Russia Weekly #107

CDI Russia Weekly-#107

23 June 2000

Edited by David Johnson

Center for Defense Information

1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW

Washington DC 20036

phone: 202-332-0600; fax:202-462-4559

djohnson@cdi.org

The CDI Russia Weekly is an e-mail newsletter that carries news and

analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political,

economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With funding

from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, CDI Russia Weekly is a

project of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI),

a nonprofit research and education organization.

CDI Russia Weekly web page (with archive): http://www.cdi.org/russia/

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Contents:

1. Itar-Tass: PUTIN OFFERS TO REDUCE STRATEGIC WEAPONS TO 1,500.

2. Segodnya: Oleg Odnokolenko, WAIT FOR AN ANSWER. ASYMMETRICAL ANSWER. Russia can be drawn into a ruinous arms race.

3. Moscow Times: Pavel Felgenhauer, DEFENSE DOSSIER: ABM Proposal an Old Ploy.

4. Voice of America: Eve Conant on Andrei Babitsky and growing concern about press freedom in Russia.

5. RFE/RL: Paul Goble, Russia: Analysis From Washington --

A De Facto Veto? (re Russia and NATO expansion)

6. Moscow Times: Oksana Yablokova, WHO Ranking Rankles Health Chiefs.

7. US Department of State's Foreign Media Reaction: Russia:

Gusinsky Arrest And Implications For Press Freedom.

******

PUTIN OFFERS TO REDUCE STRATEGIC WEAPONS TO 1,500

ITAR-TASS

Moscow, 22nd June: Russian President Vladimir Putin has stated that Russia

is ready to negotiate more substantial cuts in stockpiles of strategic

nuclear arms with the USA. In a letter, sent to co-chairmen of

international organization World Doctors for Prevention of Nuclear War, the

text of which was forwarded to Interfax by the presidential press service

on Thursday [22nd June], Putin writes that Russia is ready any time from

now to proceed further towards larger nuclear cuts and begin negotiations

with the American side on the new START-3 treaty.

"In our opinion, we have an opportunity not to stop at the summary levels

of 2,000-2,500 strategic warheads, as the leaders of our two countries have

agreed in Helsinki in 1997, but to cut their number down to 1,500 units,"

the letter says.

Putin noted that Russia has recently ratified the START-2 treaty and a

package of New York 1997 ABM agreements. The letter says that

implementation of these documents will lead to reduction of the total

number of strategic offensive weapons by approximately two thirds. "We are

relying on the USA to also sign the START-2 and the documents related to it

so as to begin their implementation as soon as possible," Putin writes in

his reply letter to the organization.

He said he appreciates the concern expressed in the letter sent to him by

members of this organization which said that "not all the possibilities

have yet been explored in the world for successful progress in nuclear

disarmament". In the Russian president's opinion, a lot depends on the

result of the discussion on the 1972 ABM treaty in connection with the US

plans to create a national missile defence system.

Putin also noted that the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

by Russia "convincingly shows our firm intention to put up a barrier to the

qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons". However, "the problem is that

the aims of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty can only be achieved if there

is participation of the states whose signature is a must for the treaty to

come into force, and, first and foremost, the USA".

Responding to a proposal of the letter's authors with regard to measures

aimed at improving the safety of nuclear missiles, Putin recalled that at

present all Russian ballistic missiles had the so-called zero flight

mission. "Way back in May 1997 Russia found it possible to adopt decisions

on not targeting its strategic nuclear weapons. It was done in order to

reduce even further the risk of an accidental nuclear conflict," the

president said.

He noted that the Russian-US accord on setting up a joint centre for

exchanging data from early warning systems and warning on missile launches,

which was signed at the June summit in Moscow, envisages the implementation

of measures aimed at improving nuclear safety. "We will continue to do

everything we can to strengthen guarantees ruling out technical and other

faults linked with the nuclear weapons," Putin said.

He praised the contribution which the International Physicians for the

Prevention of Nuclear War international organization is making to the

strengthening of peace and stability on the planet.

******

Segodnya

June 22, 2000

[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]

WAIT FOR AN ANSWER. ASYMMETRICAL ANSWER

Russia can be drawn into a ruinous arms race

By Oleg ODNOKOLENKO

On June 21 Russia made a step towards a nuclear missile

war.

After congratulating the graduates of the Peter the Great

Missile Academy, Vladimir Yakovlev, commander of the Strategic

Missile Force, unexpectedly unveiled the essence of the

asymmetrical measures Russia might take in reply to the US

plans of deploying an NMD system, which had been kept secret

before.

First, Russia might build up the number of warheads on its

intercontinental ballistic missiles (the Topol system was

initially designed for MIRVed missiles). The force commander

said this would make "the mythical" US NMD system "an even

greater myth."

Second - and this is a sensation, Yakovlev did not exclude

the possibility that, if the USA withdraws from the 1972 ABM

Treaty, Russia may withdraw from the agreement on the

liquidation of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. Such

missiles cannot reach the USA (their range is 5,500km), but

they can cover Europe up to and including its resorts on the

Atlantic coast.

Russia's withdrawal from the agreement on the liquidation

of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles would again turn

Europe into a hostage of the superpowers' confrontation. In

accordance with its strategic security concept, the USA plans

to deploy 100,000 troops with command stations and

corresponding equipment in Europe, and these would be befitting

targets for Russian missiles, Yakovlev inferred.

The force commander stressed that his statement was not an

impromptu one. "This question has long been discussed, and all

requisite research, economic, military and technical

feasibility studies have been completed," he said. He pointed

out, in particular, that "Russia has the technological

possibilities for the creation of a group of intermediate- and

shorter-range missiles, since the facilities for the production

of current delivery vehicles perfectly fit this purpose" and

hence the production of such missiles "would be much cheaper."

General Vladimir Dvorkin, head of the 4th Central Research

Institute of the Russian Defence Ministry, outlined the details

of such technical process. A Topol missile can be made one

stage shorter, which results in the Pioneer three-head missile

of an intermediate range. It can reach any European capital

within minutes. The trouble is that the US Pershing-2 missile

can also reach Moscow within 7-8 minutes (not all Kremlin

dwellers can reach the bomb shelter within that time). Of

course, Russia can withdraw from the agreement on intermediate-

and shorter-range missiles, but the USA has many more financial

and industrial possibilities to quickly restore its group of

intermediate- and shorter-range missiles in Europe (440 such

missiles were liquidated under the agreement).

And there is also the political side to this problem.

Moscow had hinted before that the liquidation of the 1972 ABM

Treaty would topple the entire system of strategic agreements.

But the question of the agreement on intermediate- and

shorter-range missiles had not been raised at the level of

presidents or experts. Instead, the Russian president

alternately called on the USA and Europe to create a common ABM

system (it is rumoured that he is also prepared to discuss this

subject in China). The Western experts had not yet analysed

these initiatives, when Vladimir Yakovlev made his stunning

statement about "the asymmetrical reply." On the other hand,

Yakovlev was most probably allowed to speak up, in an attempt

to put the final scare on the USA. But this smart move does not

fit in with the Russo-American ABM consultations underway in

Oslo.

******

Moscow Times

June 22, 2000

DEFENSE DOSSIER: ABM Proposal an Old Ploy

By Pavel Felgenhauer

Last week in Berlin, President Vladimir Putin announced that a joint tactical

anti-ballistic missile system that could cover Europe, Russia and possibly

the United States is technically feasible and that "all we need is the

political will."

Russia has been developing ABM systems since the late '50s and has much ABM

experience that other nations do not have. The nation today has the only

functioning ABM system in the world: 100 interceptors of the A-35 system

deployed around Moscow, ready to destroy any incoming missile or warhead.

However, the A-35 or its enhanced A-135 modification were never designed as a

"tactical" system or intended to cover a continent. For decades, the

country's scientists and engineers worked to create a strategic ABM to

intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles over a limited area. Sixty of

the A-35 interceptors have a range of 150 kilometers f the maximum allowed

under the 1972 ABM Treaty f while the rest have an even smaller range of from

20 to 60 kilometers. Neither the A-35 interceptors nor the technology that

Russian engineers developed while making them can be used to defend Western

Europe.

Existing Russian ABM interceptors are nuclear-tipped. For decades, our

engineers experimented with different ideas of ABM defense, including

interceptors armed with conventional high explosives or even "hit-to-kill

vehicles" that ram an enemy warhead. But high explosives proved ineffective,

while hit-to-kill was considered technically impossible. All work on

hit-to-kill "direct intercept" was stopped in the Soviet Union in the 1960s

and has not resumed.

The only workable solution was "nuclear indirect intercept." A nuclear

explosion can destroy a warhead or ICBM, even if the interceptor goes off a

kilometer or more away from the target. If Russia's ABM system is ever

activated, the skies over Moscow will be illuminated with "defensive" nuclear

explosions, some of them happening only 10 to 20 kilometers from the Kremlin

when the short-range interceptors take off.

The A-35 system was designed not to protect Moscow per se, but to disable the

first wave of incoming U.S. warheads and give the Soviet leadership 10 to 15

extra minutes to get airborne and out of town before all hell breaks loose.

Since Moscow was doomed anyway, close-range nuclear intercept was considered

acceptable. And, anyway, the deployment of such Russian ABM interceptors

outside of the Moscow region would violate the ABM Treaty.

Instead, Moscow is now proposing to use its S-300 long-range anti-aircraft

missiles or more advanced versions of the same weapon to shoot down rogue

missiles during the "boost stage" f at take-off, when a ballistic missile is

still going relatively slowly, full of easily flammable fuel and highly

vulnerable.

The problem is that the S-300 was never actually designed to intercept

ballistic missiles. The S-300 is designed to hit a plane with shrapnel that

is created after its conventional warhead explodes 20 to 30 meters off

target.

Since the 1991 Gulf War, Russian producers have been insisting that the S-300

can also destroy ballistic missiles, but this is mostly sales talk.

High-velocity shrapnel is good for destroying planes, but cannot guarantee

the destruction of a warhead, especially a chemical or a biological one.

Actually, making many holes in a biological or chemical warhead could help

create a deadly aerosol that could cover an area much larger than the one

intended by the enemy.

In 1991, the U.S. military used shrapnel-producing anti-aircraft Patriot

missiles over Israel and Saudi Arabia against Iraqi missiles. The Patriots

did intercept Iraqi Scuds, but they could not destroy them. It was precisely

after this debacle that the United States began to concentrate money and

effort on plans to make hit-to-kill interceptors both for "theater" and

national ABM defense.

Recently, it has been disclosed that the new U.S. "kill vehicles" are still

full of flaws, cannot distinguish an actual warhead from a decoy and are not

ready for swift deployment. It is not clear if these "kill vehicles" will

ever be reliable. But neither is the S-300 f deployed on land or sea f a

bargain.

Guaranteed "boost stage" intercept over, say, continental Asia, using

modified anti-aircraft missiles stationed hundreds of kilometers away, is

virtually impossible. Putin's ABM initiative seems to be very much the same

old Soviet "peace initiative," designed to produce cracks in Western ranks

and at the same time prod more concessions on ABM and other issues out of the

United States.

Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent defense analyst based in Moscow.

******

Voice of America

DATE=6/22/2000

TTITLE=RUSSIA / MEDIA

BYLINE=EVE CONANT

DATELINE=MOSCOW

INTRO: Russian authorities are continuing their

investigation of Radio Liberty reporter Andrei

Babitsky, who was best known for his reports about the

conflict in Chechnya. Moscow Correspondent Eve Conant

reports his case - and the arrest of another top media

figure - have added to growing concern about press freedom

in Russia.

TEXT: Reporter Andrei Babitsky told a news conference

that an investigation into his alleged forging of

documents has been extended for a third time. He also

said he is being blocked from receiving identification

documents that would allow him to leave Moscow.

Mr. Babitsky was arrested in Chechnya earlier this

year and spent several weeks in the notorious

Chernokozovo detention center. He is well known for

his investigative, hard-hitting reporting from behind

rebel lines in Chechnya. His reports on U-S supported

Radio Liberty have aggravated Kremlin authorities who

have branded him in the past as - anti-Russian.

/// BABITSKY ACT - IN RUSSIAN - FADE UNDER ///

Mr. Babitsky tells reporters he is quite sure his case

- in his words - was supervised, and instructions to

deport me from Russia, were issued by Vladimir Putin -

who was acting president at the time.

Although the opinions Mr. Babitsky expresses are his

own, there is mounting concern that the new Putin

administration is ready to crack down in one form or

another on perceived dissent. Mr. Babitsky's lawyer,

Genri Reznik, told a news

conference that authorities have made it impossible

for his client to get new identification documents

necessary for him to travel and work freely.

/// REZNIK ACT ONE - IN RUSSIAN - FADE UNDER ///

Mr. Reznik says he believes Russian authorities are

committing a crime - obstructing a journalist's work.

He says there is no other explanation for what he

calls - the arbitrariness of the denial of issuing him

a passport. He says it is obvious Russian authorities

believe Mr. Babitsky's work as a reporter presents a danger.

/// OPT ///

Mr. Reznik says he will open a criminal

case against authorities for obstructing Mr.

Babitsky's reporting. He says it is possible that

Russian authorities are moving so slowly in their

investigation in the hope that the public will slowly

forget Mr. Babitsky's predicament.

/// END OPT ///

There also is the case of another of Mr. Reznik's

clients - media tycoon Vladimir Gusinsky - who spent

several days in jail last week before being formally

charged with large-scale fraud.

Mr. Gusinsky is head of a media empire that includes

Russia's only independent nationwide television

network, the Echo Moscow radio station where U-S

President Clinton spoke during a recent visit, and

several liberal newspapers. Each of those outlets has

been critical of President Putin and the military

offensive in Chechnya that helped catapult him to power.

/// REZNIK ACT TWO - IN RUSSIAN - FADE UNDER ///

Defense lawyer Reznik says it is easy to compare the

cases of Mr. Babitsky and Mr. Gusinsky. He says that

authorities do not like free and honest reporting. In

his words - the reason why Mr. Babitsky is being

persecuted is the same reason why Mr. Gusinsky was

arrested - the authorities do not want sensitive

problems to be reported objectively."

President Putin has said Mr. Gusinsky's arrest seemed

excessive, but that he could not personally interfere

in the case. Friday, Russia's lower-house of

parliament is to debate whether to recommend that

President Putin fire Russia's prosecutor-general

because of his handling of the Gusinsky case.

******

Russia: Analysis From Washington -- A De Facto Veto?

By Paul Goble

Washington, 21 June 2000 (RFE/RL) -- A senior German defense official says

that NATO must secure Moscow's agreement before it undertakes any further

expansion, thereby apparently acknowledging what many East Europeans have

long suspected: that the Russian government now has a de facto, if not de

jure veto over the Western alliance's future plans.

Speaking in the Estonian capital of Tallinn on Monday, Walter Kolbow, the

state secretary of the German defense ministry, stated that Moscow does not

have a real right to block NATO's expansion. But he immediately added that

the Western alliance must overcome Russia's current objections before taking

in any new members, thus effectively making Moscow the final arbiter of the

decision.

While Kolbow refused to predict whether NATO will invite Estonia, Latvia, and

Lithuania to join in 2002, the German defense official emphasized that

"Russia's participation in European security processes is important," adding

that "even Russia's entry into NATO cannot be totally ruled out." But he did

concede that "this is a question of distant future."

Coming on the heels of Russian President Vladimir Putin's friendly meetings

with German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder in Berlin, Kolbow's words seem

certain to spark a firestorm of speculation in Eastern Europe about the

possible existence of yet another deal between Moscow and Berlin concerning

their fate.

That is all the more likely for three reasons.

First, in recent days, Putin has said repeatedly that Germany is now Russia's

principle foreign policy partner, assertions that have disturbed many in

Eastern Europe who have suffered both when Moscow and Berlin have agreed as

well as when the two have not. Moreover, some Western analysts have already

noted that setting Germany against the U.S. has long been a Russian priority.

Second, leaders of NATO countries have gone out of their way to welcome

Russia back to the NATO-Russian permanent joint council. Kolbow was no

exception. In Tallinn, he welcomed the fact that NATO and Russia "again sit

at the same table," after a period of what he called the "disrupted"

relations "after the Kosovo conflict." Such warm words are also likely to

enhance suspicions.

And third, many East Europeans are likely to view Kolbow's remark as evidence

that their suspicions about NATO-Russian cooperation are well-founded,

whatever other Western leaders may say. When the NATO body including Russia

was created, U.S. President Bill Clinton said that it gave Russia "a voice,

not a veto." Many in Eastern Europe are likely to suspect that Kolbow's words

reflect the actual state of affairs.

But Kolbow's remarks may very well have broader consequences in the alliance

itself, in Eastern Europe and in Moscow.

Some in NATO may seek to disown Kolbow's words or to suggest that he was

speaking only for himself. Such denials, if they in fact are issued, will

tend to create additional tensions within the alliance, something that may

also serve Moscow's effort to block NATO expansion. But if no one in NATO

disowns Kolbow, East Europeans will conclude that he was speaking for all the

current members.

Across Eastern Europe, such a conclusion in turn will simultaneously

exacerbate national debates about whether to make the effort NATO membership

requires or shift spending to other areas. If East Europeans conclude now

that they are unlikely to get in, some are likely to pull back from their

earlier commitments, others will seek an accommodation with Russia, and at

least a few may try to go it alone.

In Moscow, both the possible tensions in NATO and the divides within Eastern

Europe are likely to cause Putin and his government to step up their efforts

to divide the alliance and weaken its resolve to enhance the security of

Europe and the North Atlantic.

But regardless of what NATO leaders say after Kolbow's remarks, many in the

Russian capital seem certain to see his comments as a green light to do just

that.

******

Moscow Times

June 23, 2000

WHO Ranking Rankles Health Chiefs

By Oksana Yablokova

Staff Writer

The World Health Organization issued a report this week evaluating health

care systems around the world and it has been met with bewilderment in

Russia.

Out of 191 WHO member countries, Russia was ranked 130th, sandwiched between

Peru and Honduras and far behind 11 former Soviet republics. Only Kyrgyzstan,

Tajikistan and Turkmenistan rank lower.

The research, which is part of the WHO Health Report 2000, concluded that

France has the best health care system, with Italy ranked second. Sierra

Leone was ranked last behind Myanmar.

Health Ministry spokesman Alexander Zharov said the report was based on data

from 1997 and Russia's low ranking does not reflect the current state of the

health care system.

"While for France, where the economy is stable, three years do not mean much,

in Russia they mean a lot," he said Thursday.

Dr. David Evans, a WHO project coordinator, said the researchers focused on

five main indicators: the level of the population's health; distribution of

health care in population groups; responsiveness to people's needs; fairness

of responsiveness among different groups; fairness in financing among

different groups, evaluating the proportion of income people devote to health

care.

Russia's performance was so poor largely due to the dramatic decrease in life

expectancy and the declining birth rate, Evans said by telephone from Geneva.

Despite the rankings, he said the purpose of the research was not to compare

different health care systems. "The idea of having a list comparing one

health care system to the others would seem controversial. But there is no

comparison here at all," Evans said.

Boris Rozenfeld, health economist of the Academy of Sciences' Institute for

Economic Forecasting, said the report f which ranks Kazakhstan 64th, only 27

places behind the United States and 66 places above Russia f appears

controversial no matter what categories were used to rank health care

systems.

"The money Russia spends on health care needs is ridiculous if compared to

the United States and Britain, but it's difficult to imagine that Kazakhstan

boasts a better health care system and spends more money on health than we

do," Rozenfeld said.

Spending 6 percent of its gross domestic product on health needs, Britain was

ranked 17th, while the United States, which spends more on health care than

any other country in the world (13.7 percent of GDP) was 37th.

After Kazakhstan, the next highest former Soviet republic was Belarus, ranked

72nd.

******

US Department of State

Foreign Media Reaction

June 21, 2000

Russia: Gusinsky Arrest And Implications For Press Freedom

Russian newspapers, with few exceptions, have been sharply critical of the

arrest of Media Most owner Vladimir Gusinsky, tending to view it as an

attempt by the Kremlin to silence its most prominent press critic. His

eventual release later in the week has failed to quiet the media protests.

Many voiced concern about the implications of his detention for the future

of press freedom in Russia and worried that the arrest will tarnish

Russia's image abroad. On the electronic media front, NTV--the Media

Most-owned, independent television station--provided considerable airtime

to a number of Kremlin critics, who harshly condemned the Gusinsky arrest.

Pro-Kremlin stations broadcast more sympathetic accounts of the

government's action.

Even those newspapers acknowledging that the Kremlin needs to address

corruption among the so-called oligarchs held that the move against

Gusinsky is not a step toward rectifying the problem. "It is true that we

need a strong state to press ahead with reform," one paper observed, but

"the Gusinsky arrest was a disaster." Reflecting the predominant

skepticism, another daily insisted that "the target is not corruption but

the opposition press." Is it "seeking revenge or combatting corruption?"

queried an opposition paper.

SEGODNYA CONDEMNS ARREST: The Gusinsky-owned flagship paper, reformist

Segodnyawas predictably critical of the arrest, referring to it variously

as an "action of intimidation to make everyone see the limits of freedom"

and an attempt "to reduce the dictatorship of law to the dictatorship of

fear." In one front-page comment the paper posited, "The authorities are

out to avenge themselves for the meager results of their shameful search of

the Media Most offices, for the verdict by a Moscow district court calling

that search illegal, for Clinton using radio station Echo of Moscow to talk

about press freedom, and, more importantly, for Media Most resisting being

tamed."

OTHER REFORMIST PAPERS ALSO CRITICAL: Somewhat less expectedly, other

leading reformist papers (including some owned by rival media

tycoons)--such as Izvestiya, Moskovsky Komsomolets, Noviye Izvestiya, and

Vremya Novostei--joined the fray and registered strong protest. Like

Segodnya, Izvestiya anticipated further trouble after last month's federal

raid on Media Most, arguing at the time that "it may be prologue to serious

trouble with freedom of the press." The Gusinsky incarceration--"a shoddy

job" which "plumbs the depths of stupidity," most agreed--revived such

fears. "The arrest can be seen as setting a precedent," said one, invoking

the concern: "Him today, me tomorrow." Some were heartened by "unambiguous"

denunciations of the arrest "from many politicians and representatives of

the intelligentsia."

A MODICUM OF SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT: A very few papers, including

official Rossiyskaya Gazeta, offered a modicum of support for the

government's actions. Suggesting that it was proof that "all are equal

before the law," this publication argued that Putin's "dictatorship of law"

was being misinterpreted by some, leading to "resistance" and "emotional"

reactions "among certain circles and in some media."

EDITOR: Katherine L. Starr

EDITOR'S NOTE: This survey is based on reports and media summaries

submitted by post and from the Internet, dated May 12-June 21. Editorial

excerpts from Russian media are listed from the most recent date.

RUSSIA: "Russian Exotica"

Centrist Nezavisimaya Gazeta ran this comment by Marina Kalashnikova

(6/21): "Following the arrest of the head of Media Most, a wave of

indignation swept across two continents on June 13 and blew over three days

later. Freedom of the press in Russia and even the prisoner, released by

now, are no longer the hot topic in the foreign media. The show is over,

not wanted anymore. Media Most posing as an independent political factor

does not work exactly because

the West does not see it that way. Most, which preaches Western values, did

not expect that. The Western press took the newspaper's claims to playing

the role of the opposition as yet another sample of Russian exotica and

promptly turned its gaze elsewhere.... European leaders did not even think

of joining the Media Most PR campaign. Hoping that they would was an

illusion. In the West, the leading media are part of the ruling circles.

The common interests of their elites, governments and international

alliances prevail over the most serious differences and conflicts. Besides,

the West always deals with those who have real power."

"Gusinsky Talks To Newsweek, Refuses To Talk To Russia's 'Itogi'"

Reformist Izvestiya ran this column by Svetlana Babayeva and Yevgeny

Krutikov (6/20): "Vladimir Gusinsky refused to appear on Itogi [NTV's

program] on Sunday. According to its anchor, the head of Media Most did not

think he was ready to address the public, but he would certainly be ready

do so later in the week. It will be noted that the anchor did not say that

Gusinsky was not ready to talk to the Russian public--shortly before that,

the media magnate had talked to the American public. Monday's issue of

Newsweek carried an interview with Gusinsky. He says that he owes his

release to people abroad, mostly in the United States, whose Jewish

community is stronger than any other country's. As for the Russians, who

really helped Gusinsky get out of prison, he had nothing to say to them,

except warning them about their future."

"Who Incites Anti-Semitism In Russia"

Yakov Etinger wrote in centrist Nezavisimaya Gazeta (6/20): "Attempts to

present the Gusinsky case as an anti-semitic action are absolutely

groundless. No reasonable person would accept it, especially because, to

believe NTV, those behind the arrest of the leader of Media Most were Jews.

That they might be interested in inciting anti-semitism is nonsense.

Calling the Gusinsky case an anti-semitic action holds no water. Russia's

chief rabbi, Adolf Shayevich, told Izvestiya on June 14, 'I do not consider

it a political action against Russia's Jews.' As for the statements that

the Gusinsky case is a manifestation of an official anti-semitism policy, I

refer to the Russian president who has repeatedly condemned anti-semitism

in public. You may or may not like Vladimir Putin and his statements and

actions regarding the Gusinsky arrest, but you cannot deny that he is

strongly opposed to anti-semitism."

"What Is It? Seeking Revenge Or Combatting Corruption?"

L. Nikolayev said in nationalist opposition Sovetskaya Rossiya (6/20):

"Revenge for criticism against the upper crust is one thing. Fighting

thievery and corruption, which should certainly begin 'at the very top,' is

another. Which is the case at hand? Rather than awaiting an answer with

bated breath, we should demand it from the authorities in Moscow and in the

provinces."

"Kremlin Loses Ignominously"

Aleksei Makarkin held in reformist Segodnya (6/20): "So far, the Kremlin

has been losing ignominously in a war for public opinion. It is losing

because it thinks it can do anything. It can jack up Putin's popularity

rating 25 times over in a matter of months. It can vilify and cast

aspersions on its political opponents. It can force the governors to vote

for a law, whereby they can be put behind bars. Its raids against Media

Most in May contributed to its self-delusion. The Kremlin thinks that

corporate ethics in Russian journalism do not exist anymore, replaced by

fear or servility. The Gusinsky story has shown that the Kremlin propaganda

is not omnipotent. You can fight and beat the brain-washing machine."

"Getting Gusinsky Free Means Nothing"

Leonid Radzikhovsky remarked in reformist Segodnya (6/20): "Having the

authorities grudgingly let go of Gusinsky means nothing. The ire of those

who have had to eat their hats is all too apparent. They are eager for

revenge. He laughs best who laughs last."

"Who Will Defend Russia's Dignity?"

Official government Rossiyskaya Gazeta (6/20) ran this piece by Yuri

Vasilkov: "The louder the pharisaical calls about the onset of new

totalitarianism, the stronger the feeling that we are already in an age of

absolutism. A certain group of people is trying to sell us on their far

from indisputable ideas of economics, politics and ethics, disregarding the

law, logic, scheduled TV programs, diplomatic protocol and propriety. Some

jester has philosophically called this hullabaloo a 'brilliant PR operation

to build up Gusinsky.' That sounds scary. It is another blow to Russia's

reputation. The world does not really know what Russians think about this

bloated story. Russia has again been abashed in front of the whole world.

Now who is going to defend her dignity, our dignity, not the dignity of

those VIP drifters with open-ended foreign visas."

"Back To Square One"

Writing on the spur of the Russian president's trips to Spain, Germany and

Moldova, Avtandil Tsuladze said on page one of reformist Segodnya (6/19):

"Clearly, Putin seeks to consolidate his position in the international

arena. It is equally clear that his style of dealing with foreign,

primarily Western leaders contrasts with Boris Yeltsin's.... The Western

media interpret his 'superman-type' image negatively for the most part. It

makes them wary. Whatever uncertainties there were in the West about Putin

before the Gusinsky arrest have disappeared, and his image has fallen

apart, even before it has had time to form completely. Russia's position in

the world is not exactly great. Yeltsin made up for that through his

personal authority and his ability to deal with Western leaders. Putin

lacks those. Being a mystery to the West gave him a start. He lost that,

however, when Gusinsky was arrested. So this is back to square one. Putin

should first define his priorities, primarily at home. Based on his

position now, we will know where he will lead Russia."

"What Is It Going To Be?"

Valery Volkov, in assessing what recent events in Russia might mean, said

in reformist Izvestiya (6/19): "Either the administration has decided to

put society to a 'fortitude' test, trying to scare the oligarchs, the

governors, and the media--all those who refuse to submit--or it lacks the

will and power to complete that which was started. Also, Putin does not

like people butting in other people's affairs, a media magnate trying to

teach things to the government whose loans he is using, or a journalist

trying to speak for a warring party instead of just reporting, or a

governor engaging in politics instead of paving roads and building houses.

"If that is his criterion, it seems tenable in a way. But what purpose does

it serve? What will come of it? Another China? The Soviet Union of the

1930s? Postwar or present-day Germany? A combination of all those? Or maybe

it is something special again? History, if it ever repeats itself, does so

as farce."

"Putin Can Stop Russia's Drift Back To Soviet Times"

Former aide to Boris Yeltsin, Mikhail Krasnov, surmised in reformist Vremya

Novostei (6/19): "The president can stop Russia's drift back to Soviet

times. Whereas Boris Yeltsin will be remembered for breaking the backbone

of totalitarianism, Vladimir Putin still has enough public support to turn

post-Soviet Russia into a democratic Russia. Either the Establishment will

force him to play by its rules or the president will force it to serve

society. It is time the president proclaimed the values he prizes and the

means to strengthen the state he upholds. Anyhow, Russia can't do without

reform to make the government open, structured and using its energy and

resources to serve the people."

"Power Trips Over Shoe Lace"

Otto Latsin held on page one of reformist Noviye Izvestiya (6/17): "This

time the administration has tripped over its shoe lace. The evil is

political culture or, rather, a lack thereof. Ideally, that should be the

focus as politicians sit down to consider the situation. They should first

decide what to do with Media Most. Further attacks on Gusinsky would be

counterproductive anyway. The damage done to the government is bad, but

attempting to make up for it immediately will make it even worse. The

authorities would do better to realize that it takes time and effort to

undo what has been done. It is right that we need a strong state to press

ahead with reform. The lack of political culture among those behind the

throne is why they misinterpret the notion of a strong state. Putting heat

on the governors was the first ill-conceived move. The Gusinsky arrest was

a disaster. He is not a strong chess player who knocks down the figures and

hurls the chessboard at his partner's head. To be a strong chess player,

you need to play chess well."

"Whither Putin's Russia?"

Sergei Agafonov held on page one of reformist Noviye Izvestiya (6/16):

"Commenting in Madrid on the Gusinsky story in front of an amazed TV

audience in Russia and the world over, Vladimir Putin drew a perfectly

clear picture of where his Russia was going. A nightmare in the Spanish

entourage.... The guy, certainly, is physically fit and not addicted to

drinking. But he does not know what he is doing, unable to see the

consequences of his every word and gesture. The trouble is not that Putin

did a poor job of expressing himself on the Gusinsky case. The trouble is

that he has not changed since his miraculous ascent to power, remaining an

expert in a narrow and very special area. You can call it a national

disaster. In a matter of days, the head of state, scarcely established as

the master of this land and its people, lost his charisma as a serious and

mature politician."

"Total Embarrassment"

Reformist youth-oriented Komsomolskaya Pravda (6/16) remarked editorially:

"Nothing good will come of this. Politically, it is absolutely

embarrassing, with rightists, centrists and leftists all condemning the

actions of the administration. It is hard to disagree with Chubais that the

new government is losing credibility. It has turned off not only the

world's Jewry, which considers Gusinsky an honest businessman--a crook

wouldn't have been put in command of the World Jewish Congress-- but also

most civilized countries which see the attack on Media Most as an attempt

to smother freedom of the press in Russia."

"It Reeks Of Politics"

Editor-in-chief Viktor Linnik of neo-communist Slovo (6/16) contended: "The

Gusinsky arrest reeks of politics, not the kind of politics Media Most

propagandists are talking about. It is the kind of politics with which

Gusinsky has concerned himself ever since he, hungry for political power,

engaged in a political and ideological confrontation with the Kremlin."

"Kremlin Doesn't Like Media Most"

Mikhail Berger opined on page one of reformist Segodnya (6/15): "[Putin]

may talk about an independent prosecutor's office as much as he can. That

will not impress anyone, least of all the foreign audience. The story of

how journalist Andrei Babitsky was released is enough to make one question

such statements. Clearly, the Kremlin dislikes the way the Media Most media

work, and what the general prosecutor's office is doing to that company

must be its reaction to that sentiment. The whole thing looks like

vacillating between fear and freedom. The Kremlin, thinking there has been

too much freedom, tends to believe that questioning its policy, even in the

slightest, is anti-state. Hence the actions of intimidation to make

everyone see the limits of freedom."

"Rank Stupidity"

Maksim Sokolov mused in reformist Izvestiya (6/15): "The Gusinsky

incarceration is more proof of an iron-clad rule of Russian politics:

Devising clever schemes and moves does not make you a winner. Not making

spectacularly stupid things does. From the Machiavellian standpoint, this

arrest plumbs the depths of stupidity.... Once you decide to dig up the

past, you have to act so that no one can question your impartiality, so

that the public could see that the reason for your interference is some

extraordinary and irrefutable sins committed in the past, not today's

conflicts."

"All Are Equal Before Law"

Official government Rossiyskaya Gazeta (6/15) cited Secretary Sergei Ivanov

of Russia's National Security Council in an article by Boris Yamshanov:

"The law applies to one and all. This must be part of what is new in this

country. It does not come easily, meeting with resistance and causing

emotions among certain circles and in some media. The words about the

'dictatorship of the law' are being interpreted awesomely, with allusions

to stark 'dictatorship.' Emotions and stringent laws often disagree.

Russians know that well from the past. The also know what substituting

emotions for laws can lead to. We have to decide whether we want to live by

laws. If the majority says yes, everyone must learn to respect those laws."

"A Shoddy Job"

Otto Latsis charged on page one of reformist Noviye Izvestiya (6/15): "That

is a shoddy job done so that you can't but see that the target is not

corruption but the opposition press. Those behind it must know how crude it

is. In fact, they meant to have it done that way to scare away any

opposition media, any potential opposition."

"Gusinsky Arrest Spells End Of Putin 'Honeymoon'"

Yekaterine Deyeva maintained in reformist Moskovsky Komsomolets (6/15):

"The current Duma is almost entirely under Kremlin control. The 'governors'

reform can even make the Federation Council controllable--those senators

who oppose Kremlin proposals are being openly threatened with jail. Under

these circumstances, the role of counterweight to the authorities is played

by a few media which can afford to criticize the president or at least to

provide an objective analysis of his actions. And the Media Most holding

company is in the front ranks.... Our president, commenting on the Gusinsky

arrest...reiterated three times that it had come as a surprise to him. It

is hard to work out the truth. If behind the president's back people are

rushing to throw one of the best-known men in Russia...into the Butyrka as

a common criminal, it means that the president, to put it bluntly, is a

weakling and is not in control of the situation.... If Vladimir

Vladimirovich knew about the impending arrest and approved it, it means he

really is the main scourge of dissidents. The second theory is more

plausible than the first. Weren't there the searches of Media Most in May?

Didn't Putin remain silent at the time, making do with a meaningless

statement from his press service? Did the law enforcement organs whose

actions with respect to the holding company were ruled to be illegal by the

court's receive any kind of reprimand? The Kremlin's approval is

obvious.... In general terms it is not a question of the abuses, real or

imagined, of Gusinsky.... The fact is that some people in Russia continue

to be more equal than others, and the head of state provides tacit

patronage for infighting between 'his' oligarchs and 'others.'... We should

not expect any protection from the West.... We are the only ones who can

protect ourselves. And in this respect, the reaction to the Gusinsky

arrest, which has been unambiguous from many politicians and

representatives of the intelligentsia, has been an optimistic sign. The

president's 'honeymoon' is over."

"Hatred Camoflaged"

Mikhail Rostovsky judged in reformist Moskovsky Komsomolets (6/15): "It is

well known in circles close to the Kremlin that the president considers

Gusinsky a personal enemy. It is whispered inside the Kremlin that Vladimir

Vladimirovich was deeply offended by NTV's hints that the authorities were

behind a series of terrorist attacks in Russian cities.... The president

cannot be pleased either that one of Russia's biggest media empires was

outside the Kremlin's sphere of influence. All Putin's close associates

know that [Putin] is literally obsessed with the idea of personal control

over everyone and everything. So it turns out that essentially it all boils

down to one simple question: In precisely what form did Vladimir

Vladimirovich give his blessing to Operation 'Butyrka.'... [Putin] has no

need to give a direct order. He could have dropped a vague hint, sent back

a document unread, or ultimately remained silent. But it was taken as a

'blessing.' So far Putin has succeeded in playing out his trademark hand

with minimal losses. But this time the stakes are higher than ever.

Hitherto the oligarchs have fought among themselves however they wished,

but none of them has ever ended up in jail. Gusinsky's arrest can be seen

as setting a precedent. 'Him today, me tomorrow.' It is quite possible that

the arrangement of forces on the Russian political stage could alter as a

result."

"The Kremlin Goes For Broke"

Reformist Segodnya (6/14) front-paged this report by Aleksei Makarkin and

Ilya Skakunov: "No matter what the Kremlin or the General Prosecutor's

Office say, the true reason for the Gusinsky arrest is Media Most's

independence and criticism against the powers that be. The rest is details.

The Kremlin has decided to go for broke. The dictatorship of the law does

not work: The senators protest against their rights being encroached upon,

the docile Duma votes down amendments to the social-tax law that were

proposed by the Kremlin, and the Union of Right Forces joins hands with the

perpetual opposition in Yabloko to defend democracy.

"So it has been decided to reduce the dictatorship of the law to the

dictatorship of fear. The authorities are out to avenge themselves for the

meager results of the shameful search of the Media Most offices, for the

verdict by a Moscow district court calling that search illegal, for Clinton

using radio station Echo of Moscow to talk about press freedom, and more

importantly, for Media Most resisting being tamed, and for Gusinsky

refusing to leave this country."

"Oligarchs No Longer Untouchable"

Dmitry Volkov and Viktor Paukov stated on page one of reformist Vremya

Novostei (6/14): "The Kremlin is hard put to disprove that the Gusinsky

arrest is politically motivated. Obviously, it marks the end of the era of

the 'untouchable oligarchs,' whatever the charges. Up to now, the

authorities, for all the good reason they had to call the 'biggies' to

task, never went further than a warning or a show of force.... The question

is not 'Why does Vladimir Gusinsky have to suffer?' Rather, it is 'Why

him?' and 'Who is next?' Persecuting political opponents is not the

dictatorship of the law. Persecuting political allies would be more like

it. So if this is a revolution, it is wrong. If it is the seamy side of

administrative reform, it may cost us dearly--instead of having the capital

back, we may make the capitalists leave."

"Clinton Finds Himself In A Different Russia"

Natalia Kalashnikova and Valery Sychev remarked on page one of reformist

Segodnya (6/5): "Coming over for his last visit, Clinton did not find the

Russia he had once discovered for himself and the West. Instead of seeing

his predictably unpredictable 'friend Boris,' he met with 'mysterious

Putin,' who continues the war in Chechnya, maintains nuclear ties with

Iran, winks at 'raids' against the media, speaks about joining NATO, and

suggests building a joint nuclear shield against Russia's strategic

partners, of all countries.... [Clinton's] visiting radio station Echo of

Moscow, which the Kremlin lists as part of the disloyal Media Most, would

have been unthinkable during Clinton's previous trips. It may be a sign of

support for freedom of the press in Russia, as well as a way to communicate

with the Russian public."

"Media War"

Yuri Bogomolov mused in reformist Izvestiya (5/20): "There has been a lot

of tension, fraught with divisions and a war among liberal journalists

lately. Causes for strife in society have changed from Chechnya to Babitsky

and more recently to Media Most. That there is always a cause means that

something is really wrong. We are told that the powers that be are out to

crack down on freedom of the press. That may be true. But aren't we

journalists doing the same by using special services, or by putting up with

our colleagues being tailed and bugged, or by turning out to defend the

right of private security services to carry out their activities?"

"Handing Over Power To Putin"

Leonid Radzikhovsky judged in reformist Segodnya (5/19): "Almost without

any effort, Putin has concentrated tremendous power in his hands. In

accordance with an old tradition, Russia has found a 'Varangian' (a person

unknown to it), and with a moan of bliss, handed over to him full power....

Everybody--members of parliament, their electorate, the oligarchs and, most

interestingly, even the governors--has quickly grown tired of the tedious

mess in which we have found ourselves as a result of the 'unbearable state

of freedom.' Without putting up any resistance, they all hastened to hand

over the surplus (or the remainder) of their political freedom to whoever

was ready to accept it. Such are tradition and the Russian national

mentality. But what are the consequences going to be?"

"Repression, Real And Imagined"

Vitaliy Tretyakov, editor-in-chief of centrist Nezavisimaya Gazeta (5/16)

front paged this article on the recent FSB raid on rival "Media Most," in

which he suggested that some may overstate their concerns about "freedom of

the press in Russia" for "political purposes." He wrote, "what ought to be

at issue is instances of real, not mythical, repression." Tretyakov also

observed, however, that repression of Media Most would represent a serious

"mistake" on the part of the government.

"When Will They Ever Learn?"

Yevgeny Krutikov, commenting on the police raid on Media Most offices in

Moscow, said on page one of reformist Izvestiya (5/12): "It may be a

prologue to serious trouble with freedom of the press. The new government

has yet to show that it is willing to carry out democratic reform. For the

authorities to fail to produce real charges based on evidence that can be

used in court, while creating an entirely new situation in contemporary

Russia, is still fresh in our memory from Soviet times. A conflict between

the old mentality and reality is probably our chief problem today."

"Stupidity"

Reformist Segodnya's Leonid Radzikhovsky (5/12) described the Media Most

raid as "simply another stupidity by some officials in the FSB, the

prosecutor's office or other agencies which have lots of dumb generals. But

they will not pay for it. The 'guarantor of the Constitution' will.... But

then, it will do Putin good if he promptly stands up for freedom of the

press, improving the image of post-Yeltsin Russia as he does so."

"Gusinsky's Influence Abroad May Hurt Foes"

Centrist Nezavisimaya Gazeta (5/12) ran this comment by Marina Volkova and

Vladislav Kuzmichev: "The influence Vladimir Gusinsky wields abroad may

harm his foes more than anything else. Whatever the reasons for the raid,

the foreign media will call the action against the 'only opposition

channel' politically motivated or attribute it to officials trying to avoid

scandalous exposes. With Russia feeling vulnerable on its foreign debts and

Chechnya policy, its critics may use that to push decisions that will hurt

this country."

"Clinton, Blair May Come To Most's Aid"

Mikhail Rostovsky pointed out in reformist Moskovsky Komsomolets (5/12):

"The massive attack on the media holding may yet get stuck. Doing that to

Most and NTV (affiliate television channel) is not a case where you can get

away with breaking the law. (Their leader) Vladimir Gusinsky, vice

president of the World Jewish Congress, has very influential financial

circles in the West to support him. Putin may soon be getting telephone

calls from Clinton, Blair and Chirac."

*******