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CDI Russia Weekly
         Issue # 101 May 12, 2000

Edited by David Johnson
The CDI Russia Weekly is a weekly e-mail newsletter that carries news and analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With funding from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education organization. To receive a free subscription, e-mail David Johnson at djohnson@cdi.org
 
Contents
1. Christian Science Monitor: Daniel Schorr, Clinton's exit, Putin's entrance - an odd summit balance.
8. Moscow Times: Pavel Felgenhauer, Arms Talks Gap Narrowing.
10. The Global Beat Syndicate: Vadim Soloviov, Russian Forces Face A Stalemate In Chechnya.

#1
Christian Science Monitor
12 May 2000
Clinton's exit, Putin's entrance - an odd summit balance
By Daniel Schorr

Vladimir Putin has started his elected term as president. Bill Clinton is
near the end of his. And once again, the lame duck problem threatens to
bedevil the conduct of American foreign policy.

In May 1960, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev closed down relations with
President Eisenhower after the shooting down of an American spy plane and the
subsequent Khrushchev walkout from the four-power Paris summit. Later,
Khrushchev told President Kennedy he would have campaigned for him or against
him, whichever would have helped Kennedy more.

But the seven months of deep freeze were a perilous time when the Soviets
threatened a Berlin crisis and shipped nuclear missiles to Cuba.

In 1968, President Johnson counted himself out for reelection and the Nixon
campaign committee took full advantage of that. Fearing that Johnson might
hand them an "October Surprise" in the form of a cease-fire in Vietnam, Nixon
had word sent to Saigon that South Vietnam would get a better deal if it
waited for Nixon to be elected. That effectively made Johnson a lame duck,
and peace in Vietnam was delayed.

In 1980, the Reagan campaign feared that President Carter might pull off an
"October Surprise" by getting Iran to release the American Embassy hostages.

There were reports, never confirmed and indeed hotly denied, that the
Republicans asked the Iranians to hold up release of the hostages. It is a
fact, however, that the Iranians did delay the release until the exact moment
of Reagan's inauguration.

Now, again, there are signs of lame duckery in the air. Russian Foreign
Minister Igor Ivanov, on a trip to Washington, makes sure to meet with Gov.
George W. Bush. A delegation of Russian legislators meets with Republican
members of Congress, and they agree that no new arms- control deals should be
struck with the Clinton administration. Sen. Jesse Helms reinforces that by
saying that any new Clinton treaty will be "dead on arrival" in the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee.

On June 4, President Clinton arrives in Moscow for a summit meeting with
President Putin. Clinton would like to overcome Russian resistance to
amending the Antiballistic Missile Treaty so that the US can deploy a limited
antimissile system.

But both of them know that the Republicans have cut the ground from under
Clinton's feet.

At home in Russia, the Putin era opens on a note of ambiguity, underlined by
his inaugural address. From the bridge, Capt. Putin charted a course for a
Russia "free and flourishing," with respect for human and civil rights.

Below decks, in the boiler room, the boys of Putin's old KGB, now the FSB,
were charting something else - how to maintain control and stymie opposition.

It's laid out in a long document called "Structure of the Administration of
the President." The book-length transition paper was undoubtedly leaked by
someone who did not like it. It has been summarized in the newspaper
Kommersant, owned by media tycoon Boris Berezovsky.

For starters, under this plan, the president would not rely on the support of
any party, but would establish the "President's Political Council," which
would gradually push the Duma off the political stage and ensure the
president's monopoly on power.

Intelligence agencies would be part of the presidential directorate, as its
"sword and shield." Their functions would include, not only counterespionage
and counterterrorism, but also collecting "special information" about
potential candidates.

If, for example, the FSB learned of an opposition candidate planning to
reveal damaging facts about a Kremlin leader, the directorate would preempt
him with a press conference revealing damaging financial information about
him. The idea, says the planning paper, is to gain "real control over
political processes in Russia." And not only Russia, but also the "near
abroad countries;" that is, the former Soviet republics, like Georgia and the
Baltic States.

The document, not disowned by the Kremlin, is undoubtedly authentic. It is
not clear that Putin has endorsed it, but he has given other indications of
his attachment to the secret police.

In a series of interviews recently published as a book titled "First Person,"
Putin recalled: "My notion of the KGB came from romantic spy stories. I was a
pure and utterly successful product of a Soviet patriotic education."

He said that today Russia needs political police as much as it needs an army,
adding, "You can't get anywhere without secret agents."

In his inaugural speech, Putin said, "We must ... maintain and develop
democracy."

We will have to wait and see how he defines "democracy."


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#2 
The Globe and Mail (Canada)
11 May 2000
Familiar faces grace Putin's government
Kremlin insiders are wealthy tycoons left over from Boris Yeltsin's regime
GEOFFREY YORK
Moscow Bureau

Moscow -- President Vladimir Putin's nomination of a young technocrat to
serve as Russia's prime minister signals that the new administration will
continue to be dominated by many of the key figures of the Boris Yeltsin era.

Yesterday's appointment of Mikhail Kasyanov, a 42-year-old economist and debt
specialist, is expected to win swift approval from the Russian parliament in
a vote within the next week.

But the bigger question is whether Mr. Putin will challenge the power of the
wealthy business tycoons, known as the oligarchs, who lurk in the shadows
behind Mr. Kasyanov and other bureaucrats. The oligarchs, who have wielded
considerable influence over the Kremlin for the past five years, were leading
members of the so-called "family" of Kremlin insiders in the Yeltsin era.

Mr. Putin's early signals, including the nomination of Mr. Kasyanov, suggest
that the new President is unwilling to clash with the oligarchs. Mr. Kasyanov
is widely reported to have close connections to several of the oligarchs,
including the powerful billionaire Boris Berezovsky, who helped finance Mr.
Yeltsin's 1996 election campaign.

Mr. Berezovsky controls Russia's biggest television channel, which played a
leading role in destroying Mr. Putin's most dangerous rivals before the March
election.

Earlier this year, liberal politician Boris Nemtsov warned that the
appointment of Mr. Kasyanov as prime minister would mean the continuation of
the "oligarchic" rule of the Yeltsin era.

"Putin is still very dependent on the inner circle of the 'family.' He tried
to distance himself from Berezovsky in the election campaign because he knows
that Berezovsky is a notorious figure, but he cannot easily get rid of him,"
Moscow political analyst Yevgeny Volk said in an interview yesterday.

Mr. Putin has publicly insisted that he will maintain an equal distance from
all business leaders.

But his private behaviour has already cast doubt on this pledge. Last month,
according to a U.S. newspaper report, Mr. Putin intervened personally to veto
a business deal that would have brought much-needed revenue to one of Mr.
Berezovsky's biggest rivals, the private television mogul Vladimir Gusinsky.

His new appointee, Mr. Kasyanov, is an English-speaking veteran of the Soviet
State Planning Committee and the Russian Finance Ministry who negotiated a
massive debt-relief deal with a group of Russia's foreign creditors in
February. He is well respected in the West as a pragmatic professional with a
good grasp of economic reform.

But in Russia he has been dogged by allegations of corruption. The Soviet
debt market has been a lucrative source of profits for well-connected
insiders who are tipped off to pending debt payments. Some Russian
journalists and politicians say Mr. Kasyanov benefited from these insider
deals when he worked on debt negotiations. Some reports even said he was
nicknamed Misha Two Per Cent for the percentage he skimmed off the insider
deals.

One of the most reclusive oligarchs, Alexander Mamut, a banker, is reportedly
among the chief beneficiaries of Soviet debt deals linked to Mr. Kasyanov. He
is believed to be a business associate of Mr. Berezovsky.

Parliamentary leaders, however, seem ready to ratify Mr. Kasyanov's new
appointment. "Most deputies are not allergic to Kasyanov," said Gennady
Seleznyov, a Communist who is chairman of the State Duma, the lower house of
parliament.

"I am certain the majority of deputies will confirm the prime minister
proposed by Putin," added Vladimir Lukin, a deputy chairman of the Duma. "Not
because of his name or personality but because he has been proposed by the
newly elected President."

The nomination shows that Mr. Putin is accepting the basic political rules of
the Yeltsin era, observers said. It also suggests that the Kremlin will
maintain tight control of the Russian prime minister and his government,
which had sometimes become an independent power centre in the Yeltsin period.
 

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#3

Russia May Reach Stable Economic Growth in 3 Years-Kasyanov.

MOSCOW, May 12 (Itar-Tass) - Russia's Acting Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov said on Thursday that the task of the future government is to secure the basis for a stable economic growth in the country.

The task of Russia's new government is to secure the basis for a stable economic growth, "and if we create all those conditions within three years, there will be a way out of a not very favorable situation," Kasyanov told ORT television.

"We all would like to live in better economic conditions, in a better country, and if we ensure the positive tendency in those three years, it will be possible to say that the country has reached a stable growth, and unforeseen crises as well as all the problems which the population has already faced more than once will not threaten us any longer," Kasyanov stressed.

According to the acting prime minister, that could be reached through painstaking work of all the branches of power, and their desire to find a consensus.

"If we manage to preserve that one more year, then we can say that the basis for a stable growth has been created," he added.


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#4
BBC
11 May 2000
Liberal Russian media group raided
 

Armed federal agents have raided the headquarters of a Russian media group

known to be critical of the Kremlin.

Masked men, identifying themselves as tax inspectors entered the headquarters
of the privately run Media-MOST group, headed by Vladimir Gusinsky.

The group includes the national NTV television channel, the Echo Moscow radio
station and Sevodnya daily newspaper - popular and outspoken media.

The Sevodnya's Editor-in-Chief, Mikhail Berger, said the raid may have been a
direct response to the group's recent reports about corruption in the highest
echelons of power, including the presidential administration.

The BBC's Rob Parsons in Moscow says many observers believe the raid could be
the start of a wider clampdown.

Supported Putin opponent

Both the Russian Prosecutor-General's Office and a spokesman for the FSB
intelligence service said the searches were in connection with a criminal
case against the group.

Groups of armed men were also said to be posted outside other Media-MOST
offices housing internet and satellite communications companies.

Reporters were told to stay out of the way but were not threatened.

During the presidential elections in March, the Media-MOST group suppported
liberal reformer Grigory Yavlinsky giving him a platform for attacks on
ex-President Boris Yeltsin and the man who succeeded him, Vladimir Putin.

In a statement the Media-Most group described the raid as "an act of state
arbitrariness and lawnlessness ... aimed at preventing them from carrying out
their professional activity".

According to the group, the raid violates "the fundamental principles of the
Constitution and the law on mass media".

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#5

Stratfor.com
Putin Begins Crackdown on Russia’s Oligarchs
May 11, 2000

Russian tax police raided oligarch Vladimir Gusinsky’s Media-MOST offices in Moscow on the morning of May 11. The Russian press is playing up the incident as a violation of democracy and free speech. More important, it is President Vladimir Putin’s first official offensive against the corrupt upper tier of Russian businessmen. To prove his impartiality, however, Putin will next need to launch an equally strict operation against Gusinsky’s rival, Boris Berezovsky.

Armed with submachine guns and axes, tax police, Interior Ministry troops and investigators from the prosecutor general’s office evacuated and searched the Media-MOST office. Media-MOST is a holding company founded by Gusinsky that operates the NTV independent television station, the Echo of Moscow radio and the Segodnya newspaper. The Prosecutor General’s office released a statement that said prosecutors had discovered information on Media-MOST employees while investigating the embezzlement of government money. Last November, Media-MOST was also confronted by the Yeltsin administration for failing to pay a $42 million debt.

On the surface, it appears that Putin is resorting to tactics most Western observers had hoped he would resist: using the Federal Security Services (FSB) to rough up his political opposition. Russian media immediately accused the Kremlin of Stalin-style intimidation and censorship. There are several factors that support this argument. Gusinsky’s media outlets oppose Putin and his administration. NTV and Segodnya often publish features critical of the government, the war in Chechnya and Putin’s rise to power.

Also, Gusinsky does not primarily own commodities, which are the profitable industries that must be pulled out of the oligarchs’ reach. Putin’s goal is to separate the oligarchs from industries where they can steal enough money to damage the entire economy. In light of this goal, Gusinsky does not seem to fit the profile.

But, through Media-MOST’s connection to Gazprom, Gusinsky and his companies do have the power to pass on a significant financial burden, the effects of which will seep back to the national economy. In 1996 Gazprom bought 30 percent of the shares in Media-MOST. Since then, Media-MOST has accrued approximately $1 billion worth of foreign debt, for which Gazprom is liable. Should Media-MOST default, or should Gusinsky reallocate some funds to his personal accounts, Gazprom ­ in which the state has the largest stake ­ will have to pick up the debt. And the federal government, which relies on Gazprom’s profit to cover more than 25 percent of government revenues, is not willing to sacrifice a billion dollars for Gusinsky.

Finally, as a result of a rift among the powerful oligarchs who used to surround former president Boris Yeltsin, Gusinsky is Berezovsky’s rival. Observers who believe Putin is in some way allied with or indebted to

Berezovsky have already hinted that Putin is doing Berezovsky both a personal and professional favor, as Berezovsky owns several competing media companies. In order to prove he is prepared to systematically remove all of the oligarchs from powerful positions, Putin will next have to confront Berezovsky. Thus, in light of Putin’s plan to use the secret services and tax police to wipe out the oligarchs, it becomes apparent that the raid on Gusinsky’s companies was more than just a Kremlin attack on its political opponents.


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#6

NATO Admiral Satisfied with Russian Nuclear Doctrine.

BRUSSELS, May 11 (Itar-Tass) - NATO regards as normal wording on the threshold of using nuclear weapons, contained in the new concept of Russian national security, said here on Thursday the chairman of the NATO military committee, Admiral Guido Venturoni.

Addressing a news conference on the results of the meeting of the Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Military Committee at the level of chiefs of staffs, which ended on Wednesday, he commented on the exchange of information on strategic conceptual documents, which took place between the top brass of 19 NATO countries and the chief of Russian General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin.

He noted that the Russian nuclear doctrine provides for use of these weapons as an instrument of containment, as well as the last means of repulsing large-scale aggression. "Such a wording is quite natural, otherwise what will be the meaning of containment?" the admiral noted.

He stated that the final version of the concept of Russian national security and the Russian military doctrine contains less confrontation elements against NATO.

At the same time, he pointed to difference between NATO and Russian documents: the NATO strategic concept mentions Russia in the section "Partnership and Cooperation" where it is clearly stated that NATO does not consider Russia as a potential source of threat.

The Russian concept does not mention partnership with NATO, he underlined. True, in the admiral's opinion, Russia softened wording with respect to NATO. While the previous versions of the document said that NATO expansion may present a threat to Russia, it only expresses now, in the final version, "concern over expansion of military blocs".

"We know about this concern long ago, and there is nothing new about it, " Venturoni added.

He concluded by saying that NATO generals received explanations and replies from General Kvashnin to their questions concerning the structure of the Russian Armed Forces.

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#7 Russia To Gradually Unfreeze Military Relations With NATO 
    They exchanged views on the major provisions of NATO's strategic concept and Russia's national security and military doctrine. 

Both sides sought to understand each other and find a way to make joint decisions.   The Russian delegation said decisions should be made only on the principles laid out in the Russia-NATO Founding Act, namely joint forecasting, programming, evaluation and planning, and joint implementation of tasks.   Unfortunately, NATO often acts unilaterally, Kvashnin said.

The NATO considers Kvashnin's visit as a sign of Russia's willingness to continue to unfreeze relations with the Alliance, a process it began in February with a meeting between Russian leader Vladimir Putin and NATO Secretary-General George Robertson. 

Kvashnin had bilateral meetings and talks with NATO Military Committee Chairman Guido Venturoni, the new Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Joseph Ralston, German and U.S.   colleagues.     He did not take part in the 6th meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Military Committee in Chiefs of Staff Session on Wednesday morning.   It involved military leaders from more than 40 countries, including CIS states.


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#8
Moscow Times
May 11, 2000
DEFENSE DOSSIER: Arms Talks Gap Narrowing
By Pavel Felgenhauer
The seemingly endless celebrations that traditionally make for 10 days of
down time in May are over. But the coming weeks will be a time of important
decision-making. The nation will have a new government, and perhaps President
Vladimir Putin will present his long-awaited economic plan. U.S. President
Bill Clinton is scheduled to be in Moscow on June 4 and 5. The main topic of
discussion is expected to be nuclear arms issues that may determine
U.S.-Russian relations for decades to come.

The stakes are high. The U.S. government wants to amend the 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to build a limited national missile defense
(NMD). Clinton has announced that he will make a decision on NMD deployment
in June. The summit in Moscow seems to be the last chance to find a
compromise. If there is no agreement, the United States may go ahead with
NMD, abrogating the ABM treaty, which could create a long-term schism between
Moscow and Washington. Until now, Russian officials have said publicly that
consultations on ABM and NMD are deadlocked, that Russia opposes U.S.
proposals for amending the ABM treaty, while Washington rejects Russian
arguments.

The U.S.-Russian arms control fray has also intensified due to serious
disagreements in parallel talks over the terms of the START III arms
reduction treaty. The outline of START III - a limit of from 2,000 to 2,500
strategic nuclear warheads for each country - was agreed to by Clinton and
former President Boris Yeltsin in 1997 at a summit in Helsinki. But Russia,
unable now to maintain a large nuclear arsenal, wants more drastic
reductions: to 1,500 warheads or fewer. Russia also wants to impose some
limits on the deployment of U.S. long-range, sea-based cruise missiles, a
notion that has been rejected by Washington.

The situation seems to be hopeless, and the coming summit - an inevitable
disaster. But not all is as bad as it seems. Recent leaks from Washington
indicate there might yet be a compromise.

Until recently, the Pentagon was adamant that the United States should have
no fewer than 2,500 warheads. But recently there have been rumors that
Washington has indicated it could go below 2,000 if Russia compromises on
ABM. The Russian and U.S. negotiating positions on a revised START III
framework are still some distance apart, but the gap is said to be narrowing.

A compromise on ABM is possible, because the Russian military knows that the
proposed U.S. NMD system does not really threaten Russia and that in the
coming decades it would technically be impossible to create an ABM system in
North America that could fully negate even a reduced Russian nuclear
deterrent. From a purely military-technical point of view, the NMD project is
very expensive and totally unreliable. The true effectiveness of any ABM
shield can only be tested during an actual ballistic attack. Before the
opposite is proved, the U.S. government will be forced to assume, in dealing
with any unfriendly nation, that in time of war the NMD system will not be
able to intercept a single warhead.

But Russian military planners will be forced to assume that a U.S. ABM shield
will intercept more than 90 percent of incoming warheads. Such a theoretical
threat can only help our generals press for more defense spending, so m any
in our military actually want the United States to go forward with NMD.

Since 1997, the Defense Ministry has spent the lion's share of its small
procurement budget to deploy a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM),
the Topol-M (SS-27). The SS-27 was developed in the 1980s as a response to
the "Star Wars" Strategic Defense Initiative and is specifically designed to
negate enemy ABM defenses.

The Russian army began a war in Chechnya in 1999 without modern night-capable
equipment, and thousands of servicemen have been killed and wounded because
the deployment of the SS-27 "anti-ABM" ICBM sucked up all the money. However,
today the only acting ABM system in the world is Russia's own, stationed
around Moscow. A rapid deployment of a U.S. NMD could in retrospect
rationalize the SS-27 program, while at the same time creating a "threat"
that will help buy more ICBMs.

The June summit might be a success, and ground-breaking agreements might be
reached that will in the end promote increased defense spending. But if the
summit fails, defense spending will increase even more. So whatever the
outcome, both the U.S. and Russian military-industrial complexes win.

Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent defense analyst based in Moscow.

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#9 Clinton unlikely to bring new nuke reduction proposals to Moscow: official
WASHINGTON, May 11 (AFP) -
US President Bill Clinton is not likely to bring new proposals for reducing
nuclear warhead stockpiles when he travels to Russia next month for a summit
with President Vladimir Putin, a senior State Department official said
Thursday.

The official brushed aside speculation that Clinton was preparing to accept a
Russian plan to reduce the number of warheads by far more than envisioned in
a 1997 framework agreement for the proposed START III strategic arms
reduction pact.

"Our proposal for START III, which we discussed with the Russians, is
consistent with the Helsinki framework," the official, speaking on condition
of anonymity, told reporters.

"That is the number we continue to propose in the discussions and which we
continue to support."

The Helsinki framework for START III, agreed to by Clinton and former Russian
president Boris Yeltsin, would reduce each side's nuclear arsenal to between
2000 and 2,500 warheads from the 3,000 to 3,500 level enshrined in

However, in preliminary START III negotiations, Russia has proposed a further
cut of 1,000 warheads.

The Washington Times, citing unnamed officials and a conservative lawmaker,
reported Thursday that Clinton wanted to accept the Russian proposal as a
carrot to induce Moscow to agree to changes in a 1972 treaty that would allow
the United States to deploy an anti-missile shield.

Russia now opposes any amendments to the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty.

The paper said the Pentagon was fighting against the further warhead
reduction but was being pressured by the White House to support it because
Clinton wanted to conclude an arms control agreement by the end of his term
in office.

It quoted Republican Representative Curt Weldon, a senior member of the House
Armed Services Committee, as saying he was "dismayed" and "alarmed" by the
alleged proposal, which he said was being considered without consultation
with Congress.

The State Department official flatly denied any consideration of unilateral
warhead reduction and said the Russian proposal had been rejected.

"We have, as you necessarily would, examined the implications for our force
structure and strategic deterrence of what their proposal is, but we have not
changed our position," the official said.

"The position that we have taken is the 2000 to 2500" warhead numbers for
START III as envisaged by the Helsinki framework, he said.

Asked if Clinton had no new proposals to bring to Moscow, the official
replied: "That is essentially the case."

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#10
The Global Beat Syndicate
Russian Forces Face A Stalemate In Chechnya
May 11, 2000
By Vadim Soloviov
Vadim Soloviov is a military analysis and editor in chief of Independent
Military Review, a weekly supplement to The Independent in Moscow.  

MOSCOW -- Although it has managed to battle its way across Chechnya and drive

the armed separatists deep into the mountains, Russian forces increasingly
find themselves frustrated in their inability to bring the fighting to a
close. The danger now is that, unless Moscow changes its policies, the
conflict could go on indefinitely.

Despite the fact that much of the rebellious republic is under the control of
federal troops, intense fighting continues in several regions and Russian
forces continue to suffer heavy casualties.

The Russian command is beefing up its forces to deal with the continued
fighting. The 42nd Motorized Rifle Division will be permanently deployed
around Grozny, virtually isolating the capital from the rest of the republic.
Nine Interior Ministry battalions will operate in close cooperation with the
Army to seal off rebel strongholds in the mountains from the rest of the
republic. Finally, border guards will control the republic's borders with
neighboring Georgia, Dagestan and Ingushetia.

The military is, in effect, throwing its last remaining resources at the
conflict in Chechnya. Because it lacks enough commanders with combat
experience, the Russian command has been forced to transfer about 100
officers from the 201st Division in Tadjikistan to Chechnya.

Federal forces have three main objectives in Chechnya. The first is to
actively hunt down the remaining rebels and destroy their bases and supply
routes. As Gen. Valerii Manilov, first deputy of the Chief of the General
Staff, said recently, "all forces and means will be used for that purpose."
Its second goal, Gen. Manilov said, is to find and eliminate rebels still
living in areas controlled by federal forces. And the third is to prevent
acts of terrorism in the breakaway republic.

Having all three branches of the security force deployed in Chechnya will
make it easier for any one of them to avoid blame in case of heavy losses or
major defeats. And it appears that such losses will continue. Federal forces
have sustained heavy casualties after being ambushed by rebel fighters in
several recent incidents.

The General Staff says its has successfully accomplished its main mission. It
says it has destroyed the rebels' command-and-control structure, as well as
their supply system and infrastructure. It says it has cut off the rebels'
access to foreign supplies.

But if that's the case, many in Moscow wonder why federal troops still being
killed in ambushes. Why have the rebels been able to impose their tactics on
the federal troops, which nominally are in control of the region? Shouldn't
it be the other way around?

The same General Staff that claims victory also admits that the extremists
remain a significant force. Russia estimates that there are about 2, 500
rebels hiding in the mountains, with another 1, 000 dispersed among the
general population. Rebel leader Aslan Maskhadov claims a force of about
26,000. A more realistic estimate puts the number at around 15,000.

For Russian forces in Chechnya, the problem now is that they are not only
opposed by armed opponents but also by a substantial portion of the general
population. Gen. Manilov said he believes as much as 10 to 15 percent of the
people there, especially in southern regions, pose a security threat. This
contrasts sharply with official statements about the military's full control
over Chechen territory.

Neither the Defense Department nor the Interior Ministry have come up with
any suggestions on how they might change their current strategies to deal
with this continued threat. Some outside the government have voiced concerns
about the current strategy. Serguei Stepashin, the former head of the Federal
Security Service, warns that the Interior Ministry's 200,000 troops are not
prepared to conduct the type of counter-terrorist operation planned for
Chechnya. Instead, he recommends Russia's military look at the experiences of
other nations, such as Israel, to see what type of force is needed to
maintain control in the region.

Without a significant change in Russian tactics and policies, the nation
faces a never-ending conflict in Chechnya. But maybe this should come as no
surprise: after all, it took the KGB nearly 25 years after the end of World
War II to hunt down and capture the last Chechen rebel of that era.

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#11 

PBS
Frontline
Return of the Czar
May 10, 2000
Facts + Stats of the Yeltsin Era   
Drug use and addiction

The 1990s saw a dramatic increase of drug use and addiction in the Russian
Federation. Laxity and corruption among border guards, combined with poverty
and unemployment, has led to the explosion of a consumer drug market in
Russia. In 1998, a report from the Russian Federation's Council on Foreign
and Defense Policy announced a state of emergency: "The speed and scale of
the distribution of narcotics on Russian territory during the last five years
enables one to say that we are confronting a pandemic." The main flow of
drugs, mostly heroin and opium, comes from central Asia--Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and the former Soviet Republics Tadjikistan, Uzbekistan, and
Kazakhstan.

·  More than 3 million Russians, or two percent of all men, women and
children are drug users, and the rate continues to grow, according to
Interior Ministry officials quoted in April, 2000. The majority of users are
under 30.

·  By 1997, the annual amount of money turned over in drug sales was
estimated at more than $2.5 billion U.S. dollars. This was a marked increase
from the $1.5 billion estimated in 1996.

·  Drug use and addiction is taking a particularly high toll on the youth of
Russia. The Health Ministry estimates that the drug addiction rate for
teenagers rose by thirteen times over the decade, and that six percent of
school-aged children take drugs. According to the Council on Foreign and
Defense Policy, the average life expectancy of addicts after they begin using
narcotics is between 4 and 4.5 years, and the majority of addicts die before
the age of 30.

·  Six out of 10 crimes against property in 1998 were committed by drug
addicts, and the majority of those crimes were committed by individuals under
35, according to the report of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy.
Growing public concern about the extent of the problem and the lack of
effective government response has led to the emergence of a grassroots
movement to rid the country of drug dealers though vigilante justice. One
such group, called "City Against Drugs," based in Yekaterinburg, combines
raids during which suspected drug dealers are beaten and threatened with a
controversial drug rehabilitation center whose harsh methods include
handcuffing addicts to their beds and feeding them only bread and water for
three weeks during withdrawal.

HIV infection and aids

·  According to a World Health Organization report, the proportion of the
population living with HIV doubled between end-1997 and end-1999 in the newly
independent states of the former Soviet Union. This marks the most rapid HIV
growth rate in the world recorded in 1999. Over 2700 cases of HIV were
reported in Moscow in the first nine months of 1999 alone - three times as
many as in all previous years combined.

·  In November 1999, there were recorded 23,509 cases of the HIV infection
and 445 deaths from AIDS, according to the Russian Ministry of Health's
center on AIDS and HIV. The Ministry estimated that the actual number of
infections could be as much as five times higher than the officially reported
figures.

·  The increase of intravenous drug use is cited by Russian officials and the
World Health Organization as the chief cause of the spread of HIV and AIDS.
Drug addicts account for 90% of all HIV-infected people in Russia.

Men, women, and children

·  The total population of Russia is shrinking: in 1990, the population was
148.3 million; by 2015, it is expected to be as low as 138.4 million.

The suicide rate in Russia has risen 60% since 1989.

The life expectancy of a Russian man has fallen by 4 years since 1980 to 58
years.

·  Infertility is increasing by more than 3% a year, and 75% of all pregnant
women in Russia have a serious pathology during their pregnancies.

The total number of young people (ages 15-29) in Russia is decreasing.
According to the Russian State Committee on Youth Affairs, in 1998, the
number of teenagers had fallen by almost 10% from the number in 1989. The
death rate in Russia exceeds the birth rate by 70%.

·  Suicide rates among teenagers is on the rise, especially among boys. The
number of suicides among boys aged 15-19 more than doubled between 1989 and
1997, going from 950 to almost 2,000, according to a 1999 UNICEF report.

·  In a 1998 poll, Russian high school seniors ranked prostitute and hired
assassin above scientist, engineer and researcher as attractive career
choices.

·  UNICEF estimates that in 1999, 5% of primary school aged children are not
attending or enrolled in school. Real spending on education in Russia has
fallen by 1/3. In response to the monetary crisis, the number of years of
compulsory education has been reduced.

·  The general health of Russian children and adolescents has declined
dramatically. According to the Russian Ministry of Public Health, in 1999
Russian children were smaller, sicker, and weaker, both physically and
mentally. Indices of physical development such as weight, height, chest size
and muscle strength all fell significantly over the course of the 1990s.

Capital flight

·  When U.S. authorities disclosed that they were investigating the flow of
billions of dollars of dubious origin from Russia through the Bank of New
York, it brought international attention to the rapid acceleration of
"capital flight" from Russia."Capital flight" refers to the outpouring of
capital from a national economy into foreign markets without being reinvested
into the domestic market. In the economically unstable aftermath of
privatization, many Russians sought to stash their money away in safe havens,
both legal and illegal. Although statistics are hard to verify, capital
flight from Russia has been estimated to be as high as $1.5 billion a month,
or $18 billion a year.

·  Sixty-five percent (USD 78 billion) of the USD 120 billion in Western
funds and loans to Russia was transferred to private offshore accounts,
according to a recent study conducted by former US National Security advisor
Zbigniew Brzezinski at the Center For Strategic and International Studies.

·  In March 2000, US Secretary of the Treasury Department, Lawrence Summers,
announced that the total of illegal capital flight from Russia exceeded $100
billion.

·  The annual rate of capital flight reached a peak in 1998 at $25 billion.

·  Capital flight appeared to be decreasing by the beginning of 2000,
possibly due to restrictions placed by the Central Bank on international
trade activities. Some estimates for 1999 were as low as $15-16 billion.
Although higher figures for 1999--$20 billion--were estimated by some Western
economists, they agree that the capital outflow is slowing, though still
substantial. The International Institute of International Finance predicts
that capital flight for 2000 will be around $20 billion.

·  The substantial rate of capital flight may be somewhat balanced by an
increase in foreign investment. The International Institute of International
Finance claims that investors who fled the Russian market in 1998 may be
returning. According to Business Week, total foreign investment grew from $
411 million in the third quarter of 1998 to $ 613 million in the third
quarter of 1999.
 
*******

#12
Excerpt
US Department of State
10 May 2000
Transcript: U.S. Ambassador to NATO on NATO-Russian Relations
(May 5: Vershbow on arms control, Chechnya, Kosovo, NATO) (7,300)

U.S. Ambassador to NATO Alexander Vershbow appeared on a Department of
State TV Interactive Dialogue Program devoted to NATO-Russian
relations May 5, speaking from NATO headquarters in Brussels with
journalists and other participants in Moscow, St. Petersburg and
Yekaterinburg.

Vershbow discussed next month's summit in Moscow between President
Clinton and Russian President Vladimir Putin, as well as efforts in
Brussels to rebuild the NATO-Russia relationship. Despite differences
over Kosovo and NATO enlargement, he said, "we're beginning to make
some progress."

"We believe it is in our common interest for Russia to be a full
participant in handling the problems of European security, and we are
very much committed to making that a reality," he added.

The ambassador responded to questions about a number of issues,
including:

-- NATO enlargement: "Tying the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe to a collective security and defense structure is the best
guarantee that there will never again be wars and instability in
Central Europe," Vershbow said, maintaining that "the enlargement of
NATO is in Russia's interest, even if Russia doesn't yet recognize
that fact."

He said NATO has resumed talks aimed at establishing a NATO
information center in Moscow, a center which he hopes will help dispel
some of the Cold War misconceptions of NATO still held by many
Russians.

-- Arms control: High on the summit agenda will be the question of
modifying the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) to permit a
"very limited, modest" national missile defense system against
potential threats from "unpredictable" countries such as Iran and
North Korea, Vershbow said. "If we're going to have the ability to
prevent these countries from using these [inter-continental range]
missiles, either as weapons or as political levers, then we have to
work together.... We believe...there are ways to put restrictions on
the scale and the nature of a national missile defense system so that
it will not undermine the effectiveness of Russia's strategic nuclear
force."

On the reduction of U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, Vershbow said,
"START II is an excellent basis now to move on to even deeper
reductions in START III, and that will be part of the agenda for
Presidents Clinton and Putin when they meet next month."

-- Chechnya: Vershbow took issue with attempts to equate Russian
actions in Chechnya with NATO's actions in Kosovo. In Kosovo, he said,
"NATO used force basically to save a civilian population from the
destruction of the central power." That is not the case in Chechnya,
where "there has been massive destruction of civilian population
centers and large loss of life among the civilian population." He
added, "The means Russia is using in Chechnya are the wrong ones and
only laying the seed of a much more difficult and long-lasting crisis
in Russia's southern regions."
   
-- Kosovo: If Russia and NATO "had stayed together during the peace
negotiations" at Rambouillet, France, prior to the NATO air campaign,
Vershbow said, "we might have achieved a political settlement and
avoided the use of force.... Fortunately, we did come together again
in the final weeks of the air campaign. We joined our forces to
convince [Yugoslav] President Milosevic to accept the demands of the
international community. And, today, NATO and Russia are, of course,
working closely together to try to bring a lasting peace to all the
people of Kosovo."

Asked about the implications of NATO's air campaign for the concept of
national sovereignty, Vershbow replied, "We are not in any way
suggesting that that principle should be abandoned, but there are
exceptional circumstances in which sovereignty cannot be used as a
defense of flagrant violations of human rights. There is a point at
which the international community has to say this will not be
accepted; no matter what we believe in regarding sovereignty, we will
not allow the kind of genocidal activities that was unfolding in
Kosovo."
 

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#13
WPS Media Monitoring Agency
Defense and Security
Issue No. 51, 05 May 2000
LIQUIDATION OF MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS IN RUSSIA REQUIRES A GREAT DEAL OF MONEY

Meanwhile, according to the estimates of the Defense Ministry, economic circumstances will not allow Russia to maintain 3,000-3,500 nuclear charges at the level specified by the START-2 after 2005. That is why, according to the military, it is necessary to start preparation of the START-3 immediately and reduce the total quantity of nuclear charges to 1,500. Thus, Russia will have to discard at least 4,000-4,500 warheads.

Discarding of every intercontinental ballistic missile costs at least $1 million. Recycling of nuclear charges is another clause of expenditures, which also requires a great deal of money and lots of resources. The US is ready to buy highly enriched uranium from Russia and process it into depleted

form. From this operation, the Atomic Energy Ministry annually receives about $400 million of profit. At any rate, this sum somehow has not been spent on the further discarding of mass destruction weapons, but is being used to achieve other goals of the state.

Discarded nuclear submarines also create serious environmental and social-economic problems. The Northern and Pacific Fleets annually generate about 18,000-20,000 cubic meters of liquid wastes and 6,000-7,000 cubic meters of solid nuclear wastes. The storage facilities for solid wastes, which were built in 1960-1962, are still in use, but are practically filled up. Liquid wastes are also being recycled, but in insufficient quantities.

The Navy has discarded at least 150 nuclear submarines (over 90 of then in the Northern Fleet). However, the spent nuclear fuel is unloaded only from a half of these submarines. According to experts, to solve the problem of radiation safety of old submarines in the Northern and Pacific fleets, it is necessary to spend $1-1.5 billion. Even given such spending, the priority job will take about ten years and the further recovery of the regions of submarines' deployment will take a few years more. The overall program of nuclear submarines' discarding costs about $7-8 billion.

Russia has not started liquidating chemical weapons yet. The program of its destruction is lagging four years behind schedule. According to official information, the Russia's chemical weapons inventory totals about 40,000 tons, that is, almost 50% of the whole world arsenal.

According to Colonel General Stanislav Petrov, the Commander of Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Forces of the Defense Ministry, since 1993, 1.6 billion rubles in current prices were assigned for the liquidation of chemical weapons, which accounts for 1.4% of the overall cost of the whole program, or for 43% of the cost of construction of the first part of the plant for chemical weapons recycling in Gorny settlement in the Saratov Region. Petrov added that such a tendency would continue in 2000. He noted that instead of 10.5 billion rubles, which is stipulated by the program, the budget assignments for these purposes amount only to 0.5 billion rubles.

According to Petrov, to improve the situation, it was necessary to focus all efforts on construction of the plants for discarding chemical weapons in the Gorny settlement in the Saratov Region (it is ready by 50%) and Shchuchye settlement in the Kurgan Region (it is only planned). Besides, according to Petrov, it is necessary to increase the budget spending, allocating about 6 billion rubles in 2001 and 13 billion rubles in 2002 and 2003 each, and about 12 billion rubles in 2004. Between 2005 and 2013, the annual spending on this program could total 6-7 billion rubles in current prices.

By and large, according to military experts, implementation of the START-2, discarding of nuclear submarines and mass destruction weapons will cost several billion dollars. Russia does not have such money. For instance, the whole military budget of Russia for 2000 equals only about $5 billion. Just compare: since 1992, the US government spent at least $9 billion on aid to

Russia, that is, not less than two military budgets of our country, or 12.5% annually.

The military budget for 2000 is classified, but a simple analysis of open information about the mass destruction weapons' problems in Russia shows that spending on discarding of chemical and nuclear weapons is insignificant. Thus, according to the report of the National Research Center of the US

Academy of Sciences, over the last three years, the nuclear materials safety situation in Russia worsened and the persistent financial-economic crisis has aggravated this situation further. Due to this, the center concluded that the US Department of Energy needed to raise its aid to Russia for non-proliferation of fissible materials, establishment of reliable systemsfor their calculation, control, storage, and physical protection.

According to American experts, at present, at 400 objects in Russia, there are 75 tons of plutonium and 600 tons of highly enriched uranium, suitable for nuclear weapons production. Moscow and Washington have agreed to gradually reduce the quantity of available excessive radioactive materials, but this process might take many years. So far the Russian government lacks

the money for the provision of safe and reliable storage of radioactive materials and prevention of their leakage and smuggling to the third countries. To prevent such incidents, the US Administration proposed the so-called "broadened initiative for contribution to weakening of threat."

Within the framework of this initiative, in April, President Bill Clinton proposed that Congress raise expenditures on the programs of cooperation with Russia and the other former soviet republics in the field of armament reduction and non-proliferation of nuclear materials and technologies to almost $1 billion in the 2001 fiscal year. Clinton plans to assign $4.52 billion within five years to Russia and other CIS countries. American budget for 2000 allocates $889 million for this purpose. According to the US Administration, in the new fiscal year, starting from October 1, the

Department of Defense will receive approximately 50% of $974 million requested within the framework of the initiative. Pentagon will spend $469 million mainly on the well-known Nann-Lugar program, which was prepared to assist Russia to dismantle its strategic armament, subject to liquidation under the START-1 and liquidate its chemical weapons.

The Energy and State departments, two other American agencies taking part in the initiative's implementation, plan to spend $364 million and $141 million respectively. The Department of Energy cooperates with Russian Atomic Energy Ministry in the provision of protection and registration of nuclear materials, the recycling of excessive weapon grade plutonium and uranium, the conversion of military production facilities in Russian "military cities" and improvement of nuclear power stations' safety.

In turn, the Department of State provides financial and technical assistance to the Center of Science and Technologies in Moscow, which gives temporary jobs to specialists from CIS countries, who formerly worked for defense enterprises. A separate program of the Department of State is aimed at the provision of assistance to withdrawal of Russian forces and weapons from Georgia and Trans-Dniester region of Moldova.

Thus, no matter whether Moscow wants it or not, its disarmament initiatives will be mainly paid for by American taxpayers. The American population is not very happy about such prospects, but the public understands that during the cold war much more, about $4.5 trillion, was spent on armament. Hence, the US obviously considers the strengthening of security in the world and in Russia to be its priority. Of course, American aid does not always meet Russia's interests, but Russia is too weak yet to give up such aid.

 

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