CDI Russia Weekly-#115

18 August 2000

Edited by David Johnson

Center for Defense Information

1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW

Washington DC 20036

phone: 202-332-0600; fax:202-462-4559

djohnson@cdi.org

The CDI Russia Weekly is an e-mail newsletter that carries news and

analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political,

economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With funding

from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, CDI Russia Weekly is a

project of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI),

a nonprofit research and education organization.

  CDI Russia Weekly web page (with archive): http://www.cdi.org/russia/

  Visit CDI's web site: http://www.cdi.org

Contents:

  1. Moscow Times: Yevgenia Borisova, A Nation Asks: Has Enough Been Done?

  2. The Globe and Mail (Canada): John Lloyd, Torpedoing Russia's pride. In the Kursk tragedy, we see a drowning nation that the West can yet help rescue.

  3. BBC: Stephen Mulvey, What happened to the Kursk?

  4. AFP: "Chernobyl In Slow Motion" Seen In Barents Sea.

  5. AFP: Brain Drain and Bad Funding Plague Russian Science.

  6. RFE/RL: Paul Goble, Coming To Terms With The Past.

  7. Obshchaya Gazeta: Commentary by Mikhail Gorbachev: "Squeezing" the Press does the President no good.

  8. Stratfor.com: Russia Loses Its Ticket to Asia.

  9. Russian Life: Mikhail Ivanov, Burying Yeltsinism.

  10. Krasnaya Zvezda: MILITARY PLANNING STRATEGY A NATIONAL ISSUE. Opening Remarks by Russian President Vladimir Putin at Security Council Meeting.

  11. Moscow Times: Peter J. Lavelle, ESSAY: Hedgehogs and Foxes Continue Age-Old Battle.

*******

#1

Moscow Times

August 18, 2000

A Nation Asks: Has Enough Been Done?

By Yevgenia Borisova

Staff Writer

As the plight of the sunken Kursk submarine grows ever more hopeless with

each day, the navy and its supreme commander, President Vladimir Putin, are

fast becoming targets of public anger and disgust.

The navy's Soviet-style reluctance to provide information and initial refusal

to accept foreign offers of help have provoked harsh criticism that it is

more concerned about saving its honor than about saving sailors' lives.

The official explanations for what may have caused the nuclear submarine to

sink in the Barents Sea have frustrated even former navy commanders, who say

the most likely cause was an exploding torpedo.

The nuclear submarine sank Saturday morning, but the accident was not

reported until Monday, and even then the navy at first said it had happened

Sunday. And while the country was gripped with worry about the fate of the

118 sailors on board, it took Putin until Wednesday to make his first public

statements about the tragedy and order the navy to accept help from Britain

and Norway.

"Of course we should have applied for help immediately," said Alexander

Konovalov, president of the Institute of Strategic Assessments, in comments

televised Thursday on ORT. "When hours count, they thought for four days and

waited for the decision of the supreme commander, which is not the most

effective way to rescue the crew."

Putin and the navy took a beating Thursday from a wide range of newspapers.

Vremya MN's headline said "Submarine Sailors Are Being Killed by Admirals'

Ambitions," while Kommersant's headline asked "Whose Honor Is Sinking In the

Barents Sea."

The tabloid Komsomolskaya Pravda attacked Putin, who has been on vacation in

Sochi on the Black Sea: "Why on earth did he think it was possible to keep

silent for five days, when the entire country has spent those days consumed

with only one thought f will they be saved or won't they?"

Konovalov is among those accusing the navy of withholding information. "I

think the navy knows precisely what happened, but will not tell us."

Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev said Thursday that "more evidence is

accumulating in favor of the version that the reason for the tragedy is that

the submarine collided with some other object."

But Vice Admiral Yegor Tomko, a hero of the Soviet Union, said Thursday that

this was improbable.

"Where is that object then?" he said in a telephone interview. "To leave such

damage, the object must be at least as large as the submarine f and who has

seen it? I can't believe such an explanation."

He and other navy veterans think that the most likely cause of the accident

was an explosion in the torpedo compartment, but that this has not been

mentioned because it would be embarrassing for the military if the torpedoes

exploded because of negligence.

"Those two explosions that were heard might have been an explosion in the

batteries, which made a missile f which has a gunpowder engine f detonate and

explode," said Tomko, 65, who once commanded a division of nuclear

submarines, including one identical to the Kursk.

A similar scenario was voiced by the former commander of the navy division

that inspected and tested the Kursk before it was commissioned in early 1995.

"It is only a subjective opinion," Grigory Turchin said on NTV television.

"But I drew the conclusion that such damage could have been made only by the

explosion of a torpedo."

Tomko said because of the damage to the sub, only "about one third of the

crew could have survived in the best scenario: those who had been working in

the stern compartments of the submarine."

Both Tomko and Turchin said the front two compartments of the Kursk where the

torpedoes are located are likely to have been destroyed. Depending on the

force of the blast, the next compartments f where the controlrooms of the

submarine are located f may also be flooded, they said.

"If they are destroyed, that may mean that no top officers have been left at

the submarine," Tomko said.

He said he was outraged to hear that the submarine, when it left port for

naval exercises last week, was not allowed to take along emergency batteries

because they were scarce.

"I have to wonder what else they did not have," he asked rhetoricall. Tomko

blamed "the system" that has impoverished the fleet and the rest of the

military and now has failed to provide effective help to the trapped sailors.

"I still hope they are alive. Maybe they are not banging back signals because

they know they are to get help and they are saving energy," Tomko said. "But

no one can say how much longer they could survive because we don't know

exactly how many people are alive and how many compartments are not flooded."

Yevgeny Volk of the Heritage Foundation said the handling of the submarine

disaster will hurt Putin's image.

"While the tradition of Western leaders is to break their vacation and come

back if incidents like this happen, he did not do it and for many days did

not comment until the situation had become critical," Volk said.

"If the crew dies, their blood will be on the hands of the state, which

failed to finance the fleet adequately and organize a system for saving

them."

But Yury Korgunyuk of the INDEM think tank disagreed.

"We have hundreds of accidents on a large scale because of negligence and

nothing happens to those who should be responsible," he said. "I think Putin

still has a sufficient reserve of trust to survive this tragedy."

Listeners of Ekho Moskvy radio on Wednesday f 2,485 of the 3,270 polled f

said the handling of the Kursk will tarnish Putin's reputation.

*******

#2

The Globe and Mail (Canada)

August 17, 2000

Torpedoing Russia's pride

In the Kursk tragedy, we see a drowning nation

that the West can yet help rescue, says John Lloyd

John Lloyd

John Lloyd, a former Moscow bureau chief of the Financial Times, is based in

London.

The story of the 118 submariners aboard the stricken Kursk lying on the

seabed of a freezing ocean has been an unfolding horror. A handful of men has

been struggling to save them. Yesterday, Russia dropped its inhibition on

asking for international help, and rescuers from Britain and Norway set off

to join the Russian salvage crews. But the rest of us can only watch.

There is another tragedy, unfolding more slowly but as inexorably, that

Western public opinion and governments can help to lessen, even to avert. It

is the tragedy of a rotting superpower: of a state that inherited a giant's

strength but now seeks to maintain it with atrophied muscles and a starvation

diet. It is the dire possibility of a fearsome technology -- nuclear power

and nuclear weaponry -- that is no longer maintained, guarded and funded to a

level at which it can be safe, thus threatening a large part of the world

outside of Russia, as well as Russia itself.

The Northern Fleet was one of the two great Soviet naval achievements; the

Pacific Fleet was the other, with the smaller Baltic and Black Sea fleets

playing a lesser role. At the centre of the Northern and Pacific fleets, and

their main reason for existence, were and still (in theory) are the

nuclear-armed and -powered submarines, the SSBNs. Much of the rest of

Russia's navy was deployed to protect them: Although the Soviet navy was

enormously expanded, especially in the 1970s, it never had the capability to

mount an open-seas challenge to NATO.

Submarines with missiles, essentially hidden and mobile nuclear platforms,

were what the navy was all about: The possession of more or less equal

numbers of nuclear missiles to the Western powers was what made and kept the

Soviet Union a superpower, and gave it hegemony over large parts of the globe.

Russia's loss of status has been rapid, by the standards of past empires such

as the British, French and Turkish. Neither its military nor the habits of

mind of its older citizens could keep pace with it. The schemes of military

reform of the '90s were, at best, partially implemented: The high command was

generally too busy with self-enrichment to make executive decisions. The

military shrunk more by inertia than design. Conscripts did not join up and

were only lethargically pursued. And key installations were wholly or

partially abandoned. In 1994, in the Pacific Fleet, four cases of starvation

were recorded.

When I was in Moscow last year, I met a friend who had been translating for a

group of Western business people on a fishing holiday near the Kola

Peninsula, where the Northern Fleet's nuclear submarines are based. Losing

their way while driving back to their camp, the group came on a camp of

marines.

With a minimal show of military discipline, the fishermen were welcomed to

the camp, given vodka -- and asked bluntly for money to buy food. The officer

in command told them they received neither wages nor allowances. They tried

to find what paid jobs they could in the area, but they did not expect relief

soon. The camp, my friend recalled, was all but bare: Everything had been

sold for food. Yet this was part of the security of the Northern Fleet's

nuclear capacity.

Kola is now one of the most dangerous places on Earth. Near the Kursk's home

port of Zapadnaya Litsa -- a town closed to everyone except those who work

there -- more than 20,000 spent nuclear-fuel rods are stored in open

containers. In Murmansk, the gateway to the peninsula and the region's

largest port, a cargo ship, the Lepse, is moored with hundreds more fuel rods

from nuclear-powered icebreakers. The levels of radiation are many times

above the limit in Western nuclear installations.

The navy itself is in no better condition. The salary for officers is around

$100 a month -- when it is paid. There is little money for training. Indeed,

one of the reasons there were so many senior officers aboard the Kursk is

because it was on a rare training mission.

All of Russia's military, including the nuclear forces, must scrape by on

$5-billion (U.S.), the annual defence budget of a small Western nation. It is

less than 2 per cent of that spent by the United States.

This is unsustainable without more, and probably greater, disasters. Russia

cannot -- even if its fragile economic growth continues -- rise to the

challenge of securing the arsenal that the arms race bequeathed it. It is

suicide for it, and perhaps murder for much of Europe, to continue with the

cast of mind that refused to ask for help until, perhaps, it was too late.

In the '90s, an initiative by U.S. senators Sam Nunn and Paul Lugar cornered

hundreds of millions of dollars to begin to make safe and store the Soviet

arsenal. It was regarded with suspicion on both sides, and has now dwindled

to a trickle. Yet the danger it was meant to address grows greater.

President Vladimir Putin has begun the work that was ignored by Boris Yeltsin

-- to get further agreement to cut the military, to put a reduced nuclear

force under central command and redirect the meagre resources to forming a

military out of what is fast becoming a rabble. He is having to fight the

opposition of a military trained in Soviet times and corrupted in Russian

ones; and his own instincts are to build more powerful forces to retain what

influence Russia still has in the world.

Turning an imperial power into a normal state is one of the more delicate

leadership jobs, especially for a middle-ranking intelligence officer who is

the focus of every kind of conflicting expectation, and who has too few years

operating in high politics. But if Mr. Putin is to begin the task of saving

Russia and of diminishing a nuclear threat, it is what is now demanded of him.

In this, the West has to show itself willing to assist, in good faith. It has

to find the will and resources to reforge an engagement with Russia even more

intense -- and much better focused -- than that of the '90s. Last night,

there was still a slim hope that the Kursk could yet be saved. The rest of

Russia must be.

*******

#3

BBC

17 August, 2000

What happened to the Kursk?

By BBC News Online's Stephen Mulvey

The cause of the disaster that befell the Kursk K-141 submarine is a subject

as murky as the mixture of silt and water in which it now lies on the floor

of the Barents Sea.

As soon as the Russian navy admitted an accident had occurred, it put forward

two possible theories - either a collision or an explosion. But it has

settled on neither.

Pictures of the ruined vessel are reported to show massive damage from the

front to the conning tower, but are little help with diagnosis.

A Russian naval officer told the Interfax news agency they were compatible

with both the collision and the explosion theories.

Air tanks

A third theory, put forward by the Norwegian environmental pressure group

Bellona, is that the Kursk could have been involved in both a collision and

an explosion.

If the giant submarine had collided with another vessel, then that vessel

would also have been seriously damaged - but none has been found.

The collision theory therefore implies an impact against the sea bed.

This, according to Bellona, would have caused tanks of pressurised air inside

the submarine to explode, causing major damage to the superstructure.

The pressurised air tanks, and the submarine's ballast tanks, are situated

between its inner and outer hulls, which are three feet apart.

In their suppositions about an explosion, Russian officials have raised the

possibility of an explosion inside the torpedo compartment at the front of

the submarine - or an explosion outside the submarine, possibly caused by a

floating mine.

Buoyancy

But Bellona, which works closely with retired Russian naval officers, is

sceptical about the likelihood of an explosion in the torpedo compartment.

It points out that torpedoes used to explode, occasionally, inside torpedo

tubes - but in those days they were driven by combustible liquid fuel,

whereas now they are pushed out by pressure.

The Russian defence analyst, Pavel Felgenhauer, has also pointed out that the

hull of the Kursk, with 10 separate waterproof compartments, was designed to

remain floating even after a direct torpedo hit.

Bellona favours two theories:

Human error: The submarine was at a depth of 40 metres when a pilot shifted

the controls to manual, accidentally steering downwards. In a matter of

seconds the submarine hit the sea bed and pressurised air tanks exploded.

Spontaneous explosion: A tank containing pressurised air exploded

spontaneously, either because oil from the compressor leaked into it, or

because of a fracture in the wall.

It is unclear how any of these theories would tie in with the information

from US surveillance that there were two explosions, seconds apart, as the

Kursk hit trouble - the second louder than the first.

Casualties

Experts say the scale of the damage indicates that there are likely to have

been many casualties on board.

It is also thought that whatever happened to the Kursk it happened quickly -

so quickly that it could not even send out a distress call, or release an

emergency beacon.

Meanwhile, new doubts have arisen regarding the news disseminated by the

Russian navy on Tuesday that seamen inside the vessel had been communicating

with rescuers by tapping on the submarine wall.

Pavel Felgenhauer says the sounds detected were never more than a faint

knocking sound coming from somewhere inside the vessel.

And a US intelligence analysis, details of which were apparently leaked to

the US media, is said to indicate that no communication of any kind was heard

from inside the submarine at any time after the disaster struck.

*******

#4

"Chernobyl In Slow Motion" Seen In Barents Sea

MOSCOW, Aug 17, 2000 -- (Agence France Presse) Part of the Barents Sea, where

last-ditch rescue attempts are being made to save the crew of the Russian

submarine Kursk, is so full of nuclear waste that it risks becoming a

"Chernobyl in slow motion," according to the Norwegian environmental

protection group Bellona.

The Kursk, believed to have been damaged by an explosion Saturday, is one of

several dozen nuclear-powered submarines -- many of them now abandoned --

based on the Kola peninsula where the Russian Northern Fleet is headquartered.

According to the Bellona Foundation, more than 18 percent of the world's

total stock of nuclear reactors is located near fleet's main area of

operations and most of them are in a poor state of maintenance.

The Russian Northern Fleet operates 67 nuclear submarines with a total of 115

reactors between them, plus two nuclear-powered battle cruisers which each

have two reactors.

In addition it has 52 submarines with a total of 101 reactors which have been

retired from service but still contain their nuclear fuel, Bellona said.

There are a total of 240 nuclear reactors in the Kola peninsula/Severodvinsk

region on the White Sea, the greatest concentration of reactors in the world.

Of these, 236 are naval reactors on board submarines and ships, and four are

land-based reactors at the Kola nuclear power station.

In a report published in 1996, Bellona said the Northern Fleet -- founded in

1899 -- has a total of 270 nuclear reactors in service or in storage. Many of

these are located at or near Russia's seven naval bases on the Kola

peninsula, which borders the Barents Sea.

Waste from an additional 90 reactor cores are stored under what Bellona

describes as unsafe conditions at Zapadnaya Litsa. Eighteen reactor cores are

stored under similar conditions on storage ships and barges.

Overall, according to Bellona, more than 30,000 cubic meters of solid nuclear

waste and 7,000 cubic meters of liquid nuclear waste is stockpiled in the

region.

The report was co-written by a former Russian naval captain, Alexander

Nikitin, who was subsequently charged with espionage by the Russian military

authorities but acquitted.

Bellona warned that without international cooperation and financing to deal

with the nuclear danger in the region, a situation could arise that it

described as a "Chernobyl in slow motion" -- a reference to the 1986 nuclear

disaster in Ukraine.

The two nuclear reactors aboard the Kursk have been shut down and "made

safe," according to Russian naval authorities.

However a leading Russian ecologist said Wednesday that the reactors still

posed a threat.

Alexei Yablokov, former head of the advisory Security Council's environmental

commission, said the breakdown in the submarine's power supplies meant that

the reactors could not be cooled down, and that "there could be problems,

even an explosion."

*******

#5

Brain Drain and Bad Funding Plague Russian Science

MOSCOW, Aug 17, 2000 -- (Agence France Presse) Brain drain and insufficient

funding are major troubles for Russia's science, President Vladimir Putin

said on Wednesday, as cited by Interfax.

Lack of adequate funding is the most important problem facing Russian

scientists, Putin said during a meeting in Sochi with members of the Russian

Academy of Sciences, the news agency reported.

"For a long time, scarce funds were allocated on paper for scientific

development, and scientists did not receive them. Now it's changed, and

budget funds are fully given to scientific institutions, but that is not

enough," Putin said.

Brain drain is another major problem for Russia's impoverished science, due

to extremely low salaries, which are often below the survival level.

Over 30,000 Russian scientists work abroad, and large research centers which

were set up during the Soviet regime find that Russia's budding capitalists

have little interest in their work.

"During the Cold War, huge sums were allocated to military science, but today

innovative activity in Russia is very low, with only five percent of Russian

companies actively applying the newest scientific achievements," Putin said.

In developed countries, up to 87 percent of companies make use of the most

recent scientific developments, Putin added.

*****

#6

Russia: Analysis From Washington -- Coming To Terms With The Past

By Paul Goble

Washington, 16 August 2000 (RFE/RL) -- Vladimir Putin's meeting with former

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and the Russian Orthodox Church's

canonization of the last tsar are part of a new effort by Russians to

confront their country's often complicated historical record.

But reaction to each of these events highlights just how long and difficult

that process is likely to be.

President Putin received his Soviet-era predecessor for two hours last

Thursday. Gorbachev, long shunned by Putin's predecessor Boris Yeltsin,

returned the compliment by observing that he had seen "a change for the

better" since Putin became president. Moreover, he praised the current

occupant of the Kremlin for what Gorbachev said was Putin's "democratic"

approach to the media.

Then, on Monday, the Council of Archbishops of the Russian Orthodox Church

decided to canonize Nicholas II and his family who were murdered by the

Bolsheviks on July 17, 1918. The church body justified its action by saying

that "in the last Russian Orthodox monarch and his family, we see people who

sincerely tried to carry out the commandments of the Gospels in their lives."

Each of these developments is clearly the product of a careful political

calculation, one that balances the contribution such moves can give to their

authors with the risks that each of these steps so obviously poses.

By reaching out to Gorbachev, Putin has opened the way for a reconsideration

of the last years of Soviet power, a period that many in Russia look back to

with nostalgia but one whose major developments Yeltsin had either sharply

criticized or attempted to pass by in silence. At the same time, the current

Russian president's meeting with Gorbachev has angered those who dislike the

last Soviet leader or who fear a return to a Soviet-style past.

By canonizing the last Russian tsar, the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow

has extended a hand to the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, a group which

broke with the patriarchal church over the latter's loyalty to the regime

that had killed the Imperial Family. But as in the case with Putin's meeting

with Gorbachev, the canonization decision is likely to infuriate those who

were encouraged to view the last tsar as "Bloody Nicholas."

But behind these specific calculations is a more general shift in the way

Russia and her leaders have chosen to deal with the past. After the 1917

revolution, Soviet leaders initially attempted with remarkable success to

ignore or simply to denounce much of Russia's past only to see elements of

that past reemerge in various ways over the succeeding decades.

And again, after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian leaders in

general and Yeltsin in particular attempted to ignore or simply to denounce

the Soviet past and especially the Gorbachev period -- with the parallel

result that many of the elements of that period have continued to play a role

in post-Soviet Russia.

In both cases, this earlier unwillingness of many Russians to openly confront

the past and thus to assimilate it into part of the national narrative has

had the unintended effect of making the past more rather than less

influential. Consequently, this latest effort in Moscow to address the past

appears to give some promise that Russia may have begun to escape from this

particular historical syndrome.

But the historical experience of both Russia and other countries suggests

that such a shift in perspective is likely to be both long and painful.

First of all, such a shift in perspective on key historical events almost

certainly will be misread and opposed by people accustomed to denying the

past. Some will see it as a signal that Putin and the Church have launched a

concerted effort to turn back the clock, and others will conclude that both

are maligning the intervening periods.

Moreover, the obviousness of the current political calculations behind this

shift in perspective almost always has the effect of further politicizing the

past, thus making its interpretation and integration into national

consciousness more problematic rather than less difficult.

And finally, decisions like those made by Putin and by the Russian Orthodox

Church almost certainly will not be assimilated by everyone in Russia quickly

or even at all, thus opening the door to new divisions even as those who took

these decisions seek to overcome old ones.

But these two steps, as different as they are and appear to be, suggest that

Russia and Russians are now more prepared to examine their pasts with

equanimity, an approach that may have the unexpected effect of limiting the

impact of their pasts on their futures.

*******

#7

Gorbachev Urges Support of Free Press 

Obshchaya Gazeta

August 10, 2000

[translation for personal use only]

Commentary by Mikhail Gorbachev: "Squeezing" the Press does the

President no good

The situation facing the Russian mass-media has

been the center of attention for the whole of the last week. Reliable

information is mixed up with rumor. There is talk about the buying and

selling of the largest television stations, of the strengthening of state

influence on television and even of stations coming under the full

control of the government. As a consequence the conclusion is drawn,

shall we say, that in the very near future ther will be a complete end to

freedom of press in Russia.

Actually, at both the regional and federal level we have many details

about this kind of relationship between the authorities and the press

which make us feel uneasy. The primary and main fact is that the press

takes up very serious issues, provides very well argued commentary on

particular documents and signatures, but there is no reaction. There is a

guiding principle that the writer does his writing and the reader, his

reading. This is the very worst aspect of the matter: silence and being

ignored. The tradition which grew up and gained strength under Boris

Nikolayevich [Yeltsin] continues: you write and write. You are free to

write and we are free not to react to you.

Secondly, when the "Media-Most" story broke, it seemed to me that in all

certainty this did not affect NTV. Let them do their best work. However,

this was even more than an attempt to "run over" the press and constrain

journalists. This was an attempt to sow fear in society and thereby

shackle public opinion. Surely the strongest weapon in the president's

armory today is the carte-blanche which people have given him and which,

judging by today's polls, they confirm    - I mean their trust. This is

his largest resource, despite the fact that he has many [other] organised

resources; one is a resource stemming from the president's own position,

another is connected with power structures... But the latter can have no

effect unless he enjoys the people's trust. For just this reason the

president himself needs a free press above all! I can see how he is

trying slowly to break with the past and drag the country out of its

difficult situation. He has ambitions, he can use his chances and go down

in history for solving the country's thorniest problems without serving

the private interests of any clan in the process. But by treating the

mass media - the main instrument expressing popular opinion - in the way

the authorities are treating them today, a question hangs over

everybody's constitutional right to receive information, and this means

recent events can be viewed as an attempt to "run over" the constitution

itself. Therefore, I am definitely against all three national television

stations coming under state control. Well, perhaps it is more comfortable

having these stations "at your side", as it was in my day, but if we are

going to close the stations down today or hand them over to state control

this means we are going back to the past.

I suggest someone is giving the president the following advice: you have

to tighten up - they are on a loose rein. It is obvious that they really

are on a loose rein. You only need to remember the Duma campaign. But

surely the government, like society as a whole, has every right to

express its opinion on press activities, if not more so, since it has the

necessary means at its disposal for doing so through the Ministry of the

Press, for example. There are societal structures also which are bound to

examine ethical standards. Everyone has a right to criticise the media

independently. Surely the Press does not belong to some "infallible"

clan. However, there is a boundary which the authorities must not breach

on any account. It must not form the impression amongst members of the

public that the government is trying to intimidate journalists, take

control of the media or hinder the dissemination of the truth about

events among the public. If the opposite is the case, the question

unavoidably arises - where are we heading? Martial law? After all

restrictions on the freedom of information usually precede the

suppression of all democratic freedoms.

Today already the "Media-Most" dilemma has forced us to join together in

NTV's Public Council, although hitherto I deliberated for a year over

whether to head such a council.   However, if the worst dangers are

confirmed, if NTV falls under Gazprom's control, what public council can

there be then? We were formed for other aims. Very serious people joined

together - academics, politicians, writers - and all came out in favor of

forming a committee expressing support for freedom of the press. I

convened this committee but I cannot guarantee that it will wish to stay

together if the situation changes - even if asked.

*******

#8

Stratfor.com

August 16, 2000

Russia Loses Its Ticket to Asia

North Korean leader Kim Jong Il has retreated from his offer to suspend

Pyongyang’s missile program in exchange for booster rockets to launch

satellites. In a meeting with South Korean media executives on Aug. 12, Kim

said his original remarks were made in “a passing, laughable matter.” This

reversal is a diplomatic slap to Russian President Vladimir Putin, who

delivered the original offer to the outside world.

It is unclear whether this shift was the brainchild of the North Korean

leadership, or was pushed by China. But in either case, Russia has been

shut out of the Korean dialogue. This drastically decreases Moscow’s

influence in East Asia, a region that is undergoing a major political

realignment and increasing in importance.

China has historically acted as North Korea’s sponsor and has set the tone

for much of Pyongyang’s relations with the outside world. China is credited

with shaping the inter-Korean summit in June, having summoned Kim to

Beijing in the spring and again right before the summit was announced.

But Russia is looking east. Moscow is trying to establish a political

presence in Asia in hopes of economically developing Siberia and staving

off its colonization by Chinese nationals. So Putin inserted himself into a

relationship with Kim. Putin visited North Korea in July, the first such

trip by a Russian ­ or Soviet ­ head of state. Kim rewarded Putin’s efforts

by revealing the missiles-for-booster-rockets offer. This was a potential

breakthrough - and placed Putin squarely in the middle of Northeast Asian

diplomacy.

The missile offer brought Russia into North Korea’s camp, at the same time

encouraging the latent rivalry between Moscow and Beijing. By allowing

Russia to become involved, North Korea decreased its dependence upon China.

Russia benefited as well. Besides gaining an immediate spotlight on the

world stage, a North Korean missile deal would make it difficult for the

United States to set up a ballistic missile defense system in Asia.

But this political calculus is now moot, since Kim’s retreat from the

offer. However, the manner in which he did so ­ suggesting that Putin

misinterpreted an apparent joke ­ is especially insulting to Russia and

begs explanation. 

The answer could simply be that Beijing wants to retain its monopoly of

influence over Pyongyang and has tightened its grip. China, like Russia,

doesn’t want a U.S. Anti-Ballistic Missile system in Asia, but it may be

trying to slow the pace of North Korean integration into the global system.

China prefers methodical foreign policies that blossom over years or

decades, not weeks.

Though China may have compelled Kim’s reversal, the diplomatic traffic

between Beijing and Pyongyang has been relatively light since the offer was

made, and China has made no apparent threats. Chinese Foreign Minister Tang

Jiaxuan could have offered an ultimatum when he met with his North Korean

counterpart Paek Nam Sun in Bangkok late last month. But several weeks have

passed since that event. If this was the result of Chinese pressure, why

did North Korea wait?

The other alternative is that Pyongyang is taking a page from an old

playbook ­ purposely acting unpredictable in order to keep its rivals

off-guard. It did this at a much lower level in June by delaying the

inter-Korean summit for 24 hours, simply because it could. The two Koreas

are currently reuniting several families separated by the war; Kim’s

comment could be a reminder that his country has not completely accepted

South Korea’s plans.

Reversing position keeps China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the United

States off-guard, uncertain about Pyongyang’s next move. Relations with

Russia will be temporarily marred, but Pyongyang may be willing to pay that

price to preserve a measure of diplomatic independence.

The diplomatic damage to North Korea is relatively light, but the matter is

more serious for Russia. Northeast Asia is undergoing a major political

realignment, and Moscow just lost its ticket to the negotiations. Without

it, Russia will have a difficult time shaping the future of the Pacific Rim

­ and of its own eastern regions. 

*******

#9

Russian Life

Burying Yeltsinism

By Mikhail Ivanov

Mikhail Ivanov is Executive Editor of Russian Life

MOSCOW, Aug 16, 2000 -- (Russian Life) Last week Russian President Vladimir

Putin met with former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. While the

ostensible reason for the meeting was to discuss the new State Council (which

will replace the Federation Council), the meeting was, in fact, the symbolic

last nail in the coffin of Yeltsin's legacy.

Putin, a former KGB lieutenant-colonel, recently feted his first 100 days in

power, much of it spent "cleaning up" that very Yeltsin legacy. But then we

are used to this sort of thing under Russian/Soviet rulers. Tsar Alexander I

was the liberal monarch who dismantled the reactionary Prussian system

created by Paul I. Nicholas I, the "gendarme of Europe" turned tough on

Mother-Russia, cracking down on the liberalism of Alexander I. The

patriarchal Alexander III adhered to traditional Russian values and tightened

the screws after a period of relative relaxation under Alexander II, the

"Tsar-Liberator."

In this century, Joseph Stalin quickly dispensed with the Lenin's "liberal"

economic policies of NEP in favor of forced collectivization and rapid

industrialization. Khrushchev initiated a cultural and political Thaw and an

assault on Stalin's cult of personality. Leonid Brezhnev brought the Thaw to

an end and cracked down on Khrushchev-borne dissidents. Gorbachev, upon

coming to the Politburo, pledged allegiance to "dear Leonid Ilyich," but,

when he became GenSec, did his utmost to destroy the Brezhnevian system from

within. Boris Yeltsin then did all he could to bring down the father of

perestroika and even the Soviet Union.

Now Yeltsin's heir is dismantling--brick-by-brick--the shaky foundations of

Yeltsinism. In fact, there is hardly a move made by Yeltsin or under Yeltsin

which Putin hasn't called into question: the wild Russian capitalism, the

relationships between the oligarchs and the State, the criticism of the state

by the media, the negligence of the army, the socio-economic policies

vis-a-vis pensioners and public employees, to say nothing of Yeltsin's

foreign policy and his lax attitude toward Chechnya ...

Of course, Putin, ever the enlightened chekist, has been careful not to

criticize Yeltsin directly and even awarded him with the honorary lifetime

title "First President of Russia." Instead, Putin is using euphemisms such as

"we let things go out of control," or, more often, "the state allowed such

things to happen." But such formulas fool no one. We all know that the real

allusion is to the old master of the Kremlin, the Ded ("Grandpa"), the

nemesis of the man Putin met with for two hours last week in the Kremlin. In

fact, Putin had himself invited in Gorbachev, a man who Yeltsin made a point

of deleting from the list of guests to his 1996 inauguration ceremony.

Of course, ever the pragmatist, Putin didn't conceive of the meeting as just

a symbol auguring a final farewell to Yeltsinism. The young Russian president

saw some value in his older predecessor, who may throw his weight behind

Putin's constitutional reforms.

It is an ironic twist, this meeting. For it could well be argued that it was

Gorbachev who took the first step leading to Putin's rise. It was Gorbachev

and Eduard Shevardnadze who concocted the precipitous withdrawal from East

Germany. In his autobiography, Putin shared his bitter memories of how,

because of the precipitous withdrawal, Soviet intelligence officers were

locked in a Stasi building, facing a hostile crowd ready to storm the

residence. "Meanwhile, Moscow was silent," Putin recalled. It was a first

disillusionment that later led Putin to leave the KGB and start climbing

political ladders.

Now that the former spy holds the reigns of power, he can afford to be

indulgent with Gorbachev, who is hard-pressed to make even a semblance of a

comeback in Russian politics. After the meeting, the complimentary Gorbachev

observed " a change for the better in Russia and a growth in people's real

income" since Putin was named prime minister a year ago. "What the government

is doing now is right," Gorbachev was quoted as saying.

Gorbachev has been critical of Putin at times, especially on the imprisonment

of media mogul Vladimir Gusinsky. But now he is saying that the "president's

position concerning the press is very democratic." As to the idea of the

State Council, Gorbachev said it must be "a working, compact body."

But, of course, it should not be so compact that there is no place left for

Gorbachev himself. Even though Gorbachev recently reopened his foundation in

a new Moscow location, his level of influence on Russian politics is well,

merely symbolic, what with his few-hundredths percent polling in the recent

presidential election. So today an invitation to the Kremlin, is more than

welcome for the father of perestroika, whose foreign policy helped move Putin

from spying to politics.

It is a strange turn of events, indeed. The "knights of the cloak and dagger"

at the KGB have little love lost for Gorbachev, as a result of the

disintegration of the USSR. And, indeed, Putin the ex-spy may well share such

views. We cannot know. It may well be that this friendly hand tendered to

Gorbachev was Putin's way of saying "thank you" for helping push the present

president on to his path to power.

Who knows ... if Gorbachev had not decided to let the wall come crumbling

down, he might still be sitting in the Kremlin and Putin might be serving as

some colonel in Eastern Germany.

Ah, the vicissitudes of world history and politics....

*******

#10

Krasnaya Zvezda

August 16, 2000

[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]

MILITARY PLANNING STRATEGY A NATIONAL ISSUE

Opening Remarks by Russian President Vladimir Putin at

Security Council Meeting

    

     On August 11, Russia's Security Council met in session to

discuss a strategy for military planning in Russia until 2015.

Today we carry Russian President Vladimir Putin's opening

remarks at it.

    

     Good day, dear colleagues. Today we are holding a

scheduled meeting of the Security Council on a question which

has been long in the works. Namely, a military planning

strategy for Russia for a long period ahead, until 2015. This

is an issue of major importance not only for the military

establishment. It is an issue which concerns without

exaggeration the whole country, the fate of the state and of

every citizen. It is not an ad hoc question. It is a

nation-wide issue. It is nation-wide also because it calls for

tremendous resources. On its correct handling depends not only

the state's security, but also the wellbeing of its citizens. 

Already we are spending huge sums of money on defence and

security requirements. We need a clear and precise

understanding of the place and role of the Armed Forces, need a

clear and precise assessment of the threats facing Russia.

We need an appropriate and balanced military policy. We have

already lived in a period when mountains of weapons were piled

up without restraint. What that has ended in is well known to

all of us. It was also one of the reasons for the collapse of

the Soviet Union. Where are these mountains of arms today? Some

of them got into bandit hands and are turned against us. Some

we are having to scrap, spending enormous sums on it. Some have

found themselves in other states. Huge amounts are to be

brought back to the territory of Russia, but we still cannot do

this. Was it an efficient use of state funds? I think not.

     If one takes a look at today's situation, one must

acknowledge that the breakdown of expenses not only in the

Armed Forces, but also in all power structures is hardly

optimum. We cannot describe it as optimum today when despite

considerable resources being committed by the state to the

country's armed and power-related component, many of our units

conduct no drills, no combat training. If pilots do not fly, if

sailors almost never put to sea, is everything all right in

terms of the structure of the Armed Forces?

     This structure must correspond exactly to those threats

which Russia faces and will be facing in a near historical

perspective. Our Armed Forces, and all our power-related

component, is it effective? Unfortunately, no. And while today

Russia is in a position to rebuff the threats it encounters, we

must state that to a considerable extent this is done thanks to

the loyalty and courage of men in uniform. But endlessly

exploiting the human factor is impossible. So the paramount

task facing us now is to define a strategy for the development

of the country's Armed Forces until 2015, bearing in mind, on

the one hand, the state's requirements and, on the other, its

possibilities. We should proceed from the assumption that all

our moves should be absolutely balanced, checked out and

economically substantiated. Without an economic substantiation

all our plans would not be worth a brass farthing, because it

is clear that they will not be implemented as were not

implemented military reform plans in the past ten years.

     The past few months have seen a very considerable amount

of work done to prepare today's Security Council session. It

was done by the government's economic bloc, by the Defence

Ministry, by Security Council staff. An elaborate,

multi-aspected and scrupulous assessment has been made of the

state of the Armed Forces and their future prospects. Not all

has been ultimately agreed yet. I will tell you more: I have

been rather tolerant of the polemics running in the military

establishment and in society in general (as for society, it is

natural and right). But today we must draw a line under it,

adopt a weighed decision and map out a plan for its

realisation.

    

******

#11

Moscow Times

August 16, 2000

ESSAY: Hedgehogs and Foxes Continue Age-Old Battle

By Peter J. Lavelle

Peter J. Lavelle is head of research at IFC Metropol. This essay was first

published with the SKATE Information Agency.

As in Isaiah Berlin's masterful depiction of Tolstoy's view of history, the

nation's ruling elite can be divided into two groups: hedgehogs and foxes.

They represent two forces at loggerheads, both desiring to determine the fate

and meaning of the nation's most recent revolution. Under President Vladimir

Putin, one group will attain (or retain) hegemony, though not without a

drawn-out fight from both sides.

I will define the hedgehog and fox in the Russian context. Hedgehogs are

fascinated by the infinite variety of things, seeing opportunities everywhere

and taking advantage of them. Put differently: so much to steal, so little

time. For them, the political system is irrelevant. Foxes are those who

relate everything to a central, all-embracing system. This is a special breed

of Russian revolutionaries born in times of distress. They can accept defeat

in a minor skirmish and, without too many qualms, sacrifice one of their own

or some ideal (for a time), having ultimate victory as their goal.

The first decade of this revolution was ruled by a group of hegemonic

hedgehogs. This hegemony is now being challenged. Putin's "state of the union

address" and offensive against "crony capitalism" stand as a primer of things

to come.

What does this mean for Russia and Putin's revolution? Aren't there only

sharks and snakes ruling the country, with everyone else forgotten and

despised? Actually, what the country is experiencing today is the rallying of

foxes, initiating battle with hedgehogs of the Boris Yeltsin era.

To me, Putin may resemble a frog, but in reality he is a fox. He is a fox

intimidated by the hedgehogs because of his age and his good fortune at being

sponsored initially by some hedgehogs. This is changing, however, ever so

slowly; many an "oligarch" would no doubt agree. Russia's zoophagous world is

redefining itself; it is as fascinating and entertaining as it is dangerous.

The "Soviet pre-capitalist man" is undergoing a metamorphosis. The old

(communist) regime implicitly taught self-interest under the cloak of

collective social justice. Yeltsin and his hedgehogs did everything in their

power to confuse, reinterpret and bastardize this political grammar, leaving

only chaos in their wake f and an intensely divided society and paralyzed

state. Now they stand to reap the whirlwind.

Is the conflict among the nation's elites strictly politics versus monied

interests? No. Life is rarely so simple; theories, never so airtight. But

within the political establishment, many levers of state power remain in the

hands of the hedgehogs due to their position in the economy. Putin aims to

dislodge them f and judging from his "honeymoon" as president, his success

rate is dubious at best.

This is one of the biggest problems when understanding politics and business:

The division is rarely clear, and the scandalous appointment of Viktov

Kalyuzhny as deputy foreign minister comes to mind. The Communist Party's

leadership and Vladimir Zhirinovsky's mandarins are quintessential hedgehogs,

selling themselves to the highest bidder for their so-called national ideals.

Hedgehogs are the most frightening nationalists, the most harmful and

reckless "rent-seekers." The security forces appear to be a mixture of both

groups: one assemblage "fat and happy" after a decade of fleecing the state,

the other fearful as to how politicized some in their clan really have

become. The latter group's members look to Putin as their new messiah. If

Putin wishes to be their messiah, he will fail. If he desires to be a leader,

he just might succeed.

The nation's nascent civil society is suspicious of both hedgehogs and foxes,

doubting the motives of all those in power. Civic skepticism is always

healthy. It is no wonder the scandal sheet Speed f a quintessential example

of authority avoidance f is so popular. But hedgehogs are indifferent to

civil society; foxes will prey upon it. Hedgehogs equate what is good for

themselves as good for everyone. Foxes can be very base, and their seductive

forces are becoming all too apparent. Being base means playing on the

weaknesses of the spirit and not the strengths of the mind. (I am still

confounded by the fact that a semi-authoritarian state can't determine who is

really responsible for last fall's Moscow bombings. It would appear the

"dictatorship of Kukly" predates the election of the president.)

Foxes, like hedgehogs, can be seduced by their own power. Hubris and fear are

the greatest threats to Russia today. Thus, the ultimate question is: What is

the primary goal of the fox contingent f Russia or its own survival? I still

believe Russia (so far as the foxes understand it) ranks higher than personal

aggrandizement. I do not see a return to the past, though I do see the state

continuing to flex its muscles. The revolution continues.

As the foxes mount their campaign, some of the hedgehogs will falter, hoping

for redemption in spite of their creed and past. Among others, Vladimir

Gusinky, Vladimir Potanin and Boris Berezovsky, as well as the "Family," may

ultimately be spared complete destruction f not due to benevolence, but

because they will be able to be recruited to serve the "new cause." The new

unspoken slogan is this: "You have more riches than you could possibly spend;

keep and enjoy them someplace else or in silence. We'll take over from here."

That's not an unfair proposition for those who have never had the national

interest at stake.

Ladies and gentlemen, the "congress of victors" is in session, so be prepared

for what follows. Immunity or not, judgment is coming. Let's hope the "rule

of law" will become something meaningful in this country with the fall of the

"oligarchs" f the lack of such a principle allowed them to accumulate

enormous riches at the expense of everyone else. But let's also hope taking

down the "oligarchs" does not make a mockery of the "rule of law."

It is incorrect to assume Putinism will be a zero-sum game, extremely

unlikely in the post-communist setting. Yeltsin may be out, but his

minimalist achievements are not. A fox understands this well. How will Putin

serve the national interest? He has the rhetoric down pat considering the

circumstances; his actions to date appear a bit hazy, but on track

nonetheless.

Having said this, I will buck the conventional wisdom. I believe Putin is

here for the long haul. The battle between the foxes and hedgehogs has only

begun; the battlefield is only now coming into focus, giving civil society a

further respite to develop. I am not speaking about weeks or a number of

months, but another decade.

My view of Russia is about what it might be some day, not what it should be

now. This is the mistake the West has made for a decade, perhaps for the last

half century. I attempt to understand this nation in a systemic fashion, as

opposed to what used to be known as Sovietology, or "who has Kremlin parking

privileges?" I actually think more about civil society; the elite should be

nothing more than the stuff of headlines on the 11:00 p.m. news and of

irreverent late-night talk shows intended for popular disparagement of public

figures.

Tolstoy probably would not approve of Russia's most recent version of "War

and Peace" according to Berlin's foxes and hedgehogs f but at least he would

understand it.

*******