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Bruce Blair's Nuclear Column
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"A Rebuttal of the U.S. Statement on the Alert Status of U.S. Nuclear Forces"
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| November 6, 2007 |
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| Bruce Blair comments on a statement by Christina Rocca, permanent U.S. representative to the UN Conference on Disarmament, during the general debate of the First Committee on Oct. 9, 2007. He points to an overwhelming body of evidence and knowledge that contradict the statement's assertions about the alert posture of the U.S. nuclear forces. |
Author(s):
Bruce Blair
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“The Return of the Doomsday Machine?”
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| September 5, 2007 |
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| It turns out that Dr. Strangelove isn’t a strange fantasy after all. Read a recent Slate.com article that discusses the reality of a “doomsday device” – possibly still in place – to automatically launch Russian nuclear missiles in response to a perceived U.S. attack. The article also highlights the World Security Institute’s efforts to convince the U.S. and Russian governments to de-alert their arsenals and take new steps to thwart nuclear disaster.
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WSI President Bruce Blair Addresses Chautauqua Institute on Nuclear Dangers
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| September 27, 2006 |
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| On June 29, 2006, World Security Institute President Bruce Blair addressed the Chautauqua Institute on the subject of nuclear proliferation and the continuing danger presented by the current nuclear force posture of the United States and Russia. Blair emphasized the fact that American and Russian nuclear forces are kept on hair-trigger alert, ready to be launched at a few minutes’ notice, and vulnerable to accidents, sabotage, or misunderstanding. |
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Author(s):
Bruce Blair
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Iran and the Rogues: America’s Nuclear Obsession
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| September 19, 2005 |
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| Bruce Blair examines the reemergence of nuclear weapons in the national security debate. "Nukes are seen assuming newfound significance as the rogue states Iran and North Korea move closer to acquiring them, and as the United States looks to its own nuclear arsenal for a solution."
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Author(s):
Bruce Blair
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The Wrong Deterrence: The Threat of Loose Nukes Is One of Our Own Making
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| September 19, 2004 |
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| In his Washington Post op-ed Bruce G. Blair, Ph.D, CDI President and former ICBM launch control officer, comments that while nuclear terrorism is still only a specter and not a reality, Russia's recent wave of bloodshed underscores the urgency of preventing terrorists capable of indiscriminate slaughter from acquiring nuclear bombs. The current deterrent practices of the two nuclear superpowers, however, are not only anachronistic, they thwart our ability to protect ourselves against the real threats. |
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Author(s):
Bruce Blair
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The Logic of Intelligence Failure
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| April 1, 2004 |
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| In his article in the April 2004 edition of the American Physical Society's Forum on Physics and Society, Bruce G. Blair, Ph.D, CDI President, examines intelligence assessments in the context of Iraqi WMD, terrorism, and nuclear war. |
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Author(s):
Bruce Blair
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Keeping Presidents in the Nuclear Dark
Episode #2: The SIOP Option that Wasn’t)
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| February 16, 2004 |
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| ... the president’s supporting command system is not actually geared to withhold retaliation in the event of enemy missile attack, real or apparent. It is so greased for the rapid release of U.S. missiles forces by the thousands upon the receipt of attack indications from early warning satellites and ground radar that the president’s options are not all created equal. The bias in favor of launch on electronic warning is so powerful that it would take enormously more presidential will to withhold an attack than to authorize it. The option to “ride out” the onslaught and then take stock of the proper course of action exists only on paper. That is what presidents never learn during their tenures. Their real control is illusory. What’s more, the truth has been kept from the presidents intentionally. From Bruce G. Blair, Ph.D, CDI President and former ICBM launch control officer. |
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Author(s):
Bruce Blair
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Keeping Presidents in the Nuclear Dark
(Episode #1: The Case of the Missing “Permissive Action Links”)
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| February 11, 2004 |
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| ... What I then told McNamara about his vitally important [ICBM] locks elicited this response: “I am shocked, absolutely shocked and outraged. Who the h--- authorized that?” What he had just learned from me was that the locks had been installed, but everyone knew the combination.... SAC remained far less concerned about unauthorized launches than about the potential of these safeguards to interfere with the implementation of wartime launch orders. And so the “secret unlock code” during the height of the nuclear crises of the Cold War remained constant at 00000000. (includes a reprint of the 1977 Journal of Conflict Resolution article "The Terrorist Threat to World Nuclear Programs" by Bruce Blair, current CDI President, and Garry D. Brewer.)
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Author(s):
Bruce Blair
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Rogue States: Nuclear Red Herrings
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| December 5, 2003 |
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| Bruce G. Blair, Ph.D., CDI President and former U.S. Air Force ICBM launch control officer, examines the persistence of Cold War-era thinking in U.S. nuclear policy and planning, arguing that the thousands of U.S. and Russian launch-ready weapons only represent an accident waiting to happen and a temptation to terrorists to gain control over them. Large arsenals on hair-trigger alert are not needed to deter a nuclear war between the United States and Russia, nor do they deter terrorists or provide a useful tool in fighting them. |
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Author(s):
Bruce Blair
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We Keep Building Nukes For All the Wrong Reasons
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| May 27, 2003 |
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| Dr. Bruce G. Blair, CDI President and former ICBM launch control officer, examines U.S. nuclear policy and asks: what is the real driving force behind the administration's chase for bunker busters and mini-nukes? |
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