South Korea’s Growing Missile Defense System

Heeding the Consequences of Putting Missile Defense before Peace and Reconciliation

by Jenny Shin, CDI Research Assistant

The 38th Parallel is a stark reminder of the tense relationship between the two Koreas; and with every situation that causes tensions to rise, the demarcation line serves to further solidify the divide between the two countries. Events in 2009 are testament of this for just within the past five months alone, North Korea has pulled out of the six-party talks, conducted its second underground nuclear test, attempted to launch a satellite into space (believed by some to be a long-range missile test in disguise), and ratcheted up its verbal threats. In response, South Korea has gone beyond verbally condemning Pyongyang for its relentless provocations and has sided with the United States to display a tougher stance than it has in previous years. Part of this hardened attitude towards North Korea has come in the form of a growing missile defense system in the South that puts opportunities for normalized relations between the two countries on the backburner for now.

South Korea is a relatively new player in deploying a missile defense system, but missile defense is by no means a novel concept for the country. For decades, it has dealt with and lived near a missile threat from its neighbors to the North whose offensive missile arsenal has qualitatively and quantitatively outweighed South Korea’s arsenal for decades. Despite this national security concern, South Korea has in previous years been reluctant to participate in any missile defense program out of prudence not to provoke North Korea.

Ironically, South Korea has historically embarked on vigorous attempts to develop and expand its offensive ballistic missile capabilities since the 1970s. This endeavor proved difficult for a country that did not have a sound industrial infrastructure to develop these technologies. The United States was also leery of providing technical assistance to prop up South Korea’s missile program for fear that it would provoke and trigger an arms race with North Korea and the greater East Asia region. Consequently, in 1979, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between the United States and South Korea to place restrictions on the latter’s ballistic missile capabilities. Under the terms of the MoU, South Korea was prohibited from developing missiles with ranges greater than 180 km (or 112 miles) with a 500 kg payload.[1] Thereafter, South Korea carefully proceeded with its missile program, but the country’s activities were severely limited.[2]

North Korea on the other hand experienced wide independence in expanding its missile program due to its isolation. North Korea conducted its first missile test of a reverse-engineered Soviet-made Scud-B missile in 1984 followed by tests throughout the early 1990s of upgraded Scud-C and No Dong-1 (ND-1) missiles.[3] Due to the rising missile threat and the pace at which North Korea was developing its array of missiles, South Korea sought to abandon the terms of the MoU in 1995 in order to develop a stronger deterrent. Despite Washington’s repeated rejections, South Korea persisted, particularly after North Korea fired its Taepodong-1 missile, with an approximated range of 1,500 to 2,000 km, on Aug. 31, 1998.[4] The United States and South Korea eventually finalized an agreement in January 2001 that lifted the 1979 MoU and allowed South Korea to become a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). This agreement expanded South Korea’s missile capabilities up to the MTCR export control standard range of 300 km (or 186 miles) with a 500 kg-payload.[5] [6] With its newfound expanded range capability, South Korea fortified its refusal to participate in a U.S. Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system, and instead, relied on employing offensive capabilities to deter North Korea.

Looking back on past and recent history, implementing and lifting the 1979 MoU has been ineffective in deterring North Korea’s continued missile proliferation. Neither economic constraints nor U.N. Security Council resolutions and sanctions have had much weight in persuading North Korea to rethink its ballistic missile program. Today, North Korea’s missile arsenal is comprised of over 1,000 strategic weapons of various ranges that put all of Japan and South Korea in reach. North Korea also seems to be pursuing its long-range missile capabilities of the multi-stage Taepodong-2 (TD-2) which has a potential range of 6,700km.[7] Its latest launch of the TD-2 occurred on April 5, 2009. Even though this test was considered a failure by U.S. officials, it highlighted the growing challenges of the North Korean threat.

Today, North Korea has achieved the self-sufficiency it had desired through the assistance and technological contributions of China and the former Soviet Union during the Cold War-era. Therefore, its impetus for continually expanding its offensive weapons program has a different purpose: to gain diplomatic leverage and be recognized as a sovereign country. However, North Korea’s method of gaining concessions has come in the form of threats and continued expansion of its missile and nuclear programs that are counterproductive to the country’s need for economic aid.

The huge gap in missile capabilities between the two Koreas is undoubtedly a security concern for South Korea, which is why missile defense has become a recurring topic in recent years. Previously, South Korean officials obstinately refused to participate in any regional TMD system. South Korea’s Defense Minister, Chun Yong-Taek, explicitly stated in March 1999 that a missile defense system would harm reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea and would not be effective in countering North Korean missiles. Furthermore, any type of system would have been a financial burden at the time for South Korea still lacked advanced technology to maintain a feasible and workable system.[8] South Korea was also concerned about China’s reaction to Seoul’s participation in the TMD since China was an important factor in carrying out former President Kim Dae-Jung’s “sunshine policy.” The late former President Roh Moo-Hyun was slightly more yielding than his predecessor on the issue but was hesitant to fully participate in building a lower-tier missile defense system.[9] His Defense Minister Kim Jang-Soo announced on Jan. 3, 2008 that while South Korea might obtain and deploy limited short-range missile defenses, South Korea opposed joining the overall U.S. missile defense system. Ultimately, South Korea chose to deter North Korea with its limited ballistic missiles since the MoU had been lifted.

But now we see an administration, under President Lee Myung-Bak, that is more receptive to the idea of missile defense in response to increased tensions on the Korean peninsula. These tensions are in part due to the current’s administration’s conservative stance of providing conditional economic aid in exchange for North Korea’s abandonment of its nuclear program. North Korea has yet to yield to the terms of the policy and has in the meantime opted to engage in relentless provocations that have increasingly strained inter-Korean relations over the past two years.[10]

Recent missile tests by North Korea highlight the dangers that exist on the Korean peninsula, making the South Korean government more willing to establish stronger military and diplomatic ties with the United States. But apart from the close ties, South Korea announced in February 2009 its intent to develop and operationalize an independent lower-tier missile defense system by 2012. South Korea’s air and missile defense (KAMD) would consist of U.S. Patriot Advanced Capability missile interceptors, an Air and Missile Defense-Cell (AMD-Cell) command-and-control center to track and detect missiles of up to 1000 km away, and tactical SM-2 missiles to be equipped on three Aegis destroyer warships.[11] [12] It is unknown as to how big of a role the United States will play in South Korea’s missile defense system, but given the military ties between the countries and the United States’ technical capabilities in missile defense, it is likely the United States will play an important role.

In addition to developing a missile defense system, South Korea has also considered bolstering its offensive missile capabilities which it has sought for decades. This will require amending the 2001 agreement that increased South Korea’s missile range to 300 km.[13] Currently, South Korea has missiles capable of reaching Pyongyang but would need missiles with a range of 550-700 km to reach all of North Korea and its long-range missile launch site. South Korea also has cruise missile capabilities with a range of 1000 km that have reportedly been deployed earlier this year and do not violate the 2001 agreement which only applies to free flight ballistic missiles.[14] [15]

South Korea’s motive to establish a missile defense system is understandable given the dangers near its border. The country has a right to defend itself and should rightly do so, but it should proceed with extreme caution to avoid any unintended consequences. Theoretically, missile defense works not only to intercept and defend a nation but also to deter a hostile country that threatens to launch a missile, but this is based on the assumption that the aggressor is rational and understands that its attempts will fail. It is also assuming that a defending country has enough interceptors in its defense system to counter the threat and can deal with decoys and countermeasures the offense might use to fool the defenses. Looking at the current situation, neither can North Korea be considered a rational player in today’s security environment nor does South Korea have the capabilities to develop a defense system that can completely defend against an onslaught of North Korean missiles. Even South Korea’s offensive capabilities are qualitatively and quantitatively insufficient compared to that of North Korea’s to be able to deter the North.

Both South Korea, as an emerging player in the global environment, and North Korea, as a highly isolated and volatile nation, are vulnerable to the fundamental arguments of why missile defense would destabilize the region and spur a potential arms race. By propping up a missile defense system, South Korea puts itself at risk by provoking North Korea. Hypothetically, if South Korea’s missile defense system intercepted a North Korean missile, there is no knowing how North Korea will react in response because for decades it has prided itself in having more advanced missile technology. Pyongyang may potentially respond by overwhelming South Korea’s limited defenses, making Seoul’s defense completely obsolete. Deploying missile defenses certainly has risks.

This is not to belittle the importance of missile defense in defending and providing security for South Korea but rather to point out the limitations of a missile defense system in defending a nation involved in regional tensions. Over the past year, the international community has witnessed South Korea move away from considering diplomacy and reconciliation. Fortifying the country with conventional weapons and defenses has taken its place, even if this is ineffective in solving the regional tensions between the two Koreas and the real issues involved.

However, there are opportunities that exist. We now see an international community that is more unified and unanimous in condemning North Korea’s provocative acts. Even China and Russia, both of which have had historical alliances with Pyongyang, have notably voiced their objections towards North Korea’s provocations this year.[16] Previously, these two countries have resisted any measure to impose sanctions on North Korea as members of the U.N. Security Council. But it seems that recent events have displayed a change of heart, particularly after North Korea conducted its second nuclear test on May 25, 2009. All this provides a more favorable outlook in persuading North Korea from continuing down its dangerous path. South Korea has credible international support that is made stronger by every hostile act North Korea commits that threatens international security and destabilizes Northeast Asia. In the long run, this will provide a better deterrent against North Korea than any build-up of missile defense and offensive missile capabilities.

Furthermore, President Lee has recently renewed his offer to provide aid to North Korea if it abandoned its nuclear weapons program, only this time, he has opened up the topic of reducing conventional weapons along the North-South demilitarized border, stating that the two Koreas can “move toward genuine peace only when [both] reduce the number of weapons and troops and redeploy them to the rear.”[17] President Lee’s speech directed toward Pyongyang provides a more conciliatory approach that is conducive to reducing the tensions that have marred the relationship between the two Koreas over the past year. This could also be a beginning step for the two Koreas to find some middle ground to come together rather than South Korea explicitly calling for the North to abandon its nuclear program and North Korea demanding unconditional economic assistance and recognition. Tensions, harsh rhetoric, missile tests and missile defenses have concealed any indication that the two Koreas genuinely seek peace with one another.

Dealing with North Korea is no easy matter, which always puts South Korea at the crossroads between two paths of reconciling differences with North Korea and developing stronger relations with the United States. But South Korea’s stability and strong network of allies put the country in a position to work toward reducing tensions and focus on reconciliation and cooperation rather than diverging away from this path.