CDI Russia Weekly-#113

4 August 2000

Edited by David Johnson

Center for Defense Information

1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW

Washington DC 20036

phone: 202-332-0600; fax:202-462-4559

djohnson@cdi.org

The CDI Russia Weekly is an e-mail newsletter that carries news and

analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political,

economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With funding

from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, CDI Russia Weekly is a

project of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI),

a nonprofit research and education organization.

  CDI Russia Weekly web page (with archive): http://www.cdi.org/russia/

  Visit CDI's web site: http://www.cdi.org

Contents:

  1. Christian Science Monitor: Fred Weir, Putin tries big shift in military strategy.                  Russian president this week toppled Army old guard.

Defense minister may be next to go.

  2. Moscow Times: Pavel Felgenhauer, DEFENSE DOSSIER: Feds Can't Get Act Together. (Chechnya)

  3. The Irish Times: Seamus Martin, SENIOR PRO-MOSCOW CHECHEN OFFICIAL KILLED AS ANNIVERSARIES POSE NEW THREAT.

  4. Moscow Times: Andrei Zolotov Jr., Hope Waning for Meeting Between Pope and Patriarch.

  5. Russian AVN Military News Agency: MILITARY REFORM POLICY INCONSISTENT, FORMER ARMS SALES ADVISER SAYS.

  6. BBC MONITORING: KREMLIN URGED TO "HAVE A GO" AT BROKERING PEACE IN MIDDLE EAST.

  7. Xinhua: Researchers Say Russian Permafrost Could Melt in 23rd Century.

  8. Krasnaya Zvezda: STRONG AND WEAK POINTS OF THE OSCE. (Interview

with Deputy Foreign Minister Yevgeny GUSAROV)

  9. RFE/RL: Sophie Lambroschini, Central Asia: Russia Sanctioning Anti-Islamic Crackdown.

  10. Jamestown Foundation Monitor: RUSSIAN AUTHORITIES MOVE YET AGAIN TO REOPEN CASE AGAINST ALEKSANDR NIKITIN.

  11. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Marianna Belenkaya, WEST DISLIKES INTENSIFICATION OF RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY.

*******

#1

Christian Science Monitor

August 2, 2000

Putin tries big shift in military strategy

Russian president this week toppled Army old guard. Defense minister may be

next to go.

Fred Weir (fweir@online.ru)

Special to The Christian Science Monitor

MOSCOW

Russian President Vladimir Putin has taken his first whack at reforming his

nation's formidable military establishment.

On July 31, Mr. Putin either fired or forced the retirements of 10 top

Russian military officers. Analysts say many of those Putin targeted were

allies of Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev, who may be the next to go because

of his unusually public battle against a plan to slash - by as much as 80

percent - Russia's strategic rocket forces, backbone of the former Soviet

nuclear deterrent.

The purge, analysts say, suggests that Putin is tilting toward a radical plan

by Chief of Staff Anatoly Kvashnin to sacrifice the former Soviet Union's

nuclear superpower status and refocus resources on building a leaner, more

conventional military machine.

It has been apparent for about a decade that Russia cannot afford to Russia's

dilemma: conventional or nuclear arms maintain the USSR's powerful

conventional forces as well as its superpower-sized nuclear arsenal. A 1997

Kremlin study warned that the crisis of Russia's military was dire, and urged

at least 3.5 percent of gross domestic product be spent annually just to

avert a collapse.

Despite that, defense budgets over the past three years have barely averaged

2 percent of GDP, and Putin has hinted they may have to be trimmed further in

the interests of general economic reform.

"Our military faces a systemic crisis, which must be solved by radical

measures," says Pavel Felgenhauer, an independent analyst. "As the choice

looks now, we will lose our parity with the US or we are going to lose the

war in Chechnya. More likely, we'll lose both."

Last month, after Mr. Sergeyev slammed the Kvashnin scheme as "criminal

insanity" at an open military event, Putin scolded his generals for

quarreling in public and promised to settle the dispute.

A meeting of the Kremlin's powerful Security Council is slated for Aug. 11 to

discuss the issue. Although it may be postponed, experts say Putin cannot

long delay a decision on how to define Russia's long-term military priorities.

"It really looks like Sergeyev's days are numbered," says Viktor Boronets, a

former Defense Ministry official who currently works as an independent

analyst in Moscow. "His idea that we can maintain strategic parity with the

US no longer seems practical, and our new president seems like a man who

enjoys making hard choices." Sergeyev, a former commander of the Strategic

Rocket Forces, has spent most of the military's free funds to acquire about

20 new Topol-M intercontinental missiles each year since he became defense

minister in 1997. The official military doctrine, prepared under his

direction and adopted by Putin earlier this year, proclaims nuclear weapons

to be Russia's first line of defense against any outside aggression.

But the 10-month-old war against rebel Chechnya has exposed the Russian

military's potentially fatal inability to fight effectively on a conventional

battlefield. Experts say that Moscow's troops, struggling to contain a few

thousand mobile guerrillas, lack night-fighting equipment, all-weather air

support, and even such mundane supplies as steel helmets and bulletproof

vests.

"The Russian Army is so catastrophically short of conventional weapons that

the combined resources of all the country's military departments and naval

fleets were needed just to put together the antiterrorist operation in

Chechnya," says Viktor Mukhin, defense analyst with the daily Nezavisimaya

Gazeta.

Gen. Kvashnin's plan calls for trimming Russia's present force of 780 heavy

land-based intercontinental missiles by at least 400, much deeper than the

cuts suggested under the as-yet-unsigned START-3 nuclear arms-control treaty

between Moscow and Washington. The scheme also calls for abolishing the

Strategic Rocket Forces as a separate service, reducing it from 22 divisions

to two, and folding it into the Air Force. The money saved would go to

procure new conventional arms, improve military salaries, and beef up weapons

research and development.

Experts say Mr. Sergeyev is strongly supported in some official quarters,

particularly the influential Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Many policymakers

fear massive, unilateral cuts in strategic arms would lead to a disastrous

loss of Russian prestige on the global stage. "If Russia were to simply

withdraw from its position of nuclear equality with the US, it would

fundamentally alter the global security landscape we have known for more than

half a century," says Nikolai Zyubov, a former Soviet diplomat and security

analyst. "We would become a second-tier power, like France, or Britain."

But, outside of the Rocket Forces, most in the military appear to back

General Kvashnin. "The officers who have to actually fight in Chechnya, or do

peacekeeping duties in the former Yugoslavia, are sick and tired of going

without modern equipment, decent pay, and even sometimes elementary

supplies," says Mr. Felgenhauer. "They don't see why the rocket forces, whose

purpose is not to fight at all, should be so privileged and absorb all our

scarce funds."

Putin has hinted at compromise, but analysts say he is leaning toward the

Kvashnin plan. "The president has made it clear that the real threats on our

own soil and from terrorists in neighboring states have to be dealt with,"

says Mr. Boronets. "Resources will have to be redistributed for the sake of

security. Nuclear weapons just can't be sacrosanct anymore."

REPORTERS ON THE JOB 

DACHA DISPATCHES: The Monitor's Fred Weir says he weekly sees evidence that

Russia's military is up against a crunch. A barracks is located near the

village where Fred spends weekends at his family dacha. Fred says he

regularly encounters soldiers - in greasy uniforms and patched boots -

begging for money and cigarettes. Fred says they tell him that they can't get

enough to eat in their mess, and "that's easy enough to believe."

*******

#2

Moscow Times

August 3, 2000

DEFENSE DOSSIER: Feds Can't Get Act Together

By Pavel Felgenhauer

Last week, President Vladimir Putin's envoy to the North Caucasus, General

Viktor Kazantsev, surprised many when he announced that authorities were in

fact holding peace talks with Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov and prominent

rebel commander Khamzat Gilayev. But before long, the official Kremlin

spokesman on the war, Sergei Yastrzhembsky, clarified Kazantsev's statement

by saying "there are no true negotiations with the rebels f only contacts."

Two days later, General Georgy Shpak, chief of the paratroop forces, claimed

his troops had seriously wounded Maskhadov, while Kazantsev repudiated his

original statement by announcing "talk with the likes of Maskhadov are out of

the question."

Of course, official statements during the Chechen war have often been as

contradictory as the latest spat about "peace talks." Last October, when

federal forces hit the Chechen capital, Grozny, with a ballistic missile

armed with cluster shrapnel, killing hundreds of civilians, Putin told

journalists he knew nothing about any missile attacks. Also in October 1999,

Putin told European Union leaders that Russian troops would not go deep into

Chechnya f not move south of the Terek River f but soldiers were in fact

preparing to cross the Terek while Putin was speaking.

But after several months of fighting, one might hope the authorities would

get their act together. But, alas, as federal forces build permanent bases

and settle in for what appears to be a long occupation, Moscow's actions in

Chechnya are as incoherent as ever.

While some elements of the Russian occupation force are trying to win over

the hearts and minds of the Chechen population by helping to open schools and

providing small quantities of aid, other elements of the same force are

marauding, torturing captured rebel suspects and bombing villages.

The latest story of alleged peace talks with Maskhadov didn't seem to put a

dent in rebel morale f if that was the intent of Kazantsev's release. But it

has been reported that pro-Moscow Chechens are nervous, afraid Moscow is

ready to conclude a deal with Maskhadov, as in 1996, turn its back and march

out of Chechnya, leaving collaborators to the mercy of the rebels. Kazantsev

was forced to eat his own words in public to stop the growing panic.

During the first Chechen war, the endemic incoherence of the Kremlin's

policies in Chechnya was blamed on a lack of centralized command. This time,

the Kremlin vowed to do better: An army general (Kazantsev) was appointed

overall commander of the provisional task force while retaining his position

as commander of the North Caucasus military district. Two months ago,

Kazantsev's deputy, General Gennady Troshev, was appointed commander of the

task force and of the military district, while Kazantsev was promoted to be

overall presidential supervisor in the region.

It would seem a clear continuity of joint military command was being

established, but it didn't work. Troshev's and Kazantsev's authority seems

merely viceregal, and they have no true means of disciplining unruly

subordinates. If an officer in Chechnya disobeys orders, the only punishment

that awaits him is to be sent to his home base to continue service. If such

an officer comes from any other military district, the local chief may not

discipline him seriously, since Troshev holds no authority outside his

region. If an offending officer is from the Interior Ministry, Federal

Security Service or any of Russia's multiple armies, Troshev cannot send him

home immediately; he has to negotiate. Legally, there is no war in Chechnya,

so martial law does not apply, and speedy field court-martials are

impossible.

Officially, all servicemen in Chechnya report to Troshev, but their

logistical support and future promotion depend on the good will of far-off

commanders or, in the case of police units, the goodwill of many regional

governors. With such split loyalties, all Russian operations in Chechnya are

in fact the result of protracted interdepartmental negotiations, after which

no one can be sure agreed actions will be fully implemented. Or in some

cases, operations are carried out by segments of the task force without much

coordination with others.

Russian units, especially from different ministries, often do not help each

other when their colleagues fall under rebel attack, withhold vital

information, and so on. Actually, some parts of the federal force may indeed

be in contact with Maskhadov, while others simply do not know what is going

on and may not know for some time to come.

Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent, Moscow-based defense analyst.

*******

#3

The Irish Times

August 3, 2000

SENIOR PRO-MOSCOW CHECHEN OFFICIAL KILLED AS ANNIVERSARIES POSE NEW THREAT

By Seamus Martin

A senior pro-Moscow Chechen official has been killed in a car bomb attack and

two senior Russian officers were reported missing as a series of

anniversaries threatened to increase the tempo of the war in Chechnya and its

side-effects in metropolitan Russia.

Yesterday was the first anniversary of the outbreak of the current conflict

in the northern Caucasus and it also marked 70 years since the founding of

Russia's elite parachute regiment. On Sunday the Chechens will mark

'independence day of the Republic of Ichkeria'. Russian forces have stopped

all traffic in and out of the Chechen town of Gudermes which has become the

regional capital in place of Grozny which was almost totally destroyed.

The deputy chief administrator of the town of Urus-Martan, 19 km from Grozny,

identified only by the surname 'Shamsuyev' died as a car bomb exploded in the

town. He had previously received a number of death threats. Two months ago

the town's pro-Moscow Imam, Umar Idrisov, was shot dead.

Mr Mayerbek Vachegayev, who represents the Chechen rebels in Western Europe,

said: 'Last Monday, a meeting of warlords and the Sharia [Islamic] court of

the south-western front branded all collaborators traitors of the nation and

ordered them arrested or, if that is not possible, eliminated.' He also

warned of more attacks, particularly in Gudermes.

On the Russian side, deputy chief of staff Gen Valery Manilov announced that

13,500 Chechen rebels had been killed in the conflict so far including 500 in

the recent 'special forces campaign'. He gave no details of Russian

casualties.

In the north-western city of Pskov, President Putin marked the day by

unveiling a monument to 84 local paratroopers who lost their lives in a

single engagement in February. Even before the February losses, the memorial

wall in Pskov, similar in design to the Vietnam wall in Washington, named

twice as many casualties from Chechnya than from the Soviet Union's

disastrous war in Afghanistan.

'Only our decisive actions, which aimed to restore the legitimacy of the

constitution and the rights of citizens, halted the process of disintegration

of the state,' Mr Putin told a military ceremony. 'The armed forces played a

great role in this. We paid a heavy price but it was not in vain,' continued

Mr Putin, flanked by the paratroopers' commanding officer, Gen Georgy Shpak.

In Moscow, extra troops and police were drafted into the capital to deal with

the usual mayhem which occurs on the paratroops' anniversary.

Paras in their blue berets gather at several points in the capital, swim in

the fountains, drink vast quantities of alcohol and stage pitched battles

against the police and special security forces.

*******

#4

Moscow Times

August 3, 2000

Hope Waning for Meeting Between Pope and Patriarch

By Andrei Zolotov Jr.

Staff Writer

Chances for a meeting between Patriarch Alexy II and Pope John Paul II are

close to zero after a breakdown of recent talks between the Russian Orthodox

and Roman Catholic churches in the United States, said a senior Moscow

Patriarchate official.

Moscow Patriarchate officials had said as recently as June that they noted

some progress in relations between the two churches. Although a long-awaited

visit by the pope to Russia was premature, a meeting in a third country such

as Austria or Switzerland was possible, they said.

But these plans appear to have been dropped after theological talks in

Baltimore collapsed last month.

The two sides could not narrow their differences on the thorniest issue

dividing the two churches: the Greek Catholic Church, which retains Byzantine

ritual but has Catholic dogma and is subordinate to the Vatican, said

Hieromonk Hilarion Alfeyev, the senior Moscow Patriarchate official in charge

of relations with non-Orthodox churches and a participant in the U.S. talks.

Alfeyev said in an interview Tuesday that the Catholic delegation took a

tougher stand than at previous talks. A theological consensus on the issue

would have helped a political settlement of inter-church relations.

But no joint statement was adopted, and the talks are now at a dead end,

Alfeyev said.

"Nobody says that the Orthodox want the annihilation of the Greek Catholic

Church as a condition for further dialogue," Alfeyev said. "But we say their

current ecclesiological status, i.e. the situation in which these churches

are perceived as an authentic heritage of the Christian East, should be

recognized as abnormal."

Alfeyev said the head of the Russian Orthodox Church had linked the prospect

of a meeting with the pope to the outcome of the U.S. talks.

"Unfortunately, Baltimore decided nothing, [and] the dialogue is suspended,"

Alfeyev said. "If we don't have at least some serious progress in both the

theological understanding and concrete manifestation of this problem, such a

meeting is hardly possible and hardly expedient."

******

#5

MILITARY REFORM POLICY INCONSISTENT, FORMER ARMS SALES ADVISER SAYS

Russian AVN Military News Agency

Moscow, 3rd August: The conflict between the Defence Ministry and the General

Staff on the issue of structural changes in the armed forces and their

financing is a result of imperfection and inconsistency of the policy

effected by the state over the past 10-12 years in the sphere of military

reform as a whole and reform of the armed forces in particular, Boris Kuzyk,

director-general of the New Programmes and Concepts holding, told the

Military News Agency.

Kuzyk, former advisor to the president for foreign military cooperation, said

the problem was not about the persons involved. The conflict is deeper.

Russia is again facing a historic challenge - how to carry out strategic

reform of the armed forces. And staff changes cannot solve anything here,

Kuzyk pointed out. It is necessary to draw a strict line defining the

functions of the Defence Ministry and the General Staff, as it is done in

many countries of the world.

According to him, the ministry should become an office responsible for

military policy and its financial support. He did not exclude that the post

of the defence minister could be taken up by a civilian who is competent in

military and political and financial and economic issues. The General Staff

is the highest body for managing the armed forces and it should be headed by

a professional military man. Such an approach will allow to make further

steps towards a democratic society that controls the army. Moreover, it will

lift the contradiction when the military decide on what is to be reformed and

how to spend budget money. Kuzyk declined to tell whether his candidacy was

(among many others) considered for the post of the country's defence

minister.

*******

 

#6

BBC MONITORING

KREMLIN URGED TO "HAVE A GO" AT BROKERING PEACE IN MIDDLE EAST

Source: 'Izvestiya', Moscow, in Russian 3 Aug 00

The prominent Russian 'Izvestiya' daily has suggested that Russia should take

advantage of the "Camp David fiasco" and try its hand at brokering peace in

the Middle East. Following are excerpts from an article by Vladimir Dunayev

headlined: "Arafat asks to go to Moscow", published by 'Izvestiya' on 3rd

August

Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat is planning to visit us. He will visit Moscow

on 10th August. The Kremlin is not ruling out the possibility that the head

of the Palestinian Authority will be received by Russian President Vladimir

Putin.

According to news agency reports, Arafat himself asked to go to Moscow. He is

currently touring the world, talking about his impressions of his talks at

Camp David with the Israelis and he has already visited several Arab states.

Now it is Europe's turn...

Arafat will probably refresh the issue of Palestinian sovereignty in Moscow.

The Palestinians are trying to pin all the blame for the Camp David failure

on the Israelis. And since it is impossible to reach agreement with Tel Aviv,

it is not worth even trying. In Arafat's view, in this situation it would be

entirely logical for a Palestinian state to appear on the map of the world.

Moscow's stance on this issue is unlikely to have changed much and nor will

Russia be in a hurry to recognize a still nonexistent country.

Nonetheless, the forthcoming Arafat visit is unlikely to prove "empty",

turning merely into a diplomatic formality. Moscow is trying to recover one

of its key roles in the world - and this will hardly be possible unless it

restores its influence in the Near [Middle] East. Formally Russia remains a

"cosponsor" and cofounder of the peace process in that troubled region. But

in actual fact only the US is actively participating in the peace talks.

However cynical it may sound, Moscow can take advantage of the Camp David

fiasco. There are luxurious presidential residences scattered around Russia

which are in no way inferior to the US apartments in Maryland. Maybe the

Russian climate will prove more conducive to compromise Ultimately, it is

necessary to at least attempt to reconcile the Palestinians and Israelis.

We have a complete right to do so. We can recall our previous close ties with

the Palestinians And there are almost 1m of our former fellow-countrymen in

Israel. And our president has nothing to lose, unlike his US counterpart. We

will not be having an election any time soon and foreign policy does not

exert the same influence on domestic life in Russia as is the case abroad.

An Israeli Foreign Ministry representative once told `Izvestiya' that

Israeli-Syrian talks could be held in Moscow. If only at ambassadorial level.

It has not happened yet. And that is a pity. It would be an excellent

opportunity to remind people that Russia is alive and that a great deal in

the world depends on it.

Arafat's visit inspires hope - the next Camp David round may not lack Russian

participation. And to that end it is by no means absolutely necessary to

jostle with the Americans for the right to be called the "main peacemaker".

Peace cannot be divided up. You either have it or you don't. If the Americans

cannot manage it, why shouldn't we have a go? ...

******

#7

Researchers Say Russian Permafrost Could Melt in 23rd Century

MOSCOW (Aug. 2) XINHUA - The permafrost in northern Russia' s Komi republic

could melt in the 23rd century, a British research center has warned.

The average temperature in the North European part of Russia may rise by 4

degrees Celsius within the next 240 years due to global warming, causing the

melting to occur, the Interfax news agency reported Wednesday, quoting

Britain's Hadley Center for Climate Prediction and Research.

The prediction was cited at a news briefing by German researcher Otto Habeck

Wednesday in the Russian city of Syktyvkar, Interfax said.

The observations of reindeer breeders in Komi republic and Nenets autonomous

district, Arkhangelsk region corroborate the Hadley Center's data, Habeck

said.

The German scientist conducted his research under the auspices of the

European Union's Tundra project. The project was carried out by leading

universities of Britain, Finland, Netherlands and Denmark together with the

Komi Scientific Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences' Urals branch,

Interfax said.

******

#8

Krasnaya Zvezda

August 1, 2000

[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]

STRONG AND WEAK POINTS OF THE OSCE

Deputy Foreign Minister Yevgeny GUSAROV is interviewed by

Krasnaya Zvezda's correspondent Alexei LYASHCHENKO.

    

     Question: Twenty-five years ago, on August 1, 1975, the

Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in

Europe, CSCE, was signed in Helsinki. What were the fundamental

goals set forth in this important document?

     Answer: The Helsinki Final Act fundamental goals have not

been implemented to a considerable degree yet. It stipulated

the construction of a safe, stable and prospering Europe with

the integral borders, sovereignty and equality of all the

participating countries; non-interference in the internal

affairs of other countries, and non-use of military force or

its threat in the solution of problems which arose, arise and

will arise between nations. For 1975, the Helsinki set of

principles became a major step forward to the building of trust

and movement to a common European space. All these principles,

including those, which our partners respect less than others,

to put it mildly, that is, non-interference in internal affairs

and respect for sovereignty, are still of vital importance

today, as well.

     Indeed, we are living in a Europe, which radically differs

from the Europe of 1975. The Cold War is over, and we talk of a

post-confrontational world. Coming to the fore are some terms

that are connected with a new vision of not only the European

but also the global order in the 21st century. New concepts

keep appearing. European countries come across new challenges.

Conceptually it can be said that today's Europe is confronted

by the challenges of a changing world.

     Attempts have been made more than once to decide how the

Helsinki process should develop in the future. Thus, in 1992,

also in Helsinki, the participating countries adopted a

document called "The Challenges of Change." Later there were

summit meetings in Budapest and Lisbon. A very important OSCE

summit meeting was held in Istanbul last November. It adopted

the very significant Charter of European Security, which was an

attempt to adapt the principles of the Helsinki 1975 Final Act

to existing realities.

     One of the problems against which the OSCE comes across

today is that all admit that this organization will be

effective and will be able to continue its activities only if

it firmly adheres to the Helsinki principles, on the one hand,

and takes into consideration current changes, on the other.

This, in fact, is the essence of the Istanbul Charter. In

accordance with this document, today a threat is presented not

by confrontation of two military-political alliances but by

regional and internal conflicts, which always affect the

stability of both individual countries and Europe as a whole.

Other absolutely new threats are connected with economic and

information challenges. In 1975 the leaders of the nations

talked of the need to wage a struggle against international

terrorism. Today, international terrorism is a full-scale

threat to Europe.

     I think it is worth saying precisely now that we observe

the 25th anniversary of the OSCE that many of our partners

claim that the fundamental importance of the OSCE as the

organization asserting and observing the rules of relations

between nations is gone. They say that the OSCE should

concentrate its attention on solving problems, which arise

inside individual countries, often violating the borders of

what is called national sovereignty, which acquires the form of

rabid interference in internal affairs.

     In Russia's opinion, international cooperation and

communication on the scale of Europe as a whole is important

today for the country and will be important tomorrow to achieve

the goals of its political, economic and social development.

But Russia needs international cooperation based on the

principles, which have proved their value and effectiveness in

the past 25 years. We are not going to break them for the

benefit of dubious concepts such as "restricted sovereignty of

states" only because human rights and social processes develop

or do not develop in these states. Such concepts are roaming

around, including the OSCE.

     International cooperation and communication are not an

anti-thesis of national sovereignty and the principle of

non-interference in the internal affairs of states. If this

were so, we could find ourselves only a step short of the

concept known as "humanitarian intervention." It goes without

saying that certain consideration of a humanitarian dimension

should be taken into account. The OSCE has more than once

approached this problem when searching for a correct ratio

between our concern about democracy and human rights and

attempts to restrict the possibilities of their solution by

closing national borders. Such possibilities exist today; they

are mentioned in many documents, including the Istanbul Charter.

    

     Question: But this may not be the ground for interference

in the internal affairs of a country, an information aggression

against it and even open military aggression (as was the case

last year) when NATO bombed Yugoslavia. Let us call a spade a

spade. On the eve of the 25th anniversary of the Helsinki Act

the world was confronted by a situation when a group of

countries openly violated the overwhelming majority of the

Helsinki norms and principles and even the UN Charter.

     Answer: We are naturally very disturbed by such a free

approach to the Helsinki principles and the UN Charter, above

all, from the standpoint of how this will tell on the general

situation in the Euroatlantic space in the future. I must say,

however, that the OSCE does not use in full measure the

potential it has accumulated in the past quarter of a century.

This potential is truly huge. The strength of the OSCE has

always been in the fact that it is the forum, which elaborated

and continues to elaborate and observe the norms of behavior in

inter-state relations. The standards of the UN Charter and

international law in general and the principles of the Helsinki

Final Act have always been its supreme criteria.

  

     Question: What are other problems facing the OSCE?

     Answer: We see that another fundamental principle, which

has made the OSCE quite an effective organization - the

principle that all its member countries are equal among equals,

the projection of which is the consensus in decision-making, is

a target of probably most coordinated and dynamic attacks by

our partners. We felt this very well on the eve of the Istanbul

conference, when under the pretext to enhance the operational

possibilities of the OSCE they tried to persuade us into giving

up the principle of consensus. In practical terms this would

mean that a decision on one or another state could be made

ignoring the view of this state. The very character of the OSCE

is changing. It is turning from an organization of equal

cooperation into an organization in which arms twisting and the

imposition of someone's will on others are possible under the

majority principle or some other factors. We are even told that

it is a very democratic principle. I often say the following to

my Western colleagues: "You do not call in question the

principle of consensus in decision-making in NATO. This

principle also works in the European Union, and you are not

going to give it up. Why should this happen in the OSCE?" If

such a decision were adopted, it would be a big mistake.

Deviation from the principle of consensus would have very sad

consequences for the future of this organization.

    

     Question: The OSCE was created as an instrument of

international, cooperation effective on the space "from

Vladivostok to Vancouver." The past few years have shown,

however, that the main area of its operation is the Balkans and

the post-Soviet space.

     Answer: Indeed, many of the problems, which this

organization has been handling more or less successfully, have

existed on the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent

States. There are quite a few problems in the Balkans, too. As

a matter of fact, had it not been for NATO intervention, the

Balkan situation might have been much better than it is today.

But it would be incorrect to reduce the OSCE to an instrument

working in the post-Soviet space and the Balkans only. We raise

in the OSCE questions, which concern other European nations.

Five or six times we proposed at sessions of its permanent

council in Vienna to discuss the situation in Northern Ireland

on a non-confrontational plane. We wanted our partners to tell

us where they  succeed and where they fail. Let's send a

mission there. Its lessons could be of use for other

territories covered by the OSCE. Nothing comes out of it. Our

partners flatly refuse to discuss this problem within the OSCE

framework. When the Russian Ambassador in Vienna broached on

the problem of Corsica, the French representative said: "I ask

you not to interfere in the internal affairs of France." I

agree with him to a certain degree. But why, then, such an

enhanced attention to Russian actions in Chechnya?

     Russia is ready for a very broad dialogue and open for

international communication. Our country believes that the OSCE

can do many useful things, for instance, to solve the problems

of Central Asia. Its mission has been working on the settlement

of the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh for a long time now. Its

mission is involved in the searches for a Trans-Dniester

settlement and monitors the situation in Abkhazia. There are

positive changes towards the settlement of the Georgia-Ossetia

conflict. A special mission called "the OSCE group of

assistance in the Russian Republic of Chechnya" was created in

1995. It is true that the group has been staying in Moscow for

the past year as the current OSCE chairman ordered it should

leave Chechnya for safety reasons. There are several other

missions, which try to work effectively. However, if the

approach in keeping with which the OSCE's operational

possibilities continues to be turned only east of Vienna, this

organization will inevitably come across numerous problems.

    

     Question: But Russia continues to cooperate with the OSCE

on all the lines, doesn't it?

     Answer: Yes, we continue to regard the OSCE as potentially

the most effective structure for the attainment of the goals,

which the European nations have set forth: the construction of

an integral, democratic, secure and prospering Europe without

any lines of division. But it is impossible to talk in the OSCE

about the creation of a Europe without the lines of division

and, at the same time, promote NATOcentrism and NATO Eastward

expansion.

There cannot be equal economic cooperation within the OSCE

framework if steps are taken to restrict such cooperation by

the borders of the European Union.

     As I have already said above, the European Security

Charter was signed in Istanbul last November. This marvellous

document gave Europe a chance for the future. We still believe

that the OSCE can be the central, system-forming, coordinating

structure of cooperation on a Europe-wide scope. It is

necessary to ensure the complete implementation of the

agreements and principles laid down in the Istanbul Charter.

    

*******

#9

Central Asia: Russia Sanctioning Anti-Islamic Crackdown

By Sophie Lambroschini

Russia is offering moral support and material aid to Central Asian states to

support a clampdown on what officials say is an Islamist terrorist threat.

Human rights activists say Russian support lends legitimacy to arbitrary

police action against Muslim activists in countries such as Uzbekistan.

RFE/RL's Sophie Lambroschini reports.

Moscow, 2 August 2000 (RFE/RL/) -- Russian President Vladimir Putin has

expressed support for a "tough approach" against Islamic militancy in Central

Asia. He's made trips to the region and has actively promoted formation of an

anti-terrorism organization within the CIS that would concentrate on fighting

religious extremism.

Since then, countries like Uzbekistan have been increasing efforts to crack

down on dissent, citing an 'Islamic threat' as the reason.

Human rights organizations fear this trend could spread to other countries --

with tacit Russian approval.

The Taliban victory in Afghanistan, the civil war in Tajikistan, and the

hostage-taking incident last year in Kyrgyzstan are all relatively recent

events driving this fear of fundamentalism. Russia linked these incidents to

incursions by Chechen rebels into Daghestan last August, to justify its war

in Chechnya.

In Uzbekistan, many are concerned this general fear of Islamic militancy is

being exploited as an excuse to crack down not only on suspected terrorism

but on all opposition to President Islam Karimov.

A recent example of this involves Bahodir Hasanov, a devout Muslim and French

teacher. Last month he was taken into custody by Uzbek police for a fourth

time in a year. The police refuse to disclose his whereabouts or allow him

access to a lawyer. They have made no formal charges against him.

Hasanov's father and brother are already in prison for allegedly promoting a

banned pro-Islamic organization. Human rights organizations say the arrests

follow a pattern of repression that began after a bomb attack in Tashkent in

1999 that was widely seen as an assassination attempt against Karimov. At the

time, Karimov denounced the attack as a plot by extremists -- a group he

defined as Muslim fundamentalists.

Karimov later named the exiled leader of the banned democratic opposition Erk

party, Muhammad Salih, as one of the organizers of the bombing and called for

his arrest and extradition to Uzbekistan.

Human rights organizations like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch,

and the Moscow-based Society for Support of Human Rights in Central Asia say

several thousand people in Uzbekistan are in jail for their beliefs. They say

that sometimes wearing a beard is enough to brand a man as an extremist.

Abdufattakh Manapov of the Society for Support of Human Rights in Central

Asia says Karimov calls all of his opponents extremists because the Islamic

threat is so frightening, both in the region and in Russia. Manapov says he

worries a recent diplomatic rapprochement between Russia and its southern

neighbors could prolong the trend.

Manapov says Putin's past with the former Soviet intelligence service, the

KGB, and tough talk on Central Asia's security interests evokes memories of a

not-so-distant past when Moscow dominated the region. Back then, the harsh

Soviet response to any rebellion induced Central Asia's Soviet nomenklatura

to submit.

"I want to make it clear, they got frightened because they are still afraid

of the special services and of what they're capable of. What they did with

Amin in Afghanistan, what they did in Czechoslovakia in 1968, in Hungary in

1956. It's not only that they remember this, it's stored in their collective

memory. So that scared them, and they turned to Russia."

The recent criticism by the international community of the conduct of

elections in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan have given those

countries another reason to look to Russia for support.

Cassandra Cavanaugh is a regional expert at Human Rights Watch. She tells

RFE/RL that while Russia has played a minor role in Uzbekistan's interior

policy, a recent Russian-Uzbek rapprochement gives human rights workers cause

for concern. She says Russia shares with Uzbekistan a tendency to label any

form of dissent as being the work of "extremists."

Recent events illustrate this. Chechnya's Russian-appointed administrator

Akhmad Kadyrov recently outlawed "Wahabbism" -- the name given to violent

Muslim fundamentalists. Similar prohibitions have been proposed as amendments

to Russia's law on religious freedom, expected be discussed by the Duma in

September.

Manapov says Russian forces have arrested and deported dozens of people --

including some Russian citizens -- wanted by Uzbek authorities. He says the

new CIS initiative from last June -- a joint anti-terrorist center based in

Moscow -- could be a new base for common action.

"This year we don't know the dynamics yet, but we are worried by the fact

that a center for combatting terrorism was created in Moscow, by the broad

definition of the concepts of terrorism and extremism employed by some of the

countries that are the founders of the center -- first and foremost

Uzbekistan."

He says Uzbekistan's use of the word "extremist" to brand political opponents

could be a model for other countries.

******

#10

Jamestown Foundation Monitor

August 3, 2000

RUSSIAN AUTHORITIES MOVE YET AGAIN TO REOPEN CASE AGAINST ALEKSANDR

NIKITIN. The apparently never-ending effort of Russian authorities to

prosecute the well-known nuclear whistleblower Aleksandr Nikitin on treason

charges has taken an unexpected and even bizarre turn in recent weeks. On

May 30 the Russian Prosecutor General's office made an apparently

unprecedented appeal to the full Presidium of the Russian Supreme Court to

overturn an April 19 decision--rendered by no less than the Supreme Court

itself--which acquitted the former Navy officer of espionage charges. The

appeal was not made known to Nikitin himself until July 19. The move forced

Nikitin, who was at that time on a visit to the United States, to scramble

back to Russia in order to prepare yet another legal defense. He need not

have rushed: Yesterday the eleven-member presidium decided to postpone a

ruling on the matter until September 13. The ruling, itself an odd one,

leaves Nikitin twisting in the wind for several more months. The

46-year-old nuclear researcher, who first ran afoul of authorities for his

authorship of a report detailing the mishandling of nuclear wastes by

Russia's Northern Fleet, has already been subjected to nearly five years of

persecution at the hands of Russian authorities. During that time he has

faced more than ten trials, has seen Russia's Federal Security Service

(FSB) conduct several long investigations of his alleged crimes, and has

spent ten months in prison.

Nikitin's travails have drawn the attention of human rights groups around

the world--he was declared a "prisoner of conscience" by Amnesty

International--and have generated statements of concern by a number of

Western governments. For all of these groups, the Nikitin case has been

seen as a test of Russia's post-Soviet judicial system and, more

concretely, of its independence and ability to stand up the country's

security agencies. Those defending human rights in Russia celebrated

hard-fought victories in December 1999, when a St. Petersburg city court

acquitted Nikitin of all espionage charges, and in April of this year, the

Russian Supreme Court rejected an appeal lodged by the Prosecutor General's

Office and upheld the acquittal. Russian human rights advocates likewise

celebrated last year when Grigory Pasko, another nuclear researcher whose

heavy-handed prosecution by FSB investigators had much in common with

Nikitin's, was also exonerated (albeit not fully) of treason charges by a

Russian court.

As welcome as those victories were, however, they served as much to

underscore the continuing ability of Russia's security services to hound

and intimidate victims of official investigations as they did to

demonstrate the development of rule of law in Russia. And these latest

events relative to the Nikitin case would seem to be further proof of that

sad fact. Nikitin and his legal team were reportedly shocked to learn that

yet another appeal was in the works, that the nuclear researcher's long

nightmare might not yet be over. They appear to be even more shocked at the

some of the legal arguments being used in the attempt to reopen the case.

In a development which can only be described as Kafka-esque, Russian

authorities are apparently now trying to argue, for example, that the case

against Nikitin should be reopened and another investigation into his

alleged crimes launched because authorities had failed to protect the

rights of the retired officer during earlier investigations related to the

case. "This is so cynical, to set their [prosecutors'] mistakes committed

during the investigation as a ground for returning the case for additional

investigation," Yury Schmidt, Nikitin's lawyer, was quoted as saying

earlier this week. Schmidt also observed acidly that the prosecutor in the

case, who was responsible for ensuring that no violations were committed

during the investigation, had never bothered to discipline the federal

agents who had acted improperly.

According to several Russian sources, this latest appeal may represent an

effort by those originally involved in prosecuting Nikitin to "save face"

by demonstrating that the case was not the embarrassing waste of time that

the court decisions in Nikitin's favor suggested. According to this view,

the Prosecutor General's Office now hopes at the least to successfully

charge Nikitin with a lesser crime of some sort. They point as a possible

precedent to Pasko's case, in which treason charges were dropped but which

saw the former Navy journalist nevertheless convicted of having abused his

position in the military. In this vein, Russian sources point to a possible

role by Viktor Cherkesov in the court's decision yesterday to defer

judgment on Nikitin's case. Cherkesov is a former KGB agent and Soviet-era

dissident hunter who was recently named governor of the Northwest region of

Russia by his long-time associate, President Vladimir Putin. Cherkesov was

head of the St. Petersburg branch of the FSB in 1996, and is believed to

have played a key role in launching the case against Nikitin. According to

Schmidt, Cherkesov was extremely upset when both the St. Petersburg court

and then the Supreme Court acquitted Nikitin.

Those who are closely watching the Nikitin case suggest that the latest

move by the Prosecutor General's Office represents a potentially dangerous

attack on the independence of the Russian judiciary--one they hope the

Supreme Court will rebuff when it rules in September. It seems also to

reflect the broader assault on democratic freedoms in Russia which has

grown with the strengthening of the Russian security forces under Putin.

Indeed, an effort by the Kremlin to cow the nation's judiciary would seem

to be fully consistent with Putin's obvious moves to limit press freedom in

Russia.

In this regard, the renewal of the case against Nikitin also presents a

challenge to Western governments doing business with the Kremlin. The fact

that Nikitin had to cut short his visit to the United States as a result of

developments in Moscow compelled some U.S. lawmakers to pressure President

Bill Clinton into raising the issue during his talks with Putin at the G-8

summit in Japan. It is unclear whether Clinton in fact did so. More

recently the U.S. State Department expressed its concerns about the Nikitin

case, and said that the effort to reopen the investigation constituted a

manipulation of the court system and a form of harassment directed by the

Russian government against its critics. The Norwegian government has

likewise expressed its dismay over the renewal of the case against Nikitin

and reportedly has asked for an explanation from the Russian ambassador

(www.bellona.no, July 31-August 2; Reuters, August 1; AFP, August 2;

Russian agencies, August 1-2; Segodnya, August 3; UPI, July 19-20).

The West has of late muted its criticism of Russia's human rights record,

however, and, particularly in the runup to the Supreme Court's September

ruling, there is little reason to believe that it will alter that policy

substantially over Nikitin.

*******

#11

Nezavisimaya Gazeta

August 2, 2000

[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]

WEST DISLIKES INTENSIFICATION OF RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

By Marianna BELENKAYA

    

     After his triumphal visit to North Korea the Russian

President seemed to be determined to get down in real earnest

to developing relations with those countries, which the West,

in particular, the US, calls "outcasts". The three-day visit to

Russia by Libya's Foreign Minister Abdel Rahman Shalgam wound

up yesterday by a sensation, which, however, could have been

predicted. Vladimir Putin accepted the invitation of Libyan

leader, Colonel Moammar Gadhafi to visit Tripoli. The time of

the visit has not been made public yet.

     The background against which this happened imparts a

special tint to the event. Not long ago Moscow was visited by

Iraq's Vice-President Tariq Aziz (in connection with which the

US State Department trained wrathful accusations on the

Kremlin). Shortly before that Putin paid a visit to North Korea

by the nuclear threat of which Washington has been threatening

Americans a long time now. Libya, Iraq and North Korea are on

the US State Department's list of "outcast-nations," and

Washington regards cooperation of other countries with them,

especially at the top level, as a personal insult - all the

more so if any communication with these countries happens

without its approval.

Washington is somewhat alarmed by a sharp intensification of

Moscow's foreign policy and its striving to restore old ties

and promote cooperation with Eastern and Western countries

alike.

     The Washington Administration cannot forget Putin's

success in North Korea with which he arrived in Okinawa,

especially, against the backdrop of Bill Clinton's failure at

Camp David.

There is no ground either for Russia or, in particular, for the

West, to be afraid that Moscow is expanding ties with

"unreliable regimes."

     I do not see any sin in the establishment of a normal

dialogue, particularly, at the top level, with the countries,

which are unfriendly to the West. It is just the other way

around. By so doing Moscow is handling not only its own foreign

policy tasks but is working to reduce tension in the

international arena as a whole. First, it helps the West to

normalize relations with "unreliable regimes". Old and new ties

help Moscow to find a common language with both sides.

     As for Libya, Russia has never been its main business

partner. Libya is a former Italian colony and it has never

broken business ties with its former parent country. It

traditionally maintains good relations with Germany. Madrid and

London share third place as its trade partners. There was a

formal disruption of these relations in connection with the UN

Security Council's sanctions against Libya. But in April 1999

Tripoli surrendered persons suspected of terrorism, and the

Security Council suspended its sanctions. Many immediately

hurried to get a piece of the Libyan oil pie. And Italians

outpaced all the others.

     Russia is only beginning cooperation with Libya in the oil

sphere. At this point, we are unable to compete in this respect

even with Americans who constantly accuse Tripoli of complicity

with international terrorism but at the same time do business

in that country. Though American oil companies officially

discontinued their activities in Libya in 1986, all their

assets in that country are perfectly safe. What is more,

Libyans will be only too glad to get Americans invest in their

country's oil and gas industries.

     In 1970-1980, in accordance with the plan of trade and

economic cooperation with Libya, Moscow built there a nuclear

research center, two power transmission lines and a gas

pipeline.

Not counting military-technical deliveries, Russian exports

included machinery and equipment and spare parts for them. As a

result of the sanctions, Libya was for a long time unable to

pay its debt to Russia, which runs into upwards of 3.8 billion

dollars, though, compared with other developing countries, it

was quite solvent. The suspension of the UN Security Council

sanctions and their future lifting give Libya a chance to pay

its debts.

     Air communications were restored between Tripoli and

Moscow in June 1999. But the number of Russian specialists has

not increased in that country. The Russian community numbered

150 as of the end of last year. As Abdel Shalgam said on

Monday, "more Americans and Englishmen work in Libya than

Russians". "This must be changed," answered his counterpart

Igor Ivanov.

     In addition to a meeting with President Putin, Shalgam met

with Vice-Premier Ilya Klebanov. The Russian Vice-Premier said

that the question of the Russian deliveries of military

hardware had not been discussed but the sides had reached

agreement on military-technical cooperation, including "repairs

and upgrading of existing anti-aircraft equipment and armored

hardware".

Klebanov also said that in the sphere of civilian cooperation

Russia "has received the right to build a gas pipeline in the

territory of Libya" and would also build a new thermal electric

power station. Deputy chief of the Russian President's

Administration Sergei Prikhodko said that during the Libyan

minister's meeting with Putin agreement was reached to give an

impulse to preparations for a session of the inter-governmental

commission on trade and economic cooperation.

    

*******