Research Topics
Television
CDI Library
Press
What's New
Search

CDI Russia Weekly
         Issue #106 June 16, 2000


Edited by David Johnson
The CDI Russia Weekly is a weekly e-mail newsletter that carries news and analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With funding from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education organization. To receive a free subscription, e-mail David Johnson at djohnson@cdi.org
 
Contents

 

CDI Russia Weekly-#106
16 June 2000
Edited by David Johnson
Center for Defense Information
1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington DC 20036
phone: 202-332-0600; fax:202-462-4559
djohnson@cdi.org

The CDI Russia Weekly is an e-mail newsletter that carries news and
analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political,
economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With funding
from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, CDI Russia Weekly is a
project of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI),
a nonprofit research and education organization.
  CDI Russia Weekly web page (with archive): http://www.cdi.org/russia/
  Visit CDI's web site: http://www.cdi.org

Contents:
  2. Moscow Times: Simon Saradzhyan, Legal Loophole Holds Gusinsky.
  3. RFE/RL: Andrew Tully, U.S. Concern Grows Over Gusinsky Arrest.
  7. Christian Science Monitor: Fred Weir, Adoptions stalled: reform or red tape?
 8. Moscow Times: Pavel Felgenhauer, No 'Political Solution' Yet (Chechnya) .
  10. ZERKALO RTR: INTERVIEW WITH VLADIMIR YAKOVLEV, STRATEGIC MISSILES TROOPS COMMANDER IN CHIEF.

*******

      #1
      Gusinsky arrest "excessive," but Putin slams mogul's business dealings

      BERLIN, June 15 (AFP) -

      Russian President Vladimir Putin on Thursday criticised as "excessive" the detention of prominent businessman Vladimir Gusinsky, but took a fresh swipe at the media tycoon's financial dealings.

      "The prosecutor general's office could question him if it wanted to without jailing him. It's an excessive measure, but I could not prevent it," he said during a meeting with German business leaders.

      But Putin again denied any political motive for the arrest and suggested the allegedly murky business dealings of one of Russia's richest men warranted an investigation.

      "He is not accused as a representative of the press. He is not a journalist but a businessman. He takes loans all the time from different banks and rarely pays them back," said the Russian president.

      Gusinsky was detained on Tuesday, as Putin began a 24-hour visit to Spain, and imprisoned in Moscow's notorious Butyrka pre-trial prison.

      Prosecutors said Gusinsky would be formally charged with fraud on Friday. He is accused of involvement in an alleged sweetheart share deal involving the privatisation of a Saint Petersburg-based television station which deprived the state of around 10 million dollars.

      His liberal Media-MOST empire has been a constant thorn in the side of Putin, criticising the crackdown in Chechnya and probing corruption in the FSB security service the president once led.

      The media magnate's arrest has sparked a furore among Russia's political and business elite, who accused the Kremlin of muzzling critics, and prompted expressions of concern from US President Bill Clinton.

      The uproar also forced Putin onto the defensive during his visit to Spain and threatened to dog a two-day trip to Germany, which started Thursday. Questioned by journalists in Madrid, Putin testily insisted the prosecutor general's office was independent.

      But Gusinsky on Thursday blasted his detention as a "political plot" which heralded a return to Soviet-style repression, as his lawyers sought a court order for his release.

      "This is a political plot organised by highly-placed figures at the centre of power, for whom the freedom of expression represents a threat," Gusinsky said in his first public comment since his arrest.

      "It is a return to the totalitarian past of the gulags, and the 'dictatorship of the law' is carried out by judges named by a new Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," he said in a written statement released by his lawyer.

      His lawyers petitioned a Moscow court to order Gusinsky released, saying the case would be heard Tuesday. The media magnate faces months in pre-trial detention unless he is freed on bail.

      His defence team says prosecutors have failed to provide sufficient grounds for the detention of the 47-year-old former theatre manager, who must be charged within 10 days of his arrest or released.

      If convicted, the Media-MOST chief faces up to 10 years in prison. Putin again criticised the financial management of Gusinsky's Media-MOST holding, saying that the giant natural gas monopoly Gazprom -- a major shareholder in the group -- was artificially propping up his empire.

      "According to the press, he has already borrowed a billion dollars. Last week Gusinsky was due to repay 200 million dollars," Putin said.

      "He didn't do so. The money was guaranteed by Gazprom. Yet another time, Gazprom repaid the money for him in return for shares. Every time Gazprom repays hundreds of millions for him, he gives shares," Putin added.

      Observers say the natural gas giant is under heavy pressure from the Kremlin to cut off its financial lifeline to Media-MOST as part of a strategy to end the group's criticism of the Putin administration.


      *******

      #2
      Moscow Times
      June 16, 2000
      Legal Loophole Holds Gusinsky
      By Simon Saradzhyan
      Staff Writer

      Prosecutors have used a loophole in the law to keep Vladimir Gusinsky behind bars without filing charges against him, legal experts said Thursday.

      And through a loophole in another law, the media magnate could walk free at any time if he was willing to take advantage of it.

      Investigators from the General Prosecutor's Office detained Gusinsky on Tuesday saying they suspected he was involved in "gross embezzlement" of state property.

      Gusinsky has remained in the notorious Butyrskaya Prison even though investigator Valery Nikolayev, who is in charge of the case, has not presented formal charges against him. Gusinsky's lawyers said Nikolayev intended to present the charges Friday afternoon, Interfax reported. His lawyers Thursday appealed the arrest to the city's Tverskoi court, which is to hear the case Tuesday.

      However, even if the court sides with the General Prosecutor's Office, Gusinsky could go free under an amnesty passed by the State Duma last month. The amnesty, which came into being May 30, provides for the release of prisoners who hold state or military honors even if they are suspected of or have been convicted of grave crimes. The Prosecutor General's Office has urged parliament to remove the loophole, and some lawmakers have said it was a mistake.

      Prosecutors said they believe Gusinsky defrauded the state out of $10 million when acquiring shares in 1997 of Russkoye Video, a television production company in St. Petersburg that had just been privatized. If proved in court, this would qualify as a grave crime.

      Gusinsky also has an "Order of Friendship," which makes him eligible for the amnesty, according to his lawyers and the Prosecutor General's Office. But under the law, Gusinsky would have to officially request amnesty and this could prove too "morally difficult," according to Moscow-based lawyer Gulmira Orazaliyeva. He would risk being seen by the general public as guilty of a crime and trying to escape punishment, she said. The Prosecutor General's Office also said it did not expect Gusinsky to tarnish his reputation by asking for amnesty, Interfax reported.

      Orazaliyeva, who worked at the prosecutor's office before leaving in 1993 to become a criminal lawyer, said Gusinsky would not have been detained in the first place if the Criminal Procedures Code had been written with more care. Article 90 of the code says an investigator can detain a suspect for 10 days without charging him "in extraordinary cases," but it doesn't spell out what those are.

      "Unfortunately, this article gives the investigator a wide range for interpretation, leaving the suspect at his mercy," Orazaliyeva said.

      Former Prosecutor General Yury Skuratov said Article 90 is usually applied when a crime has just happened and the investigator has strong evidence against the suspect but needs a few days to fully formulate charges.

      But this is clearly not the case with Gusinsky, who is suspected of having committed a crime in 1998, Skuratov said in a telephone interview Thursday. He said the past year and a half should have given investigators enough time to formulate charges against Gusinsky before detaining him.

      The code also requires the investigator to take into account whether the suspect has tried to obstruct the investigation, flee or continue his criminal activities, which Skuratov said doesn't seem to be the case with Gusinsky.

      Adopted in Soviet days, the Criminal Procedures Code has been repeatedly amended but still contains outdated regulations, such as a general call for "strengthening of socialist law enforcement."

      Orazaliyeva questioned the ethics of investigator Nikolayev in what she called a "nonsense case" and said he was taking advantage of the code to abuse his powers.

      The legal experts said investigators also breached professional ethics by summoning Gusinsky to the Prosecutor General's Office for questioning on one matter only to detain him in connection with a different case.

      "He was deceived. þ Legally it is acceptable, but not morally," Skuratov said of his former colleagues' actions.

      Skuratov sought, however, to shift the blame to the Kremlin. "I know that they came under very strong pressure from the Kremlin" to open a case against Gusinsky, he said.

      Skuratov's successor, Vladimir Ustinov, has refused to comment on the case. President Vladimir Putin maintains that the prosecutor's office operates independently and he cannot influence the investigation.


      *******

      #3
      Russia: U.S. Concern Grows Over Gusinsky Arrest
      By Andrew F. Tully

      First, masked agents of the Moscow prosecutor raided the Moscow offices of Media-Most. Now the owner of the publishing and broadcasting empire has been arrested. RFE/RL Senior Correspondent Andrew F. Tully reports that the U.S. is becoming increasingly worried about human rights under Russian President Vladimir Putin.

      Washington, 15 June 2000 (RFE/RL) -- American government and political leaders are expressing growing concern about the arrest of Vladimir Gusinsky, the owner of Russia's Media-Most publishing and broadcasting empire. The White House demanded that Russian law enforcement officials treat Gusinsky fairly, and the State Department said the affair could harm Moscow's reputation. Members of Congress were less diplomatic in expressing their displeasure, saying the arrest is simply unacceptable.

      Gusinsky was arrested Tuesday night and put in Moscow's notorious Butyrka jail. He is being held on suspicion of taking part in the theft of $10 million in state funds in a privatization deal. Prosecutors must file charges against him within 10 days of his arrest or he must be released from custody. Joe Lockhart, the press secretary for U.S. President Bill Clinton, urged prosecutors to ensure due legal process for Gusinsky.

      "I think for our purposes, we'll continue to make the case that a free and open press is an essential part of a democracy, and that in this particular case, this gentleman should not be prosecuted for any reason relating to his position in the media, and that any charges and trial should be done in a way that provides him with due process and is open and transparent."

      State Department spokesman Richard Boucher was somewhat more critical, saying Russia's reputation could be hurt if the Putin government does not stop suppressing its news media.

      "We agree that Russia's international standing will be severely damaged if the government lets stand actions that are intended to intimidate independent media and voices with whom it does not agree."

      Several members of the U.S. House of Representatives, the lower house of Congress, were much more emphatic in condemning Gusinsky's arrest.

      At a news conference on Capitol Hill, Congressman Christopher Smith stressed that all members of Congress -- regardless of political affiliation or personal ideology -- are united against what he called the "tightening of the noose" on the throat of a free press in Russia. Smith is chairman of U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which monitors the Helsinki accords on human rights.

      "We are absolutely united -- Democrats, Republicans, liberals, conservatives, and moderates alike -- in drawing strong attention to the arrest of Vladimir Gusinsky. It's an alarming but not totally surprising development."

      Both Smith and Congressman Tom Lantos (D-California) expressed doubt about Putin's statement that he knew nothing of Gusinsky's detention in advance. Lantos said he believes the Russian president is incapable of abiding criticism.

      "Mr. Putin -- if he wants to be president of a democratic society -- needs to understand that leaders in democratic societies are subject to criticism. President Clinton has been subject to criticism. [Former U.S.] President [Ronald] Reagan has been subject to criticism. And it's time for Mr. Putin to grow up and understand that if he wants to run a free society, he will be subject to criticism."

      Congressman Benjamin Gilman (R-New York), also present at the news briefing, complained that a decade of American financial and other assistance to Moscow apparently has made little difference in terms of press freedom in Russia. "After all these years of American assistance to Russia, millions of dollars of which have gone to support key democratic reforms such as privatization of the media in Russia, almost all of Russia's printing and publishing houses, regional and rural newspapers, and major television frequencies still remain in the control of the Russian government."

      Gilman said the administration of U.S. President Bill Clinton bears part of the blame. The congressman said it is not speaking out as forcefully as it should against what he called the abuses of the Putin government.

      "In early February of this year, I wrote to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to express our very strong concern over the Russian government's manipulation of the media in that country, and asking her to tell us what the United States government's views were with regard to such manipulation. We're still awaiting a response from our secretary of state.

      Members of Congress can do little immediately to punish what some consider to be a repressive government. But on Thursday, Lantos, Gilman, Smith and other members say they plan to introduce a congressional resolution deploring the Moscow government's treatment of its news media. The measure was prompted by the raid on Media-Most by masked agents of the Moscow prosecutor's office on May 11.

      The resolution, if passed, would be non-binding, but it is intended to send an unequivocal message to Putin -- that he must do more to earn the trust of America's political leaders.


      ******

      #4
      Stratfor.com
      June 15, 2000
      Of Puppets and Oligarchs: Putin’s Crackdown Continues

      Russian media oligarch Vladimir Gusinsky was arrested late June 13 on suspicion of property theft. Foreign governments, Russian liberals and oligarchs immediately criticized the arrest as an attack on independent media. Russia’s oligarchs ­ all influential businessmen ­ are right to be concerned with the Russian government’s new assertiveness. The arrest, however, was not a move to destroy press freedom but simply to rein in oligarchs; others will follow.

      Russian President Vladimir Putin has long had reason to dislike Vladimir Gusinsky. Gusinsky’s parasitic absorption of many of the Soviet Union’s assets by legally dubious means helped degrade Russian power to where it is today. More recently, Gusinsky has backed Kremlin outsiders ­ such as the unruly Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov ­ against Russia’s ruling elite.

      Targeting Putin more personally, Gusinsky’s media empire was one of the few sources of domestic criticism of the Chechen war ­ the issue that propelled Putin to power. Furthermore, one of Gusinsky’s television shows, entitled “Kukly” or “The Puppets,” has lampooned Russian political figures for several years. Putin has not escaped Gusinsky’s scathing comedic knife. Gusinsky claims that it is this criticism ­ and the Putin puppet specifically ­ that triggered the tax police raid on Gusinsky’s Media-MOST firm on May 11. Critics of the Kremlin say the same rationale lies behind Gusinsky’s arrest.

      But in the long-daggered world of Russian politics, seeking revenge for an annoying puppet is ridiculous. Putin must curb the power of the oligarchs in order to bring Russia’s lucrative extraction industries under central control, a first step toward rooting corruption out of the Russian economy. Gusinksy controls the most extensive independent media in the country and is therefore in the best position to challenge any government program. It is logical that he is the first to fall.

      With Media-MOST tamed, others will follow ­ and they know it. The day after Gusinsky’s arrest, 17 of Russia’s most influential businessmen sent a letter to Russia’s prosecutor-general vouching for Gusinsky’s “good behavior” and calling for his release. This solidarity is a far cry from their scathing attacks on each other only months previous.

      Two signatories ­ Unified Energy Systems chief Anatoly Chubais and Rem Vyakhirev, the head of Russia’s natural gas giant, Gazprom ­ are bitter enemies. As recently as a month ago they were clashing furiously over the future of their respective firms. Desperation, like politics, makes strange bedfellows.

      Other signatories include Sibneft oil group head Yevgeny Schvidler, Interros Financial Group chief Vladimir Potanin and Alfa Group (Bank) chairman Mikhail Friedman. All now face a common threat from the Kremlin. Even Boris Berezovsky, a long-time insider in Kremlin politics, characterized his view of the arrest as “sharply negative,” despite the fact that Berezovsky’s own media holdings stand to gain the most from Gusinsky’s absence. A president angered by a puppet certainly could not threaten the oligarch of oligarchs. A president intent on taming the oligarchs is another matter entirely.

      Putin is far too pragmatic a leader to expend so much political capital simply to incapacitate an annoying puppet. Moreover, Putin has not moved against the entire press, just Gusinsky. A wider media crackdown would do nothing for Putin’s goal of gathering Western economic aid. Putin will continue his crackdown until the oligarchs see things his way.


      ******

      #5
      The oligarchs: bank-rolling Russia's power elite

      MOSCOW, June 15 (AFP) -

      The jailing of media baron Vladimir Gusinsky, one of Russia's richest men, highlights the leading role in public life of the group of politically-influential businessmen popularly known as the oligarchs.

      Seventeen of them, all hugely wealthy, wrote an open letter to Russia's legal authorities Wednesday demanding Gusinsky's release.

      Prominent among the signatories were Anatoly Chubais, the advisor to former president Boris Yeltsin who oversaw Russia's privatisation programme, and Rem Vyakhirev, head of the world's largest gas company Gazprom.

      The oligarchs between them control almost the entire Russian media and own a sizeable proportion of the nation's wealth.

      Gusinsky alone of the oligarchs has based his fortune solely on media interests rather than on manipulation of Russia's natural resources and heavy industry.

      He is also the sole oligarch to have troubled President Vladimir Putin consistently, notably with his NTV televison channel's critical coverage of the Chechen war and the satirical puppet show "Kukly" broadcast on NTV. And he is the only oligarch to have found himself in jail.

      The leading members of Russia's power-brokers are:

      Boris BEREZOVSKY (54). Bank-rolled Yeltsin's presidential campaign in 1996, and rarely out of the news since. Former deputy secretary of Yeltsin's security council, and served for a while as executive secretary of the Commonwealth of International States. Survived an assassination attempt in 1994. Heads LogoVaz, Russia's largest auto-dealer, owns majority holding in Aeroflot and aluminum giant Sibneft. LogoVaz has 3 percent holding in gas giant Gazprom and extensive media interests. Believed to have accumulated wealth of three billion dollars. Has frequently been the focus of corruption and money laundering investigations and last year was the subject of an arrest warrant. Elected to parliament in December, attacked Putin's plans for regional reform earlier this month. Notably absent from Wednesday's list of signatories in favour of Gusinsky.

      Vladimir GUSINSKY (47). A former theatre director, now chairman of Media-MOST group (television, newspapers, banking, real estate). Cites US media mogul Rupert Murdoch as a role model. Became director of US-Soviet joint venture Most in 1989, subsequently gambled on Russian appetite for entertainment and news. Media empire owns flagship daily Segodnya, NTV television, Itogi magazine, and Moscow Echo radio. Helped Yeltsin win a second presidential term in 1996, but has been a thorn in the flesh of the ruling clan throughout Putin's rapid rise to power in the past year. Itogi and Segodnya regularly published revelations of corruption and sleaze in high places.

      Rem VYAKHIREV (64). Chairman of gas giant Gazprom, Russia's largest company often described as a "state within the state". Succeeded former prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin as Gazprom chief, having been deputy chairman since 1989. Following part-privatisation in 1994, acquired around six percent of the shares. Gazprom owns around 29 regional newspapers and television stations. Supported Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov for president, but then rallied to Putin.

      Vladimir POTANIN (38). Known as the "baby billionaire", is head of the Interros financial group (banking, real estate, oil and gas, ferrous metals). A former official at the Soviet trade department Soyuzpromexport, joined Interros as director in 1991 and founded Uneximbank in 1993. Served briefly as deputy prime minister. Owns 85 percent of oil company Sidanko and 51 percent of Norilsk Nickel. Media interests include Izvestia and Komsomolskaya Pravda. Once declared by Business Week to be "the most powerful man in Russia".

      Anatoly CHUBAIS (45). Head of the electricity mammoth Unified Energy System. Formerly an economics advisor in Leningrad, was named deputy prime minister in 1992 and oversaw Russia's privatisation programme. Served in several governments under Yeltsin, and a member of the Kremlin inner circle throughout Yeltsin's years in office. Arch-rival to Berezovsky for position as main power behind the throne.

      Also prominent among the circle of oligarchs include Pyotr AVEN, head of Alfa Bank and a former cabinet minister, Roman ABRAMOVICH, a Berezovsky business partner who owns a large swathe of Russia's aluminium industry, and Alexander SMOLENSKY, president of the troubled Stolichny Bank Sberezhiny-Agro, known as SBS-Agro.


      *******

      #6
      BBC MONITORING
      RUSSIAN INTEGRATION INTO NATO ADVOCATED BY RUSSIAN MILITARY EXPERT
      Source: Russia TV, Moscow, in Russian 1240 gmt 15 Jun 00

      A top Russian military analyst has called for increased Russian participation in NATO. This is Russia's only means for influencing NATO, Aleksandr Vladimirov said. The general outlined the advantages Russia would gain from this course. He said that Russia must clearly define its policies and advocate them within NATO. The interview was broadcast in Russia TV's "Spetsnaz" programme which also suggested alternative approaches to European security. The following is the text of the report broadcast on 15th June. Subheadings have been inserted editorially.

      [Voice over] The Cold War has ended but contrary to all logic the NATO nuclear alliance moved its presence closer to the borders of the Russian Federation. Moreover, the bombing of Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan and Yugoslavia shows that the USA is trying to give NATO an independent military-political role in the world, primarily in its own interests.

      The US government's interest in eastern Europe is pursuing two main aims. The first is to create a so-called buffer zone between barbarian Russia and civilized western Europe; and secondly to station troops and weapons, including nuclear weapons, at a minimum distance from the potential enemy. However, at the same time, any country of the European alliance automatically becomes a target for a first strike. For, the price to be paid for NATO membership is rather more considerable than money. American strategists are simply pressurizing the countries of western and eastern Europe in the mistaken belief that they are deflecting the threat from themselves. It would be naive to suppose that diplomatic niceties and smiles can conceal the anti-Russian trend of the USA's policy in the west. Its aim is to create conditions ensuring the irreversibility of the disintegration of the USSR and a system of control over the former Soviet republics and the countries of eastern Europe.

      [Presenter in studio] Russian foreign policy is currently acquiring clearer contours. The security council and the foreign ministry are demonstrating a clearly proactive strategy. Thus, for example, the statement by Defence Minister Marshal [Igor] Sergeyev about Russia's readiness to cooperate closely with NATO which he made recently in Brussels placed our potential military-political partners in an interesting position. At least, the members of the alliance were not totally prepared for Moscow's sensible and constructive initiative.

      Hello, my name is Aleksandr Zhilin.

      The idea of integrating our country into NATO was substantiated and expressed as far back as 1996 by the well-known Russian military analyst, General Aleksandr Vladimirov. True, this cost him dear. The general was regarded as virtually betraying our national interests. Intelligent magazines stopped publishing his fundamental works. However, after a relatively short time people returned to this idea and this time at the level of state policy.

      Aleksandr Vladimirov is our studio guest today.

      Russian integration is only way to curb NATO

      [Aleksandr Vladimirov, vice-president of the collegium of military experts] I think NATO is of interest to us from many points of view, in the first place because it is a reality which we already experience. Secondly, we have no political, economic or defence capabilities or possibilities able to curb NATO and prevent it from expanding towards us. And there are many wise people who have said that if you cannot control a process you should try to head it because you can keep saying no or you can smother an opponent in an embrace.

      In the first place we already have experience of joint actions in the Bosnia operation which, as you know, was a joint operation and it is now being implemented. Finally, the Kosovo operation is also a joint operation although we made many mistakes right from the start, without mentioning the strategic mistakes made by the NATO and US leadership. Nonetheless, the potential exists for the further development of cooperation there, but this is only one part.

      Advantages of Russian participation in NATO

      One of the serious complaints which the NATO leadership currently has against our representatives in Brussels is that they are absolutely passive. They try not to participate in anything, not to display their concern about anything, not to impose any point of view of their own. And this is wrong because NATO is of interest to us a professional organization. It is a vast professional alliance which has unique experience of organizing and managing joint groupings of multinational forces. Any participation in it by us at any level would give us an idea of the technologies of modern management of forces and groupings which they have. And we can simply learn a lot from them. And they can learn a lot from us, too.

      I think at present our chief task is to gradually place our representatives in NATO structures and bodies and gradually ensure our participation in them in order, on the one hand, by our participation to constrain the NATO leadership, its forces and organizations in certain specific things and, on the other hand, to change its ideology, to destroy the alienation and to force NATO to come to the opinion that without Russia nothing can be done, even in planning, not to mention the implementation of any strikes or any operations.

      Moreover, we can and should delegate to the NATO structures and to the structures of peacekeeping operations under the aegis of NATO and the UN, our strategic allies, for example the obvious ones such as Ukraine and Belarus. And although under their constitutions these states maintain a neutral status, I think that one could find many reasons and possibilities to ensure that there should be Ukrainian peacekeepers and Belarusian peacekeepers alongside our peacekeepers since the combat fraternity of our peoples should be forged in some joint actions.

      [Q] But you must agree that NATO does not always demonstrate its readiness for any constructive cooperation with Russia. Look at the Sea Breeze series of exercises in the Baltic area and Ukraine which took place under, let us say bluntly, an anti-Russian banner when Russia was always regarded as the probable opponent. We see clearly that the USA and NATO as a whole constantly maintain a certain zone of tension between Moscow and Kiev. Is that not so?

      Alternatives approaches to European Security

      [A] I consider that it is fundamental that President Putin should put forward as a Russian initiative the idea that the UN should create - as UN sub-systems - UN regional security sub-systems, which would have their own security council and their own power-wielding component. In Europe, for example, such a system could, in principle, be formed by our greater Europe including everyone - ourselves, the Belarusians, the Latvians and so on. And the military component of this would be formed on the basis of troops of NATO and the Russian army, the Belarusian army and the Ukrainian army. And, since NATO includes the USA and Canada and since Russia is a great nuclear power, the participation of the two guarantor nuclear powers in this joint system would remove all fears about possible collisions between participants in this system.

      Moreover, I consider that in this regard we already have the CIS system of collective security which received a new powerful impulse for its development a few weeks ago when treaties were concluded with Belarus and other CIS countries.

      [Voice-over] I would not wish to present Russia as outraged virtue. It has got what it deserved. Nonetheless, we still have time. The Kremlin can still put forward new constructive proposals. There are alternatives to the further expansion of NATO which are not detrimental to the interests in the first place of the European countries and the countries adjacent to the continent.

      The first alternative is the expansion of the zone of neutral countries in Europe, the creation of a system of guarantees of their neutrality within the framework of non-bloc international organizations, the drawing up of a new European legal code on the basis of non-interference in the internal affairs of states and respect for their political choice. The second alternative is the declaration of the non-nuclear status of the Mediterranean Sea for all states without exception, restricting the presence in the Mediterranean Sea of strategic naval vessels and groupings not belonging to the navies of littoral states.

      The third alternative is the demilitarization of the Baltic Sea while preserving the frontier patrol and militarized rescue forces of the littoral states. The fourth alternative is the demilitarization of the Black Sea, following the example of the Baltic Sea; it is necessary to introduce a ban in the Baltic Sea on holding offensive naval exercises against coastal installations. The fifth alternative is to sign a world convention on banning the participation of nuclear Powers in military-political blocs and alliances.

      These are only a few possible alternatives for the peacekeeping activities of advanced European civilization. Some people may find them too fantastic. But did the easy successes of the West in privatizing the political heritage of the USSR not seem equally fantastic?

      [Zhilin] Aleksandr Ivanovich, when one analyses the relations between Russia and NATO one sometimes come to the conclusion that in Brussels they seem to respect us and they seem to take our point of view into account. But in their actions in practice they seem to ignore Russia's position. So what should Russia do, how should it arrange its relations in order to monitor NATO's actions and to influence the strategy and perhaps even the tactics of these actions?

      [Vladimirov] In order to defend its position, it must have a position. That is the first point. If we know what we want to say and what we want to receive as a result of this position, then we have something to defend. If we passively follow along behind and only react to their actions, if we do not propose any initiatives of our own, if we do not share them and do not propose them to NATO then we shall be eternally doomed only to reacting. The first thing is to have an active position and to know what we want.

      Secondly, it is only by pursuing a system of working within NATO itself that one can gain prestige in this organization. There is no other way to achieve this. And the more rapidly and the more fully, let me repeat once again, we gradually insert our presence into the structure and the bodies then the quicker will the way of thinking change.

      The fact that within NATO not everyone regards us benevolently is quite evident. But to form this benevolent attitude is something that only we can do, by convincing them that we are necessary for their security.


      *******

      #7
      Christian Science Monitor
      16 June 2000
      Adoptions stalled: reform or red tape?
      By Fred Weir, Special to The Christian Science Monitor

      Eight-month-old Sasha is a lively boy with bright blue eyes and - at least when he gets a bit of attention - a big sunny smile.

      Lying on his belly in a playpen with seven other babies in the Lubertsy Baby House, he is blissfully unaware that bureaucrats are juggling with his destiny.

      "Sasha has excellent chances of being adopted, as do many of the children here," says Olga Struchkova, director of the Baby House, some 20 miles from Moscow. "But the system ... has always been too bogged down in red tape, and now it has almost ground to a halt," she says.

      One of President Vladimir Putin's first acts after being elected in March was to sign a decree outlawing intermediaries in the adoption process, immobilizing at a single stroke some 150 agencies from the US alone who've been helping to pair foreigners with Russian babies.

      Outside agents must now register officially with the Russian government, and prove their good intentions with a stiff battery of documentation - a reform many professionals say is necessary and overdue. But they chafe at the complex paperwork and time-scale involved. Registration will take as long as three months, and the process won't be opened until July at the earliest.

      "Registration requirement is a good thing if it will eliminate a lot of the less-experienced and perhaps less ethical agencies who have been working in Russia," says Sara Harris, a representative of the North Carolina-based Christian World Adoption agency, which has handled about 50 Russian adoptions annually for the past six years. "But for the moment there's an enormous amount of disruption. Many adoptions have been frozen in the pipeline because none of us are being allowed to work."

      Ms. Harris, an American who married a Russian citizen in 1966 and has lived in Moscow ever since, believes the Putin government has the best intentions. "There are very strict rules governing adoption in the US, and it's not unreasonable for Russia to tighten its own requirements," she says. "The system has been riddled with inconsistencies, inefficiencies, and corruption, all of which needs to be cleaned up.

      "I do not believe these new measures are aimed against foreigners who want to adopt Russian children," she says.

      The numbers of American couples seeking to adopt in Russia has been growing steadily since the practice became legal here after 1992. More than two-thirds of the 6,200 Russian children adopted by foreigners last year went to the United States.

      About 620,000 children languish in Russian orphanages, and experts say the numbers are growing due to post-Soviet economic deprivation and a breakdown of social and family values.

      About 80,000 are currently listed on the national registry of children available for adoption. But adoption is not a developed tradition in this country. Last year, Russians adopted about 7,000 kids, just slightly more than the numbers taken by foreigners.

      Due to the language barrier and the labyrinthine Russian bureaucracy, a savvy middleman - often an American of Russian descent - is usually called in to help handle the arrangements for foreigners trying to adopt a Russian baby. Experts say the process typically costs about $20,000, some of which may be spent on gifts for the orphanage and to win the favor of local judges and officials.

      Russian nationalists have accused outside middlemen of manipulating the system and using their clients' wealth to jump waiting lists and secure the healthiest babies. By banning foreign agencies until registration takes place, the Putin government has triggered worries that it may be preparing to crack down on foreign adoptions.

      "Our children should stay in Russia," says Viktor Kozin, a parliamentary spokesman for the ultranationalist party of Vladimir Zhirinovsky, which wants to ban foreign adoptions altogether. "Rich Americans want to buy our babies and turn them against Russia. That can't be allowed."

      At the Lubertsy Baby House, home to 105 infants in the village of Malakhovka, Ms. Struchkova shakes her head. "That's a very influential point of view in some circles, but it's a minority one," she says. "To me it's perfectly obvious that the most unpatriotic thing is to leave a Russian baby without parents."

      According to Harris and others, the stronger regulations decreed by President Putin might have the effect of stealing the nationalists' thunder. One of the new rules will require adoptive parents to register their baby with the Russian consulate in their country, to keep open its right to Russian citizenship until the age of 18. Another orders parents to submit regular progress reports on the child for four years after the adoption.

      "If they work properly, the new regulations will weaken political pressure by applying the kind of tough standards the critics have been calling for," Harris says. "In the long run, the environment can be improved."

      Since adoption is supposed to be free of charge under Russian law, no one seems very willing to talk about the economic contribution being made by prospective foreign parents to keep the rickety, underfunded Russian orphanage system alive. But it may be considerable.

      Struchkova complains the Russian government is far behind on the 32 rubles (about $1.15) that is supposed to be paid for each child's daily upkeep. "My staff and I routinely go for months without our salaries," she says. "The authorities are simply not living up to their responsibilities."

      She turns cautious when asked about the expensive fax machine and computer sitting on her office desk, and the shipment of new children's furniture arriving at the back door of the orphanage for the young ones, all under 4. "We get food, clothing, and other things from friends and sponsors," she says. "There's no law against humanitarian aid, you know."

      Ms. Harris says the mystery is easily solved. "As an American adoption agency working in Russia ... we encourage parents to donate about $1,000 to the orphanage as a way of saying thanks and helping the children who remain behind," she says. "Our agency always makes sure it is given in the form of necessities. We never hand over cash."


      *******

      #8
      Moscow Times
      June 15, 2000
      DEFENSE DOSSIER: No 'Political Solution' Yet
      By Pavel Felgenhauer

      Since last October, President Vladimir Putin and other high-ranking officials have continually stated in public that the ultimate goal of the nation's efforts in Chechnya is a political solution that would reintegrate the rebel province into Russia. The Kremlin has also announced often that the military "antiterrorist" operation is not a substitute for political dialogue and that negotiations will begin as soon as die-hard separatists are uprooted, or possibly even earlier.

      Moscow's stated desire to seek a political solution in Chechnya has always been good news for Western governments that want to do business with Putin and do not want the Chechen problem to get in the way. Several times during the last 10 months, Kremlin officials have hinted that political negotiations are imminent, and each time the Western media fell for the story. Western governments have in turn used "peace in Chechnya soon" reports as a pretext for indefinitely prolonging the grace period for Putin to investigate and correct human rights violations in the North Caucasus, despite growing evidence gathered by human rights organizations of war crimes and mass slaughter of civilians by federal troops.

      This week, the Kremlin's "political solution" unfolded in the form of a decree appointing Moslem cleric Mufti Akhmad Kadyrov as head of the pro-Moscow administration in Chechnya. Putin also reformed the way in which Chechnya is administered, dismissing special government representative General Nikolai Koshman and imposing a system described by Kremlin officials as direct presidential rule.

      Most likely, Western governments will again cynically use the fact that a Chechen has been appointed to rule Chechnya to prop up their present policy of being deaf, dumb and blind to any bad news from the North Caucasus. But the propaganda effect in Chechnya itself of the Kadyrov appointmentwill probably be insignificant. Kadyrov has been supporting military actions since the outbreak of hostilities; if he couldn't make the rebels surrender before, how can he change anything much today?

      It seems obvious that Kadyrov will be no more than a figurehead in Chechnya. The military and special police units will not obey his orders. Putin has already announced that a special viceroy will be appointed to supervise Kadyrov "in a day-by-day mode." Kremlin sources say the top military commander in the Caucasus and Chechnya, General Gennady Troshev, will in fact be Kadyrov's supervisor. It is possible that Koshman will also be reinstated, say, as Kadyrov's "deputy," to keep the mufti from having any control of money matters or security.

      While the authorities have been busy cutting out a new cloak to cover up the routine of a frustratingly inefficient anti-guerrilla operation, the rebels have been up to some very new mischief. A shrapnel-bomb explosion two weeks ago in Volgograd near a military base that killed and wounded several servicemen was followed by a series of lethal suicide car-bomb attacks in Chechnya. It seems the rebels that tried to fight primarily regular battles with military troops before are now in fact resorting to terrorist methods to complement their guerrilla assaults.

      Modern bomb-terrorism was actually invented in Russia in the 19th century by anti-tsarist revolutionaries. Since then, many people in this country, almost all innocent, were prosecuted for "terrorism" during Communist rule, but the country (and its security services) did not experience any genuine organized terrorism for nearly 100 years. The nation's security services are badly equipped, untrained and utterly corrupt f no good at all for countering real terrorists.

      The present war in Chechnya has been officially christened "anti-terrorist," but it is in effect an air bombing campaign. After recent rebel bomb attacks, all the authorities could do was round up Chechens at random. Such "terrorist" suspects are often beaten up in custody, sometimes ruthlessly tortured and then quite often released after relatives pay bribes.

      But if the Chechen rebels, frustrated by the cruelty of the occupation, extend their terrorist revenge attacks, then the nation's undisciplined security services certainly will have a hard time effectively infiltrating and subverting dedicated terrorist cabals. In fact, the brutality of the nation's authorities today, combined with their nearly institutionalized corrupt practices, are recruiting dedicated terrorists with an efficiency no Islamic zealot could ever hope to achieve.

      Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent, Moscow-based defense analyst.


      *******

      #9
      Excerpt
      US State Department
      15 June 2000
      Transcript: Secretary Cohen Interview with RTR TV in Moscow

      Moscow -U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen told a Russian television audience June 13 that he feels new optimism for Russian engagement in world affairs.

      Earlier, Cohen met with Russian Defense Minister Marshall Igor Sergeyev and President Vladimir Putin, and he cited those meetings, as well as Sergeyev's attendance at the recent NATO Permanent Joint Council (PJC) and Putin's recent summit with President Bill Clinton, as evidence of "an active engagement. I think Russia wants to engage the United States and other countries in a very proactive way." He called Sergeyev's attendance at the PJC a sign that "the level of cooperation is going to get better," and said the renewed participation by the Russian military in the PJC will be beneficial to NATO, to Russia, and to the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo.

      Asked about the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) and the United States' proposed national missile defense system, Cohen pointed out that there were discussions rather than negotiations between himself and the Russian leaders. "I came to explain the United States' position in terms of the nature of the threat that we face from rogue states and the nature of a limited national missile defense system that would be directed against a North Korea, an Iran, Iraq, or other so-called rogue state," Cohen said.

      "The system that we have in mind would in no way pose a threat to Russia's strategic system, so it was an opportunity for me to meet with your President and also with your Minister of Defense Sergeyev and his associates and colleagues to lay out the architecture of what the United States has in mind for a limited system against a limited type of attack coming from a rogue state," he added.

      The United States seeks to work together with Russia to modify the existing ABM treaty so that both could be protected against "a limited type of attack coming from a nation that does not have many hundreds of missiles that they could launch against either Russia or against the United States," Cohen said. "So we're trying very hard to encourage mutual agreement and a mutual modification of the treaty itself. We think that Russia should proceed with this modification and work together with the United States."


      *******

      #10
      TITLE: INTERVIEW WITH VLADIMIR YAKOVLEV, STRATEGIC MISSILES TROOPS
      COMMANDER IN CHIEF
      (ZERKALO RTR SUNDAY PROGRAM, 20:00, JUNE 11, 2000)
      SOURCE: FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE

      Svanidze: So, ABM and Putin's proposals. Our guest is the commander-in-chief of Strategic Missiles Troops, Colonel-General Vladimir Yakovlev.

      Yakovlev: Good day.

      Svanidze: Good day, Vladimir Nikolayevich. I've got a question concerning Putin's proposals. They were announced for the first time and formalized in a joint statement at the summit, at the meeting with President Clinton. How would you comment on this joint statement?

      Yakovlev: The joint statement identifies certain directions in which both Russia and the US will be moving in the near future. Some mass media described it as a declaratory statement. However, if you take a closer look at clause 14 of the statement, you'll see that the presidents identified concrete measures to solve the problems --

      Svanidze: I see you are holding the text of this statement, and I am looking up clause 14, which reads "the development of measures that would allow both sides to take necessary steps to preserve strategic stability in the face of new threats".

      Yakovlev: These directions follow from the four main problems concerning the deterrence potential as a key aspect of international security. And this is what should be done right now in the armed forces.

      Svanidze: To make a swift transition to this week's events, Vladimir Putin put forth a proposal not only in Italy, in Rome, but he basically addressed it to all West European countries to build a joint missile defense system. You responded immediately. You were quoted by the press as saying that if the President ordered, you would obey. Excellent. As a military man and as a officer, you had to say this. But is it possible to build a joint missile defense system, say, with Western Europe?

      Yakovlev: Research made in Russia and the testing experience we have allow us to pursue this. Although there are two aspects to it. First, whose money will be used to solve this problem?

      Svanidze: This is very important, isn't it?

      Yakovlev: The ideal solution would be not to create and not to deploy a missile defense system. A missile defense system prompts the other side to constantly build up its potential and at the same time look for ways to beat this system. So, this will be just a waste of money that will not give the world any stability. On the contrary, it will destabilize the situation and lead to nuclear anarchy and a desire of some countries to either possess nuclear weapons or find ways to counter these systems.

      Svanidze: Maybe I misunderstood you. Are you saying that the more the ABM systems are improved and the faster they are improved, the more peace is endangered?

      Yakovlev: The more peace is endangered and --

      Svanidze: You are the command-in-chief of Strategic Missiles Troops, aren't you?

      Yakovlev: Yes, I am.

      Svanidze: And you are against the modernization of the missile defense system?

      Yakovlev: That's right. I am against this. I am against this because we agreed in 1972 to create one district in the US and one district in Russia and to cover them. This is quite enough in order to solve the question of mutual understanding through a dialogue on the deployment of strategic offensive weapons. All the more so because the creation of a national missile defense system encourages the so-called threshold states not only to possess nuclear weapons, but to modernize them more and more --

      Svanidze: I've got it at last. I am sorry, it took me some time. So, if I understand you correctly, you are against the modernization of national missile defense systems. Is that right? Because they prompt other countries, a potential aggressor to improve their own offensive weapons. But what about building a joint missile defense system, what do you think of this?

      Yakovlev: If a political decision is made, we could determine the architecture of this system. It should be directed only against certain potential threats which may endanger, say, the territory of Russia or Europe.

      Svanidze: Here comes a question and this text on the table in front of you, the joint statement by Putin and Clinton, "strategic stability in the face of new threats". So if we propose to build a joint missile defense system with America or with Western Europe and speak of new threats, where do they come from?

      Yakovlev: We may speak of new threats and there are different approaches toward new threats. There was this Rumsfeld Commission in the US and its conclusions do not coincide with the data provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. Often they differ in terms of our experts' work. There were proposals to conduct a dialogue in order to determine the degree of threats, of possible threats, maybe for the next quarter of a century.

      We find this definition in the joint statement. We need further dialogue in order to determine the degree of these threats.

      Svanidze: And where they come from.

      Yakovlev: And where they come from, yes. There may be different assessments. We have assessments saying that by the year 2015 five to eight threshold states may --

      Svanidze: Threshold states are the states which basically have weapons but do not have means of their delivery, is this right?

      Yakovlev: These are the states which have weapons and have means of their delivery, either for medium-range ballistic missiles or for tactical missiles, depending on --

      Svanidze: But why are they called threshold states then? What is the threshold?

      Yakovlev: The thing is that they have not yet reached the level of full possession of nuclear weapons and delivery capabilities both for ballistic --

      Svanidze: Speaking seriously, the greatest threat -- of course, to the extent that you can measure -- comes from these countries, is that right? We will not name them now.

      Yakovlev: I think there is no point in naming them now, although I think everybody knows them. We understand that these threshold states may pose a threat to some extent. But I think it is senseless to talk about this now. I mean to talk about this, meaning a period of up to 2015-2025 when there may be some threats from that side.

      Svanidze: My last question, and I would appreciate it if you gave just a short answer because we have no time for a longer one. Will we have a joint missile defense system in the foreseeable future either with the US or Western Europe? What is your forecast?

      Yakovlev: I think everything will depend on the decision to be made.

      Svanidze: To be made --

      Yakovlev: Primarily on the political decision on this issue.

      Svanidze: You mean that if it is made, technology will match it.

      Yakovlev: Our technology allows us to work on theater missile defense, on non-strategic missile defense.

      Svanidze: Thank you, Vladimir Nikolayevich.


      *******

      Back to the top


      Back to the Center for Defense Infomation Site
      Back to The CDI Russia Weekly Site