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Issue #103 | 26 May 2000 | ||||
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Issue #103 | 26 May 2000 | ||||
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CDI Russia Weekly-#103 26 May 2000 Edited by David Johnson Center for Defense Information 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW Washington DC 20036 phone: 202-332-0600; fax:202-462-4559 djohnson@cdi.org
The CDI Russia Weekly is an e-mail newsletter that carries news and analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With funding from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education organization. CDI Russia Weekly web page (with archive): http://www.cdi.org/russia/ Visit CDI's web site: http://www.cdi.org
Contents: 1. Moscow Times: Pavel Felgenhauer, Powder Keg in Central Asia. 2. Voice of America: Peter Heinlein on Clinton-Putin summit. 4. Jamestown Foundation Monitor: Regional Leaders Having Second Thoughts About Putin's "Power Vertical" 5. Moscow Times: Vladimir Kozin, Developing Good Neighborly Relations [re Russia and NATO] 6. Izvestiya: Russian Generals are Winning the War With Eritrea. 8. RFE/RL: Frank Csongos, Russia: Helsinki Commission Concerned Over Human Rights Record. 10. The Global Beat Syndicate: Mikhail Zheglov, Free Press in Russia Under Attack. 11. MOSKOVSKY KOMSOMOLETS: Interview with Security Council Secretary Sergei Ivanov. 12. BBC MONITORING: Russian Foreign Minister Reiterates Desire for Multipolar World System.
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Moscow Times May 25, 2000 DEFENSE DOSSIER: Powder Keg in Central Asia By Pavel Felgenhauer Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent, Moscow-based defense analyst.
This week, President Vladimir Putin's aide Sergei Yastrzhembsky accused the ultra-conservative Islamic Taliban rulers of Afghanistan of supporting Chechen separatists and of providing military training to rebels. Yastrzhembsky also said, "I would not exclude the possibility of preventive strikes if there is a real threat to Russia's national interests." Afterward, Yastrzhembsky confirmed that his belligerent statement reflected the official views of the Kremlin.
During a visit last week to Central Asia, Putin agreed to help defend Uzbek President Islam Karimov against Moslem extremists. It would appear that Yastrzhembsky's warning to the Taliban was intended to reassure Karimov and other former Soviet rulers in Central Asia. But in reality, the Central Asian presidents do not seem happy. At least, none of them has expressed his gratitude to Yastrzhembsky.
The Central Asian presidents are authoritarian, in varying degrees. Under their rule, the population of Central Asia, not overly rich in Soviet times, has become more impoverished. The region is a potentially fertile playground for radical Islamic agitation. The post-Soviet Central Asian chieftains are afraid the Taliban could spark an Islamic revolution. But because the Central
Asian presidents are so afraid, they try not to provoke the dreaded Taliban publicly.
Karimov, like many other Central Asian presidents, has done his best for years to suppress any form of opposition, especially Islamic opposition. Uzbek and Tajik authorities have also been helping anti-Taliban forces for years in Afghanistan, but have done so covertly.
The Russian authorities themselves for years have been the main supporters of the Taliban's arch-rival, Ahmad Shah Masood. The military secretly supplies Masood with arms and ammunition, using the territories of Tajikistan and other Central Asian states for the covert operation with the tacit support of local authorities. Actually, Iran, which does not like the Taliban and believes its brand of Islam is too conservative, has also been using the territory of some Central Asian states to supply Masood and other anti-Taliban forces, coordinating these operations with Russian agents.
The Central Asian presidents may be authoritarian, but they are secularly so. The governments in Moscow and the West see these secular regimes as an important firewall that may stop the spread of radical Islam. The West, if not actually supporting anti-Taliban, Russian-Iranian covert operations, has at the same time done its best to turn a blind eye.
While Masood and his Tajik tribal warriors are still challenging the Taliban from inside, no serious infiltration into Central Asia is possible. It seems that Masood may fight on for years to come. The Taliban is a religious movement of Pushtuns, the majority tribe in Afghanistan. The Taliban have occupied over 90 percent of Afghan territory, but if they do not eat their pride and make some power-sharing deal with the mountain Tajiks, resistance will continue.
A continuation of covert anti-Taliban operations would seem to be a reasonable policy for Russia to pursue. But open "preventive" strikes could be suicidal. The United States attacked alleged terrorist bases in Afghanistan in 1998 with long-range cruise missiles from the sea. The Taliban could not retaliate.
Russia does not have long-range conventional missiles. A "preventive" strike could only be launched from Tajik or Uzbek territory, and the Taliban would have a pretext for striking back against Russian forces and Russian allies in the region. Russian attacks would recall the bitter memories of the invasion of the 1980s, which could unite Afghans behind the Taliban. Yastrzhembsky's saber rattling, though far less than an actual attack, is in itself extremely unwise.
It seems that the main target of Russian anti-Taliban threats is U.S. President Bill Clinton, not the Taliban. By threatening alleged terrorist bases in a foreign country with attack, the new Kremlin administration is in retrospect condoning previous U.S. raids on such targets. Clinton is coming to Moscow next month, and Putin will no doubt tell him that the West should actively support Russia in its war against "terrorists" in Chechnya. Last month in London, Putin scolded Western leaders for not supporting the Chechen campaign "because they are afraid of a reaction among the Moslem inhabitants
of Europe. ... Western Europe could pay heavily for this."
Putin actually seems to believe that he is defending Western civilization. Will he some day bomb the Afghans to prove to the West how good he is?
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Voice of America DATE=5/24/2000 TITLE=RUSSIA / U-S NUCLEAR BYLINE=PETER HEINLEIN DATELINE=MOSCOW
INTRO: U-S Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott sounded an optimistic note as he sat down in Moscow for difficult arms control talks ahead of next month's U-S/Russia summit. But as V-O-A's Peter Heinlein reports from Moscow, the stakes are high and the chances for success seem limited.
TEXT: As he began negotiations with his Russian counterpart, U-S Deputy Secretary of State Talbott acknowledged that the differences facing them will be tough to overcome. But he told reporters he is encouraged at seeing a little progress in each session of talks.
The two countries have sharply different interests on arms control issues. The United States wants to amend the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty to allow construction of a limited missile defense system. The proposal has broad bipartisan support in the U-S Congress. Russia, on the other hand, wants to negotiate a START- Three treaty (EDS: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) that would further limit each nation's nuclear arsenal to about 15-hundred warheads. Russian strategists say the cuts would enable Moscow to maintain nuclear parity at a time of limited defense budgets.
But in both countries, there is stiff opposition within the military establishments to making any concessions. Russian generals fiercely oppose amending the A-B-M Treaty, saying it would undermine the entire premise of arms control and lead to a new nuclear arms race.
For its part, the U-S military Joint Chiefs of Staff argue that Russia's START-Three proposal would cut too deeply into the U-S nuclear deterrent.
With such formidable opposition, and the wide gap in interests, most observers agree it will be impossible to reach a breakthrough arms deal before President Clinton comes to Moscow next month to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin.
But analyst Alexander Pikayev says the outlines of a framework agreement are coming into focus. /// PIKAYEV ACT ONE /// What is possible is that they could reach an agreement, a general agreement that they could sign by the end of the year, so they would determine the basic parameters of START-Three, which could be negotiated for several more months and signed before President Clinton leaves office. And also they could start consultations on A-B-M Treaty modifications, what would be, I believe, the major political achievement of the Clinton administration during this Moscow summit. /// END ACT /// Mr. Pikayev sees these arms control talks, with a new president in the Kremlin, as a golden opportunity for the Clinton administration to boost pro-western forces within Vladimir Putin's inner circle. /// PIKAYEV ACT TWO /// In Russia, we have a very fragile balance
between anti-westerners and pro-westerners inside the Putin administration. And given that fragile balance, what could be important is the American position. If the Clinton Administration -- Madeline Albright, Strobe Talbott -- could be able to convince Russia to make a good deal, that the U-S is really ready to offer a good compromise, a good way out, it could decisively affect the balance of power in Russia, so what we see now is a struggle for the mind and heart of Vladimir Putin. /// END ACT /// But Mr. Pikayev admits the Clinton Administration strategy could backfire if Kremlin hard-liners prevail. That could leave the United States with no choice but to withdraw unilaterally from the A-B-M treaty, giving Russia a pretext to pull out of other agreements. Moreover, it would allow the Kremlin to capitalize on differences between the United States and its allies over the wisdom of abandoning the A-B-M Treaty.
The director of the Moscow Carnegie Center, Alan Rousso, says the Clinton administration is making a dangerous gamble that could end in a huge propaganda victory for the Kremlin. He says it would be best to take the entire arms control issue off the summit agenda. /// ROUSSO ACT ONE /// It's too late unfortunately to cancel the summit. If they could have seen this coming, they would have been wise never to have scheduled it in the first place, because it's too risky. But we've crossed that threshold. It's too late to turn back, so the summit will go on. So they have no choice but to lower expectations and hope they aren't bloodied too badly by Republican criticism that this was a meaningless summit, that the U-S didn't get anything from it and so forth. /// END ACT /// Mr. Rousso predicts the Clinton-Putin meeting will be what he calls "a feel-good summit," where the difficult issues such as press freedom and Russia's commitment to an open society are left off the agenda or downplayed. He says Mr. Clinton's goal is to put U-S/Russia relations on the right track for the upcoming U-S political season. /// ROUSSO ACT TWO /// I think they want to send a positive message back home for domestic political reasons, if for no other reason than that the Clinton-Gore strategy has been a success. And they're going to try to bask in that light for a while, and hope it rubs off on voters and demonstrates the effectiveness of the Clinton-Gore strategy on Russia. /// END ACT /// A senior U-S official says behind-the-scenes arms control talks will continue right up to the summit and beyond.
President Clinton is due to arrive in Moscow June 3rd for a three-day visit. It will be the first meeting between the two leaders since Mr. Putin took over the top Kremlin job last New Year's Eve, when former President Boris Yeltsin suddenly stepped down.
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Russians cite Japan as 4th biggest source of threat: press
MOSCOW, May 25 (Kyodo) - While only 1% of Russians believe Japan is a source of threat to Russia, in terms of ranking, Japan comes out in a national survey as the fourth most feared country in Russia, the Interfax news agency reported Thursday.
Interfax, quoting results of a survey conducted by the Regional Policy Research pollster, said Russians rank the United States as the country posing the biggest threat to Russia, cited by 27% of the 1,600 respondents.
China ranked second, cited by 3% of the respondents, followed by Latvia, a former Soviet republic where there is constant friction with its sizable Russian population, with 2% of the respondents citing the country as a source of threat.
Japan and Russia have been at loggerheads over a territorial dispute, but Interfax gave no reasons why Russians regard Japan as a source of threat.
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Jamestown Foundation Monitor May 25, 2000
REGIONAL LEADERS HAVING SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT PUTIN'S "POWER VERTICAL". President Vladimir Putin's push to transform Russia's federative relations is moving forward quickly. The Prosecutor General's Office yesterday announced that it is setting up offices in each of the seven new federal districts, which are headed by presidential representatives. In addition, there are signs that the Kremlin will take further steps to empower the presidential representatives. Yesterday, Pavel Krasheninnikov, the former justice minister who now heads the State Duma's legislative committee, said yesterday that other law enforcement structures, including the Justice Ministry, should establish offices in the seven districts as a way to "strengthen federalism and legality on the entire territory of the Russian Federation." Krasheninnikov, a member of the pro-government Union of Right-Forces, said that these measures fully comply with current legislation and denied that they would be aimed at taking power and authority away from the regions. Likewise, Dmitri Medvedev, first deputy head of the presidential administration, said that Putin's sweeping plan to reorganize federative relations does not violate the Russian constitution or require changes in the country's Basic Law (Russian agencies, May 24).
Despite these reassurances, the plan's apparent goal--to set up structures directly subordinated to the Kremlin which circumvent and supercede parallel structures belonging to the regional governments--would be a cardinal change in Russia's political system. The Interior Ministry and the tax police reportedly plan to follow the lead of the Prosecutor General's Office and set up offices in the headquarters of each of the seven districts. This will rob the heads of the constituent regions of key levers and attributes of power--such as the Interior Ministry's OMON special police units, which have often been the decisive factor in "settling" property disputes. All of this helps explain why, according to the same report, regional leaders who initially welcomed Putin's steps to strengthen the presidential "power vertical" are starting to have second thoughts
(Nezavisimaya gazeta, May 25). Many regional leaders clearly cannot be happy over a reform program which threatens to turn them into, as a newspaper put it, "ordinary medium-rank officials" (Moskovsky komsomolets, May 24). Various regional leaders have openly expressed unhappiness with the Kremlin's draft bill to replace the governors and local legislative assembly heads with their own appointees on the Federation Council and thus deprive the regional leaders of immunity from criminal prosecution. Alexander Nazarchuk, speaker of the Altai region's legislative assembly, said on May 23 that the sitting members of the Federation Council will "insist" on maintaining membership in the council (Russian agencies, May 23).
The regional leaders, with their obvious vested interest, are not alone in expressing their reservations. A leading Moscow journalist, Yulia Latynina, suggested this week that Putin's plans boiled down to substituting "the governors' arbitrary rule" with "centralized arbitrary rule" (Moscow Times, May 24). Likewise, a leading liberal newspaper described Putin's federative reform measures as "a series of blows against the independence...of the regional leaders, who under the conditions of the extreme weakness of the legislative and judicial branches are the single real counterweight to the authoritarianism of the Center" (Obshchaya gazeta, May 25).
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Moscow Times May 26, 2000 Developing Good Neighborly Relations [re Russia and NATO] By Vladimir Kozin Vladimir Kozin is the deputy head of staff of the foreign affairs committee of the State Duma. He contributed this comment - in which he presents his own views - to The Moscow Times.
In spite of the halt of NATO's operation against Yugoslavia and the generally successful visit to Moscow by NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson in February, Russia-NATO relations are still in the doldrums. Today's Russia-NATO dialogue is restricted to essentially two key directions: issues of international peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, and some aspects of arms control.
There are still deep divisions between the two sides. Russia has not yet fully overcome an anti-NATO syndrome regarding NATO's use of military might in the Balkans and its not allocating funds for restoring the economy of Yugoslavia. NATO shows a clear concern on the operations by federal forces in Chechnya, accentuates the issue of human rights, and insists on a political solution to the situation.
Both the Kremlin and NATO headquarters experience hostile feelings toward each other on plans for NATO enlargement. And both sides are at loggerheads over recent doctrinal statements toward each other. NATO has criticized the Russian concept of national security and the new military doctrine. Moscow has serious questions about the new strategic conception of NATO adopted at its summit in April 1999. Moscow objects to the possibility of NATO's use of force beyond its "zones of responsibility" without the approval of the UN Security Council. The Kremlin is concerned by NATO's not wanting to fulfill the spirit and the law of the NATO Founding Act, including the point on
devising joint solutions to security issues.
In short, Russian-NATO relations are at a low point. Does this benefit anyone? No. Russia and NATO - and the many nations in the alliance, including those with nuclear weapons and great military potential - are too significant on the world stage to allow a permanent state of mutual confrontation or even suspicion or mistrust.
Both sides should undertake energetic, purposeful steps to ensure that the relationship moves forward. They should weigh the actions they take beyond their national borders, understanding their responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, and not permitting interference in the internal affairs of nations. Predictability, consistency, pragmatism, openness - these are key words that should define the sides' operations in international affairs. Moscow is ready to sign on to this. So how can we ensure this goal?
We must ensure the effective working of mechanisms already in place for working on security issues, something that is not happening now. This should be done not only within the framework of the Joint Permanent Council of Russia, NATO and the nations that signed on to the Partnership for Peace. We also need regular Russia-NATO summits, particularly when crises arise, with the goal of resolving them peacefully. In between high-level visits, meetings should be conducted between the foreign and defense ministers of Russia and NATO; at such meetings, concrete proposals should be adopted on bilateral, regional and global problems.
To solve major issues that arise in world politics and bilateral Russian-NATO relations, we should establish a direct, continuously functioning line of communication between the Kremlin and NATO headquarters, like the hot-line that has long existed between the official residences of heads of states.
The perspectives for a deepening of the dialogue and cooperation between Russia and NATO do exist; we did develop some experience before the Balkan crisis. The key to a full thaw in Russian-NATO cooperation could be NATO's objective perception of the Russian government and its policies, as well as a change in the bloc's general direction, which raises serious concerns here.
At the start of the 21st century, Russia and NATO should be constructively engaged so as not to allow a worsening of regional or international problems. They should base this relationship on a fundamentally different foundation. Otherwise, both sides will find themselves in confrontation or in a state of permanent hostility toward each other.
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Russia Today press summaries Izvestiya May 25, 2000 Russian Generals are Winning the War With Eritrea Summary
Izvestiya came to possess unique documents that can serve as evidence that Russian generals are participating in the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
The war in the African Horn, which has already claimed fifty to sixty thousands lives, is reaching its culmination. Ethiopians are winning. They have completed the crushing defeat of eight Eritrean divisions on the western front and broke the defense system of the enemy in the central part of the
front.
The war is conducted with the use of all kinds of military technology worth billions of U.S. dollars, including some funding as credits obtained from the World Bank. There is a lot of Russian military materiel that came to the two African countries directly from Russia, or was re-exported from CIS countries, North Korea, China, or Romania.
Why did Ethiopia suddenly start to win as two years before it looked absolutely helpless in this military conflict? Izvestiya's answer to this is that Ethiopean victories were prepared by Russian generals.
The Embassy of Eritrea in Moscow prepared a document, which says that not a single sitting of the military council in Ethiopia passed without participation of Russian generals. The document lists concrete names of Russian military specialists, part of who are pilots of Russian Su-27 fighters-bombers and of MiG military helicopters. It was passed to the Russian Foreign Ministry.
Generals and officers can be in Ethiopia on a legal basis, as military advisers, who teach local officers how to handle the Russian military supplies, which are either left in Ethiopia from the Soviet times or were exported in the recent past. The Defense Ministry confirmed to Izvestiya that there are Russian military specialists in Ethiopia, but they denied that Russian pilots participate in combat actions there. However, Izvestiya's sources said that there are pilots from Russia and other CIS countries, both in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Thus, every day, Russian pilots, fighting for both sides, have a chance to meet with each other in mortal combat. Unlike military advisers, Russian pilots in Africa have no official status. If they become prisoners, Russian diplomats will not bustle about rescuing them: officially, Russia condemns mercenary military. However, the author notices that unofficial policies are different.
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ICTY accepts Russian explanation of alleged war criminal's Kremlin trip
THE HAGUE, May 25 (AFP) - The head of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) said Thursday that he had accepted Russia's explanation of why a warcrimes suspect was allowed to visit Moscow.
Dragoljub Ojdanic, Yugoslavia's Defence Minister, visited his Russian opposite number earlier this month despite being the subject of an international arrest warrant.
Ojdanic, who has been indicted by the ICTY on suspicion of war crimes and crimes against humanity during Yugoslavia's 1999 campaign against separatist rebels in Kosovo, was allowed to leave Moscow after discussing military cooperation with Marshal Igor Sergeyev.
But Claude Jorda, ICTY president, said in a statement released here that he was satisfied by the explanation given by Russia's ambassador to The Hague for the oversight.
Alexander Khodakov told the tribunal that Ojdanic's visit was given the go-ahead because of an "internal technical hitch" in communication between federal departments.
"The ambassador said that measures had been taken in order to ensure such a situation does not happen again," Jorda's statement said.
An ICTY spokesman also brushed aside accusations from Russia's Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov that the tribunbal had become politicised.
Ivanov said Wednesday in Florence after meeing NATO representatives that the ICTY had "long since turned into a body that is not so much judicial as politicized."
Russia was "not satisfied" with the way the tribunal is fulfilling its mandate, and reserves the right to raise its concerns at the UN Security Council, he said.
Responding to the attack, ICTY spokesman Jim Landale said: "This tribunal is composed of 14 judges from 14 different nations. It is certainly not a politicised institution.
"If they (the Russians) consider it illegitimate, it is inconsistent considering that they took part in the creation of this tribunal."
The ICTY was initially set up to try suspects for warcrimes committed in the former Yugoslavia since 1991. But its scope was extended last year to include Kosovo.
Sixty-seven names appear on its open indictment list, including Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. Of that number, 39 are in detention and one has been provisionally released, according to the tribunal's Internet site.
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Russia: Helsinki Commission Concerned Over Human Rights Record By Frank T. Csongos The U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe held a hearing in Washington on Tuesday to examine whether human rights are in retreat in Russia under the new leadership of President Vladimir Putin. Key panel members and witnesses expressed concern that the answer appears to be yes. RFE/RL Senior Correspondent Frank T. Csongos reports.
Washington, 24 May 2000 (RFE/RL) -- The chairman of the U.S. Helsinki Commission says there is growing concern that the development of human rights in Russia is taking a turn for the worse under new President Vladimir Putin.
Republican U.S. Congressman Christopher Smith of New Jersey, chairman of the panel also known as the U.S. Helsinki Commission, said Tuesday recent Russian government actions against independent media are a source of grave concern as is the conduct of Russian forces in the breakaway republic of Chechnya.
Smith made the comments at a commission hearing in Washington called to examine the course of human rights in Russia.
"Under the administration of President (Boris) Yeltsin, human rights activists were able to achieve significant gains in making respect for human rights, if not a standard, at least a consideration in public policy. There is growing concern, however, that Russia's development in the area of human rights is taking a turn for the worse under recently elected President Vladimir Putin. "
Smith singled out two developments since the resignation of Yeltsin on Dec. 31, 1999. One was the treatment of RFE/RL correspondent Andrei Babitsky, who was held prisoner by Russian authorities earlier this year. The other was the recent raid by masked Russian authorities on the Media-Most offices in Moscow. Media-Most owns the independent NTV network and other media properties that have been offering critical coverage of the war in Chechnya and trying to expose corrupt politicians.
"The treatment of Radio Liberty journalist Andrei Babitsky and the recent armed raid on the offices of Media-Most and Russia's independent NTV network are only two of the most brazen and prominent examples of government pressure on media freedom. Further from the international spotlight, local authorities in Russia's regions have been harassing and intimidating journalists who print what displeases the powers-that-be."
Smith said the signs were ominous.
"I dare say, with the treatment of Babitsky and the raid on Media-Most, Moscow seems to signal to the regions that such a policy toward the media is acceptable."
U.S. Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell, a Colorado Republican and the panel's co-chairman, also made a similar conclusion.
"Recent actions against independent media are certainly a source of grave concern as is the conduct of Russian forces in the ongoing war in Chechnya. Ironically, a protracted war there could prove an Achilles heal for President Putin as casualties among young Russian conscripts rise."
Retired U.S. General William Odom, a former director of the super-secret National Security Agency, was the first to testify before the panel.
Odom said that while Russia maintains some of the formalities of electoral democracy, its policy in Chechnya and its management of the recent parliamentary and presidential elections make it difficult to believe that it is a truly democratic country. He said freedom of the press, due process of law and personal security for Russian citizens have all suffered setbacks.
"This is a highly dysfunctional kind of state to be in and it prevents any serious progress toward liberal democracy and civil society in the short run."
Odom also said the United States must overcome its residual Cold War thinking in which Russia is the most important country in the world. He said such an attitude is good neither for Russia nor for the West.
Igor Malashenko, first deputy chairman of the board of Media-Most, called the raid on the offices by heavily armed men in camouflage uniforms and black ski masks as an act of harassment by the Russian government.
The attacks on Media-Most and other Russian media are intended to intimidate publishers and journalists and to make them to self - censor themselves."
Malashenko said there is little doubt that the demonstration of force which occurred on May 11 also was intended as a punishment for material already published or aired on television programs.
"President Putin promised in his inauguration speech to establish a 'dictatorship of law' in Russia. Unfortunately, after the raid on Media-Most it looks like the Kremlin intends to rely more on the arbitrary and disproportionate use of force rather than the rule of law."
Babitsky, the RFE/RL correspondent, is barred from leaving Moscow and instead offered written testimony to the committee. In it, Babitsky was especially critical of Russian military tactics against Chechnya.
Babitsky said Russia employed an overwhelming military force, numbering about 90,000 men, against the small republic. And, he said, due to a massive
information campaign, many Russians have become convinced that the large majority of Chechens are hostile to Russia.
Babitsky, whose independent coverage of the Chechen war infuriated Russian authorities, said the Chechens are deprived of their civil rights in Russia because of their ethnic background. He said no positive changes in the situation can take place as long as Russian authorities and the public opinion conceive the Chechen nation as a threat to the existence of Russia.
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THE U.S. MAY TRY TO LINK ABM ISSUE TO NATO ENLARGEMENT -- GORBACHEV
MOSCOW. May 25 (Interfax) - Former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev thinks that the recent announcement by nine European countries of their wish to join NATO as soon as possible may have been backed up by a U.S. attempt to achieve Moscow concessions in the anti-missile defense issue. Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Slovakia, Macedonia, Albania, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania made the announcement. "If Clinton attains the agreement of Putin to revise the ABM Treaty of 1972, it would be very easy to hush the Europeans who dislike the idea of a billion dollar project of the U.S. star shield," Gorbachev said. The initiative of the nine countries is "sort of a ballon d'essai, an article for profitable commerce," a bargain for Russia's consent, he thinks. Gorbachev excludes that such a unanimous expression of the political will on the part of Central European countries is independent and says that expression "has an apparently destabilizing operation" behind it. "Evidently, such a proposal could not have been invented and, the more so, put forward without preliminary consultations with the United States and its approval of the move," Gorbachev says in an article with the title "An Obvious Step against Russia." The article was written for the Italian Stampa newspaper and published by Nezavisimaya Gazeta on Thursday. Gorbachev has the impression that the United States "is apt to prevent any possible revision of the military-political doctrine drafted by Washington at the NATO summit when the war in the Balkans was in full swing." "It is an obvious step against Russia, which has repeatedly and energetically announced the inadmissibility of NATO's further enlargement to the East, especially if it is valid for any sovereign republic of the Baltics," Gorbachev says. He thinks that a joint strategy of Russia and the European Union is necessary to provide for collective security. "Naturally, it must involve the United States, without which there can be no security for anyone in Europe or the rest of the world," Gorbachev says.
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The Global Beat Syndicate Free Press in Russia Under Attack By Mikhail Zheglov Mikhail Zheglov is Chief of Information Service of the 7 Days Publishing House, a division of the Media - Most holding in Moscow. May 24, 2000
MOSCOW -- My wife was nearly hysterical. "Oh, thank God, your telephone still works," she wailed when she called me at my office. "Are they there? How many? Are you okay? Are they going to question you? Will they let you go?
When?"
I was dumbfounded. What was she talking about?
She explained: "I heard it in the news, that masked and armed people blocked Media-Most offices, letting nobody in and nobody out, forbidding use of telephones and e-mail, searching offices and everything, even personal things What's going on?"
That was how I learned of the raid on the headquarters of my employer. My wife's concern was understandable. For some reason, though, our office was not among those raided by armed, masked men, apparently working on behalf of the government.
That was also when I realized how precarious the position of a free press is in Russia today.
Media-Most is a powerful and popular media company. It operates the NTV television channel and Echo of Moscow radio station. Its 7 Days publishing house produces Segodnya, a major daily newspaper, and Itogi, a weekly news magazine, as well as several other publications. The company is financially and politically independent from state authorities, who have long been dissatisfied with its news coverage and political analysis. More often than not, Media-Most has been critical of the Kremlin's policies in Chechnya, of official corruption and of the growing influence of special services and enforcement agencies.
The raid demonstrated just how irritated the government had become with such coverage.
It is still not known for sure whether the raid was conducted by members of the General Prosecutor's Office, the Federal Security Service, or any of the dozen or so other branches of state security. Nor does it really matter. While officials have offered various justifications for the commando-style raid, its goal was clearly to intimidate those critical of the government.
As Vladimir Zhirinovsky, a member of the Duma and the leader of the Liberal Democratic party, put it, "The KGB has come to power. It is good. And one should resign oneself to the fact. There will be trials and arrests. It is good for our people."
Zhirinovsky may have a notorious reputation but he's also known for saying openly what others dare only to think.
What's most alarming about the raid is that it could not have taken place without the consent of President Vladimir Putin or those high up in his administration. There has been no official reaction -- and certainly no criticism -- of the attack from the Kremlin.
The raid on Media-Most is only the latest and most dramatic example of the pressure independent media is facing in Russia. A recent survey, conducted by the Russian Union of Journalists and a number of non-government organizations, found that journalists in every region are routinely denied free access to information. Regional authorities regularly attempt to control news coverage and often exert pressure on newspapers by either limiting their distribution or blocking their publication at state-owned printing houses.
The federal government has been equally hostile. Even before the raid, the Ministry of Press and Information had sternly reprimanded such influential newspapers as Kommersant and Novaya Gazeta for publishing interviews with the Chechen rebel leader Aslan Maskhadov. How different are these actions from
official censorship?
More ominous are reports by the Russian Union of Journalists that government officials at every level are increasingly using their economic and regulatory powers to limit press freedom by denying broadcasting licenses and revoking certain tax breaks.
Mikhail Lesin, the Minister for the Press and Information, is known to favor the creation of a state-operated media monopoly. His deputy Andrey Romanchenko recently proposed revoking the broadcast licenses of "hostile organizations" such as the U.S-supported Radio Liberty. Other media organizations that either challenge or fail to support government policies could be the next targets of such retaliation.
It is an attitude that was prevalent during Stalinist times: those who are not with us are against us. It is an attitude that allows a government to feel perfectly justified in deploying masked gunmen to deal with its enemies.
One has the strong impression that such democratic values as freedom of the press and the rule of law are not shared by Russia's current rulers. The danger is that what little press freedom currently exists in Russia today may not last much longer.
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TITLE: INTERVIEW WITH SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARY SERGEI IVANOV (MOSKOVSKY KOMSOMOLETS, P. 4, MAY 22, 2000) SOURCE: FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE
SECRETARY OF RUSSIA'S SECURITY COUNCIL SERGEI IVANOV: "I DO NOT FORGIVE TREACHERY" THE MAN IN THE CROWD FINDS HIMSELF IN THE INNER CIRCLE He was a Soviet intelligence officer in Scandinavian countries, Britain and Kenya. He became the first "legalized" member of the Putin team. In his book the President described his relations with the Secretary of Russia's Security Council Sergei Ivanov as "a feeling of team spirit". It is said that the Security Council will soon be charged with the task of monitoring the fulfillment of all of the President's decisions...
Q: Sergei Borisovich, what has changed in your life since you entered top-league politics? How do you feel in the Kremlin? A: I feel quite comfortable here. I will not say that my promotion has put me under any stress. I understood the entire responsibility that I assumed on accepting Vladimir Vladimirovich's offer. I did not have any big doubts, anxieties or moral anguish. There was only one difficult moment connected with the transition to this post. Few know about it. When Putin convincingly persuaded me to leave the intelligence service, this did bring about a big change in my consciousness. I am prepared to admit this because I devoted 20 years to a work I loved.
Q: Do you prefer shadow roles? A: Any profession leaves its imprint on the personality. I know this from my own experience. All my life I tried not to stand out in a crowd. I was taught this.
Q: The broad public knows little about you. Doesn't it ire you when you are referred to as being "very plain" because you do not have any striking individual features? A: On the contrary, this is a complement, proof of professionalism.
Q: Nevertheless, let's fill the gap. Who were your parents? What were you like as a child?
A: I was a normal child. I was born into an ordinary family in Leningrad. From childhood I loved seamen, films and books about the sea. My mother's brother was a blue water skipper. He sailed to exotic countries, for instance, to the Falklands still before the conflict between Argentina and Britain. Perhaps, my love for the sea is rooted in his stories. The Beatles were my idols and my interest in English when I was in the 4th and 5th forms was largely explained by my interest in their songs. I studied in a school where a special emphasis was made on the teaching of English so by the 6th form I knew all the Beatles repertoire. At the same time I was keen on sports, I played soccer and hockey. I also liked basketball but considering my height I had no future in that sport. By the end of my school years I became interested in international affairs and to the question "Whom would you want to be?" I replied -- a diplomat. After school I enrolled at the Department of Philology at Leningrad State University.
Q: How do graduates of a department of philology get into the intelligence service? A: There is a rule in intelligence: no successiveness of generations. So not one of my relatives ever worked in intelligence. The knowledge of languages that I got at the department of philology was a necessary condition for work in certain areas. Of course, given that all the other selection qualifications are met. By the end of my study at the university I was offered to join the security service. After that there was serious training at the KGB Higher Courses in Minsk and in an intelligence school.
Q: You were sent abroad quite quickly... A: I was on three long-term assignments. I want to warn you at once that I would not like to say anything about where I was and what was my job. I will only say that these were West European countries and Africa. Although, this is no military secret at all.
Q: How did the country of the Beatles, the idols of your childhood, impress you? I believe life in Britain differed from what life was in our country then. A: I found it very interesting. I could apply the knowledge that I got in the university and the Foreign Intelligence Academy. I was particularly interested in the Western model of the economy. I understood the principles of the functioning of the Western society, the essence of its economic laws. When you live in a country for 6-7 years you get a chance to feel this. For instance, the claims about a free market are a myth. The state very powerfully intervenes in the economy, forming the market and the rules of game.
Q: We know from films and books that a Soviet resident agent in the West traditionally is tempted by all sorts of traps set up by the Western special services. Were you tempted? A: I will disappoint you -- nobody tempted me. But, of course, I was under surveillance. I had to be a good psychologist.
Q: It is said that you are a very introvert and calm person. Is this accomplished by tremendous effort or is this in line with your temperament?
A: Perhaps, I am an introvert. But not to the extent of dashing away from people or avoiding contacts. As to my temperament, indeed, I would describe myself as an introvert.
Q: In other words, you alone know about your true feelings. It is an open secret that women play a certain role in a man's life. Tell us about your wife, how did you become acquainted? A: My wife is a native Muscovite. I have been working in Moscow for more than 20 years so it is only very tenuously that I can be described as a member of the St.Petersburg team. I met my future wife in the company of my friends in Moscow. At the time I lived in Leningrad so we met on weekends. We have a humorous slogan in our family: Long live Bologoye! (railway station roughly halfway between St.Petersburg and Moscow -- FNS). We married a year later. We both were 23. She is an economist by education. During my trips she was always with me. We have two sons, both are students now. My wife knows the computer and a foreign language well. She is working now but her co-workers do not know who her husband is. Just as in the institutes where my sons are studying they do not know who their father is. In our family we respect each other's independence. That is why don't ask me where they are studying. In the West there is a good term -- privacy. I mean inviolability of private life. In our country, unfortunately, this notion is not widespread.
Q: Did you often fall in love? What is your ideal woman like? A: I first fell in love in my last year in school. Of course, it was a Platonic love. At the university there were affairs but then I fell in love with my future wife and from that time on I am a one-woman man. And my wife remains the ideal for me. Fair-haired and lithe. In my opinion, facial beauty is relative. The figure, the chiseled silhouette is much more important for a woman. But the brain, the intellect must be on a par. I was not aware of this in my youth, but I was lucky. My wife and I have similar interests and attitudes to life. True, I hate the romance novels that she reads.
Q: Do you like to read? A: In my student years I read Galsworthy and Somerset Maugham. I like very much Valentin Pikul for his succulent language and Viktor Konetsky's stories about the sea. Lately I have become interested in intellectual detective stories, naturally, in the language of the original. I have in my library the whole of Le Carre, 78 works by Agatha Christie and Forsyte.
Q: How do you spend your leisure? A: We like to get away from people. To walk in the woods, to loaf around, to read. I love fishing very much. I love nature. Imagine, you stand on the equator somewhere in East Africa and next to you are the snow-capped peaks of Kilimanjaro.
Q: It must be under your influence that Vladimir Putin mentioned in his book his wish to visit Kenya. Have you been on a safari? A: A safari is not a lion hunt. You get 20 years behind bars for that. The Africans have realized that it is much more profitable for people to come from all over the world to watch lions eat and make love rather than shoot them.
Q: What other games, besides politics, do you play? A: I play virtually all games -- tennis, soccer, volleyball. I have rudimentary golf skills. And I like the card game preference.
Q: What food and drinks do you prefer? A: My drink and food preference variated in the course of my life. I drink vodka when the food is right. I like whiskey, both malt and light. Lately I have developed a preference for red wines. As to cuisine, I like Russian, Finnish and Chinese food and do not like English and French food.
Q: What is it that you do not tolerate in people? According to Bulgakov, cowardice is the most terrible vice. What do you think of that? A: One should not demand resolve, fearlessness and daring from everybody. Stupidity, hopeless and permanent stupidity, of course, irritates. It also irritates me when I get a long and irrelevant answer to my question. I do not forgive treachery.
Q: Do you forgive women foolishness? A: I do not differentiate between the sexes.
Q: Are you a superstitious man, do you believe in faith? A: No, I am absolutely not superstitious.
Q: An intelligence officer should not be reckless, should never lose his head, never show his emotions and so on. But you are no more an intelligence officer. Therefore, another way of life is now possible and another attitude to life. Are you capable of changing? A: I do not think so. A character cannot be remolded. True, I think I am becoming more communicative and outgoing. But I hate and will never like high society gatherings, this posing in front of cameras, this milling of the beau monde.
Q: In recent years the theme of relations between capital and government has become quite constant. The progressive public is worried about Vladimir Putin's ties with the oligarchs. For instance, Berezovsky claims that they are pals. What are your relations with the oligarchs? A: I am not acquainted with any of the oligarchs. I had several meetings with Chubais. The reality is that big business has already formed in Russia. But at the same time we do not have clear rules of the game. There exists the serious problem of lobbying. In any country there is a clear distinction between political lobbying and corruption. Russia needs appropriate laws, we need a law on corruption. I repeat, I am not maintaining any relations with any representatives of business. I think, this gives me a certain advantage.
Q: Are they trying to establish contacts? A: Well, in principle, they are not.
Q: It is said that the Security Council will soon concentrate in its hands control over the implementation of all of the President's and the government's decisions. A: During the past three-four years this is exactly what the Security Council has been doing. We monitor the fulfillment of the President's decrees dealing with the country's security. But our functions do not include blanket control over the fulfillment of all economic decisions.
Q: It is said that there are files on all the oligarchs and they can be used as a means of bringing capital back into the
country and adjusting ownership. A: Personally I do not know about any such files.
Q: Then I will rephrase my question. Does the state have enough information to control the situation in the country? A: The state today has sufficient levers to control the real situation in the country. It also has possibilities to get information about what is happening...
(Interviewed by Svetlana Branitskaya)
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BBC MONITORING RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER REITERATES DESIRE FOR MULTIPOLAR WORLD SYSTEM Source: `Nezavisimaya Gazeta', Moscow, in Russian 24 May 00
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov has reiterated the need for a "democratic multipolar system of international relations" with a powerful United Nations at its core as an alternative to the US-centric, unipolar system apparently preferred by the West. Addressing a lecture at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations on 23rd May, he also said that a "dynamic, aggressive foreign policy should be pursued wherever that accords with [Russian] national interests and produces tangible returns". The following is the text of a report published in the Russian newspaper 'Nezavisimaya Gazeta' on 24th May:
The two-day Gorchakov Lectures under the title "The world and Russia on the threshold of the 21st century" end at the MGIMO [Moscow State Institute of International Relations] today. Yesterday, at the opening of the lectures, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov spoke, presenting Russia's new foreign policy concept in the context of the foundations of diplomacy laid by the [19th-century] "iron chancellor", Aleksandr Gorchakov.
The minister devoted the main attention to the legacy of Gorchakov's diplomacy and Russia's main foreign policy priorities. As he said, the main thing is that we have begun not only to interpret, but to put into practice Gorchakov's rich legacy, which is remarkably consonant with Russia's present-day foreign policy objectives (the emphasis on national interests and their skilful defence in the most difficult conditions). This is reflected in documents, chief among them the updated Russian Federation foreign policy concept.
Expressing regret that in recent years the West's policy has shown evidence of a desire to build a unipolar system based on the dominance of a limited circle of the most developed states headed by the United States, Ivanov once again proposed the Russian alternative: the building of a democratic multipolar system of international relations. The Russian concept of the world in the 21st century proposes a joint quest for ways of increasing the manageability of world processes and ensuring stability in the world. It is obvious that the pinnacle of the international security structure should be the United Nations, as the unique and irreplaceable mechanism for ensuring peace. This presupposes the strengthening of the UN's peacemaking potential and first and foremost the role and responsibility of the UN Security Council. The next tier is UN collaboration with regional organizations (such as the OSCE) which are designed to ensure security on the scale of individual regions. The reinforcing material for this entire construct
should be strict observance of the principles and norms of international law.
The minister noted that the present changes in the world have coincided with one of the most difficult but inevitable periods in Russia's many centuries of history, in connection with the move to the path of democracy and the market economy. In this connection, we must structure Russia's foreign policy in such a way that it not only reacts appropriately to worldwide processes, but also serves as an effective instrument for performing the tasks of internal development, that is, ensures the consistent realization of the country's national interests, the minister stressed. A dynamic, aggressive [Russian: nastupatelnaya] foreign policy should be pursued wherever that accords with national interests and produces tangible returns.
The most graphic example is Russia's initiatives in the sphere of international security and disarmament: the ratification of the START-2 and CTBT [Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty] treaties and the 1997 New York package of accords on ABM.
Ivanov concluded his speech in the words of Prince Gorchakov. "In whatever sphere we may seek to build our assumptions, be it Europe or the East, we come to the same conclusion: for our security as much as for the sake of our might in the foreign arena, and also in the interests of peace and general equilibrium, Russia's paramount duty is to complete the internal transformations, on which the future of Russia and all the Slav peoples depends. That is the fundamental basis of our policy."
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