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Site Last Modified: October 18, 2005
In March 2003, the U.S.-led coalition invaded Iraq to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein. The declared reason for Operation Iraqi Freedom was the disarmament of the Iraqi dictator, who was accused of developing and concealing weapons of mass destruction in violation of UN resolutions and despite ongoing UN weapons inspections. Less than a month later, the Saddam’s Ba’athist regime was no more, the Iraqi Army had virtually disintegrated, and American forces occupied Baghdad. On May 2, 2003, U.S. President George W. Bush declared an end to major combat operations in Iraq.
Since then, little has gone according to plan. Occupation forces seemed unwilling or incapable of stopping the widespread lawlessness that would, over the course of the following year, merge with a broader anti-occupation insurgency. By late 2004, over 1,000 American troops had been killed in Iraq, along with an untold number of Iraqi civilians. Some areas of the country remain outside the control of coalition forces or the tenuous Iraqi interim government. Aid and contract workers have been abducted and/or killed on a regular basis. Little progress toward Iraq’s reconstruction has been made. On Oct. 7, 2004, the U.S. chief weapons inspector reported that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction, and little capacity to develop them.
Eye on Iraq, the Center for Defense Information’s on-line forum, is designed to provide timely coverage of unfolding events in Iraq and the factors that will shape the future. Ongoing contributions to Eye on Iraq will include factual briefings on the political and military forces at play in Iraq as well as analytical pieces focused on military, diplomatic, and international security developments.
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Treatment of Iraqi Detainees by Iraqi Security Forces
During U.S. Occupation
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January 31, 2005 |
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| One of the primary responsibilities of the newly elected Iraqi national assembly will be to draft a permanent constitution. Of special importance will be the promotion of human rights and the crafting of adequate safeguards and enforcement mechanisms, especially given allegations of human rights violations by security forces under the interim Iraqi government during U.S. occupation. The interim Iraqi constitution, continuing in force during the period of transition, includes provisions promoting human rights and making it possible to prosecute government agents. However, the interim Iraqi government and U.S. occupiers have failed to implement a major provision of the interim Iraqi constitution to provide for a national human rights commission with independence and authority to take up allegations of human rights violations. |
| Author(s):
Steven C. Welsh
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Law Watch
Abu Ghraib Court Martial: "Ring Leader" Spc. Charles A. Graner, Jr., Sentenced to Ten Years
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January 25, 2005 |
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| Spc. Charles A. Graner, Jr., on Jan. 14, 2005, became the fifth U.S. soldier convicted for Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse, all of them reservists. Graner, a prison guard in civilian life, was convicted at a general court martial for maltreatment of persons subject to his orders, conspiracy, assault, indecent acts and dereliction of duty. Graner's trial did not offer much in the way of a "bird's-eye view" of the standards and practices of U.S. detainee operations since Sept. 11, but arguably did represent an assertion of standards of military justice more stringent than those raised in the past by politically appointed administration lawyers. |
| Author(s):
Steven C. Welsh
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Iraq Reconstruction Update #5: Retaking Fallujah
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December 14, 2004 |
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| Even as coalition authorities and the Iraqi interim government began to consider preparations for elections to be held in 2005, 20-30 towns in northeastern Iraq remained outside of coalition control. In an effort to pacify these predominantly Sunni areas, coalition officials devised a plan to retake key towns, and, it was hoped, strike at the heart of the insurgency. As a centerpiece to this plan, on Nov. 8, 2004, U.S. Marine and Army units, complemented by some Iraqi troops, embarked on Operation Phantom Fury, the retaking of the town of Fallujah. |
| Author(s):
Michael Donovan, Ph.D
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Law Watch -- Abu Ghraib
Military Intelligence Spc. Armin J. Cruz Convicted over Abu Ghraib Abuse
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September 15, 2004 |
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| A second U.S. soldier has pled guilty and been convicted for detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad, the first from military intelligence. Clearly a number of overriding questions remain regarding Abu Ghraib and ongoing detention operations. |
| Author(s):
Steven C. Welsh
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Policy Watch -- U.S. Presidential Election 2004
Analysis of John Kerry Acceptance Speech, Democratic National Convention
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July 30, 2004 |
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| Analysis of Presidential nominee John Kerry statements relating to security policy, including U.S. Iraq policy, at the 2004 Democratic National Convention. |
| Author(s):
Steven C. Welsh
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Audio: Gen. Zinni on The Diane Rehm Show
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June 1, 2004 |
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| Gen. (Ret.) Anthony Zinni, USMC, former head of CENTCOM and current CDI Distinguished Military Fellow, talks with Diane Rehm about Iraq (streaming audio, requires Real Player). |
Author(s):
Anthony Zinni
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Law Watch: First Abu Ghraib Prisoner Abuse Court Martial
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May 24, 2004 |
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| Even as questions remain over how far accountability ultimately will extend, in the first court martial over atrocities at the Abu Ghraib U.S. military prison, military policeman Specialist Jeremy C. Sivits, on May 20, 2004, pled guilty under a plea bargain. Under the plea bargain, Sivits, an Army reservist, will testify in future prosecutions. |
| Author(s):
Steven C. Welsh
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Law Watch: U.S. Responsibility for Violations of the Geneva Convention at Abu Ghraib Prison
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May 17, 2004 |
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| As scrutiny over the criminal atrocities at Abu Ghraib Prison intensifies and prosecutions and reforms get underway, one of the many questions that continue to be wrestled with is that of responsibility. Both the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (hereinafter GC-POW) and the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (hereinafter "GC-Civ") hold that -- in addition to particular individuals being held responsible for wrongdoing -- the United States itself bears responsibility for violations of the conventions' mandates. |
| Author(s):
Steven C. Welsh
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Day Two in Iraq
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November 18, 2003 |
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| Lawrence J. Korb, former Assistant Secretary of Defense and current CDI Senior Advisor and Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, writes from his recent DOD-sponsored trip to Iraq: "Dinner with the troops back in Baghdad gave us a dose of what life is like for our enlisted men and women serving in the Baghdad area. We chatted with reservists who were called up on short notice and have not yet been told how long they will remain in Iraq. The soldiers wondered what their mission was, why they had not yet received their ceramic vests ..., why there were not enough phones, and why, if we are making so much progress, mortars are being lobbed into their compounds every night. The downing of the Chinook helicopter was a real shock to many."
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| Author(s):
Lawrence J. Korb
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Day Three in Iraq
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November 18, 2003 |
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| Lawrence J. Korb, former Assistant Secretary of Defense and current CDI Senior Advisor and Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, writes from his DOD-sponsored trip to Iraq: "... neither the Administration nor the military seems to recognize that the insurgents do not have to win the war; they just have to avoid losing. Even the briefing acknowledges the insurgents are becoming more organized and lethal.... One cannot visit Iraq without being very impressed by the quality and devotion of the men and women serving there. For the most part, they are in an impossible situation. They are being asked to do a job for which they had little or no training by a government that failed to adequately plan ahead. I asked one soldier how long he thought the Army would be in Iraq. He replied, “As long as 10 years.” |
| Author(s):
Lawrence J. Korb
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