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December 1, 2008

Who Are The Authors of "America's Defense Meltdown?"
 

Do you sometimes grow suspicious of Pentagon reform manuals written by "think-tankers" who never worked there? Do you wonder from time to time why a former top DOD official opining advice did not make a fuss about misguided policy when he was still in the Pentagon?

How come that general talking so boldly from the comfort of his retirement (and a corporate board room) did not cause a big ruckus about that issue when he was wearing the uniform? Do you sometimes get the impression that the important defense official you are talking to is feeding you some sort of party line or that he seems to think he is doing you a favor just by standing next to you?
 
I can virtually guarantee that you will not experience any of these sentiments if you talk to the authors of the new anthology "America's Defense Meltdown: Pentagon Reform for President Obama and the New Congress."
 
The authors of this new book represent over 350 years of combined experience with the military services, the Pentagon bureaucracy, defense-minded senators on Capitol Hill, the design of real-world (and highly successful) weapons, and authorship of a score of books on defense history and analysis.
 
Many of them were not exactly "shrinking violets" during their careers in the Army, Marine Corps and Air Force, the DOD bureaucracy and Capitol Hill. Some of them paid with their jobs for for their outspokenness. When you come and talk to them, you may have regrets. But it will only be because of the new, disturbing arguments you hear about how seriously America's defenses have declined - and that it is both Republicans and Democrats who are responsible.
 
Come where?
 
To the reception for the publication of "America's Defense Meltdown."
 
When: Wednesday, Dec. 3, 2008 at 6:00 p.m. until it's over.
 
Where:  The Old Guard Room (downstairs) at the Officers' Club at Fort Myer in Rosslyn, Va.  
 
Copies of the book will be free, but - alas - it will be a cash bar.  Buy an author a beer and argue with him over which chapter of the book President-elect Obama should read first!
 
Find more details, and directions, for this event by clicking here.  
 
Read  the "About the Authors" section of "America's Defense Meltdown" below:
 
About the Authors

Thomas Christie began his career in the Department of Defense and related positions in 1955.  He retired from the Pentagon in February 2005 after four years as director of Operational Test & Evaluation. There he was responsible for advising the secretary of defense on policy and procedures for testing weapon systems and for providing independent evaluations of the test results to both the defense secretary and Congress. He earlier served as director of the Operational Evaluation Division at the Institute for Defense Analyses, where he was also intimately involved in DOD weapons testing. Between 1985 and 1989, he was director of program integration in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, responsible for developing processes for managing the defense acquisition system. Prior to that, he had served in two separate positions under the assistant secretary of defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation): director of tactical air division and deputy assistant secretary of defense for General Purpose Programs. Before coming to the Pentagon in 1973, Christie was the director of the Weapon System Analysis Division at the Air Force Armament Laboratory, Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., where he had begun his career as a weapons analyst.

Col. Robert Dilger (U.S. Air Force, ret.) started in the Air Force as an enlisted man and then entered flight training to become an F-86 pilot. He was the squadron weapons expert and a member of the European Fighter Wing’s F-86 weapons team.  He later flew F-84 fighters for the Air National Guard and was recalled to active duty during the Cuban missile crisis. Later, he was in the Fighter Wing’s “tactics shop” at DaNang Air Force Base in Vietnam, serving under the famous “No Guts, No Glory” Col. “Boots” Blesse. Dilger was shot down over Vietnam by anti-aircraft artillery on his 187th mission in the war and was credited with one “kill” in an F-4. He received three Silver Stars and a Purple Heart for his war service. His next job was as an instructor in charge of air-to-air training at the Air Force Weapon’s School, Nellis Air Force Base, Neb. – the Air Force’s famous “top gun” school.  Upon graduation from the Army War College in 1975, he became the armament director of the A-10 in charge of the 30-mm cannon and its ammunition. There, he reduced the cost of the ammunition to one-eighth its earlier expense and improved its effectiveness – doing so with a novel program that re-competed the production contract year after year.  Dilger retired from the Air Force in 1980.

Bruce I. Gudmundsson served in the Marine Corps Reserve for 20 years, joining as a private in 1977 and retiring as a major in 1997.  The author of seven books and several hundred articles, he is a historian who specializes in the internal workings of military forces (their structure, training, doctrine and culture) as well as the way that these things influence their ability to adapt to changing circumstances.

William S. Lind served as a legislative aide for armed services for Sen. Robert Taft, Jr., R-Ohio, from 1973 to 1976 and held a similar position with Sen. Gary Hart of Colorado, D-Colo., from 1977 to 1986.  He is one of the founders of the American military reform movement and anticipated the debate over maneuver warfare with an article in Military Review in March 1977, “Some Doctrinal Questions for the United States Army.” He is author of the “Maneuver Warfare Handbook” (Westview Press, 1985) and co-author, with Gary Hart, of “America Can Win: The Case for Military Reform” (Adler & Adler, 1986). Mr. Lind was heavily involved with the adoption of maneuver warfare doctrine by the U.S. Marine Corps in the early 1980s, assisting with the writing of FMFM-1, “Warfighting” and FMFM 1-1, “Campaigning,” and co-authoring FMFM 1-3, “Tactics.” Mr. Lind has also written widely for both professional and popular publications.

Col. Douglas Macgregor (U.S. Army, ret.) was awarded the bronze star with “V” device in 1991 for valor for his leadership of the 2nd Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment that destroyed an Iraqi Republican Guard Brigade in the first Gulf war.  After that, in November 1997, Macgregor was assigned to Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) where he became the director of the Joint Operations Center during the Kosovo Air Campaign. In January 2002, Macgregor was directed by the secretary of defense to present the CENTCOM commander with a concept for intervention in Iraq. The plan assumed a no-notice armored attack on two axes and that Iraqi Army and administrative structures would be retained. Though modified in unfortunate ways, major elements of his concept were adopted.  He is also author of four books, including “Breaking the Phalanx” (Praeger, 1997) and “Transformation Under Fire” (Praeger, 2003), which have significantly influenced thinking about transformation inside America’s ground forces. His newest book “Warrior’s Rage: The Battle of 73 Easting” will appear in 2009. 

Col. Chet Richards (U.S. Air Force, ret.) is a consultant and writer based in Atlanta.  He is the author of  “If We Can Keep It:  A National Security Manifesto for the Next Administration” (Center for Defense Information, 2007), “Certain to Win: The Strategy of John Boyd Applied to Business” (Xlibris, 2004) and other publications on Third and Fourth Generation Warfare.  He holds a doctorate in mathematics and is adjunct professor of strategy and quantitative analysis at Kennesaw State University.

Lt. Col. John Sayen (U.S. Marine Corps, ret.) served in the Marine Corps’ artillery, armor and military intelligence. He retired in 2002. During his last years of service, he worked at the Pentagon analyzing and reporting on trends in international affairs that would affect U.S. interests. Mr. Sayen has published two books on the Army and the Marine Corps and numerous articles for military and historical periodicals. He currently works as the senior contract doctrine writer at the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Staff Training Program at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Va.

Pierre Sprey consulted for Grumman Aircraft's research department from 1958 to 1965, then joined Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's "Whiz Kids" in the Pentagon. There, in 1967, he met the Air Force's brilliant and original tactician, Col. John Boyd and quickly became a disciple and collaborator of Boyd's. Together with another innovative fighter pilot, Col. Everest Riccioni (U.S. Air Force), they started and carried out the concept design of the F-16 air-to-air fighter, then brought the program to fruition through five years of continuous bureaucratic guerilla warfare. More or less simultaneously, Sprey also headed up the technical side of the Air Force's concept design team for the A-10 close support fighter. Then, against even steeper opposition than the F-16 faced, he helped implement the A-10's innovative live-fire, prototype fly-off competition and subsequent production.  Sprey left the Pentagon in 1971 but continued to consult actively on the F-16, the A-10, tanks and anti-tank weapons, and realistic operational/live-fire testing of major weapons. At the same time, he became a principal in two consulting firms; the first doing environmental research and analysis, the second consulting on international defense planning and weapons analysis.  During this period, Sprey continued the seminal work of Col. Richard Hallock (U.S. Army/Airborne) in founding the field of combat history/combat data-based cost effectiveness analysis for air and ground weapons.  During the late 1970s, Colonel Boyd and Sprey, together with a small, dedicated group of Pentagon and congressional insiders, started the military reform movement. Attracting considerable attention from young officers, journalists and congressmen, the movement led to establishment of the Congressional Military Reform Caucus and to passage of several military reform bills in the early ’80s.  Sprey continues to work with reform-minded foundations and journalists.  Numerous articles, books and theses have described the work of Colonel Boyd and Sprey on the F-16, A-10 and military reform. These include Robert Coram's “Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War” (Little, Brown & Co., 2002) and James Fallows' “National Defense” (Random House, 1981).

James P. Stevenson is the former editor of the Navy Fighter Weapon School’s Topgun Journal; author of “The Pentagon Paradox” (Naval Institute Press, 1993), a history of the Navy’s F-18 Hornet development; and of “The $5 Billion Misunderstanding” (Naval Institute Press, 2001), a history of the Navy’s failed A-12 Avenger II stealth bomber program. He also served as the assistant managing editor of Air Safety Week and west coast correspondent for Defense Week.  He has written many articles in professional and popular journals and has lectured on numerous occasions on national security and aviation issues.

Maj. Donald E. Vandergriff ( U.S. Army, ret.) served for 24 years of active duty as an enlisted Marine and Army officer. He has had numerous troop, staff and educational assignments in the United States and abroad. Donald Vandergriff was named ROTC instructor of the year 2002-2003 and the 3rd ROTC Brigade instructor of the year for 2003-2004. Vandergriff is a frequently published authority on the U.S. Army personnel system, Army culture, leadership development, soldier training, and the emergence of Fourth Generation Warfare.  He has authored many articles and briefings, as well as four books: “Spirit, Blood and Treasure: The American Cost of Battle in the 21st Century” (Presidio Press, 2001), “The Path to Victory: America's Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs” (Presidio Press, 2002), “Raising the Bar: Creating and Nurturing Adaptability to Deal with the Changing Face of War” (Center for Defense Information, 2006) and “Manning the Future Legions of the United States: Finding and Developing Tomorrow's Centurions” (Praeger Security International, 2008).  Vandergriff is currently a contractor in support of the Army Capabilities Integration Center Forward at Crystal City, Va. 

Col. G.I. Wilson (U.S. Marine Corps, ret.) is a retired veteran. He was a close associate of the late Col. John Boyd.

Winslow T. Wheeler is the director of the Straus Military Reform Project at the Center for Defense Information in Washington, D.C.  He has authored two books: “The Wastrels of Defense” (U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2004) about Congress and national security, and “Military Reform” (Praeger Security International, 2007).  From 1971 to 2002, Wheeler worked on national security issues for members of the U.S. Senate and for the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO).  In the Senate, he was the first - and according to Senate records the last - individual to work simultaneously on the personal staffs of a Republican and a Democrat.  Wheeler is the editor of this anthology.

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