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Issue #102 | May 19, 2000 | ||||
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Issue #102 | May 19, 2000 | ||||
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CDI Russia Weekly-#102
The CDI Russia Weekly is an e-mail newsletter that carries news and analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With funding from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education organization. CDI Russia Weekly web page (with archive): http://www.cdi.org/russia/ Visit CDI's web site: http://www.cdi.org
Contents: 1. Jamestown Foundation Monitor: MIKHAIL
KASYANOV IS RUSSIA'S NEW PRIME MINISTER. ****** Jamestown Foundation Monitor MIKHAIL KASYANOV IS RUSSIA'S NEW PRIME MINISTER. Mikhail Kasyanov's confirmation as Russia's new prime minister, according to some observers, marks a defeat for the advocates of radical pro-market reforms who, until now, have been seen as having the ear of President Vladimir Putin. The State Duma yesterday voted overwhelmingly to confirm Kasyanov, 325 to 55, with 15 abstentions. Kasyanov received unanimous support from the pro-Putin Unity and People's Deputy factions, from former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov's Fatherland-All Russia faction and by Vladimir Zhirnovosky's LDPR. Only one of the Union of Right-Wing Forces' twenty-eight Duma members voted against Kasyanov. A majority of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) faction--thirty-six members--voted against Kasyanov, while twenty-eight voted for him. Among those independent deputies who voted for Kasyanov were Roman Abramovich and Boris Berezovsky. The two Kremlin-connected tycoons are said to be close to Kasyanov--an assertion the new prime minister has denied. A majority of Grigory Yavlinsky's Yabloko voted against Kasyanov (Russian agencies, May 17). On May 16, the day before his confirmation, Kasyanov met with the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) faction in the State Duma. He reportedly told its members that he had not even read the economic program written by the Center for Strategic Research, the think-tank led by Deputy Property Minister German Gref, which has been widely touted as "Putin's think-tank." At the same time, Kasyanov said he had read an alternative conomic program drafted by Yuri Maslyukov, the KPRF economist who served as first deputy prime minister in Yevgeny Primakov's government (Kommersant, May 17). Maslyukov once headed Gosplan, the Soviet state economic planning body, where Kasyanov also once worked. Kasyanov told the KPRF that Maslyukov's program and that of the government "coincided" in several areas--above all "in relation to the use of investment to lift the economy." Some observers interpreted this to mean the use of state or state-guaranteed credits, not private investment. In his speech to the Duma yesterday, Kasyanov said the government would consider various economic plans, including the Gref center's, in early June (Russian agencies, May 17). In the view of some observers, the Gref program would have a chance of being realized in full if Gref himself were made a first deputy prime minister in the new cabinet. Kasyanov, however, will not have a first deputy. Even if the Gref program falls by the wayside, of course, it does not mean that Kasyanov is poised to adopt the KPRF program. Yet the new prime minister seems not to share the goals of de-bureaucratizing the economy and shrinking the level of state involvement in the economy which has been expressed by members of the Gref center, Andrei Illarionov, Putin's economic adviser, and some members of the SPS. Indeed, some members of Gref's team seem to have sensed that they are losing--or have lost--the battle for influence over Putin. Yevgeny Yasin, the former economics minister who now heads the Higher School of Economics and has advised the Gref center, predicted yesterday that Gref's program would be adopted by the Kasyanov government, but with "modifications." Vladimir Mau, a liberal economist on the Gref team, said the government's economic decisions would depend on the "political situation" in the country, and that the strong economic growth envisaged in the Gref plan would depend on the government carrying out "a responsible economic policy" (Russian agencies, May 17). These were hardly votes of confidence. Other observers have been more blunt--and, from a liberal point of view, gloomy--about what Kasyanov's appointment means. According to an analysis posted this week on Polit.Ru, a news/analytical website, Kasyanov's appointment shows that Russia's leadership has staked on an "Asian model" of economic development--meaning "capitalism with a weak competitive environment, paltry development of small- and medium-sized businesses and five to ten powerful private-state holdings, [which are] provided with preferences and protection by the entire state machine" (Russian agencies, May 16). ****** RUSSIAN, U.S. PRESIDENTS WILL MEET FOUR TIMES THIS YEAR MOSCOW. May 18 (Interfax) - Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Bill Clinton will meet with each other four times before the end of this year, Sergei Ivanov, secretary of the Russian Security Council, and Samuel Berger, Clinton's national security advisor, told the press on Thursday following lengthy talks at the Kremlin. Laying the groundwork for the upcoming Moscow summit early in June is the chief goal of his talks in Moscow, Berger said. This will be the first time Clinton and Putin have met since the Russian president's inauguration, he noted. The two presidents will also meet at the G-8 summit in Okinawa in July, at the U.N. General Assembly session in New York this September, and at the APEC summit later in November, Berger said. These meeting will provide the opportunity for progress on various issues obtaining in bilateral relations and lay a foundation for the future, the national security advisor said. The Kremlin meeting lasted over three hours and covered issues pertaining to strategic stability and economic cooperation, among other fields, Ivanov said. "We took a look into the future and considered the very significant global problems we will face in 2000 and later," he said. Berger will discuss issues of economic cooperation during his meeting with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov on Friday, Ivanov reported. The outlook for the Russian-U.S. commission for economic, scientific and technological cooperation will be high on the agenda for this meeting, he added. The future of the ABM Treaty is "just one of a number of complicated problems," Ivanov said. The outlook for cooperation between the two countries' law enforcement agencies in combating drug trafficking, organized crime and terrorism is good, Ivanov continued. "The recent developments in the Philippines prodded us into discussing this issue." Such complicated issues as the ABM Treaty "we discuss in a frank and quiet way," he said. ****** #3 President Vladimir Putin on Thursday named the men who will be his representatives in the seven federal districts he recently created to strengthen his control over the regions - and most of them come from the top ranks of the military, police and security services. Putin dispatched General Viktor Kazantsev, the commander of the North Caucasus Military District, and his deputy General Konstantin Pulikovsky to the North Caucasus and Far Eastern districts, respectively. Viktor Cherkesov, deputy director of the Federal Security Service, or FSB, was appointed to supervise the Northwestern district, and Deputy Interior Minister Pyotr Latyshev was named Putin's representative in the Urals district. Georgy Poltavchenko, who spent decades climbing the KGB ranks before being appointed to run the St. Petersburg tax police, was assigned to the Centraldistrict. Only two of the seven districts created Saturday by presidential decree will e supervised by civilian politicians. Former Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko was chosen to supervise the Volga district, while Leonid Drachevsky, minister for the Commonwealth of Independent States in the outgoing government, was appointed presidential representative in the Siberian district. The seven newly appointed representatives will replace those who now work in 80 of the 89 regions in accordance with a decree that Putin's predecessor, former President Boris Yeltsin, issued in 1997. Those representatives had little say in local affairs and were largely figureheads. Unlike Yeltsin, who once encouraged regional leaders to take "as much sovereignty as they can," Putin has made clear his determination to limit the powers of the independent-minded governors and build a strong central state. To help him tighten federal control over the regions, Putin, a former KGB officer who later headed the FSB, has turned to veterans of the "power" structures. Yevgeny Volk, an analyst at the Heritage Foundation, said Putin's new representatives, who have years of military service under their belts, will "take tough measures" if necessary to enforce the Kremlin's will. They are iron-disciplined and will not hesitate to enforce whatever order Putin gives them even if it brings them into conflict with local governors, Volk said. However, Volk cautioned that Putin and his seven envoys should tread carefully when expanding their powers at the expense of the governors, because any blitzkrieg could backfire, especially in the ethnic republics where separatism can easily be rekindled by local leaders. Both Pulikovsky and Kazantsev have won reputations as strongmen while running the military campaigns in Chechnya, while Cherkesov, Poltavchenko and Latyshev have spent enough time commanding law enforcement units to know how to enforce the Kremlin's orders, the analyst said. The seven new districts largely coincide with the country's six military districts run by the Defense Ministry, another sign of Putin's desire to install a military-like system of civil administration, according to Volk. Putin's vision of the "power vertical" resembles the one that existed in tsarist times when all of the provinces were under the iron rule of so-called governor-generals who had unlimited powers and reported directly to Moscow, Volk noted. Under Putin's decree, the new representatives are to report directly to the president and are charged with "guaranteeing the realization of the constitutional powers of the head of state." However, even the five commanders will also be reduced to figureheads like their predecessors if the Kremlin does not transfer control over disbursement of federal funds from the governors to them, Volk said. Only nine of the 89 regions contribute more to the federal budget than they get from it, and therefore federal subsidies are vital to most regions and can be used to put pressure on local administrators, he said. The heads of the federal districts should also be able to personally control appointments to the regional branches of federal agencies, whose heads are now appointed with the consent of the governors, Volk said. Without these powers, the representatives will likely follow in the path of FSB General Vladimir Kondratyev, whom Yeltsin appointed as his envoy to the Primorye region to try to bring its governor, Yevgeny Nazdratenko, under Kremlin control. Unable either to control disbursement of federal funds in the region or influence personnel policy, Kondratyev eventually had to make peace with Nazdratenko in what was largely seen as a victory for the governor. Following up his decree creating the seven federal districts, Putin announced plans Wednesday that would give him even greater control over the 89 regions. In a nationally televised address, Putin said he would seek powers to remove regional leaders from office and deprive them of their right to automatic seats in the Federation Council, parliament's upper house. The Kremlin also would have the power to dissolve regional parliaments. "We are talking about laws that will strengthen and cement Russian statehood," Putin said in his address. With the notable exception of Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov, regional leaders' reactions to Putin's plans were positive. They may have concluded that it was wise, at least for the time being, to show their loyalty to the new president. St. Petersburg Governor Vladimir Yakovlev said Putin's measures were "natural," Itar-Tass reported. Yakovlev, who was re-elected last weekend, said the regional leaders who come to Moscow for a day or two to attend Federation Council sessions "should not be passing 100 laws a day." Mintimir Shaimiyev, who rules Tatarstan with a great deal of autonomy, also didn't object to Putin's proposal to have "representatives" of the regional leaders instead of the regional leaders themselves sit in the upper house. "Tatarstan is prepared to elect predictable people who aren't weaker than Shaimiyev to the upper house," Itar-Tass quoted him as saying. Luzhkov, however, objected to the proposed changes, saying they would violate the spirit of the Constitution. Alexander Kotenkov, the president's representative in the Duma, the lower house, gave assurances Thursday that legislation on dismissing governors and disbanding local legislatures provides for a fair legal process and will not depend on the whim of one person. According to the legislation, governors can only be removed after two court decisions confirming that they violated federal laws, Interfax reported him as saying. Likewise, the disbanding of local legislatures would require a similar court ruling and the approval of the State Duma. ***** #4 Many of Russia's far-flung and diverse regions have been stubbornly going their own way for almost a decade. But freshly inaugurated President Vladimir Putin has taken the tiger by the tail with a sweeping, but risky, scheme to curtail the powers of local governors and enforce Kremlin writ over the world's largest country. In a decree issued last Saturday night, apparently to attract as little attention as possible, Mr. Putin ordered Russia divided into seven administrative super-regions, each headed by its own Kremlin representative. The representatives are tasked with taking direct control of all federal agencies - such as security and taxation - and ensuring that Moscow's directives are strictly carried out. As yet, there has been no overt move to tamper with the country's 68 provinces and 21 ethnic republics, where local leaders often rule like satraps. The Kremlin claims at least 30 regions have enacted laws that contradict the Constitution, and several have implemented almost insurrectionary policies, such as local customs barriers or withholding tax revenues from Moscow. The mainly Muslim Volga republic of Tatarstan has its own Constitution, which its leader says should take precedence over Russian law. The Urals republic of Bashkortistan operates an almost Soviet-style state control over the local economy. "The reality is that some regions enjoy unlimited legislative freedom, which in some cases borders on full independence," notes the daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta. But few doubt the new measure will disappear into Russia's bottomless bureaucratic sands, as have many such plans in the past, unless swiftly followed by tough steps to wrest power and privilege from entrenched local elites. "Putin's decree is only the beginning of reform to restore federal control in this country," Gleb Pavlovsky, one of Putin's closest aides, told state-owned RTR television on Monday. "If Putin is serious about this plan, it will require sweeping amendments to the Constitution and major changes to the power structure in Russia," says Sergei Tarasenko, an analyst with the independent Fund for Realism in Politics in Moscow. "This puts him on a collision course with local powers." The initial response of many regional governors has been to welcome the new scheme and praise Putin's decisiveness. "Don't be fooled by that," says Mikhail Vinogradov, an analyst with the Center for Current Policy in Moscow. "That's the old game of local leaders. They turn an obedient and worshipful face to the Kremlin, but actively sabotage its orders in their own regions." According to most Russian experts, Putin is aiming at recreating the czarist administrative system, in which territorial units known as gubernia were each ruled by a governor-general appointed by the czar in St. Petersburg. No regional or ethnic differences were recognized under that system, which stretched from Poland and Finland in the west to Chinese lands around Port Arthur and Manchuria in the east. Moscow is awash with rumors that Putin intends to curtail the upper house of parliament, dominated by regional governors, which has the power to veto all national legislation and constitutional amendments. The liberal Vremya Novostei reported on Tuesday that the president has asked the Duma, the tame lower house, to pass a law giving the Kremlin authority to hire and fire regional leaders at will. The first dismissal of a key governor "is scheduled for this summer," adds the daily Izvestia. Putin has warned repeatedly that Russia is being ripped apart by the forces of economic regionalism and separatism, and urgent steps will be required to reverse the decay. One of his first acts upon being named prime minister last year by former President Boris Yeltsin was to launch a ruthless military campaign to crush Chechnya, the only republic that has so far attempted to secede. "Putin's people have this belief that the main threat to Russia is national disintegration," says Andrei Piontkovsky, director of the Center for Strategic Studies. "They see the ethnic republics, in particular, as hotbeds of separatism." The problem is not imaginary. The Soviet Union developed an elaborate constitutional facade that granted varying degrees of self-determination and autonomy to the bewildering array of Eurasian peoples that were conquered and assimilated into the Russian empire over centuries. In reality, the country was run strictly from Moscow. Post-Soviet Russia inherited built-in instability. It no longer possesses the totalitarian means, but its Constitution still recognizes different levels of local autonomy and special ethnic privileges. Mr. Yeltsin did little to address the problem, preferring to let local leaders control their own turf as long as they paid public homage to the Kremlin. On a stop in Tatarstan during the first Russian presidential election in 1991, Yeltsin told a crowd that regions should "take all the sovereignty they can swallow." It turned out they had quite an appetite. "The ethnic issue is very delicate in Russia," says Mr. Piontkovsky. "It was one of the flashpoints that led to the breakup of the czarist empire, and then to the collapse of the Soviet Union decades later." But if the Kremlin does not move decisively to claw back power from the regions, the reforms may create nothing more than a new layer of corrupt and arrogant bureaucrats. "The Kremlin is in a state of euphoria right now thanks to all its recent victories. Elections won, Chechnya is subdued, oil prices are high, and the economy is growing. But this euphoria can lead them into big mistakes," says Mr. Vinogradov. "Even if the plan succeeds, and these super-region administrators get real power, what will change?" asks Vladimir Pribiulovsky, director of Panorama, a leading political consultancy in Moscow. "Russia needs effective market reforms and economic development. Simply rearranging the lines of authority can't accomplish much." ****** #5 During his recent visit to Malaysia, vice premier of the Russian government Ilya Klebanov said that in 1998 we sold 2.5 billion dollars' worth of weapons, in 1999 - already 3.5 billion dollars' worth and within the next two to three years we are expecting to reach a 5 billion dollars mark. Actually, this would make up a fifth of the revenue part of the budget. In the late 1980s, we exported 15-20 billion dollars' worth of weapons, said a spokesman at the press service of the Rosvooruzheniye firm, which accounts for 80% of all arms sales. However, we netted a mere two billion dollars from this amount. In the record-high for new Russia year 1996 as far as sales are concerned, we sold 3.6 billion dollars' worth of weapons. A third of this amount went to pay part of the government debt. Russian-made destroyers, Diesel-electric submarines of the "Kilo" class, Su and MiG fighters, tanks, infantry fishing vehicles and anti-aircraft complexes command a ready sell now. Among major buyers are not only our traditional partners (China and India) but also Brazil, Malaysia and even some Nato countries. ******* #6 Russian President Vladimir Putin has scheduled several foreign visits to Central Asia and Europe prior to his attendance at the G8 summit in Japan in July. Conspicuously absent from his itinerary thus far is China, despite Moscow's pledge in early January that the first visit abroad for the new Russian President would be to Beijing. Russia and China engaged in building a strategic partnership during the tenure of former Russian President Boris Yeltsin. However, Putin appears to have reshuffled Moscow's priorities and its assessment of China. Shortly after Yeltsin's New Year's resignation, which caught Beijing off guard, Kremlin staff announced that Beijing would be the first trip abroad for whoever became Russia's new president. The announcement was made to assure the Chinese that little would change with the transfer of power from Yeltsin - who Chinese President Jiang Zemin knew well - to Putin, a relative unknown in Beijing. The very fact that Russia failed to give prior notice of the impending power shift to its strategic partner foreshadowed the new direction of Sino-Russian relations. The Sino-Russian strategic alliance developed to counter the growing international dominance of the United States after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Whereas Yeltsin viewed the formation of a strategic alliance with China as a key point in his international policy, Putin focused inward on Russia, seeking ways to heave the nation out of its economic and social quagmire and back to the great nation status it once held. Putin's plans require contact with Europe and the United States, as well as Japan, all of which were able to provide financial assistance to Moscow. Thus China takes a lower priority, and instead becomes a competitor for economic aid and investment. In the longer term, China's growing population and regional power aspiration present a direct threat to Moscow. With Russia unable in the end to get too close to the West, Putin may eventually move to heighten the tensions between China and the United States, manipulating them into confrontation. Beijing's WTO plans have attracted the attention of international business and investors hoping to enter into China's markets and cheap labor pools. This takes potential resources away from Russia, while at the same time strengthening China. This presents an emerging threat to Moscow, as both China and Russia's areas of strategic interest overlap in several areas, particularly in Asia. With the arrival of Putin, Russia and China are busy reassessing each other's intentions. This has led to several delays in scheduling the Putin-Jiang summit. At the end of February, the Chinese foreign minister traveled to Moscow to discuss bilateral relations and coordinate reciprocal visits of Jiang and Putin. However, little came of this meeting regarding summit preparations. In early April, Russian Foreign Ministry sources told the Interfax news agency that Putin and Jiang would meet in May in Dushanbe at the annual Shanghai Five summit, which brings together the heads of China, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. In a bilateral meeting on the sidelines, Putin and Jiang were to finalize the date for Putin's visit to Beijing. The Shanghai Five summit was postponed, however, and the Moscow-Beijing summit again failed to materialize. Despite the cancellation of the meetings in Dushanbe, Putin travelled to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan May 18 and 19, his first visits abroad since his inauguration May 7. Putin's other foreign visits include two visits to Europe - Italy on June 5, Germany on the June 15 - and a potential visit to Spain. Putin will also visit Japan July 21-23 for the G8 summit, and again sometime in August for a bilateral visit. In October, Putin will travel to India and has been invited to Poland, France, and South Korea, among others. The visit to Beijing remains elusive and is now expected to take the form of a stopover on the way to the G8 summit. Sources in Beijing say the Russian Embassy is still awaiting confirmation from the Chinese for the date of Putin's visit. According to Interfax, the Russian Foreign Ministry has said that, as Putin's plane does not need to refuel to get to Japan, any stop in China could be regarded as a full visit. While Russia is not yet abandoning contact with China or treating it as an opponent, it clearly does not view China as a priority in its international contact. Both China and Russia face issues of internal stability, leading each to embark on a resurgence of nationalistic sentiments in order to maintain control. While they may share similar international goals, allowing for some continued cooperation, Moscow's new leadership, foresees a longer term potential for China to impinge on its strategic interests. The combination of internal issues of stability and external overlapping spheres of influence will forestall the chances for a formal Sino-Russian strategic alliance.
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#7 Moscow, 18th May: There are 80,000 Russian army troops and police officers in Chechnya with "a maximum of 3,000" separatist rebels facing off against them, a senior Russian general said on Thursday [18th May]. Since February, Russia had been systematically withdrawing its troops from the embattled republic, Col-Gen Valeriy Manilov, first deputy chief of Russia's general staff, announced at a news conference in Moscow. Two paratroop regiments pulled out in February, another in March and three motorized infantry regiments returned to their bases in the Siberian, Ural and Volga military districts last month, Manilov reported. Most of the rebels are deployed in the districts of Vedeno, Nozhay-Yurt and Kurchaloy, he said. "That's also where all the ringleaders of the fighters are - Khattab, Shamil Basayev and his brother, and also Aslan Maskhadov," he said. Some of the rebels are based in the neighbouring Russian region of Dagestan - in its Botlikhskiy and Tsumadinskiy districts along the Chechen border, the general said. "There are die-hard bandits in the south of the district centre of Urus-Martan as well. The notorious [commander Ruslan] Gelayev is also there," he said, and several rebels groups are active near Georgia's border. Quite a few rebels are masquerading as civilians in the plains and foothills of Chechnya, Manilov went on. "There are also bandits in Groznyy which they constantly infiltrate in small groups." "In effect, the entire middle and lower echelons of the bandit formations ringleaders have been eliminated" in "special operations", the general said. But the top echelon has lost no one, and "it's their turn now", Manilov said. "The circle around them is steadily narrowing." They have two options, "either surrendering or being eliminated", he said. On the subject of amnesty for those rebels who are surrendering, the general said that "thanks to the amnesty, more than 2,500 bandits have laid down their weapons". He went on to report that 150 of the 845 individuals who were arrested as suspected rebels have been released and 500 of the 1,086 people in pretrial detention in the Chechen village of Chernokozovo have been freed and 94 of these amnestied. Separatist leaders "have been introducing reprisals, all the way up to mass executions", to keep other rebels from surrendering themselves, Manilov said. "This has had a substantial effect on the numbers of those who took advantage of the amnesty but was unable to prevent the withdrawal of bandits." Manilov said the Russian forces will carry out the main task set them by the Russian leadership: "The definitive, complete and irreversible elimination of the bandit formations in Chechnya as a system." ******
#8 While the Russian White House was buzzing recently with rumors of upcoming hirings and firings, most ministries were calm. The generals, for their part, felt confident that new President and Commander in Chief Vladimir Putin would leave them where they were. Economic policy may still stir passions, but with the approval of the new military doctrine, defense policy is pretty much settled. Putin approved the new doctrine at the end of April - an event that went largely unnoticed. The idea of the military doctrine, it seems, became a sort of holy grail, a source of revelation that would tell the top brass exactly what kind of army Russia needed. The first attempt at a military doctrine was drawn up in 1993, while Pavel Grachev was still defense minister. But the generals decided more was needed - a whole national security vision. This took another four years' work in the Security Council. By that time, it was clear that large cuts in numbers were needed if the Army was to survive. But the last three years, during which time actual reforms have taken place under Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev, have seen nothing but criticism. The idea was that reform would be impossible without a doctrine that identified potential military threats and responses the state should make. Not that there was any lack of guidelines from above. But the military bosses didn't find in them what they were looking for - a powerful enemy to be resisted, justifying any amount of defense spending. Sergeyev was always skeptical about a military doctrine as he realized that what Russia needed was an army it could afford, not an army able to respond to any and every military threat. At the same time, former President Boris Yeltsin, never one for theory in any case, didn't seem bothered by the lack of a military doctrine. But this all changed last year when NATO action in Yugoslavia led to a rise in anti-Western sentiment in Russia and brought the hawks to the fore. Finally, there was an enemy to point the finger at. At almost the same time, Putin became secretary of the Security Council. Suddenly, the work that had been dragging on interminably picked up speed. As acting president, Putin approved the new national security policy on Jan. 10, and followed it with the military doctrine three months later. Knowing the new president's belief in guidelines from above, officials are likely to take the new doctrine seriously. Itching to name its enemies, General Headquarters sent a draft to the Security Council last October, in which it said that Russia's security was threatened by the West, which wanted to create a single-pole world, expand NATO eastward and carry out military operations without U.N. Security Council approval. But the Russian Security Council realized this would mean designating leading Western countries as potential enemies - a provocative step. The result was that instead of being listed in the military doctrine, these threats were included in the national security policy. This creates a contradiction: The policy document says that Russia's national interests are threatened by Western countries, and yet it also points out the "critically low level of combat-readiness in the Russian armed forces." As Viktor Yesin, head of military reform on the Security Council said, "no matter how much Russia's economy improves, Russia will never be able to counter an organization like NATO with conventional weapons." The military doctrine resolves this contradiction by putting the emphasis on the nuclear deterrent. Gone are the earlier "negative guarantees" under which Russia pledged not to launch a nuclear strike first. The new doctrine says that "Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in the event of attack on itself or its allies using nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction, or in the event of large-scale aggression using conventional weapons in situations critical for its national security." With conventional weapons not in top shape, it is logical enough to put the emphasis on nuclear forces. But this concept also has its drawbacks. The only ones able to organize such a full-scale attack on Russia are Western countries and China. As a result, the broader deterrent is not just an insurance policy, it also reproduces Cold War-era confrontation and could lead to real conflict. It's not clear either that the broader deterrent would ensure a worthy place for Russia among the leading countries. Moscow and Washington may reach agreement on START-III and the ABM treaty, but relations could be cool all the same. Russia has become used to thinking that nuclear disarmament issues are of fundamental importance for the United States. But the more relations between the two countries improve, the less importance America gives to nuclear agreements with Russia. The United States no longer sees a direct threat coming from Russia, despite its nuclear arsenal, and U.S. experts think the nuclear factor will play a declining role in relations with Russia. The next U.S. administration, they think, will not look at Russia as the second superpower. The question is, does the Kremlin understand this? This is perhaps the military doctrine's most serious flaw. Its provisions regarding nuclear arms are thought-out and clear. As for conventional forces, the doctrine says they will be effective only in local wars and domestic interventions. But if this is so, then the country needs no more than a few fully equipped army groups made up of professional soldiers. Chechnya has shown that professionals are best if the aim is to win battles and keep losses down. The new doctrine, however, does not want to abandon the idea of a huge conscript army. The doctrine calls on the state to preserve and renew military potential and on industry to increase defense capacity - ideas that hark back to the Soviet days of mobilizing all resources for confrontation with half the world. The doctrine also announces creation of a single military system - bringing all military groupings under one umbrella - but contains no specific provisions on how to do this. What no doubt happened was that General Headquarters wanted to take control of everything itself and other ministries resisted. Sergeyev, it seems, whose name has been given to the new doctrine, sees its contradictions. It's no coincidence that he insists this is a transition-period doctrine. But if this is the case, it leaves little hope that military reform will progress smoothly from here. The contradictions in the doctrine will only bring grist to the mill of those opposed to reform. ******* #9 REALITY CHECK: Tax Police or Thought Police? Last week's raid by heavily armed "tax police" and other security forceson the headquarters of Media-MOST, a Russian media holding company,suggests that the Putin Kremlin's efforts to increase efficiency are notlimited to the Russian economy--Moscow's authoritarian apparatus isreceiving a tune-up as well. This is not to say that Media-MOST or its leader Vladimir Gusinsky havedone nothing wrong; it is in fact likely that the organization'ssecurity services were conducting at least some of the illicitoperations described by Russian law enforcement officials. It isreadily apparent that Gusinsky's security force far exceeds (in numbers,equipment, and background) what it necessary for the physical protectionof Media-MOST facilities and executives. According to variousestimates, the security staff numbers between one and two thousand; allconsider it to be heavily armed. Moreover, key figures in the Media-MOST security operation include suchindividuals as former KGB general Filip Bobkov, whose background in theKGB's Fifth Main Directorate--responsible for monitoring and suppressingdissent in the USSR--would seem to have prepared him for illegalsurveillance and other unsavory activities Media-MOST is alleged to haveconducted rather than actual security work. One former Soviet politicalprisoner has written that Bobkov had a reputation for "unabashed hatredand deliberate cruelty, more so than any other KGB officer any of us ever met" and noted that he was a top deputy to the last three chairmen of the Soviet KGB and served as the country's number one political policeman. It is hard to imagine what (legal) work he could be doing that would be useful to a media holding company--especially one that enjoys marketing itself as a defender of Russia's free press. Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that Gusinsky has found little sympathy for his predicament. As one prominent Western business leader sarcastically put it, the raid "couldn't have happened to a nicer guy." Still, while avoiding a defense of Gusinsky or Media-MOST's security forces, many leading Russian political figures have sharply criticized the Russian government's action. The real issue is not what Media-MOST was or was not doing. Realistically speaking, the security forces of many major Russian enterprises are likely to be engaged in similar activities. In fact, a security firm working for companies controlled by one of Gusinsky's rivals--Boris Berezovsky--was investigated only last year on similar charges. That case (which also appeared justified on merit) blew over when Boris Yeltsin fired Berezovsky's antagonist, Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov. A real crackdown on Russia's private security forces would find many, many targets. In fact, however, there has been only one target so far--Media-MOST. This is no accident; Media-MOST's television network, NTV, and its newspapers, such as Segodnya, have been sharply critical of Vladimir Putin for many months. Gusinsky's media organizations have criticized the conduct of the war in Chechnya, attacked the government's vague and incomplete statements of policy, and linked Putin and his new prime minister, Mikhail Kasyanov, to surviving elements of the Yeltsin inner circle--including Berezovsky. Thus it is clear that the principal objective of the raid on Media-MOST was likely not to begin a crackdown on the privatization of the work of the former KGB but to find a legal excuse (however valid) to discourage further unfavorable coverage by giving Media-MOST a clear warning. The argument that this is the true purpose of the operation is also supported by recent actions against other critical media. The newspaper Novaya gazeta, for example, was officially warned by the Russian press ministry for printing an interview with Chechnya's president, Aslan Maskhadov. Novaya gazeta also lost an entire recent issue--including several articles on massive campaign finance violations by Yeltsin and Putin--to unidentified computer hackers. Earlier this week, one of its journalists was savagely beaten outside his apartment. Another paper, Kommersant, also printed an interview with Maskhadov and was similarly warned. The bottom line is that just as in the Yeltsin era, law enforcement today seems less a matter of the law than of politics. Taking into account Putin's significant efforts to centralize and empower the Russian state, it may not be long before his "dictatorship of law" becomes merely a dictatorship. There can be no Russian democracy in the absence of genuine opposition and free media. The Clinton Administration became so entangled in its political support for Boris Yeltsin and its desire to sign agreements with Moscow that it was blind to--and was forced to whitewash--the steady erosion of democracy and genuine economic reform under his leadership. The U.S. cannot afford not to see Mr. Putin's actions more clearly. (Paul J. Saunders is Director of The Nixon Center. His e-mail address is psaunders@nixoncenter.org.) ****** #10 INTRO: More than one-thousand demonstrators have rallied on a square in central Moscow to denounce what they call a plot by Russia's new government to clamp down on press freedom. Moscow Correspondent Peter Heinlein reports a number of prominent politicians and media personalities joined the protest. TEXT: /// CHANTING - FADE UNDER /// Free the media - these demonstrators shouted as they stood in the bright May sunshine bathing central Moscow's Pushkin Square. By the standards set during anti-government protests of the past, this was a small rally. As the Soviet Union crumbled and independent Russia emerged in the early 90's, huge crowds often gathered around the statue of Russian poet Alexander Pushkin to demand press freedoms. That tradition faded away in recent years as a free media began to emerge. But recently there has been a rise in incidents that seem to target independent reporters and media outlets. The most disturbing event was last week's raid by heavily armed and masked police on the headquarters of the country's largest independent media company, Media-Most. After that, Russia's Union of Journalists decided it was time to revive the Pushkin Square rallies. The Federal Security Bureau, or F-S-B, the modern-day successor to the Soviet K-G-B, says the raid was a legitimate part of a criminal investigation. But the director of Media Most's N-T-V television channel, Evgeny Kiselyov - one of Russia's best know media personalities - calls the incident part of a deliberate campaign aimed at silencing government critics. /// KISELYOV ACT /// I do really think that there is a great danger in the country. I do believe that the F-S-B raid on our offices was an attempt to silence independent journalists to intimidate not only the free press, but the society as a whole. /// END ACT /// Others at the rally went even further, expressing fears that President Vladimir Putin is intent on again making Russia a police state. /// MAN CHANTING, FADE UNDER /// Fascism will not be allowed - was the cry of 75-year old Pyotr Tsvetkov. It was a slogan used in Russia's battle against Nazi Germany in World War Two. Mr. Tsvetkov says younger Russians, who voted overwhelmingly for President Putin, need to be reminded about the dangers of police rule. /// TSVETKOV ACT - IN RUSSIAN - FADE UNDER /// He says - Putin is not worthy of being president. He is Stalin. He is a butcher of our people. We believed him, and he cheated us. Liberal lawmaker and former presidential candidate Grigory Yavlinsky was among the politicians whoaddressed the rally. /// YAVLINSKY SPEECH - IN RUSSIAN - FADE UNDER /// He noted that while the turnout was encouraging, many of Moscow's most prominent journalists were conspicuously absent. Free-speech advocate Alexei Simonov, head of the Glasnost Foundation human-rights group, says that in the current environment of media intimidation, a lot of journalists are afraid to speak out. /// SIMONOV ACT /// For getting better the situation must change in so many details, including the attitude of journalists, which you see several people discussed - that some people were afraid to come and they are working in leading newspapers of Moscow. And that is a big problem. If this population will get frightened, that will be the end of democracy. /// END ACT /// /// SPEAKING AND CROWD - FADE UNDER AND HOLD /// The editor of the mass-circulation Moskovsky Komsomolets newspaper, Pasvel Gusev, told the rally he worries that the government is consciously trying to divide journalists. Among those who stayed away from the gathering were representatives of the media outlets controlled by Kremlin ally Boris Berezovsky. State-run media largely ignored the rally, giving it only a brief mention. N-T-V's Evgeny Kiselyov noted the division in the media community, saying - a lot of people we call our colleagues seem to have become cowards. ****** #11 Last week, President Vladimir Putin signed a decree creating seven new federal districts that happen to coincide closely with preexisting military districts created in the 19th century under Tsar Alexander II. Of course, the new federal districts do not fully correspond with the military division of the country: There are actually eight Defense Ministry districts, including the Zabaikalsky district on the Chinese border, which is not mentioned at all in Putin's decree. Nevertheless, the decree has caused controversy in Moscow. Previously, "plenipotentiary representatives" were appointed in each of the 89 regions and acted as the Kremlin's ambassadors in the provinces. Like any ambassadors in the modern world of swift mass communication, the provincial presidential envoys played a largely ceremonial role. Provincial governors and presidents of autonomous republics seem to be unruly and overly independent, but in fact they are firmly under the thumb of the Kremlin and the Moscow bureaucracy. Most governors spend months each year in Moscow, lobbying and begging for federal funds. Many have even built permanent official mansions in Moscow to accommodate their constant visits. However, the intense interaction of regional rulers and Moscow bureaucrats virtually bypassed the regional presidential envoys, since they were far from the true decision-makers in Moscow and did not have any genuine power base in the regions. Putin's resolution to abandon the institution of plenipotentiary representatives in each of the 89 regions was a just one. But the decision to reinvent plenipotentiary representatives in the form of district viceroys seems totally out of date. In the 18th century, it took almost two years for a government decree issued in St. Petersburg to reach Kamchatka, on the Pacific coast. In those days, having a plenipotentiary representative in the Far East made sense. But what will these new seven viceroys do today? Will they be traveling ambassadors, constantly rotating between the 10 or so regions in their command, between oblasti and republics that are diverse economically, politically and ethnically, trying to control all? Or will the regional rulers flock to the new seven subcapitals of the country? Simply traveling between the regions is no easy matter. Most commercial airlines transit through Moscow. Flying from a major city in the Volga region to, say, Nizhny Novgorod is commercially senseless,so there are no direct flights. Putin's decree seems to be irrational, and the seven new viceroys will be even more thoroughly removed from real decision-making than the 89 "representatives" they replace. The only realistic scenario that will give the seven viceroys any credence is the establishment of a military-backed police state. If military district commanders soon will be reinforcing martial rule together with Interior Ministry district forces, it is essential for the Kremlin to establish a network of "plenipotentiary" civilian administrators to supplement the uniformed officialdom. It is also prudent for the Kremlin to get together a skeleton federal district civilian administration under the guise of "plenipotentiary representatives" before martial law is actually announced. The move to establish seven federal districts may be a sinister coup preparation, or just pure bureaucratic idiocy. The true test of Putin's intentions will be the evolution of the Kremlin's relations with the military-security services. During the rule of Putin's predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, the military did not play any significant political role. Yeltsin did not like or trust the military. During the first Chechen war, he did not have any regular meetings with his military staff, unlike Putin, who likes to call himself a military person and an "officer," who publicly flies jet fighters and roams nuclear submarines. Putin's militaristic prances have won him some support in the ranks of the armed forces. But Putin has inherited a disgruntled military, commanded by generals who were commissioned by his predecessor. If Putin indeed wants to use martial law, he will first need to put his own stamp on the ranks of the military-security hierarchy to establish a network of personal loyalties. It has been reported that the entire military leadership has submitted letters of resignation. This may be a formality, and all generals may soon be reinstated. But if serious changes are indeed under way in the armed forces and in the security services, martial law may actually be around the corner. Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent, Moscow-based defense analyst. ****** #12 MOSCOW. May 18 (Interfax) - Russian President Vladimir Putin is regularly examined at the Central Clinic, but more frequently visits the Presidential Administrative Department's Medical Center with requests to assist his acquaintances - sportsmen - than with complaints of his own. "Luckily, Vladimir Putin is quite a healthy man with no chronic illnesses," chief of the Medical Center and member of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences Sergei Mironov said in an interview in the Thursday edition of Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper. Putin does not turn to the Medical Center specialists as a patient. He instead "asks for consultations and surgeries on some sportsmen," whom he meets during "wrestling exercises," Mironov said. Putin has a personal physician, experienced cardiologist-reanimator Viktor Rovnov, appointed by a presidential decree when he became the prime minister, Mironov said. He said he does not think that is enough, bearing in mind the president's huge load. Putin comes to the Central Clinic for regular medical examinations but Mironov said he thinks "a flying reanimation unit" should always accompany the president on his travels. As of now, it does not accompany the president on short-distance trips. Mironov does not accompany the new president either, in contrast to the times of Russia's first president Boris Yeltsin. "There is no pressing need for that," he said. Mironov said he found it hard to give a positive answer to the question whether Vladimir Putin had consulted his physician before going to Chechnya in a MiG fighter jet or submerging in a submarine during a trip to the Murmansk region. "The president is so sure of his strength that now and then he can neglect some formalities," Mironov said. He reminded the newspaper that Putin went in for martial arts and can "control his condition very well." As for Yeltsin's health, Mironov did not say that the first president "has become much healthier" since the resignation. "However, things are now easier for him as the psychological and emotional strain that the head of state constantly lived under is now gone," he said. "Responsibility for the health of Boris Yeltsin and the level of medical services have not dropped," he noted, adding that he sees Yeltsin two or three times a month "as need be." "There are no contraindications" for Yeltsin taking trips abroad, Mironov said. At the same time, he said he opposes Yeltsin's possible visits to Africa and Latin America. "Oh no, he should not do that!" Mironov said. The doctors have advised Yeltsin against going to Egypt on vacation because of the difference in climate, he said. ******* |