 |
|
|
|
|
|
| Iraq Constitutional Referendum |
|
October 18, 2005 |
 |
|
| With counting still underway, delayed in part by a massive sandstorm, early returns point toward sufficient numbers of Iraqi voters having cast ballots in favor of Iraq’s draft permanent constitution to assure a majority of votes in favor of its passage. Formation of an indigenously created and ratified constitution is a cornerstone of democratic rule of law and self-determination. Moreover, law and security go hand-in-hand, with each needing to contribute to the other. It will be important to observe how scrupulously Iraq’s new government respects rule of law. Just as important will be how vigorously and effectively the Iraqi government and its security forces can expand an indigenous capacity to quell violence, and establish and maintain peace and security. The ability of the United States and its partners to turn over greater control of Iraq to the fledgling Iraqi government depends on both ... |
| |
Treatment of Iraqi Detainees by Iraqi Security Forces
During U.S. Occupation |
|
January 31, 2005 |
|
|
| One of the primary responsibilities of the newly elected Iraqi national assembly will be to draft a permanent constitution. Of special importance will be the promotion of human rights and the crafting of adequate safeguards and enforcement mechanisms, especially given allegations of human rights violations by security forces under the interim Iraqi government during U.S. occupation. The interim Iraqi constitution, continuing in force during the period of transition, includes provisions promoting human rights and making it possible to prosecute government agents. However, the interim Iraqi government and U.S. occupiers have failed to implement a major provision of the interim Iraqi constitution to provide for a national human rights commission with independence and authority to take up allegations of human rights violations. |
| |
| Iraq Prisoner Abuse and the Geneva Conventions |
|
July 30, 2004 |
|
|
| Precise causes and motivations behind the Abu Ghraib atrocities still are unclear. The unlikelihood that torture or other abuses can secure accurate intelligence, assuming a detainee possesses useful information to begin with, perhaps adds a further air of incompetence to the legal, moral, and strategic fiascoes — e.g., the rank illegality, disrespect for human rights, dishonor to the uniform, sabotage of good will, inflaming of adversaries, and dangers of reciprocal reprisals. With investigations still underway and many facts yet to be uncovered, also unclear is how far accountability can and should reach. |
| |
|
|
|
|
|
