CDI Russia Weekly-#108

4 July 2000

Edited by David Johnson

Center for Defense Information

1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW

Washington DC 20036

phone: 202-332-0600; fax:202-462-4559

djohnson@cdi.org

The CDI Russia Weekly is an e-mail newsletter that carries news and

analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political,

economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With funding

from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, CDI Russia Weekly is a

project of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI),

a nonprofit research and education organization.

  CDI Russia Weekly web page (with archive): http://www.cdi.org/russia/

  Visit CDI's web site: http://www.cdi.org

Contents:

  [Note from David Johnson: I was in Moscow last week so issue #108 was

delayed.]

  1. Itar-Tass: RUSSIA'S PUTIN EXPOUNDS BENEFITS OF JUDO IN INTERSTATE RELATIONS.

  2. Itar-Tass: NEW FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPT RECOGNIZES RUSSIA'S LIMITATIONS.

  3. The Globe and Mail (Canada): Geoffrey York, Chechen rebels launch wave of kamikaze attacks. Suicide bombers inflict heavy casualties on Russian military.

  4. Moscow Times: Pavel Felgenhauer, DEFENSE DOSSIER: Budget Fray Begins to Boil.

  5. AFP: Putin's three-month rule puts oligarchs on the defensive.

  6. Jamestown Foundation Monitor: NEWSPAPER: PUTIN BACKS RESTORING SOVIET ANTHEM.

  7. The Russia Journal: Mikhail Delyagin, Putin’s weakness endangers society.

  8. BBC MONITORING: KREMLIN "OBSESSION" WITH "TOUGH" FOREIGN POLICY RISKS ISOLATING RUSSIA - PAPER.

  9. Moscow Times: Anna Badkhen, Security Council Rapidly Gains Power.

  10. Vremya MN: GRIGORY RAPOTA: "I'M AGAINST GUNG-HO SPIRIT IN THE ARMS TRADE." (interview)

  11. Vek: VLADIMIR YAKOVLEV: "THE WORLD IS TOTTERING ON THE EDGE OF NUCLEAR ANARCHY." (interview with Colonel-General Vladimir YAKOVLEV,

Commander of the Strategic Missile Force)

  12. AFP: Islamic extremism, security, economic cooperation to top Central Asia meet. (Russia and China meet)

******

#1

RUSSIA'S PUTIN EXPOUNDS BENEFITS OF JUDO IN INTERSTATE RELATIONS

ITAR-TASS

Tokyo, 4th July: In an interview broadcast by the Japanese Fuji Terebi

television network on Tuesday [4th July], Russian President Vladimir Putin

said he regards his favourite judo as an integrated system of views "which

prefers evolution to revolution".

Putin recalled that "judo" is translated into Russian approximately as a

"soft way", which contains "a certain philosophical meaning". This

philosophy, the Russian president said, "teaches us to use and cherish what

we have". Putin's opinion is that this approach can be also used in

interstate relations. "If we cherish the potential which we have

accumulated and use everything that is available with both our country and

our partners, we shall (be able) jointly and gradually ensure the result we

all would like to achieve," he said.

When relating, at the request of a Fuji Terebi journalist, his love of

judo, Putin described this sport as a "very substantial contribution by the

Japanese people to world culture". "I know that very many people in the

world are grateful to the Japanese people for that, and one of such

grateful persons is sitting before you," he said.

In conclusion of the interview, the Russian president, in response to a

question from the host of the programme, said his favourite judo techniques

are "a back throw (tsuri-komi-goshi) and body drop (tai-otoshi)".

*******

#2

NEW FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPT RECOGNIZES RUSSIA'S LIMITATIONS

ITAR-TASS

Moscow, 1st July: President Vladimir Putin approved the Russian

Federation's foreign policy concept yesterday. ITAR-TASS was told by the

president's press service that it contains a system of views on the essence

and main directions of the country's foreign policy.

The adopted concept handles aspects of Russia's national security, foreign,

defence and information policy and cultural links.

In answer to a question earlier from ITAR-TASS, Russian Foreign Minister

Igor Ivanov said: "The previous foreign policy concept was adopted in 1993.

A lot has changed since then. Serious changes are taking place in the world

and have taken place in Russia. Naturally, all of this is taken into

account in foreign policy."

On the subject of what is new in the 2000 concept, Igor Ivanov said "first

and foremost its realism. Our foreign policy priorities are more closely

linked than before to long-term development tasks at home and take into

account the country's real possibilities and resources."

"The highest priority in Russian foreign policy is protection of the

individual, of society and the Russian state. We need to use all our

resources to provide reliable security and to create favourable foreign

conditions for its gradual development. We need to influence general world

processes in the direction of forming a stable, just and democratic world

system," the Russian foreign minister said.

He said "the concept stresses more than before the issue of defending the

rights and interests of Russian citizens and compatriots abroad and the

issue of defending the interests of Russian business abroad.

"We have also tried to assess with more realism the international

situation, the balance between positive and negative tendencies that we are

seeing in the world today."

"Recognizing Russia's limited foreign policy resources, given known

objective factors, we nonetheless take the firm view that Russia has enough

prerequisites to enable it to occupy a respectable place in the world. The

strengthening of Russian statehood and civil society and the quickest move

to solid economic growth are important factors in this," the minister said.

The new concept "states clearly that Russia will pursue an independent and

constructive foreign policy, firmly standing by its interests," the foreign

minister said in conclusion. Our policy is to be based on consistency,

predictability and mutually beneficial pragmatism. Russia will remain one

of the most important stabilizing factors in international relations."

*******

#3

The Globe and Mail (Canada)

July 4, 2000

Chechen rebels launch wave of kamikaze attacks

Suicide bombers inflict heavy casualties on Russian military

GEOFFREY YORK

Moscow Bureau

Moscow -- In their bloodiest attack in months, Chechen rebels have killed at

least 37 Russian soldiers and injured many more in a co-ordinated wave of

suicide bombings against military targets across Chechnya.

The Muslim rebels said they had killed more than 400 Russians, although rebel

claims are often exaggerated. Rebel spokesman Movladi Udugov called it "a

huge catastrophe for Russia" and "the first phase of a major operation for

the liberation of Chechnya."

The bombings served notice that the Chechen separatist rebels are still a

powerful force with the ability to inflict heavy damage on the Russian

military.

Barely a week ago, Russian military commanders were proclaiming that the war

in Chechnya was effectively over. They were boasting that they could afford

to halt their air strikes and artillery attacks because large-scale

resistance had ended.

But the latest rebel bombings make it clear that the war is still raging,

with the Russians still vulnerable to Chechen fighters who have switched to

suicide attacks and other classic guerrilla tactics.

Including civilians and rebels, at least 54 people were killed and more than

100 injured in the suicide bombings at Russian military barracks and command

posts on Sunday, the Kremlin acknowledged yesterday.

In each case, the blasts were triggered by trucks carrying three to five

tonnes of explosives, Russian television said. Russian soldiers fired on the

trucks in most of the incidents, but they were unable to prevent the

explosions.

The deadliest of the suicide bombs was in the Russian-controlled city of

Argun, east of Grozny. Witnesses said a truck roared at high speed toward a

gate outside a Russian military dormitory. It crashed through the barrier and

exploded in a massive blast that destroyed much of the barracks, leaving a

huge crater.

Rescue workers were still digging through the rubble in Argun yesterday, but

Russian officials confirmed that the blast had killed at least 25 Russian

soldiers and elite police officers. At least 81 were injured.

The Russians responded to the bombings by sending helicopters into the skies

to search for the rebels. But they seemed to have little idea where to hunt

for the guerrillas. In one incident, Russian helicopters opened fire on a

residential neighbourhood of Argun, hitting a hostel where refugees were

living. Doctors said 11 refugees were wounded by the Russian helicopters.

A rebel spokesman said the Chechens had two battalions of suicide bombers

with 500 people "ready to die for Islam."

Chechnya's separatist President, Aslan Maskhadov, said the bombings show that

the Russian troops have "no chance of establishing control in Chechnya."

The Chechen capital, Grozny, is filled with rumours that the rebels could be

ready to launch a massive counterattack similar to the offensive that led to

the defeat of the Russian military in 1996 at the end of the 1994-96 conflict

in Chechnya, a Russian television channel reported yesterday.

The Kremlin has refused to negotiate with the Chechen rebels, and the latest

bombings seemed to have done nothing to weaken its resolve.

"There is only one thing that can be done -- to find them and crush them,"

said Colonel-General Valery Manilov, deputy chief of staff in the Russian

armed forces. "Talks will not help."

The suicide bombings began in early June, when the rebels claimed

responsibility for killing a dozen Russian soldiers.

*******

#4

Moscow Times

June 29, 2000

DEFENSE DOSSIER: Budget Fray Begins to Boil

By Pavel Felgenhauer

Two weeks ago, General Konstantin Svidersky sent his soldiers to occupy a

power-distribution station to prevent the local power company from cutting

off the main electric supply of his nuclear intercontinental ballistic

missile base in the Altaisky region in southern Siberia because of unpaid

bills. Each ICBM division has a small rapid-deployment unit to defend silo

bases against surprise attack, and these commandos apparently still occupy

the power station, though the incident was reported by national RTR

television only Tuesday.

General Svidersky's division is armed with the most deadly ICBM ever

deployed: the heavy silo-based SS-18, which can carry a payload of up to

8.8 tons. In arms control agreements, all SS-18s are considered capable of

carrying 10 nuclear warheads of 500 kilotons each. But, in fact, some of

these 34.3-meter-long missiles carry only one 25-megaton warhead f the most

powerful ever deployed on any ICBM f capable of wiping out big cities like

New York or Los Angeles in a single stroke.

Under the START II treaty, ratified by parliament in April, all SS-18s

should be disarmed by 2003 and fully scrapped by January 2008. But today,

all 180 SS-18s are ready for takeoff, should Defense Ministry computers

supply the ICBM onboard computer with launch orders and targeting

coordinates.

It is unnerving to know that such terrible vehicles of destruction may be

left without a proper power supply. It is even more frightening to see

strategic rocket officers in a belligerent mode attacking civilian targets

deep inside Russia. We all hope that ICBM officers on both sides of the

Atlantic are always calm, cool and collected, because who knows what will

happen if these men get really upset?

But this latest incident is not the first time in recent years that the

nation's military bases have had their power supply cut. Several years ago,

the power supply of the huge underground command center of the Strategic

Missile Forces west of Moscow was also cut off; the military was forced to

activate emergency power generators.

Of course, Svidersky's ICBM silos also have backup electricity sources in

case of war, and a power shutoff by a commercial supplier cannot cause

nuclear holocaust in and of itself. In fact, in the past conflicts with

utilities were often provoked intentionally or aggravated by Defense

Ministry officials, not because the situation was critical, but to help in

lobbying for more defense spending.

Over the last decade, our generals have deliberately behaved as squatters,

not paying gas, electricity and other bills, while spending available

resources trying to maintain f despite cuts here and there f the old Soviet

military machine in as intact a state as possible. Today, the nation is an

economic midget, with a gross domestic product some 2 percent of its main

Cold War adversary, the United States. But on paper we are still a military

superpower.

Inside the military, there is much infighting on how to distribute

resources between the army, air force, navy and strategic forces. But all

military chiefs are united on one issue: Defense spending should be

increased f and the more, the better. Recently, the chiefs were full of

hopes that President Vladimir Putin would make good on his rhetoric of

reestablishing "Russian greatness and dignity" by restoring the military to

its Cold War grandeur. But despite Putin's pro-military pronouncements, the

actions of the new government have caused alarm in military circles.

Alexei Kudrin, the new finance minister, said last month that soldiers

fighting in Chechnya are paid too much (up to $1,000 a month); as of June

1, their pay was cut by several times. Kudrin has also said that military

officers will get a pay hike this year that will not even cover inflation,

since they are better off than other state employees. Government-sponsored

tax reform may also soon revoke the income-tax exemption and other benefits

servicemen enjoyed.

At present, the government is putting together the 2001 budget. Kudrin has

said he wants to have a budget surplus; if he gets what he wants, the

generals can kiss good-bye any serious defense-spending hike.

It seems that Putin's pro-liberal economic rhetoric is hurtling toward a

head-on collision with his pro-militaristic sentiments. And it is obvious

that the military will not bow out of the contest gracefully. The timing of

the military attack on the power station and the timing of the news release

about the incident indicate that a serious budget fray between liberalism

and militarism is coming to the fore.

Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent, Moscow-based defense analyst.

*******

#5

Putin's three-month rule puts oligarchs on the defensive

MOSCOW, July 2 (AFP) -

Three months after President Vladimir Putin won power, Russia's business

elite is on the defensive, fearful of attacks from the authorities, courts

and rival "oligarchs."

"Under Boris Yeltsin, the situation was frozen for several years, a bit like

during the Brezhnev era," said economist Christopher Granville of the Fleming

UCB financial group in Moscow.

"Today, there's no consensus any more, everyone's position is in doubt and

anything is possible in the fight for power," he said.

"The oligarchs' current dilemma is simply that none of them understand the

new rules of the game," said Alexei Zabotkin, of the UFG finance house.

Since June 13, when Russia's leading independent media magnate Vladimir

Gusinsky was arrested, several other oligarchs have found themselves under

attack.

However, in most instances, no direct link with the Kremlin has been proven,

although Putin vowed during his election campaign in March that the oligarchs

would disappear as a class under his rule.

On June 20, prosecutors launched an investigation into the 1997 privatisation

of the Norilsk Nickel firm, the world's biggest producer of nickel and

palladium, a rare metal used in catalytic converters.

The mining giant is controlled by the Interros group of Vladimir Potanin,

whom Putin hosted in talks at the Kremlin last week after receiving an open

letter from the business magnate urging the president to intervene in the

Norilsk case.

"It's blackmail, Potanin was the first oligarch to sign the letter of support

by Russia's leading businessmen for Vladimir Gusinsky" said Alexei

Venediktov, editor of the Echo Moscow radio station owned by Gusinsky.

Seventeen captains of Russian industry and finance wrote to the prosecutor

general expressing alarm over Gusinsky's arrest and fears for the future of

democracy, urging his release.

"Putin is going through the oligarchs," commented the Kommersant business

daily, owned by influential businessman Boris Berezovsky.

The Kremlin interview with Potanin resembled "a football coach inviting a

striker to rejoin his team," the paper said.

Other signatories of the oligarchs' joint letter have also come under

pressure. Piotr Aven and Mikhail Fridman, who run the powerful Alfa group,

saw their TNK oil firm raided by investigators probing another contested

privatisation.

Moscow press reports link the raids to complaints from disgruntled rivals,

and the Kremlin has not, so far, been directly implicated in the affair.

However, the hand of the Kremlin has been clearly visible in recent

developments concerning Russia's two biggest firms: the natural gas monopoly

Gazprom and electricity generator UES.

On Friday, rising star Dmitry Medvedev, a close Putin aide, was elected to

the Gazprom board and became its chairman.

Medvedev ran Putin's successful election campaign and is tipped to replace

Alexander Voloshin as Putin's chief of staff after serving his apprenticeship

as first deputy head of the presidential administration.

Political analyst Vladimir Pribylovsky said the string of recent attacks on

leading oligarchs were more likely signs of an intra-clan power struggle

rather than an orchestrated attempt by the Kremlin to weaken them.

"Putin would like to see everyone standing to attention, and he is waiting to

see which group will come out the winner," he said.

Adding to the sense of uncertainty is the fact that some oligarchs would

appear to be more equal than others.

Those who reputedly retain some influence with the young Kremlin master --

such as Berezovsky and Roman Abramovich -- have not yet seen their business

interests come under scrutiny, even though their personal fortunes have also

been based on disputed privatisations.

"Putin wants to redistribute wealth to oligarchs who are close to the

authorities," explained Venediktov.

********

#6

Jamestown Foundation Monitor

July 3, 2000

NEWSPAPER: PUTIN BACKS RESTORING SOVIET ANTHEM. President Vladimir Putin

has reportedly spoken in favor of rehabilitating the hymn of the Soviet

Union. That, at least, was the claim made today by Segodnya, the daily

newspaper published by Media-Most, the media holding run by Vladimir

Gusinsky, who was recently arrested and remains under investigation for

allegedly embezzling government funds. The Soviet anthem would reportedly

replace the one which replaced it following the 1991 Soviet collapse and

which Putin's predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, officially confirmed as the

country's anthem in a presidential decree. Segodnya noted that Belarusan

President Alyaksandr Lukashenka called for the rehabilitation of the Soviet

anthem during a meeting of the joint Russia-Belarus parliamentary assembly

earlier this year, and that Rossiiskaya gazeta, the official Russian

government newspaper, also came out in favor the idea in May. According to

Segodnya, one of the co-authors of the lyrics to the Soviet anthem, Sergei

Mikhalkov--father of Nikita Mikhalkov, the award-winning film director and

monarchist--has told the presidential administration that he is not against

re-writing its lyrics (Segodnya, July 3).

If the report on the Soviet anthem is true, it would correspond to the

recent calls to restore the statue of Felix Dzerzhinsky--the founder of the

Cheka, the Soviet Union's first secret police agency and the forerunner of

the KGB--which stood outside the KGB headquarters at Lubyanka Square before

being removed following the August 1991 abortive hardline putsch. A KGB

veterans group recently sent a letter to Putin, himself a veteran KGB

officer, asking that the statue be restored. Last month, Nikolai

Kharitonov, leader of the Agro-Industrial deputies' group in the Duma, also

called for the Dzerzhinsky statue to be restored (Moskovsky komsomolets,

June 24). Meanwhile, a poll carried out by the Public Opinion Foundation

found that 60 percent of the respondents supported the idea of re-erecting

the Dzerzhinsky monument at Lubyanka Square, while only 21 percent opposed

the move. The poll found that 53 percent of Muscovites supported restoring

the monument, while 35 percent opposed it. At the end of 1998, when the

State Duma called on the Moscow city government to restore the statue, 45

percent of Russians polled said they supported restoring "Iron Felix,"

while 36 percent opposed the move. At that time, 53 percent of Muscovites

polled said that they opposed re-erecting the Dzerzhinsky monument (Russian

agencies, July 2).

It should be noted that the Public Opinion Foundation, one of Russia's

leading polling agencies, has in the past worked on a contract basis with

the Kremlin. This means that the foundation's poll concerning the

Dzerzhinsky monument, along with the demarches by the KGB veterans' group

and Nikolai Kharitonov, could be part of a Kremlin push to restore the

monument--or, at least, a Kremlin trial balloon.

*******

#7

The Russia Journal

July 1-7, 2000

Putin’s weakness endangers society

By Mikhail Delyagin, director of the Institute for Problems of Globalization

Columnist predicts President Vladimir Putin will have trouble implementing

his plans for the nation.

 

President Vladimir Putin’s ideology and action plan is one of "a great leap

forward" ­ tough and rapid liberal economic reforms achieved through

maximum concentration of political power.

This fall, when both the economic and political situation could seriously

deteriorate, Putin’s administration will have to have sorted out

consolidation of political forces and full control over the media and

business. Then it would be logical to "purge" and restructure the

government, the current "interim" government having fulfilled its mission

of reaching agreements with the Paris Club and International Monetary Fund

and preparing a program for the next "working" government.

Then, continuing in the Presidential Administration’s logic of "PR can do

anything," party lists would be scrapped for Duma elections. Most deputies

in the new Duma would be from Unity (Yedinstvo), and the Kremlin would have

no trouble controlling this virtually single-party Duma, which would

provide the stability needed to push through the toughest economic reforms.

But Putin is having trouble just getting through stage one ­ concentration

of power. He’s already managed to get into conflict with all influential

groups in society: With the regions through his federal reforms that give

more power to Moscow; with business ­ the arrest of Vladimir Gusinsky and

renationalization of some companies have frightened off investors; with the

independent media and democratic intelligentsia; with cash-strapped voters

who still hope he will fulfill his electoral promises and who will feel

intensely let down if he doesn’t; with the army and security ministries who

stand to see their already low incomes decrease further in the wake of tax

reforms.

The weakness displayed by the state in the Gusinsky affair has made all the

more clear how Putin’s construction is crumbling around him, for both

economic and political reasons.

His only exit now is to try and once again consolidate society around him.

But a shortage of administrative, organizational, and ­ more importantly ­

intellectual resources, will make this impossible. The result will be an

anti-Putin coalition by the end of summer. This is all the more likely as

there is nothing positive happening in any of the key political areas ­

reform of power, Chechnya, and relations with the outside world.

It is this context that will give rise to two opposing fronts, between

which will be caught not only Putin, but all more moderate forces in

society. The first ­ an anti-Putin front ­ will consist of oligarchs,

governors and the more dogmatic liberals. The second will be made up of

those who support the idea of order. Not just the security ministries will

be represented here. The notion of order finds more and more supporters as

the war in Chechnya drags on and the state shows its helplessness.

There’s no big conspiracy in all this. It’s just the spontaneous

development of two increasingly hostile social forces. Putin’s job as

president is to rein these forces in and channel their energy into working

toward common objectives rather than confrontation. But so far, he doesn’t

seem to know how to do this.

Putin is looking more and more like Mikhail Gorbachev, who didn’t know how

to reconcile the conservatives and the democrats, and so let them ruin the

country. The current forces in Russia can’t achieve anything on their own.

The oligarchs have shown that all they can produce is thieving and

defaults. The security people have shown that they can’t even properly put

together a criminal case, let alone bring about progress in society.

Like a decade ago, society today is in danger, and like a decade ago, it is

because of a weak president. The weakness is unbearable to watch. Putin

with furtive gaze, admitting he doesn’t know how to use a telephone, and

then to top it all off, saying the measures taken by the prosecutor’s

office were unjustified. This weakness could have dreadful consequences ­

Putin’s inability to "get through" to the prosecutor general for

information on Gusinsky’s arrest could be seen as proof of his professional

incompetence. He doesn’t even know how to use the phone.

Putin now has two options. Either he can give in and become a puppet in the

hands of one or the other of the opposing forces in society, and repeat the

fate of Gorbachev. Or he can become a strong president, which doesn’t mean

using force ­ the sign of weakness and stupidity ­ but consolidating the

two forces now appearing in society around common interests.

These common interests could be a society in which the liberal ideal of

personal freedoms and responsibilities is complemented by the ideal of

social responsibility and a minimum of state regulation as a foundation for

market relations.

*******

#8

BBC MONITORING

KREMLIN "OBSESSION" WITH "TOUGH" FOREIGN POLICY RISKS ISOLATING RUSSIA - PAPER

Source: 'Kommersant', Moscow, in Russian 1 Jul 00

Russia is about to publish a new foreign policy blueprint whose main

distinguishing feature is "tough defence of the country's national

interests on the international arena". This, however, is viewed by the West

as "inflexible and even dangerously aggressive", according to the Russian

newspaper `Kommersant'. The following is the text of an article published

in the newspaper on 1st July:

President Vladimir Putin has approved a new blueprint for Russia's foreign

policy. The president's press service announced this yesterday and promised

that the document would be published next week.

The new Russian foreign policy blueprint is a large document, which, the

president's press service reported, "constitutes a set of views on the

substance and main avenues of Russia's foreign policy activity". The

original draft blueprint was discussed by the Security Council three months

ago on the eve of Vladimir Putin's inauguration [as published]. Then it was

decided to put the finishing touches to the document, which is what the

Foreign Ministry and Security Council were instructed to do.

While the two Ivanovs - Sergey [Security Council secretary] and Igor

[foreign minister] - were working on improving the blueprint to enshrine in

it "consistency, predictability, and mutually beneficial pragmatism", the

new Russian president was engaged in putting into practice the main areas

of Russia's foreign policy doctrine. The main distinguishing feature in its

activity is "tough defence of the country's national interests on the

international arena". According to Igor Ivanov, this approach "has nothing

in common with self-isolation". That may be true. But whereas Russia is not

endeavouring to isolate itself, people have been trying of late to keep

their distance from it because of its "tough defence" and its reluctance to

heed the international community's opinion.

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe is demanding that

Russia be expelled from this organization, the EU is scaling down

cooperation, the United States is ceasing to pretend that it takes account

of Russia when making important decisions in the arms control sphere. All

this is the result of the Kremlin's "obsession" with toughness in policy,

which the world actually views as inflexible and even dangerously aggressive.

The Russian regime cannot fail to see the country's growing isolation from

the rest of the world. It is no coincidence that Moscow has of late been

making many efforts to gather around it satellite countries, whose unity is

based on fear. This primarily involves [Belarusian President] Alyaksandr

Lukashenka's regime and the countries of the Customs Union and the CIS

Collective Security Treaty. If the country's new foreign policy blueprint

enshrines that approach in international affairs, Russia will have a grim

future.

******

#9

Moscow Times

June 30, 2000

Security Council Rapidly Gains Power

By Anna Badkhen

For the past year or so, the Security Council has been of little

significance. But now that former Security Council secretary Vladimir Putin

sits in the Kremlin, it is gaining political clout at a rapid rate.

It groups President Putin's closest allies, including the seven governor

generals he has appointed to reign in the regions. And under a bill that

sailed through its first reading Thursday, the council would become the

country's last resort of state power should a state of emergency be declared.

The new emergency bill states that in a situation of political, criminal or

environmental emergency the president can decree a state of emergency under

which the council would run the country.

The 450-seat Duma passed the legislation by a vote of 395 to 2. The bill now

goes to committee for suggested amendments at a second reading scheduled for

the fall session.

The Security Council has been growing increasingly active under Putin,

producing major doctrines on defense and media issues. Some analysts said

Putin is forming it into a power center to rival the Kremlin and government

administrations.

Sergei Markov, director of the Institute for Political Studies, said Putin

has staked much on the council due to the "necessity for increasing

noninstitutional, informal methods of influence on the situation."

By strengthening the council with his own allies, Putin is trying to set it

up in competition with the members of the presidential administration, headed

by Kremlin Chief of Staff Alexander Voloshin, a leading member of the

so-called "family," an ever-changing circle of Kremlin insiders.

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov has worked assiduously to create a

firm power base of his own in the government, flushing out Putin appointee

Dmitry Kozak as head of the government bureaucracy in favor of his protÎgÎ,

Igor Shuvalov.

Boris Kagarlitsky of the Institute for Comparative Politics said Putin was

betting on the Security Council out of desperation.

"I think that the strengthening of this body is happening because [the

Kremlin] is losing control" of the country, Kagarlitsky said.

"When a side structure that is not provided for by the Constitution gains

more and more power, it means that the [state] system is falling apart," he

said.

Formed in 1993 under former President Boris Yeltsin, the Security Council is

chaired by the president. It brings together the so-called power ministers

fthe defense, foreign, interior and emergency situations ministers f the

Federal Security Service director, the seven governor generals and other

officials.

While it enjoyed a period of strong influence when Boris Berezovsky held the

post of deputy secretary on the council from 1996 to 1997, the Security

Council declined responsibility for developing the country's military and

security doctrines, after his dismissal into a largely ceremonial

consultative organ. Although the advisory body is not anti-constitutional,

the Security Council is not provided for by the Constitution, which also came

into force in 1993.

Putin combined the post of Security Council secretary with his job as head of

the Federal Security Service, or FSB, in 1999, before he was tapped as prime

minister. His predecessors include General Alexander Lebed, now Krasnoyarsk

region governor.

After Putin became acting president on Dec. 31, he began to strengthen the

council. Analysts said at the time that he was putting all his eggs in one

basket.

Putin's replacement as Security Council secretary was Sergei Ivanov, the

president's inconspicuous ally from St. Petersburg. Like Putin, Ivanov worked

in the KGB. He once told reporters he considers all mentions of his

unremarkable appearance as compliments.

Ivanov was confirmed in his post in late May, immediately after Putin

appointed to the council his hand-picked regional envoys, among them two of

his former colleagues from the Leningrad KGB and three military officers.

By appointing his envoys to the council, Putin put them on par with the top

government ministers.

The Security Council burst into unprecedented activity after Putin came to

power. In April, it approved f and Putin signed into force f a new military

doctrine that broadened the Kremlin's authority to use nuclear weapons. The

previous military doctrine was prepared and signed into force in 1993.

Last week, the council approved an information security doctrine, a document

that has no analogies in the past. The document will become a law as soon as

Putin signs a decree enacting it.

Kagarlitsky warned that entrusting the Security Council with emergency rule

may provoke a coup like the 1991 putsch, when high-ranking Soviets attempted

to unseat President Mikhail Gorbachev.

The emergency bill maps out the conditions under which a state of emergency

can be introduced. The president can decree a state of emergency if there are

"attempts to usurp or appropriate power, forcible changes of constitutional

rule or its fundamentals; terrorist acts, siege of particular territories;

mass disorder; inter-ethnic, confessional and religious conflicts accompanied

by violence that pose a threat to the life and safety of citizens, or to the

normal functioning of state and public institutions; or emergency situations

of a technological, ecological or environmental kind."

In order to become valid, the presidential decree must be approved by the

Federation Council within 72 hours.

******

#10

Vremya MN

June 28, 2000

[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]

GRIGORY RAPOTA: "I'M AGAINST GUNG-HO SPIRIT IN THE ARMS

TRADE"

     A conference was recently held in the Sukhoi design bureau

in the town of Zhukovsky, attended by Grigory Rapota, First

Deputy Minister of Industry, Science and Technology. The

subject on the agenda concerned Russia's prospects on the world

market of aviation technology, above all military-technical

cooperation.

Grigory Rapota discussed some of these questions with Sergei

Putilov of Vremya Novostei.

    

     Question: What problems do weapons producers want you to

resolve first and foremost?

     Answer: Weapons exporters complain, with good reason, that

they have problems with emerging on foreign markets without

state assistance. Indeed, the arms trade is mostly a

political-economic question. And the government should act as

the trade agent, lobbying the interests of its defence

industries. This is why we will try to help them as much as we

can.

     On the other hand, we should not overestimate the

possibilities of the state. Our weapons are frequently more

competitive than the weapons produced by our rivals, but we

cannot win a place on the market because our rivals, although

they sometimes sell inferior commodities, offer better

financial conditions. They most often grant them long-term

loans for the purchase of weapons. For example, the USA

annually grants 1.3 billion dollars in tied credits to Egypt,

and 1.8 billion dollars to Israel. So, where would Egypt or

Israel buy weapons? In France, Britain or the USA?

Consequently, Russia should help its arms exporters in a

similar manner. Although we must admit that Russia has very

limited possibilities in this sphere.

    

     Question: So, we will not be able to make a great leap in

the export of weapons and hardware in the near future?

     Answer: We must above all maintain the nascent trend,

which will not be simple. Last year we sold weapons to the tune

of 3.5 billion dollars, and the returns this year will most

probably reach 4 billion dollars. If we maintain this trend,

Russia will get 5 billion dollars in arms exports revenues in a

year or two.

     On the other hand, I am against the gung-ho spirit,

especially in such delicate sphere as the arms trade. Some

experts say things that lead us to believe that foreign clients

cannot wait to buy our weapons. Let's be realistic. There is a

harsh competition on the market, what with the powerful

military-industrial complex of the USA and vast sums of money

allocated to producers there, the kind of money we lack. So,

when evaluating the prospects, we should take into

consideration all circumstances, rather than say that we can

sell weapons to the tune of tens of billions of dollars. And

some people really make such irresponsible statements.

    

     Question: This probably concerns also Russia's prospects

on the market of aviation technology. Judging by available

forecasts, new-generation American and European fighters F-22

Raptor, JSF, Eurofighter and Rafale will dominate the market in

a few years. Why is not the Russian government working hard

enough to ensure the creation of a combat aviation complex of a

new generation.

     Answer: Personally, I think that we must create such

fighter without delay. But the state in the person of the

Defence Ministry should say exactly what aircraft it needs,

following which the money will be spent on creating it.

    

     Question: We need such plane not only to ensure the

national defence ability. We also need it to maintain our

positions on the world arms market. Maybe we should create two

versions of such plane, one for export and one for domestic

consumption, so to speak?

     Answer: I don't think a plane created for the air force

would greatly differ from its export modification. The trends

are the same everywhere.

     Such plane must be multifunctional, have better control

systems and engine, and more sophisticated weapons. I want to

stress that our work on foreign markets should also serve the

interests of national security. Be it an export or a domestic

variant, we need above all a plane with certain characteristics

and combat possibilities. And this is where the military must

have their say.

    

     Question: The Russian government has announced a policy of

creating integrated structures in the framework of defence

industries. Is this policy justified?

     Answer: The whole world is doing this in the aerospace

industry, which can be explained by growing competition on

foreign markets. The need is apparent if we look at this

problem from the viewpoint of increasing export possibilities

and raising the competitiveness of our commodities.

    

******

#11

Vek

No. 25

[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]

VLADIMIR YAKOVLEV: "THE WORLD IS TOTTERING ON THE EDGE OF

NUCLEAR ANARCHY"

     Colonel-General Vladimir YAKOVLEV, Commander of the

Strategic Missile Force, interviewed by Nikolai POROSKOV

     Question: It has become traditional to say that the

withdrawal of the USA from the 1972 ABM Treaty would destroy

the system of nuclear security and treaties, that took decades

to create. But what exactly will this destroy?

     Answer: It will destroy the trunk of agreements based on

the 1972 ABM Treaty, namely SALT-1, SALT-2, the treaty on the

liquidation of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles,

START-1 and START-2, and possibly START-3. It is like

destroying the foundation of a building. This will also affect

two parallel agreements, on the comprehensive prohibition of

nuclear tests and on nuclear non-proliferation. This will also

encourage the so-called threshold states and unofficial nuclear

states to plunge into nuclear anarchy.

     Besides, Russia and the USA will become unpredictable to

each other from the viewpoint of progress in the development of

nuclear weapons, since they will dismantle the system of

verification inspections, which entails hundreds of visits by

delegations of either side, reduce to naught the 1,000

notifications, which we exchange on training launches, as well

as the exchange of telemetric information.

    

     Question: During his visit to Italy, President Putin

suggested creating a common European ABM system. Let's leave

the political side of this proposal aside. But what are the

technical aspects of the creation of such system?

     Answer: As of now, Russia has the research achievements, a

cooperation of industries, the technological and test base for

improving ABM systems in a sufficiently effective way. We have

all requisite elements but money. If the political decision is

made, we will create a common European ABM system. Our

information space enables us to fully control the southern

underbelly of Russia and Europe. This includes the threshold

states, which have, or can acquire, delivery vehicles for

nuclear warheads.

     Targets in Russia and Europe can become feasible [for

these delivery vehicles] in the next 20-25 years, but not

targets in the USA. At the first stage, we would determine the

most vulnerable targets in Europe, in particular, nuclear power

stations and state control agencies, and open umbrellas over

them by deploying anti-missiles. We could also create new

radars.

    

     Question: What is the Russian ABM system now? The trigger

of the Strategic Missile Force?

     Answer: We have the equipment allowed by the 1972 ABM

Treaty, in particular, the space-based early warning systems -

an orbital group that controls the territory of the US missile

bases and gives the Supreme Commander a chance to make

decisions on possible reply actions. The second echelon

consists of ground-based radars. And anti-missiles, of course.

    

     Question: Judging by the current developments, the

Americans are resolved to create an NMD system. They have built

a radar station in Alaska and in Vardo in Norway. Why are they

dangerous to us?

     Answer: There are two radars in Norway, Globus I and

Globus II. If they are linked up with the radar in Alaska, they

will be able to tackle the tasks of the US ABM system. The

Norwegian radar controls the areas patrolled by our navy in the

Barents Sea and the northern trajectory between Plesetsk and

Kamchatka.

     Although we provide all telemetric information about

missile launches, these radars can also acquire additional

information.

If this station works jointly with the radars of cruisers with

guided missiles, which Norway will receive and which can be

hypothetically armed with Aegis and Standard anti-missile

systems, the system can be used to liquidate our missiles at

the boost stage. 

    

     Question: During their meeting in Moscow, President

Clinton and Putin signed the Memorandum on Agreement on the

Establishment of a Joint Centre for Exchange of Data from Early

Warning Systems and Notifications of Missile Launches (JDEC).

It says that the USA and Russia will provide processed launch

information to the JDEC. Does this mean that there will be no

mutual notification in case of a nuclear conflict between our

countries? And second, must we provide the Americans with

information about missile launches in China and India, which US

radars do not cover, and must the USA provide information about

its NATO partners?

     Answer: Yes, we must. Information shall be provided to the

JDEC from national warning systems, processed there, so that

both Russian and American combat crews would be able to use

this data.

Without opening access to the algorithm of our systems, of

course. Information can be provided to third countries on

agreement between Russia and the USA.

     Of course, the JDEC will not be created to prevent a

nuclear conflict. We hope that eventually other countries would

join in its work on a contractual basis. Today Russia exchanges

official notifications of the launches of ICBMs and space

launch vehicles only with the USA and Norway.

    

     Question: Maybe the US NMD is not as black as it is

painted?

Independent experts have calculated that it will take some

20,000 anti-missiles in six or seven NMD regions in the USA to

liquidate 1,500 Russian warheads. Can the USA create such a

vast system?

     Answer: These calculations can play their part in

influencing common Americans, but not specialists. According to

US experts, only 60-80 out of the 100 anti-missiles of the US

NMD system will be effective. We should also remember about the

great variety of the means of influence, which include the use

of both conventional and nuclear weapons. The balance of forces

will change if the USA created two NMD areas.

    

     Question: Mr. Rotfeld, Director of SIPRI, claims that

Russia and the USA need no more than 300 warheads, although

there are 22,000 warheads in the world now. What do you think

about this?

     Answer: Why should we listen to Rotfeld? The Russian

President says we need 1,500 warheads, and he relied on the

expert evaluation of the Russia-USA balance of forces,

development prospects and lineup in the nuclear club and

possible nuclear progress of threshold states in the next 10-15

years.

This figure is substantiated from the economic,

military-strategic and political viewpoints. There are many

opinions similar to Rotfeld's, but these people bear no

responsibility for the security of the state and the system

agreements.

    

     Question: The scrapped missiles are dismembered at special

bases and the Ministry of Atomic Energy removes weapons-grade

plutonium from warheads. But the Americans are storing these

elements, so as to be able to return them to their rightful

place in case of need. This is called the return potential. Do

we have it, too?

     Answer: There is a problem of the return potential, but it

does not amount to the military-strategic superiority, which is

frequently mentioned. This loophole can be liquidated by

START-3.

    

     Question: We count warheads in the Strategic Missile

Force, the navy and aviation. Maybe we should return to the

idea of the strategic deterrence forces under single command?

     Answer: We have long been assured of the effectiveness of

such forces. The decision was made back in 1991, but subjective

reasons prevented its implementation.

    

     Question: Let's imagine a scale of contributions of each

of the three elements of the triad to nuclear deterrence. It is

said that the aviation component should be stronger. Will we

ask Ukraine for the strategic bombers it inherited?

     Answer: The land-based group has always played, and will

continue to play the star role. It tackles 99% of tasks in the

reply-retaliation strike and some 60% of tasks in the reply

strikes. It has 65% of warheads and is maintained in permanent

readiness, with a coefficient of at least 0.96.  It holds the

pride of place in the deterrence scale. The USA has always put

the spotlight in the negotiating process on the land-based

group.

Ours are symmetric structures. The largest US element is its

naval component, followed by the aviation and land groups. In

Russia, the largest element is the land-based group (stationary

and mobile), followed by the naval and aviation components. The

strengthening of the aviation component will create certain

problems.

    

     Question: Do you think that the latest US plans show that

the USA has dropped the concept of mutual assured destruction

in favour of a concept of guaranteed US survival?

     Answer: Mutual assured destruction and unacceptable

damage, the ideas which we took up in the 1960s and have been

faithfully repeating since then, are a myth. Assured survival

is the continuation of the myth.

    

******

#12

Islamic extremism, security, economic coop to top Central Asia meet

DUSHANBE, July 4 (AFP) -

A five-nation summit led by Russia and China was due to open here Wednesday

with sights set on boosting security, increasing economic cooperation and

staving off Central Asia resurgent Islamic extremism.

The fight against terrorism and separatism will dominate the agenda when

Chinese President Jiang Zemin and leaders of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan

and Tajikistan meet Wednesday in the Tajik capital Dushanbe, analysts said.

The Shanghai Five group was set up originally to resolve border issues, but

its focus has shifted amid mounting concern about the rise of Islamic

fundamentalism in the region.

Central Asian leaders blame Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, which shares a 2,000

kilometer (1,200 mile) border with Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan,

for the spread of extremism, weapons and drugs across their territory.

China is also nervous about simmering separatism among the mostly Muslim

ethnic Uighurs in its western Xinjiang province.

Analysts say Russian President Vladimir Putin is likely to push for a united

front against the mutually perceived danger when he meets fellow leaders at

the summit.

Moscow accuses Afghanistan's hardline Taliban militia of providing military

support to Chechen separatists, and in May threatened air strikes against

Islamist rebel training camps in areas controlled by the Taliban.

The fifth gathering of regional leaders since 1996, this year's summit will

include Uzbekistan as an observer, and a meeting of foreign ministers, said

Igor Sattarov, head of information at the foreign ministry.

Uzbekistan, which was rocked by a series of bomb attacks in its capital

Tashkent in February last year, has called on Russia for protection against

terrorism and extremism.

Russia, under Putin, has been trying to reassert its influence in the region

by offering military assistance in the area of security.

Both China and Russia are competing with the United States and Iran for

influence in the resource-rich region for control over the transportation of

Central Asia's oil and gas wealth.

This issue is also likely to feature on the talks agenda.

Jiang, who was arriving in Tajikistan late Monday, will also tour

Turkmenistan, which has some of the world's largest gas reserves but lacks

access to world markets.

The Chinese president is expected to push a 7,000-kilometer pipeline project

while in Ashgabat, which would ship 28 billion cubic meters of gas to China's

Xinjiang province at a cost of 8.5 billion dollars.

The pipeline proposal has hardly moved forward since an agreement was signed

in 1995 for Exxon, Mitsubishi and the Chinese National Oil and Gas

Corporation to study its feasibility.

Analysts say the proposal is unlikely to be commercially viable and that

China's bid to gain a foothold in Central Asia will come up against the

stumbling block of Russia.

"Central Asia still fears China. Russia is closer to Central Asia

historically and culturally and it would be the lesser of the two evils,"

said Dosym Satpayev, at the Central Asian Political Research Agency.

Russia and China may use the forum to strengthen their own strategic

partnership, said Yevgeny Volk, of the Heritage Foundation in Moscow.

The two countries are fighting to stave off US domination in world politics.

Both have strongly condemned the NATO bombings in Yugoslavia and vehemently

protested US plans for a national missile defense system, which they warn

could trigger an arms race.

Putin and Jiang are expected to hold one-on-one talks during the course of

the summit and Putin plans to visit China on July 18.

The leaders will hold a joint session in the morning after which they will

sign a Dushanbe Declaration summing up their meeting, while China, Kyrgyzstan

and Tajikistan will sign a separate trilateral border agreement.

******