In Brief • Official Name: al-Ittihad al-Islami (Islamic Union) Country of Operation: Somalia, very limited presence in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and suspected but unconfirmed presence in other countries of East Africa, notably Kenya. • Year Founded: Unknown but suspected to have formed in the early 1990s (around 1991-1992 after the fall of the Barre dictatorship). Membership: Approximately 2000 but only a small, unknown percentage of these is considered extremist. Affiliated Groups: None indigenous to Somalia but has known ties to al-Qaida elements in Somalia and other East African countries. External Aid: Has received financial support from terrorist financiers in the Middle East and Diaspora remittances from abroad as well as weapons, funding, recruitment and logistical training from al-Qaida.

Al-Ittihad al-Islami (Islamic Union) is Somalia’s largest Islamic terrorist organization.  The group gained power in the early 1990s following the collapse of the Siad Barre dictatorship.  AIAI originally sought to form an Islamic state in Somalia and force the secession of the Ogaden region in Ethiopia, which it believed was wrongly seized during Somalia’s colonialist period.  It has since concentrated on establishing an Islamic state in Somalia.  The group does not possess a wide-reaching international agenda or global capabilities and maintains a regional focus centered on Somalia.  However, it has known ties with other Islamic terrorist organizations, notably al-Qaida, and advocates the spread of Islamic fundamentalism as well as a vehement hatred of the West and secular government. 

The Siad Barre dictatorship was a relic of Somalia’s colonial past and, through its corrupt and draconian rule, kept a lid on the myriad tribal, factional and religious divisions that existed within Somali society.  Following the regime’s fall, these divisions erupted into clan warfare that saw the country torn apart as rival factions vied for influence.  AIAI exploited these circumstances to consolidate its power as well as gain legitimacy for its cause. 

As Somalia dissolved into a cauldron of warfare, famine and instability, the succession of internationally-supported provisional governments exercised little control over the countryside and could not compete with elements such as AIAI that enjoyed grass-roots appeal among the people.  In order to facilitate its dissemination of Islamic fundamentalism and garner support, AIAI began providing social and humanitarian services to the Somali people.  These included establishing schools and orphanages; supporting local religious magistrates; and, forming “pockets of security” throughout the country.  Due to the endemic corruption, violence and instability, AIAI was able to fulfill the role of the government and win the hearts and minds of the people it “served” while augmenting its power base and further spreading its ideology. 

Early on, AIAI concentrated the bulk of its activities on strengthening its domestic base of support to facilitate the spread of its fundamentalist brand of Islam as well as the seizure of the Ogaden region of Ethiopia.  AIAI members believed that their ultimate goal of establishing an Islamic state in Somalia could not be achieved without unifying the country.  In order to do this they needed to force the secession of the Ogaden which they believed was rightly part of the Somali state.  Thus, most of the group’s earlier activities centered on forcing the Ethiopian government to relinquish its control over the Ogaden, and these usually consisted of attacks against Ethiopian government targets.  Most notably, the group is suspected of carrying out bombings in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa in 1996 and 1997.  During most of the 1990s, AIAI engaged in similar, small-scale terrorist attacks throughout Ethiopia but these decreased as the Ethiopian military stepped up its efforts to combat elements of the group in the Ogaden region and border areas shared with Somalia.  By the end of the decade, AIAI had sustained significant losses at the hands of the Ethiopian army, and has not yet fully recovered from an operational standpoint.

AIAI has since abandoned several of its original goals and allied itself with other terrorist organizations.  Some believe it did so as a result of the defeats it suffered in the Ogaden.  Specifically, in the mid-to-late 1990s AIAI aligned with al-Qaida elements in East Africa to increase its power base, gain financial and material resources and improve its operational effectiveness within Somalia.  To this day, AIAI elements maintain close ties to al-Qaida affiliates in Somalia and the surrounding region and share the group’s hatred of the West and secularism.  While AIAI membership has dwindled to approximately 2000 (with only a small unknown percentage of these being militant), it has compensated by exploiting its ties with al-Qaida.  During the 1990s, AIAI members were suspected of receiving training and weapons from al-Qaida in Afghanistan.  In addition, AIAI obtained logistical support from al-Qaida through Sudan and Eritrea and financial support through Middle East financiers and “western Diaspora remittances.”  Thus, their mutually beneficial relationship has provided al-Qaida with expanded influence in Somalia and East Africa while AIAI has exploited al-Qaida’s financial, logistical and recruitment resources to augment its power in the region and improve its position in Somalia. 

Currently, al-Ittihad al-Islami operates through a small, decentralized cellular network primarily in Somalia with a limited presence in Ethiopia.  It is also suspected to be present elsewhere in the region, notably Kenya, which has served as the host of Somali provisional governments.  The group continues to engage in small-scale terrorist attacks against Somali factions it opposes as well as limited incursions into Ethiopia (though, again, their presence has been substantially reduced).  In 1998, AIAI members kidnapped eight Red Cross workers and two pilots in Somalia, demanded a ransom and then subsequently released them.  The group is also suspected of being involved with several attacks in November 2002 on Israelis in Kenya, including a rocket attack on an Israeli airliner. 

Recently, the AIAI has remained relatively inactive in Somalia and East Africa though its membership is unknown if still estimated to be significant.  The group has had little contact with the United States aside from suspected, but unproven, involvement in the factional violence in Somalia surrounding the deaths of 18 U.S. Army Rangers and Delta commandos during the botched raid in Mogadishu (the Somali capital) in 1993 that precipitated the U.S. withdrawal in January 1994.  The United States has never placed AIAI on the State Department’s Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list.  However, following the Sept. 11 attacks and the passage of the PATRIOT Act, AIAI has been placed on the Terrorist Exclusion List, and its assets frozen within U.S. jurisdictions.

SOURCES:

“Al-Ittihad al-Islami,” Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, U.S. State Department, April 2004.  http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/31947.pdf

“Islamic Group Suspected in Kenya Attacks,” CNN Online, Nov. 29, 2002.  http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/africa/11/29/somali.group/index.html

John Pike, “Al-Ittihad al-Islami,” FAS Intelligence Resource Program, Federation of American Scientists, May 21, 2004.  http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/ogadin.htm

“Somalia,” The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, April 21, 2005.  http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/so.html 

“Statement on the Designation of 39 Organizations on the USA PATRIOT Act’s
Terrorist Exclusion List,” International Association for Counterterrorism and Security Professionals (IACSP), April 2005.  http://www.iacsp.com/terrorist_exc.html