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"UN Small Arms Process Back on Track: United States Plays Limited Role"
by Jonah Leff, CDI Research Assistant
Two years after the failed United Nations Review Conference on Small Arms, United Nations member states again met on the issue of small arms. Over 130 states met from July 14-18 for the Biennial Meeting of States (BMS), where states reviewed progress on the implementation of the Programme of Action (PoA), a politically binding agreement agreed to in 2001 that establishes national, regional and global measures to stem the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. The meeting marked the third BMS meeting; the other two took place in 2003 and 2005.
The BMS focused primarily on three thematic issues: international cooperation, assistance and national capacity-building; stockpile management and surplus disposal; and illicit brokering. Governments also spent one day discussing the implementation of the International Instrument to Enable Sates to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (also known as the International Tracing Instrument, or ITI). The ITI is a politically binding document established through the PoA in 2005, which enhances international cooperation for the tracing of illicit weapons around the world.
After an arduous week of formal and informal negotiations, which were chaired by Dalius Cekuolis of Lithuania, governments unanimously adopted an outcome document representing the conclusions of the meeting. One hundred thirty-four countries voted in favor of the document, while two countries abstained (Iran and Zimbabwe), and 56 countries were not in attendance, including the United States.
The meeting’s final report primarily encourages states to uphold their commitments enshrined in the PoA, but also includes some new elements. For example, in the section on international cooperation, assistance and national capacity-building, states agreed to utilize two new mechanisms—a PoA Implementation Support System established by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) as well as a database designed by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)—to enhance assistance by matching needs with available resources. States also discussed the possibility of establishing a legally binding instrument on brokering in small arms and light weapons, but no timetable or commitment has been determined. In addition, the report’s section on stockpile management specifically defines regulations, standards and procedures for managing stockpiles and destroying surplus weapons.
The report also listed concerns voiced by some states that in the past were too controversial: civilian possession of small arms and light weapons; linkages between security, armed violence, development and human rights; ammunition; prohibiting the supply of small arms and light weapons to nonstate actors and terrorists; and transforming the PoA into a legally binding agreement. Although many states called for recommendations on these issues to be reflected in the report, other states opposed their inclusion. What resulted was weakened language that allows states to remain free from any obligations that did not enjoy consensus.
Although the document was adopted, some states voiced strong opposition to the process. Iran objected to the negotiating procedures throughout the week, calling for a more transparent line-by-line negotiation of the draft outcome document. Iran argued that a “take it or leave it” approach sets an “unjustifiable precedent in the field of disarmament.” Indonesia, speaking on behalf of the Non-aligned Movement, agreed that the process had not been ideal, but said it would accept the draft’s text. All other states objected to Iran’s stance, some calling small arms a “matter of life or death” and stressing the importance of reaching agreement.
Unlike previous UN meetings on small arms, the United States was not a factor in the final deliberations. During the small arms Review Conference in 2006, the United States expressed opposition to continuing the small arms process at the international level, claiming that it was an inefficient use of funds and time. The United States, which took part in the 2001, 2003, 2005 and 2006 UN meetings and agreed to the PoA in 2001, has some of the strongest laws on regulating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. However, rather than continuing multilateral meetings, the United States believes more practical initiatives should be taken at the national and regional levels to enhance implementation of the PoA. In addition, the United States faces strong opposition to the UN process from the National Rifle Association, which has had a large influence on U.S. policy statements and actions throughout the UN small arms process. In the end, the United States did not participate in the BMS and only attended the one-day discussion of the ITI.
In addition to governments, over 150 representatives of nongovernmental organizations (NGO) from 36 countries were also in attendance. In addition, over 20 states had NGO representatives serve on their delegations as advisors, demonstrating significant cooperation between governments and civil society. NGOs and intergovernmental organizations (IGO) also held more than 30 side events at the meeting’s margins, which included various presentations by members of the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), the launch of the 2008 Small Arms Survey, as well as a rap performance by a former Sudanese child soldier, Emmanuel Jal. Jal was also invited later in the week to perform in front of states—a considerable break in UN conventionality—during the NGO presentation at the meeting.
The outcome of the BMS demonstrated states’ rejuvenated commitment to eliminating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. The next meeting of states to discuss the PoA will likely take place after January 2009, which provides an opportunity for the next U.S. administration to reengage the United States in the UN small arms process and to continue international progress on this issue.
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