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CDI Russia Weekly
         Issue # 100   May 5, 2000

Edited by David Johnson
The CDI Russia Weekly is a weekly e-mail newsletter that carries news and analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With funding from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education organization. To receive a free subscription, e-mail David Johnson at djohnson@cdi.org
 
Contents
1. Christian Science Monitor: Fred Weir, Calendar clash: Candles and sickles and flags, oh my! As Russians flock to Easter observances this week, the May Day red flags start to look like quaint Soviet folklore.
  2. AFP: Putin to consolidate hold on power after inauguration.
  3. Moscow Times: Pavel Felgenhauer, Inaugurating an Era of Hope and Denial.
  4. The Russia Journal: Alexander Golts, Russia's military learns to go it alone. Putin takes rational approach.
  5. Prague CTK: Havel: Chechnya Should Hold Referendum on its Future.
  6. In These Times: Jeffrey St. Clair, Wasted. (re nuclear waste)
  7.  Novye Izvestia: AMERICA AND WE HAVE MORE SIMILARITIES THAN DIFFERENCES IN OUR VIEWS, IVANOV, (Interview with Foreign Minister Igor IVANOV)
  8. Interfax: Poll: Russians Divided on START-2.
  9. RFE/RL: Frank T. Csongos, U.S./Russia: Arms Talks Face Tough Challenges.
  10. Program on New Approaches to Russian Security (PONARS): Sarah Mendelson, Explaining the International Community's Response to the War in Chechnya.

*******

#1
Christian Science Monitor
3 May 2000
Calendar clash: Candles and sickles and flags, oh my!
As Russians flock to Easter observances this week, the May Day red flags
start to look like quaint Soviet folklore.
By Fred Weir

The streets of Moscow are empty, as they always are in the first week of
May.

This is the onset of northern spring, and no Russian czar, commissar or
president could ever have prevented folks from making for their country
gardens to put down the tomatoes, cucumbers, and beets.

But beneath the silence, ideologies are clashing mightily over the soul of
this traditional spring holiday.

Millions of Russians marched Sunday with crosses, icons and candles in the
ancient Kryostni Khod (Stations of the Cross) processions around to mark the

beginning of Easter, which follows a different calendar here than in the
West. Confined to a few showplace churches during Soviet years, the
celebration is rapidly reconquering Russia's popular consciousness.

Easter masses in the beautiful Orthodox cathedrals of Moscow and St.
Petersburg were crammed this year. Famous and powerful people, like
President-elect Vladimir Putin, made sure they were prominent among the
crowds. During this entire week one believer meeting another offers the
salutation: "Khristos Voskres" (Christ has Risen). "Vo Istina" (Truly),
comes the response.

On the other hand, tens of thousands of other Russians still took up hammer
and sickle emblems, red flags and portraits of the Soviet Union's founder
Vladimir Lenin to march in May Day parades in cities across the country.
Once
a key holiday on the Soviet calendar, the international workers' day of
solidarity is still an official day off. It is important to people who
resent the changes of the past decade.

"We fought, we worked, we built a great country," said Svetlana Kortunova, a

pensioner in her 70s, marching in a Communist-led Moscow parade. "They may
have destroyed the Soviet Union, but they will never take away the peoples'
holiday...."

Russia's official calendar is a crazy quilt of Soviet-era political
commemorations, ancient religious festivals, and holidays grafted-on by
former President Boris Yeltsin. The only real tension occurs at moments when
the church and the Communists are both vying for attention, like early May.

No one seems to know the significance of the holidays invented by Mr. Yeltsin
in a futile bid to create a post-Soviet political tradition. One example is
Independence Day on June 12. "Independence from whom?" Russians ask.

A survey conducted last week by the independent VtSIOM agency last week
suggests prerevolutionary tradition may be decisively winning the battle for

possession of early May. About 84 percent of respondents in the poll said
they planned to take part in the week-long celebration of Orthodox
Easter....Just 45 percent said they would mark May Day.

Of course, that still means there must be millions who honor both the
religious festival, drenched in the Russian church's medieval color, and the

secular, militant workers' holiday.

Politicians trying to straddle the fence should beware. Arriving at a
workers' rally, a tired-looking Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov was
greeted by followers who eagerly congratulated him with May Day. Mr.
Zyuganov responded, "Vo Istina." Oops.

Optimists say these contradictions will go away by themselves in time.

"Already young people have stopped regarding these Communist marches as some

kind of threat," says Olga Zaretskaya, a specialist in Russian cultural
studies. "They see it more like an outdoor exhibition of Soviet folklore."

And when Mr. Putin is inaugurated Sunday, it won't just be a dour ceremony.
-
there will be an elaborate and glittering Kremlin party. Maybe it will
become the first of a whole new wave of holidays.
 
#2
Putin to consolidate hold on power after inauguration

MOSCOW, May 4 (AFP) -
Vladimir Putin will be sworn in as president of Russia on Sunday, and is
expected to move swiftly to consolidate his hold on power to allow him a
free hand in pushing through vital economic reforms.

The first task of the 47-year-old former KGB spy, who won a comfortable
election victory on March 26, will be to nominate a prime minister and
cabinet.

The top candidate for the PM post is Mikhail Kasyanov, the country's de
facto
cabinet chief since Putin, who currently holds the post, became acting
president on the snap resignation of Boris Yeltsin on December 31, 1999.

The first deputy prime minister, who could win cross-party support in the
State Duma lower house of parliament, which must approve the president's
nomination, said Wednesday the new government should be in place by the end
of May.

The Duma is expected to hold a confirmation vote on the candidate on May 19.

Some of the suggestions put forward provided for "fairly large changes" in
the cabinet line-up, said Kasyanov.

Putin, a political unknown when he was catapulted into the prime minister's
seat nine months ago, is seen as likely to concentrate on stamping his
political authority in Russia before embarking on overhauling the economy.

"Real power will remain vested in the Kremlin, and with a tame Duma and
little real opposition, the key word will be centralisation," commented Eric

Kraus, chief strategist at NIKoil Capital Markets.

If Putin has learned one thing from Yeltsin's era, it is that under Russia's
current chaotic political system it has proven all but impossible to devise,
implement and enforce a coherent programme of reform.

Pressing though the economic agenda is, analysts thus expect Putin to start
by consolidating his power, bringing Russia's robustly independent governors
to heel, placing his own men in strategic posts in the government White
House, the Kremlin administration and law enforcement bodies.

The Kommersant newspaper leaked an internal Kremlin memo on Wednesday which
set out plans to boost the powers of the presidential administration and
increase the role of the secret services in running the nation's affairs.

"Russia will become an even more presidential republic. The government will
be restricted to a modest role: carrying out economic tasks and not straying

from the political line," the business daily commented.
"Russian liberal economists will be immune from criticism, just like in
Chile
under Pinochet," it added, describing Putin's approach as relying on
"totally
KGB methods of control".

Putin's greatest challenges are crushing inequality, corruption, economic
muddle and habitual political anarchy that has allowed a clutch of shadowy
business tycoons to pull the strings of power.

So far the new Kremlin chief has not set out his economic platform in any
detail.

But the government has already promised sweeping tax cuts next year and
Putin
has vowed to cut the country's swollen bureaucracy, which has grown to 2.7
million, as well as improve the legal climate for foreign investors.

Analysts point to the choice of ultra-liberal Andrei Illarionov as a top
economic adviser to Putin as proof of his intentions.

On the foreign stage, Putin will face his first big test at the beginning of
June when US President Bill Clinton visits Moscow for a summit that will be
dominated by the two countries' dispute over arms control.

Moscow is continuing to threaten to pull out of nuclear disarmament talks
should Washington press ahead with a plan to build an anti-nuclear shield
that would violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

Meanwhile tensions with the West continue to simmer over the brutal Russian
crackdown in breakaway Chechnya, although the war remains popular at home

despite mounting casualties from rebel ambushes.


#3
Moscow Times
May 4, 2000
Inaugurating an Era of Hope and Denial
By Pavel Felgenhauer

On Sunday, Vladimir Putin will be inaugurated as president. No doubt, he
will receive congratulations from world leaders, and not all of them will be just
a curtsy. Putin is a strong leader who can deliver: The ease with which the
long-beleaguered START II arms limitation treaty got through parliament has
made foreign leaders who need something from Moscow flock to meet the new
Kremlin boss.

One of the first to come was Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori. Of
course,
the Japanese have been trying for decades to get back the South Kuril
islands. It is rumored in Moscow that, in the late 1980s, when the
government
of Mikhail Gorbachev was struggling to get Western credit to fill an
increasingly bankrupt Soviet budget, the Japanese received a tentative offer

from Moscow to make a deal on the Kurils - with a price tag that was
reportedly in the tens of billions of dollars.

The cautious Japanese decided to bargain and delay, apparently believing the
sum too extravagant and the offer to buy what they considered rightfully
theirs too straightforward for Japanese business culture.

At the same time, former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl paid on the spot when
the opportunity arose and got a unified Germany without delay. The Japanese
missed a historical opportunity and have been biting their nails ever since.

Gorbachev had the power, the need and the basic inclination to solve the
Kuril problem for good. The next occupant of the Kremlin, Boris Yeltsin, was
constantly bickering with parliament, and was too busy and too
self-indulgent
to deliver anything concrete to anyone who was not an oligarch.
Moscow nevertheless took Japanese aid money, and Yeltsin solemnly promised
to
clinch a peace treaty to formally end World War II before 2000, which would
have solved the Kuril problem to everyone's satisfaction.

But the Kremlin not only did not deliver a "peace treaty" as promised, it
did not even pretend it was trying to deliver.

Today, the Japanese hope they have in Putin a ruler who, like Gorbachev,
needs the money and can make it happen. And the Kremlin seems to have a
propaganda machine set up that is able to sell virtually anything to the
public.

One Western statesmen after another has said after meeting Putin that he is
a
person one can do business with. The present U.S. administration badly wants
to modify the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, so next month U.S.
President Bill Clinton will also be coming to Moscow, hoping for a deal.

Yet Western leaders may find Putin to be a shrewd negotiator, not like the
softhearted Gorbachev. Putin may not deliver either on ABM or on the Kurils.

And there is another problem that Western leaders have largely neglected to
date: Evidence is accruing - gathered by human rights activists, journalists
and diplomats - that increasingly connects Putin's government with
premeditated war crimes and the mass slaughter of civilians in Chechnya.


It is also increasingly evident that Putin is not just some bad guy who has
smitten poor good old Russia with PR tricks. Many Russians have succumbed to
a nationalistic revenge fever, almost as Germans did in the 1930s. More than
60 percent of Russians fully support the brutal campaign in Chechnya despite
growing military personnel casualties. Furthermore, a 1999 poll showed that
31 percent of Russians agreed that "Russia is currently a superpower," while
65 percent said "no." But in a poll conducted last month, 53 percent said
"yes," that Russia is a superpower, while only 43 percent responded "no."

Of course, the nation does not have much today that can truly make it a
superpower. All it can brandish is a crumbling nuclear arsenal and a will to
kill, as demonstrated in Chechnya. But an impotent desire to be a superpower
may make a revisionist, nationalistic Russia an even bigger threat to the
world and to itself than it was in the Soviet period.

A growing gap between aspiration and capability can cause neurotic,
increasingly unstable behavior. In the Soviet era, Moscow did not need to do
anything special to make the world shudder. Today, a growing number of
Russians believe that the world will soon be afraid of us again. But what
happens if the world fails to get agitated?

It seems that Western leaders think they can safely channel resurgent
Russian
nationalistic energy into Chechnya or some other Eurasian backwater by
keeping Putin "engaged" and that lucrative deals may be signed with Moscow
in the meantime.

But what if appeasement doesn't work?

Pavel Felgenhauer, an independent, Moscow-based defense analyst, writes a
weekly column on defense issues for The Moscow Times.

#4
The Russia Journal
May 1-7, 2000
Russia's military learns to go it alone
Putin takes rational approach
By ALEXANDER GOLTS

Unlike the former Soviet Union or the United States, Russia lacks military
allies ­ something that gave former President Boris Yeltsin an inferiority
complex. The CIS leaders took advantage of this, winning concessions from
Yeltsin and making only a purely symbolic show of unity under Moscow's
direction in return.

That time, it seems, has come to an end. Speaking to officers of the Black
Sea fleet, President-elect Vladimir Putin said, "Without the Army and the
Navy, Russia has no allies." This paraphrases a statement ascribed to one of
the Russian tsars: "Russia has only two allies ­ the Army and the Navy."

Putin has made it clear that he knows the real ­ very modest ­ value of
military alliances with any of the former Soviet republics. Putin's choice
to
make his first visits abroad to Belarus, Russia's closest military ally, and

Ukraine, which is consistently scaling back military cooperation with
Moscow, looks like a deliberate plan.

Neither Minsk nor Kiev have understood that times have changed. Just before
Putin's visit, the two countries were busy doing their best to show
continued loyalty to their respective lines. Belarussian President Alexander
Lukashenko
came out with a sensational statement that Moscow and Minsk would soon
create

a 300,000-strong joint group armed with cutting edge weaponry. Lukashenko
said the group would form the first strategic line of defense before NATO's
push to the east.

In Kiev, meanwhile, talk resumed on Ukraine's potential integration into
NATO
structures. U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was in Ukraine just a
day before Putin, and the Ukrainians tried to give her visit symbolic
significance. Ukrainian leaders discussed with pleasure the possibility of
closer relations with NATO and brought up for the umpteenth time supposedly
serious problems linked to the Russian Black Sea fleet's being based in the
Crimea.

Neither Lukashenko's statements nor Kiev's insistent hints have anything to
do with reality. Belarus has an army of 80,000 men, and even adding the
100,000-strong forces of the Moscow military district, the numbers
Lukashenko
wants still aren't there. It's completely unrealistic to imagine that
Russia,
still at war in Chechnya, would spend money on relocating additional troops
to ward off a mythical threat. Especially not when this would also mean
having to develop smooth-running single command and operations management
and holding maneuvers for which neither Russia nor Belarus has the money.

Putin made clear what's what in Minsk when he said that any joint projects,
including military projects, are impossible when the two countries have such
differing economic systems. After this, Lukashenko's statements about secret
and highly important agreements look like no more than an attempt to save
face.

All the more so as when Putin returned to Moscow, he definitively buried
Lukashenko's idea, saying that there would be no joint command. Russian
troops would obey Moscow, Belarussian troops would answer to Minsk. As for
joint operations, Putin said they could be required only "in circumstances
which, we hope, will never come about."

Ukraine's hints at military integration with NATO likewise had little
practical significance. Putin realizes that Kiev's NATO blackmail has no
more
weight behind it than Minsk's readiness for joint operations. Bringing the
Ukrainian army up to NATO standards would require spending the equivalent of
the entire Ukrainian budget as well as making considerable changes to the
way the country is governed.

What are referred to as the "problems of the Black Sea fleet" are not
significant, having mostly to do with obstacles created by the Ukrainian
authorities in replacing military technology, pensions for retired
servicemen
living in Sevastopol and attempts to artificially raise utilities prices.
The Black Sea fleet itself plays a key role in Ukraine's security.

Belarus and Ukraine are both Russia's debtors, are unable to pay for their
energy supplies and are each in their way trying to play on Moscow's mostly
irrational fear of NATO expansion. But the moment Putin raised the serious
issues of economic relations, all the military castles in the air just fell
apart.

The discussion on Ukraine's Russian gas debts was so tough that Ukraine's
President Leonid Kuchma did not even give Putin a chance to answer the
question of the Black Sea fleet's debts, hastening to say that "The Black

Sea fleet's debts to Sevastopol are not comparable to Ukraine's debts to
Russia."

Putin has taken a rational approach to military issues. He said that "we will
protest if NATO moves towards our borders," but keeps this protest free of
hysteria and exaggeration. No sooner did NATO stop seeing Moscow as a source
of evil, than Russian military policy began to look more rational.

Back to the top



#5
Havel: Chechnya Should Hold Referendum on its Future 
Prague CTK in English
April 28, 2000

SZEKESFEHERVAR, Hungary, April 28 (CTK) - Central
European presidents have not yet found a reliable recipe for peaceful
coexistence at their summit today, but President Vaclav Havel said that
one of steps towards the coexistence was for each nation to determine its
own identity.
    He said that Russia did not sufficiently realise its own identity and
therefore denied Chechnya inhabitants the opportunity to make a free
decision on their country.
    "Russia must realise where it begins and where it ends" and take into
consideration that Chechnya is a nation with different traditions,
history and religion, Havel told Czech journalists after the summit.
    "In a democratic environment it would be appropriate to ask the
nation whether or not it wants to be part of the empire.   But no
referendum has been held there, but only a hard military was attack was
launched which targeted not only terrorists, but the whole nation," Havel
said.
    "To me this reflects an insufficient awareness of one's own
identity," he added.
    This, Havel said, is also proved by Russia's unclear stands on NATO
enlargement.   "Russia...should seek partnership relations with the
others, particularly with the alliance," Havel said.
    During his visit to Slovenia on Thursday, Havel said that much would
depend on what attitude the international community would take to new
Russian President Vladimir Putin right at the beginning of his
presidential era which, he said, might last for decades.
    Havel said today that he did not like the lax attitude of some states
to preventative security policy.
    "The presence of observer missions should be stronger in Montenegro
where there is a potential danger," Havel said.
    The 7th summit is attended by the presidents of 11 states while
Italian President Carlo Anzeglio Ciampi has excused himself as
negotiations on the formation of a new government are underway in Italy. 
The attending presidents represent Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech
Republic, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia
and Ukraine.
    The informal meetings of central European presidents were initiated
by Havel.   The first took place in Litomysl, east Bohemia, in 1994.
 

Back to the top



#6
In These Times
May 15, 2000
Wasted
By Jeffrey St. Clair

Back in October, In These Times reported on a scheme hatched by the Russian
nuclear agency to import spent nuclear waste from commercial reactors in
Europe and Japan for storage in the Russian outback (see "Hot Property, Cold

Cash," October 17). This story finally has grabbed the attention of the
national press. On April 12, the Boston Globe reported that Russian Minister

of Atomic Energy Yevgeny Adamov is proceeding with plans to import 20,000
tons of radioactive waste for storage and eventual recycling at the Mayak
nuclear facility in the Ural Mountains.

Adamov boasted that the deal would generate more than $21 billion over the
next 10 years, a figure nearly equal to the Russia's entire 1999 budget.
"The
deal is extremely beneficial for the ministry," Adamov said, "and we are
intending to carry it out."

The main stumbling block is a 1992 law passed by the Duma that prohibits
Adamov's agency from importing nuclear waste from countries outside the
former Eastern Bloc. But Adamov claims to have the blessing of new Russian
President Vladimir Putin and, according to Russian greens, has vowed to
overturn the ban in the upcoming legislative session. Last year, Adamov was
accused of offering Russian legislators a variety of bribes for their votes,
including cash, trips to France and prostitutes.

Adamov never enjoyed a particularly close relationship with the Yeltsin
government's inner circle. But he and Putin have been close since the
president's days in the KGB. Russian greens rightly fear that the
Putin/Adamov alliance will prove dangerous to both the environment and
environmentalists.

Under Putin, the FSB - the KGB's successor - has interrogated and locked up
several anti-nuclear organizers on trumped-up drug charges, or the absurd
pretext that they are aligned with Chechen separatists. And Putin's state
prosecutors have continued to harass Alexander Nikitin, the nuclear
whistleblower acquitted of violating Russian secrecy laws in December. The
new crackdowns have given a chilling context to Putin's vow to lead the
country through "the dictatorship of law."

Jeffrey St. Clair is a contributing editor of In These Times.
 
#7
Novye Izvestia
April 29, 2000
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
AMERICA AND WE HAVE MORE SIMILARITIES
THAN DIFFERENCES IN OUR VIEWS, IVANOV
         Foreign Minister Igor IVANOV Was Interviewed  in
Washington by Novye Izvestia's Yuri SIGOV

     Question: Before you came to the US the American mass
media actively criticized Russia for its Chechen policy. Did
American officials raise this question during talks with you?
     Answer: This may surprise you but we practically did not
discuss Chechnya at all. Neither President Bill Clinton nor US
Senators asked me any questions about it. Though they signed an
appeal on Chechnya, we did not broach on this issue during our
conversations. I think this is largely the result of the
explanations made by the Russian side. In addition, the
campaign of misinformation conduced by Chechen patrons in the
territory of the US has proved to be ineffective. I think the
campaign per se is clearly dying out.
    
     Question: What was the American reaction to the adoption
of the anti-Russian resolution in Geneva, which accuses our
country of human rights breaches in Chechnya?
     Answer:  I think that those who voted for that resolution
did not read it at all. I emphasized precisely this in my
conversations with American colleagues. The resolution talks of

the "parties to the conflict," thereby actually equating
Russia's federal forces and bandits and terrorists. This means
that the conflict with Basque separatists in Spain and the
Northern Ireland problem in Britain can be regarded at the same
level.
Those nations, which signed a resolution of condemnation of
Russia, have thereby created an extremely dangerous precedent
in international relations. As I see it, though Americans have
voted for that resolution they will realize the danger
emanating from its text and the criticisms they trained on
Russia when they closely scrutinize it.
    
     Question: Your American colleagues must have asked you
about President-elect Vladimir Putin. How has their attitude to
Putin changed since he has been elected President?
     Answer: Americans practically did not ask me any questions
about Putin as a person. I suppose more than enough information
about him became available before my arrival in New York. By
the way, at the disarmament session, which the UN
Secretary-General opened, Russia was more than once commended
for the ratification of the START II Treaty. It is largely
thanks to Putin that the treaty, which was in a state of
suspense for so many years, has finally been ratified. This
became a serious step towards convincing the West and America
that it is possible to do serious business with Russia. So, I
think Putin introduced himself to America, and it now knows him
sufficiently well.
    
     Question: The ABM Treaty was the main stumbling block at
your negotiations in Washington. Have you succeeded in getting
the US position less tough to any degree?
     Answer: Yes, Americans demand a substantial revision of
the 1972 ABM Treaty. As you know, within the framework of
preparations for the deployment of their own ABM system the
last missile launching is to be made during President Clinton's
visit to Moscow in June. I want to remind you that it is not
the first serious conflict in connection with the ABM Treaty
since its adoption. I do not think that the desire to amend it
is prompted by any real threats to America from anyone. It is
connected with the interests of the US military-industrial
complex. We for our part are carrying out active work to
explain the danger of such a course. We do not say No to
Americans but offer a real alternative to the deployment of
such a system. It is important that they do not flatly reject
our arguments; they take them seriously and listen to them. It
goes without saying that it is a very complicated and
principled issue. However, I want to emphasize that the game
has not been lost, and we naturally want the best scenario to
gain the upper hand eventually.
    
     Question: What if President Clinton signs the law on the
deployment of a national ABM system before his term expires?
How would Russia be able to meet such a challenge then?
     Answer: I want to recall that we have adopted a law,
according to which we will not feel bound by START I, START II
and other arms control agreements, if the 1972 ABM Treaty is
violated. Where would this lead? Naturally, this would lead to
a growing arms race and other rather unpleasant consequences.
This is unquestionably a very bad course of developments but we
are ready for it.
    
     Question: Heated debates are on concerning the
reorganization of the UN and the increase of the number of its
Security Council members. What is the position of Russia on
this question and will Moscow be for the preservation of the
veto right in this organization?
     Anwer: I think a reform of the UN is quite timely. But
there should not be reforms for the sake of reforms. The idea
is to improve the efficiency of this organization. If its
Security Council has many members, it will have great
difficulties in adopting operative decisions. It is proposed to
increase the number of its members to 21. I think this will be
quite enough.
Germany and Japan are obvious candidates. We think that one
representative from Asia, one from Africa and one from Latin
America must be added. But regardless of the expansion of the
Security Council's membership, the veto right should be
preserved.
    
     Question: When in Washington you met with Republican
candidate George Bush Jr. What have you discussed with the man
who can become America's next President?
     Answer: During our meeting and talking with journalists
later the Governor of Texas came out for the relations of
partnership between our two countries. He realizes very well
that a great deal depends on US-Russia relations in today's
world. He also said that Russia should be a strong and
prospering nation and that both Russia and America would stand
to gain by this. It is difficult for me to predict what policy
he will conduct if he becomes the President. As for now, as an
American citizen and as the governor of a large state he
clearly understands the need to maintain good partnership
relations with Russia.
    
     Question: Has President Clinton told you which questions
he is going to discuss with Putin during their summit meeting
in Moscow in June?
     Answer: I suppose the START-ABM problems will be the most
important questions of their conversations. It is natural that
experts will continue preparations for this summit. While in
the US, we have already explained Americans in detail our
position on and possible consequences of the deployment of the
US national ABM system. This will be undoubtedly the key issue.
Clinton also made it clear that during the time, which is left
to the summit, he would actively stimulate American companies
to return to the Russian market and continue working there. The
two presidents will also discuss problems of international
terrorism and a whole package of bilateral ties. By and large,
the Moscow summit will be very important, and the future of our
bilateral relations will largely depend on its results.
    
     Question: Americans believe, nonetheless, that the
question on the deployment of their national ABM system has
practically been decided. Suppose President Clinton comes to
Moscow and confronts it by the fact that the 1972 ABM Treaty is
being already violated, what real possibilities might Russia

have to change such a situation?
     Answer: I want to stress again that we are not going to
sit on our hands and wait. It goes without saying that we will
fight.
And I absolutely disagree with some media, which claim that
Washington is trying to entrap Moscow. You must not think that
we do not realize what is happening around us. Professionals
conduct negotiations with Americans on our side, and even if we
have only one chance out of a hundred, we will fight one,
trying to persuade Americans that our position is correct. When
some say:
what can we use except a dialogue, I answer: right now we are
fighting by political methods. If the US adopts its ABM
program, Russia will resort to other, non-political, methods.
We have the means and the possibilities for this, and Americans
know it.

Back to the top



#8
Poll: Russians Divided on START-2 

MOSCOW.   April 28 (Interfax) - A clear majority
of Russians, 70%, are aware of the START II ratification by the State
Duma.   This figure was derived from a national poll of 1,500 Russians
conducted by the Public Opinion survey fund immediately after the
ratification, on April 15.   The results of the poll were made public on
Friday.

    According to the survey, the respondents' opinions were divided as
regards the question whether the coming of START II into force would be
advantageous for Russia or not.   Nearly a third of Russians, or 32%,
take the view that the ratification of the document will do Russia good,
while 29% hold the opposite position.   However, the largest part of the
respondents, or 39%, were undecided.

    At the same time, the respondents were quite clearly aware of famous
Russian politicians' positions towards START II ratification, which
became evident from the answers to two questions about the supporters and
opponents of the ratification.

    In the respondents' view, the ratification was first of all approved
of by Russian President-elect Vladimir Putin (30%), Liberal Democratic
Party of Russia (LDPR) leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Yabloko leader
Grigory Yavlinsky (14% each), while Russian Communist Party leader
Gennady Zyuganov was virtually the only opponent of the ratification
(40%).

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#9
U.S./Russia: Arms Talks Face Tough Challenges
By Frank T. Csongos

U.S. President Bill Clinton is scheduled to hold a summit with Russian
leader
Vladimir Putin in Moscow on June 4-5. The top issue is expected to be
nuclear
arms. The U.S. is seeking to amend a nearly three-decade old treaty that
prohibits both sides from building a shield to intercept nuclear
missiles.... It
also seeks to further cut nuclear weapons. But there are key disagreements
on
several fronts. RFE/RL's Senior Correspondent Frank T. Csongos looks at the
issues.

Washington, 3 May 2000 (RFE/RL) -- U.S. and Russian officials are exploring
ways to further limit nuclear weapons, while at the same time leaving the
door open to deal with potential threats from third countries.

The discussions have centered on the Cold War-era Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty that forbids both sides from building defenses aimed at
shooting

down incoming rockets. The idea behind the ABM treaty was to make a nuclear

war unthinkable in light of the fact that each side had thousands of
warheads at its disposal.

But with the collapse of the Soviet Union a decade ago and the emergence of
new potential nuclear powers, the U.S. now argues that today's realities
mandate different approaches. Earlier this year, the U.S. presented Russia a
proposed draft agreement that would allow the United States to deploy a
limited missile defense system.

The U.S. says it needs to protect itself against the threat of attacks from
the so-called rouge nations of North Korea, Iraq, Iran and Libya.
A summary of the U.S. Administration arguments given to Russian officials
says the U.S. national defense system would be limited and intended to
defend
against only a small number of missiles. It said the proposed shield would
be
incapable of threatening Russia's strategic nuclear deterrence, which still
commands thousands of warheads and the means to launch them.

White House spokesman Joe Lockhart said Monday the Russians have nothing to
fear from a U.S. missile shield.
"We've made a public argument and a private argument that this limited
national missile defense does not pose a strategic threat to the Russians
and
it is designed to counteract an increasing threat from rogue nations."

Lockhart also said that the U.S. considers its strategic relations with
Russia pivotal and seeks further nuclear cuts.

"It is our policy to not only make sure that we're doing everything we can
to
develop solid relations with the Russian government; it's also our policy
and
our arms control strategic goal to reduce the number of missiles that the
Russian government has."

Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, who held talks in Washington last week
with U.S. President Bill Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright,
said Moscow is opposed to amending the 1972 ABM treaty. President Clinton is
expected to focus on arms reduction issues during a planned summit in Moscow
next month with recently elected Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Last month, the Russian state Duma ratified after a long delay the START II
treaty that cuts nuclear weapons on both sides. But Russian lawmakers made
ratification conditioned on the U.S. abandoning plans to build a limited
anti-ballistic missile system. The U.S. Senate already has ratified the
START
2 treaty without conditions.

Several members of the U.S. Congress met on Tuesday in Washington with a
visiting Duma delegation. They expressed concern about the Duma's
conditioning its ratification.

Congressman Doug Bereuter, a Republican from Nebraska and a member of the
House International Relations Committee, summed up Congressional feelings
this way.

"In my view not only does such linkage put a dire risk to the implementation
of the Start II treaty but it also calls into question the prospects for any
further nuclear weapons reduction."

Republican Senator Jesse Helms, the chairman of Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, said last week that the Senate will not ratify any arms treaty
with Russia during Clinton's remaining term in office that ends in January.

Treaties must be ratified by the Senate in order for them to go into effect.

Helms summed up his views this way in remarks last week on the Senate floor:
"With all due respect, I do not intend to allow this president to establish
his legacy by binding the next generation of Americans to a future without a
viable national missile defense."

Helms said Clinton is trying to lock the U.S. into a system that cannot
defend the American people.

"For nearly eight years, while North Korea and Iran raced forward with their
nuclear programs, and while China stole the most advanced nuclear secrets of
the United States, and while Iraq escaped international inspections,
President Clinton did everything in his power to stand in the way of
deploying a national missile defense."

The Heritage Foundation, a conservative U.S. think tank, said in a recent
study that Clinton should go ahead as rapidly as possible with the
anti-missile defense system. Heritage research fellow Baker Spring said the
technology already exists to begin deploying it.

A Congressional Budget Office study estimates that the total price tag, over
15 years, for the Clinton administration's limited ground-based missile
defense system could be $60 billion.

Presumed Republican presidential nominee George W. Bush, who also met with
Ivanov in Washington, says he favors development of a U.S. defense system to
protect Americans and their allies "against a rogue missile launch, against
any missile launch. It's part of redefining a post Cold War era."

Bush said he made it clear to Ivanov that if elected president his first and
foremost priority would be to keep the peace between the two countries.


#10
Program on New Approaches to Russian Security (PONARS)
Harvard University
Policy Memo Series
Memo No. 143

Explaining the International Community's Response to the War in Chechnya
By  Sarah E. Mendelson
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
April 2000

In between his night at the opera with Tony Blair and his tea with Queen
Elizabeth, Vladimir Putin refused to see Mary Robinson, the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights, when she was in Russia in April. That Putin
was able to snub a representative of the UN investigating war crimes but
then
was embraced (literally) by Western statesmen and royalty is one of many
reminders that this war is not front and center for policymakers dealing
with Russia.
 
Why is this the case? Most Westerners believe that the war in Chechnya,
however horrible, is an internal matter and should not interfere with or at
least not influence the West's relations with Russia. Many add that given
Russia's nuclear weapons, what could the West do anyway? NATO is hardly
ready
to rush in. Yet the international community does sometimes interpret human
rights abuses as worthy of decisive response, and there are many options
available to states and international organizations short of using force. So
why the comparatively muted response to Chechnya? I argue that few of the
conditions necessary to stop human rights abuses have yet been created.
 

Russian Spin

Certainly one influence on how the war is perceived inside and outside
Russia
is the fact that the Russian government has done a masterful job of
controlling the media, a lesson policymakers learned from the last war in
Chechnya. The Russians packaging this war for the media are the same ones
who
fashioned the brilliant re-election campaign of Boris Yeltsin in 1996
(remember: this was a candidate who polled in the single digits six months
before the election and who won reelection while secretly in the throws of a
heart attack). These people now run Rosinformattsentr, the one-stop-shop
where you can get all you need to know about the "anti-terrorist" operation
in Chechnya.
 
To achieve this media control, the Russian government is doing what all
states do: control public access to the battle zone. Such control, in
theory,
should ensure that the West believes what the Putin government wants it to
believe about Chechnya.
 
However, abundant and consistent testimony gathered by organizations such as

Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Physicians for Human Rights, the
Russian group "Memorial," the French groups "Doctors of the World" and the
Nobel Peace Prize Winner "Doctors Without Borders," indicates that something

else is going on. Testimony points to systematic and indiscriminate use of
force against both civilians and those who care for the wounded. Evidence
suggests that Russia is in violation of the Geneva Convention and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
 
Among the most powerful pieces of evidence is a survey done by Physicians for
Human Rights (PHR). This organization recently interviewed 1140 refugees from
Chechnya who were displaced by the war to Ingushetia. Compared with a similar
one they did in Macedonia with Kosovar Albanians in the summer of 1999, the
PHR survey suggests that the level of violence committed in Chechnya by
Russian Federal Forces against the civilian population is quantitatively
greater (with as many as four times the number of civilians killed) than in
Kosovo--a situation which roused the international community to action.
 
A few Western journalists have also witnessed the nature of the violence.
French journalist Anne Nivat--who had been in Chechnya for much of this
latest war until she was escorted out by the FSB in the middle of
February--painted for me a particularly vivid picture of a Russian
bombardment that she experienced on February 1 from 11:30 a.m. until 5:15
p.m. in Alkhan-Kala (which was said at the time to be controlled by Russian
forces). Her account is very similar to those gathered by Western
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) detailing bombardments in late
January-early February in places such as Katyr-Yurt and Aldi. Nivat
considered it a miracle that she had lived through it. Not a house was left
standing.
 
Lessons Learned

So, if violations have been documented, and the international community
responded recently when presented with a smaller degree of violence, why
isn't more being done about Chechnya? The reasons for this are numerous and
complex.

First, the victims have no clear face in the West. The plight of the
civilian
population in Chechnya blurs for most people with the violence of the
rebels.
Put simply, the Chechens have a PR problem. For the most part, they have a
terrible image in the West, and they have done little to change it. To the
outside, the government of Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov tolerated
kidnapping and lawless-ness. The videos that the Russians show on TV (and
have been seen in the West) reveal Chechen rebels executing and even
decapitating victims, many of them Russian troops.
 
Then there is the human rights community inside Russia. Anyone who has been
involved with Russian political and social activists--as I have both as a
practitioner and a scholar for the last six years--knows well how
disorganized they can be. What is really striking is how, in contrast to the

PR machine that runs the Kremlin, these groups are not even sure what a
"media strategy" is, let alone have one that they are trying to
implement....
 
One must hasten to add that even if Russian NGOs mounted a media campaign,
they need a media to which they can gain access. Placing stories is
expensive
according to all reports. Many journalists are reluctant to cover stories
for
free, especially if they contradict the Kremlin line. Add to this the fact
that many Russian journalists have been frightened by the treatment of
Andrei
Babitsky, the reporter for Radio Liberty who was beaten and called a traitor
by Putin for his critical reporting of the war in Chechnya. The Kremlin's PR
machine has convinced many Russians that Babitsky was in collusion with the
rebels, and deserved the torture he experienced in Chernokozovo, a
"filtration camp" in Chechnya.
 
Western NGOs are experiencing constraints as well in mobilizing a campaign
against the abuses in Chechnya. These groups are so busy documenting
atrocities that there is little time or money to mount a campaign to stop the
war--though it is unclear that they even see this as part of their mandate.
Make no mistake; they have proof of crimes committed against civilians that
need to be investigated. They have lots of evidence of Russian
non-compliance
with international norms and humanitarian laws. But they have yet to link up
with the human rights community inside Russia on these issues. And they have
yet to circulate this information in a compelling, coordinated way to
international organizations and states that do have the power to put
pressure on the Russian government to investigate the allegations of atrocities.
 
An unfortunate example of not getting information out in a timely way
occurred recently. Physicians for Human Rights should have had their powerful
survey on the desks of the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) in Geneva in
April as the Commission debated a response to the war. While the UNCHR did
pass a resolution (25 in favor, 7 opposed and 19 abstentions) calling for a
national investigation into abuses, the resolution might have been more
strongly worded with more states in favor if members of the Commission had
received the information from PHR.

 
The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, is also responsible
for how this resolution was worded and its vote. After all, the vote followed
her visit to Russia. There, she was prevented from seeing what she wanted to
see, and Putin refused to meet with her. But instead of insisting in strong,
clear language on the need for an international and a national independent
commission to investigate human rights abuses, she mumbled something about
the need for an investigation (for how could she not). According to human
rights groups around the world, and most importantly inside Russia, she
dropped the ball: without an international commission working along side a
national one, few think a national review will be independent of the Russian
state.
 
The UNCHR is joined by NATO in sending contradictory messages to the
Russians. As more and more evidence of atrocities and filtration camps in
Chechnya surface, one realizes that NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson's
rapprochement with Putin in February occurred during some of the worst
moments of the war.
 
I learned in a series of meetings with NATO officials that they grow weary
when they are told that evidence from Chechnya suggests a situation more
gruesome than the one that prompted them to respond with force in Kosovo. "We
need to have good relations with the Russians," they plead. I argued that
they need to make every encounter count. As is, NATO engagement with Russia
appears permissive of non-compliance with international laws and not just in
Chechnya. NATO sends mixed signals to the Russians on many different levels.

For example, NATO consistently categorizes the interaction of NATO troops
with Russians serving in Bosnia as a success. Yet many human rights groups
have evidence that Russian SFOR troops in Bosnia are trafficking in women
from Eastern Europe. For the most part, NATO officials in Brussels and in
Bosnia do not deny that trafficking occurs, but most shrug their shoulders
over what to do about it. One high ranking military official even took a
"boys will be boys" attitude.
 
Of course a different response is possible: several years ago, when
confronted with Russian troops trafficking in Eastern Slovonia, Croatia,
Jacques Paul Klein, now the UN Mission head in Bosnia, flew to Moscow and
threatened to make this story public unless the Russian General Staff
disciplined its soldiers. The Russian military responded immediately by
replacing their troops. The trafficking stopped, and the Russians were
instrumental in catching an individual indicted for war crimes.
 
In terms of abuses in Chechnya, the problem is not that international
organizations are doing nothing. The problem is that the response is
inconsistent and uneven. While NATO pursues a business as usual approach,
and
the UNCHR issues a resolution guaranteed to make no one happy, the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) suspended Russia's
voting rights. Although in May PACE will take up the matter of Russia's
expulsion from the Council, most observers think this slap on the wrist is
the end of the matter.

 
Conclusion

To date, several important ingredients necessary for stopping human rights
abuses are absent in the case of Chechnya. The victims are difficult to
distinguish from the villains. From studies on other human rights campaigns
around the world, from Chile and Argentina to China and Burma, the presence
of an organized domestic NGO community is necessary and must be linked up
with the transnational NGO community. In Russia, the NGO community is
fractured and disorganized. Scholars who have studied the abolition movement
in the United States, the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, and other
human rights campaigns tend to agree that states generally follow civil
society in condemning these situations. States, international organizations,
and specifically decision-makers tend to respond to pressure from civil
society--from NGOs, both local and transnational. This is not to say it is
all the responsibility of civil society to stop abuses; states have the
ultimate power to do this. But in this case, the absence of coordinated
strategies from NGOs both in Russia and the West and inconsistent responses
from the international community have done little to effect change in Russia
on this issue.
 
It is worth thinking about the lessons Russians are likely to take away from
this second war in Chechnya. Surely, one is that the use of force against its
own civilian population actually costs them very little in their dealings
with the international community. For those inside and outside Russia that
have a stake in Russia developing as a democracy, that is a tragedy.

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