANS EXPERT ON POST-ELECTION SITUATION IN YUGOSLAVIA. ****** #1 From the Center for Defense Information Washington DC NOW AVAILABLE! CDI's Issue Brief "National Missile Defense: What Does It All Mean?" As the debate in the United States on the planned deployment of the national missile defense (NMD) system heats up, the Center for Defense Information (CDI) has released a timely Issue Brief, "National Missile Defense: What Does It All Mean?" on this important national security issue. The Issue Brief is designed to offer unbiased, in-depth, and up-to-date information on all aspects of the NMD debate to citizens, educators and decision-makers nationwide. Missile defense has gained additional prominence as one of the most divisive and defining issues in this year's presidential campaign. The 56 page document includes the following: "The Impact of National Missile Defense on Strategic Relations with Russia" By Dr. Bruce G. Blair, President of CDI and the author of "The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War." "Why Should You/We Care?" By Rear Admiral Eugene J. Carroll, Jr., USN (Ret.), Vice-President of CDI, and former Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations. "Technical Feasibility, Threat Justification, and Program History and Chronology" By Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.),CDI Chief of Research, and a former Defense Intelligence Agency official and a Military Attaché in London. "Current and Past Cost Estimates" By Christopher Hellman, CDI Senior Analyst, former Congressional aide. "NMD and Asia: Views from China, India, Pakistan, Japan, North and South Korea" By Dr. Nicholas Berry, CDI Senior Analyst, and the co-author of "IR: The New World of International Relations." "Europe and NMD: Views from the European Continent and the Role of Europe in NMD Architecture" By Tomas Valasek, CDI Senior Analyst, former journalist on European security issues. In addition to the print version, CDI is preparing a web site with further information on the National Missile Defense program. Each section in the print version will be updated on the web, on an as-needed basis, to keep the document current. Readers of the Issue Brief will further benefit from access to the latest CDI documentary on missile defense, "Star Wars: New Hope or Phantom Menace?" This thirty-minute film contains interviews and testimonies by the nation's foremost experts on missile defense. A transcript of the film is available on the Web. www.cdi.org TO ORDER... Please send a check for $5 to the Center for Defense Information, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Suite 615, Washington, DC 20036. Please write "Issue Brief" on the check. For more information, please e-mail Tomas Valasek at tvalasek@cdi.org ****** #2 Moscow Times September 29, 2000 Lopsided Army Cuts Show Kremlin Fears By Simon Saradzhyan Staff Writer The Kremlin's plan to drastically downsize the 1.2 million-strong army while keeping the number of troops with other defense agencies largely intact indictates that, like his predecessor, President Vladimir Putin is more concerned about maintaining control of the country than any external threats. The plan, which Putin's Security Council is set to endorse within the next two months, calls for the Defense Ministry's armed forces to be cut to 850,000 by 2004. Other agencies such as the Interior Ministry and Federal Border Service will fire a total of only 50,000 to 60,000 servicemen. "The planned reforms show the Kremlin is more concerned about its control of the regions, instability inside the country," said Alexander Vetsko, defense analyst at the Moscow Carnegie Center. Army personnel will be slashed from the present total of some 400,000 to a mere 220,000, according to the plan. The navy and air force are set to lose 50,000 and 40,000 servicemen, respectively, according to news reports. In comparison, the Interior Ministry will see its troops cut from about 200,000 to 180,000. The railway troops will lose 10,000 servicemen and the Federal Border Service will be downsized by 5,000 guards. The very possibility that the Interior Ministry's forces and the army will be roughly equal in size proves how ill-thoughtout the pending reforms are, said Konstantin Makiyenko, a defense analyst at the Center for the Analysis of Strategies and Technologies. Like his predecessor Boris Yeltsin, Putin continues to cherish the Interior Ministry, and its troops have proved to be "good only at tackling unarmed civilians," Makienko said. Charles Dick, head of the Conflict Studies Center at Britain's Sandhurst Military Academy, said that cuts in the army "would have made sense" if the interior troops were combat ready. But they are not. Observers agree that inner threats, such as separatism in the North Caucasus, are more imminent than the possibility of foreign aggression. But they note that the interior troops cannot cope even with lightly armed Chechen rebels. Units from the Defense Ministry have borne the brunt of fighting in Chechnya, while interior troops have mostly been used for mopping up afterward. That sentiment raises questions about whether cutting the armed forces alone is the best way to go about army reforms. Dick said it would have been more expedient to merge the interior troops and army into one force, but the Kremlin won't do that because it is afraid that such a force could be used by political opposition to topple the government. The Security Council met to discuss the military reforms Wednesday, but the president decided to postpone formal endorsement of the plan. He did reiterate, however, his determination to downsize the Defense Ministry and the other defense agencies that jointly consume about one-third of the federal budget. "We spend colossal resources on the military, and we allow the military budget to be wasted on peripheral issues that have nothing in common with either the army's combat readiness nor with its direct supplies," Putin told the council. Indeed, the Defense Ministry shells out about 80 percent of its budget just to maintain the size of its forces. Such a hefty price tag leaves only pennies to spend on new arms and combat training. Reforming the armed forces by merely slashing its size will not make the remaining units more combat ready. Although such cuts are a significant step forward, they will need to be followed by other reforms such as transitioning the forces from a drafted into a professional army and putting more money into training and weapons. ******* #3 Jamestown Foundation Monitor September 28, 2000 MOSCOW STRUGGLES WITH DECISIONS OVER LOST SUBMARINE KURSK. More than a month after the tragedy in the Barents Sea which left 118 Russian submariners dead, confusion continues to plague government efforts to reach decisions on whether and how to mount separate operations aimed at recovering bodies and raising the vessel itself. The government's indecision has been highlighted anew over the past several days, with the signing of a contract to mount the operation for recovering the bodies with one Norwegian firm being postponed only to be followed in short order by the approval of another contract--but this time apparently with an entirely different Norwegian company (AP, APN, September 27). The hasty change can only raise new questions about both the competency of the government commission overseeing the Kursk recovery efforts and the preparedness of the Russian-Norwegian diving team which will ultimately descend to the sunken submarine. The move to push ahead with recovering the bodies comes, moreover, amid increasing pressure in Russia to cancel the recovery mission altogether. Under such conditions there may yet be new twists and turns in the Kremlin's approach to dealing with the Kursk. There have been a fair number of twists and turns already. On September 22 the St. Petersburg-based Rubin maritime technological design bureau, which built the Kursk and is overseeing the recovery operations, was to have signed a contract to recover the bodies with Stolt Offshore. That is the Norwegian firm whose divers took part in the original rescue mission to the Kursk. But negotiations with Stolt faltered at the last minute, and there were reports that Moscow had again put the contract out for bid to other foreign firms. Then, on September 26, Russian agencies reported that the government commission investigating the Kursk disaster, which is chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov, had in fact reached a decision to authorize an agreement on the recovery of the bodies with a Norwegian firm. Suddenly, however, it was not clear either when the contract would be finalized or whether it would go to Stolt (The Norway Post, September 19; Itar-Tass, Russian Public TV, AP, September 22; Russian agencies, AFP, September 26). According to reports published last week, the sticking point between the Rubin plant and Stolt Offshore was the cost of the operation. According to one report, Moscow was offering US$5-7 million for the operation to recover the bodies, while Stolt was insisting on considerably more (possibly as much as US$20-25 million) (Reuters, September 24). Russian hesitations, however, seemed possibly to have been the result of factors other than a concern over pricing. Over the past two weeks there have been indications that political pressure on the Russian government to mount the body recovery operation is weakening. In the immediate aftermath of the Kursk tragedy, and amid the government's gross mishandling of the accident, families of the lost sailors pressed hard for a quick recovery of the bodies. That pressure led Putin to pledge that the government would launch a recovery mission. Putin backed that decision up on September 19, when he reportedly gave official approval for the mission to go forward UPI, September 19; Vremya MN, September 20). Even at that time, however, family members of the lost sailors were said to be looking anew at the considerable risks involved in the mission, and were coming around to accept the view that the sailors might be best left onboard the sunken Kursk. That view was corroborated more concretely yesterday, when it was reported that some eighty relatives of Kursk crewmen had addressed a letter to the Kremlin and top government officials. It urged the government not to mount the recovery mission this fall. Reports suggested that those favoring this view were growing increasingly concerned that a rescue effort mounted so late in the year could wind up being the cause of new fatalities at sea (AP, Reuters, September 20; Segodnya, September 21; Russian agencies, September 27). Similar concerns have also been expressed by several leading naval officers, including current Northern Fleet commander Vyacheslav Popov and former Black Sea Fleet commander Eduard Baltin. They and others have argued that, in tragedies of this sort, it is traditional and honorable for the navy to leave those lost buried at sea. They have also pointed out the sad but undeniable fact that it will be virtually impossible in any case to recover all of the bodies on the Kursk--Baltin suggested at most twenty to thirty might be recovered--and that the rescue operation would only bring more pain to the sailors' families and to Russian society. Those critical of the recovery mission have also pointed out that the operation involved--which would include cutting holes into the Kursk's hull in order to gain access to its interior--would likely weaken the vessel structurally and further complicate any future effort to raise the submarine as a whole. Klebanov himself, moreover, appeared earlier to state quite clearly his own disinclination to mount a recovery operation. He was quoted on September 13 as urging the Russian government to "consider the expediency of raising the bodies" (NTV, Russia TV, September 15; Segodnya, September 14). The failure after long negotiations to reach an agreement with Stolt on recovering the bodies led to a delay which some thought might in any event rule out the likelihood of mounting a recovery operation this year. It was pointed out, for example, that training for the Russian divers who are to conduct the operation with the Norwegian team was to have begun on September 16 and is now behind schedule. Underwater operations in the Barents Sea will only become more difficult and risky as the weeks pass, and it was unclear how deep into November the Norwegians might be willing to go before insisting on putting off the operation until next year (Segodnya, September 20). But those considerations seem no longer to be on the Russian government's mind. In an appearance before the Russian Federation Council yesterday, Klebanov assured lawmakers that retrieval work would begin before October 10 and would be completed by the end of the month. He appeared also to suggest that the Russian divers would be carrying out an even greater portion of the recovery operation than had earlier been indicated (AP, Russian agencies, September 27). In his appearance before the Federation Council, Klebanov had another surprise. He told lawmakers that the Rubin facility's plan for next year's effort to raise the Kursk submarine has now been rejected in favor of an alternative "Russian-Belgian" plan. The latter has the advantages, according to Klebanov, of being both technically simpler and cheaper. He provided no details (Russian agencies, September 27; Segodnya, September 28). Klebanov's assurances notwithstanding, it seems likely that next year will nevertheless only bring new and equally difficult decisions for the Russian government regarding the advisability and feasibility of raising the Kursk as a whole. Prior to Klebanov's announcement yesterday, reports had suggested that the operation would go forward sometime next summer and that the costs would be considerable--more than US$50 million, according to one estimate (UPI, September 19). In this debate, however, Klebanov is apparently strongly on the side of those who are urging that the Kursk be raised. The Russian minister has reportedly argued that this is the only way that Moscow can allay fears--expressed most forcefully by environmental groups--of a possible radiation leak from the severely damaged vessel. Some Russian authorities are thought also to want the opportunity to conduct a more thorough investigation into the reasons why the Kursk was lost (BBC, September 19). On the other hand, Russia's atomic energy minister, Yevgeny Adamov, has argued against trying to raise the vessel. He and some other Russian experts contend that the Kursk's reactors shut down automatically at the time of the accident, eliminating the threat to the environment. "From the point of view of the nuclear reactors, of nuclear safety, absolutely nothing justifies raising" the sub, Adamov said on September 12. He suggested that trying to raise the Kursk would only increase the chances of a radiation leak (AFP, September 12; UPI, September 13). Answers to some of the many questions unanswered by the government with regard to its plans for the Kursk may be provided this weekend, when the contract with the still-unnamed Norwegian company is scheduled to be signed (AP, September 27). Developments to date, however, generate little confidence in the Russian government's ability to make sound decisions or to pursue sensible policies in its efforts to deal with the consequences of the Kursk disaster. Under such conditions, those watching the Kremlin can only hope that its actions do not generate new tragedies in the Barents Sea, either through an over-hasty effort to recover the bodies of Kursk crewmen, or in conducting the technologically demanding job of trying to raise the vessel itself. ******* #4 gazeta.ru September 28, 2000 Nuclear Materials Controls To Be Tightened The Russian cabinet has admitted that state authorities have failed to exercise sufficient control over nuclear materials and as a consequence, there have been numerous attempts to steal nuclear materials. Prime Minister Kasyanov has promised to improve the situation and promised that consolidated control over the nuclear materials will be established by 2001. At Thursday’s cabinet meeting the Russian government ministers discussed the blueprint for a federal system of registration and control of fissionable materials. According Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, in the Soviet Union a strong and highly efficient system of consolidated control over nuclear materials existed and persons who had access to those materials were personally liable for the safe use of those materials. From 1945 till 1991 there were only two attempts to steal registered nuclear materials, whereas in 1991-1999, there were twenty-three such attempts. An official with the Atomic Ministry Vitaly Nassonov has informed Gazeta.Ru that at present there is no consolidated system of nuclear materials registration and therefore, it is very difficult to track the quantity, deployment and transportation of nuclear materials. Currently, control of nuclear materials is the responsibility of several government agencies and state-controlled organizations: Amongst others those are the Atomic Ministry, the Defense Ministry, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, State Atomic Inspectorate (Gosatomnadzor). At present, the agencies which deal with fissionable materials use two methods of regulation: bookkeeping and technical registration. The second methods provides for registering quantities at all stages of processing and storing. The enterprises that produce and store and distribute nuclear materials have to present quarterly reports on the amount stored and distribution etc. There are 61 enterprises in Russia that store nuclear materials. 14 of those are beyond the Atomic Ministry’s jurisdiction. According to the Ministry’s estimations, it is necessary to establish control over approximately 70 enterprises and organizations that belong to 13 federal executive power organs. The Russian government has since long attempted to create a consolidated system of control over nuclear materials. This goal was set in 1996. The government’s latest initiative stipulates that all data concerning nuclear materials will be accumulated in the federal nuclear control data center. In order to implement the new measures, special legal acts stipulating the liability of the persons granted access to nuclear materials need to be devised and passed. According to Kasyanov, the necessary paper work is being completed but the main obstacle is a poor state of finances. Two years ago the concept of the unified system of nuclear control was elaborated. The concept outlined the jurisdiction of the Atomic Ministry, State Atomic Inspectorate, Interior Ministry and other agencies, and of the State Academy of Science. However, resulting from dispute with the Atomic Inspectorate, the concept remained merely a concept. Besides, the governmental resolution dated July 10, 1998 did not stipulate for allotting any financing for the implementation of the concept from the state budget and therefore, control over nuclear materials was in fact financed by the enterprises concerned. Eventually, in January this year, the state allotted 70 million rubles for a period of 7 years. However, according to experts’ estimations, 30 times that amount is required for the measures to be effective. Nevertheless, in July 2000 the Atomic Ministry launched a pilot model of the Federal nuclear control data center into operation. At Thursday’s cabinet meeting, the ministers drew up instructions for agencies in charge of control over nuclear materials, first and foremost the Atomic Ministry, to speed up the solution of outstanding problems. The government also promised to raise additional funding for nuclear materials control program. Mikhail Kotov ****** #5 East: Analysis From Washington -- Fighting Corruption By Paul Goble Washington, 27 September 2000 (RFE/RL) -- Corruption in Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet states is "reaching new heights and posing new challenges" both to the countries of that region and to international institutions which seek to help them, according to a World Bank report issued in advance of that organization's annual meeting this week in Prague. The challenges to the countries of this region are obvious: If they do not move quickly and effectively to fight corruption, the 250-page report says, the costs to them will be "extremely high" in the form of lower economic growth, less foreign investment, and greater domestic cynicism about moves toward a free market. Even worse, the authors of the report say, corruption having become institutionalized in these states now hits new companies there far harder than it does state-owned enterprises or already privatized enterprises, a pattern that strikes at the most dynamic part of the economy and thus casts a shadow over the economic future of these states. The extent of the problem was signaled earlier this month when Transparency International released its annual Corruption Perceptions Index ranking 90 countries according to surveys of business people and the public in those states. Only two of the former communist countries -- Estonia and Slovenia -- were in the top third of the ranking as among the least corrupt -- and even they were 27th and 28th, respectively. Most former communist countries were in the middle third. But some of the largest -- including the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Yugoslavia -- were in the bottom third, among the most corrupt. Indeed, Russia ranked 81st out of 90, and Yugoslavia was 89th, exceeded in corruption only by Nigeria. The World Bank report says that even those countries which have launched anti-corruption campaigns often have failed to follow through. Or what has been still worse, it continues, they have conducted these campaigns for the political benefit of one part of the elite rather than for the goal of instituting "key structural reforms." But the challenges that corruption in these countries pose to international institutions may be equally great, the report entitled "The Quality of Growth" suggests. Over the last decade, the World Bank and many other Western institutions and governments have viewed privatization, liberalization, and macrostabilization as both a necessary and sufficient means to overcome the legacy of the communist past. The continuing growth of corruption, the authors of this report argue, indicates that these institutions, just like the countries in this region themselves, must devote more attention to the development of effective legal systems, greater political participation, and the social welfare infrastructure that largely collapsed along with the old communist regime. And at the same time, these Western countries have seen corruption from the post-communist countries spread into their own countries as those who have received such illegal gains seek to launder them through Western banks. The World Bank report appears to represent a potentially significant shift in the way the bank does business with this region. Some critics of the bank insist that its loans, made on the basis of the old paradigm of how to promote economic change, have only added to the problem. But bank officials, including the authors of this report, insist that they have already begun to factor in its conclusions as they make decisions about new loans. To the extent that this document does become a turning point at the World Bank, its basic argument would suggest that that international financial institution may now invest more in social and political infrastructure, helping to build better court systems and other programs as a means to promoting economic change. That would mark a major departure from the bank's past approach. Moreover, such recommendations could put it at odds with some of the preferences expressed by some of the governments who are its largest shareholders who likely will continue to press for money to go to strictly economic projects. But even if that happens, this report is likely to play an important role in sparking a new debate in the West over just what it will take to help the formerly communist countries of this region make the transition and thus contribute to a better understanding of both the possibilities these countries have and the difficulties they and the West continue to face. ****** #6 Washington Times September 27, 2000 Policies steering Russia to corruption By Amos Perlmutter Amos Perlmutter is a professor of political science and sociology at American University and editor of the Journal of Strategic Studies. Rep. Christopher Cox, California Republican and chairman of the House Policy Committee, and members of the Speaker's Advisory Group on Russia have just published a most devastating report on Russia's road to corruption, in which the Clinton-Gore administration is found guilty of failing the Russian people and exporting government instead of free enterprise to Russia. They strengthened the central government with inappropriate and misunderstood policies toward a post-Cold War Russia. Despite the fact it is a Republican partisan report, all of the indictment can be found in the American press and media over the past eight years, as the footnotes to the report demonstrate. The report also had the benefit of an advisory group that includes Democrats, Republicans, Russian and American diplomats, scholars and experts. It is impeccable scholarly and policy analysis of the Clinton-Gore foreign policy toward Russia. The major indictees are Vice President Al Gore, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, and then Deputy Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers. Under this troika, according to the report, "By focusing on strengthening the finances of the Russian government and on transforming state-owned monopolies into private monopolies, instead of building the fundamentals of a free enterprise system, the Clinton administration ensured that billions in Western economic assistance to Russia would amount to mere temporizing." The main culprit, of course, is President Clinton, who was unwilling to involve himself in foreign policy generally, and in critical issues of the U.S. policy toward Russia specifically. This administration forfeited a monumental historical opportunity to design an American post-Cold War policy that could usher Russia into the democratic Western world and into free enterprise. Compare this with Harry Truman, who succeeded in helping design a policy that moved Germany from its Nazi ignominiousness into a Western democratic society and restored Germany as a part of European and Western civilization. Mr. Clinton did not have the vision to do for Russia what Truman did for Germany. Truman did not leave the German-European Cold War policy to his vice president. Truman and his most senior advisers were responsible, as a commander-in-chief should be, for dealing with the most significant event after the utter defeat of Nazism. For 50 years we waged a Cold War to bring an end to the Soviet Union. When the end came, President Clinton had no historical or intellectual understanding of the significance of turning Russia away from central government and authoritarianism. He delegated his leadership responsibility in this area to the vice president, which meant it actually went to chief Russian adviser, Strobe Talbott. "The structure of the policy-making troika left the rest of the government either unwilling or unable to critically assess the direction of the Clinton administration policy." The Cox report lists other fundamental flaws of the Clinton administration Russian policy: A strong preference for strengthening Russia's central government; a close personal association with a few Russian officials who were among the main culprits of the corruption, especially with the corrupt former Prime Minister of Russia Viktor Chernomyrdin, who amassed more than $5 billion during the manipulation of privatization of energy after the collapse of the Soviet Union; a narrow focus on the Russian executive branch at the expense of the emerging democratic forces outside the Kremlin; "an arrogance toward Russia's nascent democratic constituencies that led to attempts at democratic ends through decidedly non-democratic means"; and, above all, in light of increasing corruption and mounting evidence of the failure of their policies, the troika was unwilling to recognize their monumental errors and continued to support a failing policy. Mr. Clinton effectively delegated the management of U.S.-Russian relations to Mr. Gore in April 1993 with the establishment of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, the function and structure of which "offered a perfect blueprint for the eventual failure of the entire Clinton administration policy toward Russia. By superseding normal policy-making and well-established intra- and intergovernmental channels of communication, the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission would come to impede the information flow to decision-makers in Washington . . . distracted Russian government officials from what should have been their main focus: constructing the essential elements of a free enterprise." The most critical indictment, next to the absence of the president, is the report's finding that the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission "contributed to a deliberately uninformed U.S. policy toward Russia." The report faults the administration for failure to establish basic legal elements of free enterprise that would have replaced communism and could have prevented the conditions that helped organized crime to flourish. "Privatization" of government entities in Russia should have taken place under an independent legal system, not connected with the Kremlin. Courts, business law, the enforcement of property rights, should have been part of a system independent of central authority. This would have brought an end to the oligarcical economy, and to the corrupt financial moguls that were part of the Yeltsin court, which was supported by the troika. According to the report, President Clinton compared Mr. Yeltsin to Abraham Lincoln. What an oxymoron. The administration encouraged disregard for the legislative branch of the Yeltsin administration, and thus played a part in undermining the growth of pluralistic, democratic government in Russia. In the area of weapons proliferation, the failure of the Clinton administration's economic strategy for Russia was found to have a profound effect on America's national security interests. The one industry in which Russia enjoyed a true comparative advantage in the global market, according to the report, "was its military hardware, weaponry, and related technology." This critical non-privatized industry became a source for corruption and for selling weapons to rogue states like Iran, Iraq, Korea and elsewhere. It could have generated hard currency and put hundreds of thousands of unemployed Russians back to work. Instead, it became involved in organized crime. The Cox committee's recommendations include: "A stable, secure, democratic and prosperous Russia is a vital American interest"; a legal foundation for a free enterprise economy. They recommend rethinking the economic strategies the Clinton administration adopted. An end must come to "unconditional subsidies to the Russian central government." And an end to concealing failures in U.S.-Russian relations, which have been "a hallmark of U.S.- Russia policy during the 1990s." Stop misleading the American people on U.S.-Russia policy. "President Clinton failed to make the reconstruction of Russia at the end of the Cold War his priority. . . . The president must lead." ****** #7 The Globe and Mail (Canada) September 28, 2000 Bolshoi dancers revolt over firing of leaders New management cancels performances, overhauls plans for ballet's fall season By GEOFFREY YORK MOSCOW -- Russia's top ballet dancers have erupted in open revolt against the Kremlin, accusing it of wrecking the world-famous Bolshoi Theatre by sacking its leaders and cancelling its latest productions. Dozens of the Bolshoi's leading dancers are supporting a protest against the radical shakeup at the 225-year-old ballet and opera theatre, already rocked by the firing of its top director last month. "I've danced at the Bolshoi for 20 years and it's painful for me to see them ruining everything that is dear to me," said Alexei Fadeyechev, the ballet's director and one of its most popular dancers in recent decades. "I could easily stay quiet and keep my job. But I'm ready to fight to save the name of the Bolshoi. We've had good performances lately, we just had a successful foreign tour, and now all of our efforts are being destroyed by someone's evil will." After a decade of turmoil and stagnation at the theatre, Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a decree last month sacking the Bolshoi's general director. The director, Vladimir Vasilyev, was replaced by a new management team that has cancelled ballet performances and overhauled plans for the theatre's fall and winter season. The result, according to the dancers, is a chaotic situation of broken contracts and jeopardized foreign tours. "I can only call it a disaster," Mr. Fadeyechev told a hastily called press conference this week. "The Bolshoi has always been called a state within a state, but now we have a state of emergency. The consequences are an empty repertoire, cancelled tours and the theatre's ruined reputation." Mr. Fadeyechev has appealed to Russia's top cabinet ministers and parliamentary leaders for support in the battle. He said the appeal was endorsed by the ballet's trade union and about 100 of its dancers at a special meeting last week. "It is against Russia's national interests to ruin the Bolshoi ballet, which is our national pride," he said in an interview. "What else do we have, what other achievements do we have in this country now? Rusty missiles? Self-exploding submarines?" Mr. Fadeyechev charged that the Kremlin tried to silence him by preventing him from holding his press conference at the Bolshoi or at a state-controlled news agency. Instead, he was forced to hold it at the offices of a weekly newspaper. Other dancers have confirmed that the ballet company is demoralized and unhappy with the shakeup. Yuliana Malkhassiants, a leading dancer and 17-year veteran of the Bolshoi, said the sudden changes at the theatre were "like a revolution that destroys everything, down to the ground." The Bolshoi's new deputy director, Alexander Voroshilo, denied that any tours will be cancelled. He said the cancelled performances were a result of the "musical taste" of the Bolshoi's new artistic director, Gennady Rozhdestvensky, a well-known orchestra conductor who was appointed to the new management team this month. To the astonishment of the dancers, Mr. Rozhdestvensky has now disappeared on a six-week foreign tour, although he stayed in Moscow long enough to cancel the Bolshoi's scheduled opening-night show and replace it with another opera. He said he had to leave the country to fulfill previous contractual agreements with orchestras in the West. "How long will we be managed by people who admit they don't understand what they are managing?" Mr. Fadeyechev said. ****** #8 World Socialist Web Site www.wsws.org The battle for control of state television Russian President Putin tries to break Berezovsky's grip By Vladimir Volkov 28 September 2000 In recent weeks, the battle for control of the most important Russian television channel ORT has intensified. The Kremlin is trying to strengthen its own control over this semi-state-owned broadcaster, since it adopted an extremely critical attitude to the government following the disaster on the nuclear-powered submarine Kursk. ORT is the only station that can be received in all 89 regions of Russia, and therefore has a high propaganda value. It is the direct successor of the former central Soviet television broadcaster, which was denationalised in the mid 1990s. Since then the station has been under the control of the oligarch Boris Berezovsky. Although the state owns 51 percent of the shares in the station and Berezovsky only has a relatively small proportion, he has succeeded in being able to act as spokesman for the entire remaining 49 percent of the shares, which to a large extent are in private hands. Up until the spring of this year, Berezovsky did not have any problems regarding his position in relation to ORT, since as an entrepreneur and a politician he was close to the Kremlin. ORT played the crucial role last autumn in provoking anti-Chechen hysteria, which guaranteed victory for the Kremlin bloc “Unity” in the parliamentary elections of December 1999 and cleared the way for Putin's victory in the presidential elections in March 2000. But since then the interests of the Putin government and Berezovsky's have developed in different directions. Berezovsky was publicly and sharply critical of the administrative reforms Putin implemented. These foresee the creation of seven large federal districts and mean the dissolution of the federation council, which represent the interests of the regional elite. Berezovsky was also against continuing the war in Chechnya and called for the conflict to be settled politically as soon as possible. This summer, Berezovsky undertook a number of demonstrative steps. First he tried to form a new parliamentary group in the Duma, but failed. Then he announced the creation of a new political organisation under the name “Civilisation”. Next he resigned as a deputy from the Duma. The series of disasters in August—the explosion in the centre of Moscow that claimed more than ten lives; the sinking of the Kursk and the fire on Moscow's landmark TV tower—highlighted the Russian government's incompetence and its indifference regarding the fate of the population, and supplied Putin's opponents with new arguments. In the second half of August, one of Berezovsky's most important “information cudgels”, the political programme of Sergei Dorienko on ORT, attacked Putin. In response, the Kremlin put pressure on ORT's executive board, which banned further transmissions of the programme. In addition, two members of the board were dismissed who were considered Berezovsky supporters and editorially responsible for the newscasts. It became obvious that the Kremlin was endeavouring to purge the management of the television station to defend its own interests. Berezovsky reacted by issuing an open letter to President Putin, saying that the logic of his methods were a return to totalitarian rule. At the end of the letter Berezovsky expressed the intention of entrusting control of his block of shares to a group of journalists and cultural representatives, and suggested that the state do the same with its shares. Berezovsky extended the original list of shareholders, which had contained only a few names, to over twenty and presented it during a press conference on September 7. The people on this list can be divided into three groups: To the first, (and probably the largest) belong people who are actively connected either with Berezovsky's media enterprises or are personally close to him. To the second belong representatives from the field of culture, opponents of any state interference into business affairs and the media (e.g. the writer Vassily Aksionov who lives in America). The third group comprises representatives of Berezovsky's competitors in the media business, particularly from the “Media Most” holding led by Vladimir Gusinsky. Berezovsky has taken great pains to make everything look as if he has set aside his own interests, and in view of the increasing danger of a state diktat, is exclusively concerned with the creative freedom of the television station. His proposal would be carried out legally in the following way: the chosen people should be combined in a legal entity that will take over the 49 percent belonging to Berezovsky. The transfer should be without cost and for a period of four years, during which time the ownership of the shares will be divided equally among the administrators. If the process is successful, then, once the four years have passed, 20 percent of the shares would become the private property of the administrators. It is not hard to see what Berezovsky really hopes to achieve. By dispersing the shares among a larger group, he hopes to retain his influence over each one individually and make it more difficult for the Kremlin to push through its own interests regarding the television channel. Most of his enterprises work on exactly the same basis. His management principle has long been known: why buy a whole enterprise, when one can have the management? The Kremlin received Berezovsky's initiative with calm, regarding it as a small tactical victory. Putin commented, one can “only” praise Berezovsky, and added that it was important the list of shareholders did not contain “influenced people”. The Kremlin will keep a whole series of administrative and financial levers regarding ORT. Additionally, Putin can count on the support of a majority in the Duma, which is clear from the letters of two large Duma factions—“Unity” and “OWR.” Also, the chairman of the largest parliamentary group, Gennady Zyuganov of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, supports the Kremlin and suggested placing ORT completely under state control. Putin has also received further support from ultra-nationalist forces such as the notorious newspaper Saftra (Tomorrow). In one of their editorials they accuse the media holdings of Berezovsky and Gusinsky of an anti-Russian conspiracy. In Putin, Saftra sees a Russian national hero and looks upon all Putin's opponents as representatives of the “fifth column”, who operate in the interest of the US and other Western powers. In fact, despite all this nationalist mythology, it is Putin who is supported by Western politicians and governments rather than his opponents. After the submarine disaster it looked as if Putin's international reputation had been seriously shaken. But the West does not see any alternative to Putin at the present moment. One the manifestations of the West's confidence in relation to the Russian side was the transmission of data about the submarine disaster by the American military. All the documents came into the hands of Sergei Ivanov, chairman of the Security Council and one of the closest people to Putin. Undoubtedly, it will now become even more difficult to find out the details of the course of events that led to the misfortune in the Barents Sea. After the announcement that he will give up his block of shares, Berezovsky is trying to present himself as someone who is concerned about the fate of democracy and freedom of opinion. “This step”, he explained, “is one of the first steps in the construction of a civil society.” The Kremlin apologists are trying, for their part, to present this conflict as a fight against the oligarchs and corruption. The events of the last years have exposed the arguments of both sides as grotesque and inexcusable lies. It does not need repeating here, what a crucial role Berezovsky and his media enterprises played in arguing for the strong state and the “dictatorship of the law”. All that has become an integral part of today's Kremlin policy. As far as Putin is concerned, he is and remains nothing other than a creature of the “Oligarchs”, who represent the interests of big capital. All sides are only concerned with bringing the country's most important mass media under their complete control. The rest is hypocrisy and fraud. ****** #9 BBC MONITORING RUSSIAN BALKANS EXPERT ON POST-ELECTION SITUATION IN YUGOSLAVIA Source: Russia TV, Moscow, in Russian 1630 gmt 27 Sep 00 Interviewed in Russia TV's "Details" programme on 27th September, Russian Balkans expert Vladimir Volkov said the situation in Yugoslavia after the elections is new and very alarming. Morally, the Milosevic regime is suffering defeat, but the constitution requires a second round to be held. However, Vojislav Kostunica is backed and funded by Western leaders and NATO's aggression against Yugoslavia in 1998 is now repeating itself. It is true however that Milosevic is on a losing streak and that logic suggests a change of political leaders. But the West should not foster any illusions about Kostunica being an obedient toy, given the existence of the Serb ethnic question. Following are excerpts of the interview. Subheadings have been inserted editorially. [Presenter Sergey Pashkov] The "Details" programme is on the air. Hullo! It looks as if the political map of Central Europe is changing again. It looks as if Milosevic is on the way out: eight per cent is a wide gap and perhaps, a second tour, an extra two weeks, would be needed by Slobodan Milosevic in order to come to agreement both with the opposition and perhaps with the West, to exchange his personal security and the security of his comrades-in-arms for a peaceful handover of power, perhaps, at worst. At best, Slobodan Milosevic can lay claim to a fairly high post inside Yugoslavia: he has a very large party and he has a very large faction in parliament. What will happen? What will happen in Europe? What implications does this hold for Russia? We will be talking about this today with Professor Vladimir Konstantinovich Volkov, director of the Institute of Slavistics and Balkan Studies, doctor of history... Situation is new and very alarming [Q] Let's get to the point straight away: the situation in the Balkans, the situation in Belgrade, is this at last the long-awaited stability and peace or is it the forerunner of a new civil war? [A] Unfortunately, it does not seem to me that this draws a final line. This is rather a new and a very alarming interim stage. We are now seeing a totally unique situation and, evidently, it is necessary to separate the situation, which has arisen in Yugoslavia itself, from the situation we are observing now in the international arena. Morally, the Milosevic regime is suffering defeat [Q] Let's first talk about the situation which has arisen in Yugoslavia itself. Do you agree with the thesis that the Milosevic regime is declining in importance: Milosevic, as a politician, has ceased his existence? [A] I agree with your remark that eight per cent is a very large gap and the recognition of this fact by the Central Electoral Commission is in itself already a very serious phenomenon. We can say that, morally speaking, the Milosevic regime is suffering defeat. But the sphere of moral assessments is one thing, another matter is that we are dealing with a specific constitutional situation. Under the Yugoslav constitution and in accordance with all electoral regulations, the winner is he who gets over 50 per cent of the vote... [Q] Is 50 per cent of the vote also needed in the second round? Or is an ordinary majority enough? [A] An ordinary majority is needed there. But inasmuch as there are [only] two candidates and there will not be any dissipation of votes, the winner will be perfectly evident. Kostunica backed and funded by Western leaders But here we have come up against a totally unique situation when literally the same evening when balloting had ended, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, whose leader and candidate is Vojislav Kostunica, declared itself the winner. That is not something which has occurred in any other state. Nowhere else have we come up against such a situation. [Q] But unique is that this position was backed there and then by Western leaders: both the prime minister of Great Britain and the president of the United States said that they are absolutely certain that such statements by the Serb opposition are well-founded. [A] There we move to the other aspect of these elections, namely the international situation in which they are taking place. Please pay attention to the following matters. Literally a week or even more prior to the elections, the mass media in the West, and not only they, but officials as well, started saying that they would not allow Milosevic, as they put it, "steal victory". That is to say, he was accused beforehand of a premeditated attempt to rig the elections. They were saying that under no circumstances would they allow him to walk off with this victory, they predicted Kostunica's victory. That is the first thing. Secondly, we know that officially - and that is also an absolutely new fact - large funds were handed over to the opposition, which this opposition is using to operate. I am not at all against this political struggle and it seems to me that both the Democratic Opposition of Serbia and Kostunica are very worthy leaders, but when such a - well - public struggle is unfolding around these elections, such a whipping up of passions from outside, this is blatant interference in Serbia's internal affairs. NATO's aggression in 1998 is repeating itself [Q] But as regards Serbia and the Balkans, this is not exactly new: There has been both the bombing of Belgrade, military pressure, real pressure on the Milosevic regime on the part of the NATO countries - this is already as it were an event of the most recent history: political pressure and military pressure. What does this mean for us? Does this mean that if Kostunica wins, that if the West is now investing financially, backing the victorious Serb opposition, Russia will have no place left in the Balkans? [A] You have touched on an entire set of problems. Let's try sorting them out a bit... Now we are seeing a repetition of this [1998] situation and I am getting the impression that NATO simply wants to take revenge for the thwarting of its preliminary scenario over a year ago. And we can now see that a very unconcealed and very powerful news-and-psychological, propaganda war is being waged against Yugoslavia. An economic war - sanctions - is being waged against it. But, at the same time we can also see and are observing that the ships of the 6th American Fleet in the Mediterranean have been put on combat alert, the troops stationed in Kosovo have been placed in a state of increased combat readiness, and in Croatia, Yugoslavia's neighbour, military manoeuvres are taking place, that is to say, evident sabre-rattling is in progress. How do you assess this situation? [Q] Well, one can interpret it two ways. On the one hand, one can say that this is pressure on Yugoslavia, on the other hand, one can say that this is pressure on the Milosevic regime. After all, objectively this entire situation is being supported by Kostunica: we have outlined this topic. Milosevic on a losing streak -logic suggests change of political leaders Let's talk about Russia now. I would like to know what will happen to our policy in the Balkans? [A] Russia has been placed in a very difficult position in this situation. First of all, I would like to stress that Russia has long-standing, friendly relations with Serbia and we regard Serbs and Serbia as a state which is very close to us, but this does not mean that Russia should support the Milosevic regime. Unfortunately, the situation has turned out in such a way now that Milosevic is losing one round after another, both in the international arena and in domestic politics. Naturally, the logic itself of the unfolding of events prompts the need for a change of political leaders. That is one issue. Kostunica will not be obedient toy in the hands of the West [Q] But will we be able to come to an agreement with the new political leader, will we be able to come to an agreement with the Democratic Opposition of Serbia or will they already be staunch and stable allies of the West? [A] That is difficult to say. It seems to me that if the West fosters great illusions about, say, Serbia's new leader - let's assume this will be Kostunica - being an absolutely obedient toy in the hands of the Western powers, that is an illusion. It is an illusion because, it seems to me, many analysts in the West do not realize, it would seem, a simple truth: as a result of the ethno-civilian conflicts in the former Yugoslavia a new and very dangerous question has arisen: the Serb ethnic question: Serbs, as a nation, have found themselves dismembered. The territory on which the Serb population has lived for centuries has found itself cut off: the Serb Krajina in Croatia, the territory of Bosnia-Hercegovina, the territory of Kosovo which was the heart of the medieval Serbian state. As a result of the collapse of the old Yugoslavia, the Serb people has found itself dismembered, divided and all the gains it received through two Balkans wars and two world wars have been cancelled. [Q] Moreover, I believe that the issue of the future of Montenegro also arises now . I believe that Montenegro's president, [Milo] Djukanovic, will raise the matter of Montenegro leaving the federal Yugoslavia and thus the existence of Yugoslavia as such can be can called into question. Albanian national question also rears its head There is also the Albanian question, the question of Macedonia's Albanians. That is to say, the apparently explosive situation there is not very reassuring. [A] Here we have touched one more problem which is interconnected with other questions existing in the Balkans. Apart from the Serb national question which has arisen as a result of the ethno-civilian conflicts in Yugoslavia, the Albanian national question also exists objectively. The Albanians, as a nation, have found themselves historically divided among various states... Therefore this question is very complicated. We cannot say that peace could come the Balkans even as a result of this question being resolved. Stability in Balkans is in the West's interests [Q] Thank you, Vladimir Konstantinovich. The question is whether the West will be able, whether the West will try - by investing substantial funds in Serbia, in Yugoslavia - avoiding new bloody conflicts. At any rate, it is evident, that it is in the interests, of Western leaders, including Bill Clinton, who has elections coming up and a chance for [Albert] Gore to win in the elections, to achieve some stability in the region. The question about what Russian diplomacy will do in the Balkans henceforth, remains open. You have listened to the "Details" programme. All the best! ***** |
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