Feb. 8, 2008

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA), never one to shy away from unusual and unorthodox budgeting decisions, has surpassed itself.  If it proceeds as planned, the funding for all missile defense-related programs in the upcoming budget year will be at its highest point ever: $12.3 billion (this includes the official MDA request, but also funding by other services for missile-defense programs like the Space-based Infrared System satellite network or the Patriot missile defense system).  Furthermore, in the fiscal year 2009 (FY 09) budget request, MDA unveiled its new format for funding requests. Gone are the block developments in two-year increments for each weapon system of its entire Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).  Now, MDA has reshuffled its weapon systems into new blocks where an overall capability is shot for, describing this as “a key initiative designed to enhance the transparency, accountability, and oversight of the BMDS program.” However, these new blocks are not tied to a timeline and leave many of the BMDS weapon systems out.  As a result, while ostensibly this decision was made to enhance oversight of the development process, in actuality, it is going to make it practically impossible. 

These blocks are defined as such:

“Block 1.0: Defend the United States from Limited North Korean Long-Range Threats

“Block 2.0: Defend Allies and Deployed Forces from Short- to Medium-Range Threats in

One Region/Theater

“Block 3.0: Expand Defense of the United States to Include Limited Iranian Long-Range

Threats

“Block 4.0: Defend Allies and Deployed Forces in Europe from Limited Iranian Long-

Range Threats and Expand Protection of U.S. Homeland

“Block 5.0: Expand Defense of Allies and Deployed Forces from Short- to Intermediate-

Range Threats in Two Regions/Theaters”

While MDA claims to have transformed its budgetary process, its budget justification documents keep to the old way of categorizing the various weapon systems based on their individual characteristics.  Really, what we are seeing here is a new spin being put on the old programs: there is no added benefit in doing so.  Instead, this format obfuscates the blocks’ overall size and thus hinders determining their total costs.  As for their components, the goals established above translate into the following:

Block 1.0: The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, which as of the end of 2007 has 24 ground-based interceptors deployed in Ft. Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif.  MDA wants to get six more GBIs fielded this coming year. 

Block 2.0:  The Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system.  As of the end of 2007, 21 Standard Missile (SM)-3 interceptors for Aegis BMD warships have been fielded, as well as 17 Aegis BMD warships, 10 of which are fitted out for the SM-3 interceptors (the other seven are intended for long-range surveillance and tracking).  Block 2.0 capabilities include 71 Aegis SM-3 Block I/IA missiles, 15 Aegis BMD destroyers, and three Aegis BMD cruisers.

The THAAD program isn’t as far along as the Aegis BMD.  Block 2.0’s capabilities include two fire units holding 48 interceptors.  What does it have left to do to meet these capabilities?  Deliver two fire units holding 48 interceptors.

Block 3.0:  GMD…again.  This time, this is an additional 14 GBIs in a new field at Fort Greely.  Why this particular field would be more appropriate for intercepting a theoretical Iranian long-range ballistic missile instead of the field that is already there is unclear.  This block capability is supposed to also have the ability to discriminate a target from its countermeasures via “more sophisticated sensors and algorithms.”

Block 4.0:  GMD variant. This requires a two-stage interceptor that is still being built but that MDA claims its parts “are nearly identical to those already tested and fielded in the three-stage booster.”  It also requires the X-band radar from Kwajalein and an AN/TPY-2 transportable radar. As for the latter, “The site for this radar has not been selected, but its placement should enable it to provide information early in the flight of a potential ballistic missile launch and help discriminate threat reentry vehicles [RVs] from associated countermeasures.”  In discussing the coverage that this block is presumed to provide, MDA admits, “There are several countries, particularly in Southern Europe, that are not at risk from a long-range ballistic missile attack from Iran because they are too close to its long-range missile launch sites.”  The assumption that anyone is at risk from Iran’s non-existent long-range missiles is a highly dubious one.  Ironically, MDA does acknowledge that these same countries which are left out in the cold from the hypothetical Iranian long-range missile threat actually are “vulnerable to attack from short- to medium-range missiles, a capability that Iran has demonstrated.”  Alas, that is not what Block 4.0 is being designed to counter.  But never fear, as “[p]roviding protection of these countries from the shorter-range threats can be covered by NATO-deployed systems, which could be integrated with the BMDS.”

Block 5.0: More Aegis BMD and THAAD.  Its capabilities should include 23 SM-3 Block IA interceptors, 53 SM-3 Block IB interceptors (which are anticipated to have a better seeker), two THAAD Fire Units with 48 interceptors, and an AN/TPY-2 radar for forward deployment.  All of this needs to be built and delivered.

For those five blocks, only three weapon systems are mentioned: the GMD, Aegis BMD, and THAAD programs.  Additionally, there is a high level of procurement for what have been promoted as research and development programs.  This means that there is a high rate of production for systems that have yet to prove themselves during realistic operational testing – an unwarranted leap of faith in the technology.  According to MDA, “the estimated production rate capacity of the facilities that will produce the assets being fielded is one GBI per month, two SM-3s per month, three THAAD interceptors per month, and two AN/TPY-2 radars per year.”

What about all the other missile defense systems?  They are all shunted into what’s being called Capability Development, which in turn is subdivided into “Future Capability Development” and “BMDS Special Interest.” This includes the Airborne Laser (ABL), Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI), Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV), Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS), Space Test Bed, and Near Field Infrared Experiment (NFIRE), Arrow, and David’s Sling, among others.  Everything else that is not considered capability development or part of the aforementioned blocks has been put into three separate categories: sustainment, mission area investment, and MDA operations.

Because Congress ended up cutting funding for the European missile defense site in the FY 08 budget talks due to concerns about its applicability without the presumed host countries’ agreement and the effectiveness of the new GMD-variant interceptor, MDA had to push back a few programs.  The second field at Fort Greely has been delayed half a year, while work on the new GMD-variant interceptor has been “advanced” by one year. MDA still believes it can get all its GMD work done by 2013 though.

Despite its claims otherwise, MDA does not have a plan for handing the weapon systems over to the services. Previously, the demarcation between development and transfer was hazy.  Regrettably, it still is. MDA has created three capability delivery categories, all of which are extremely subjective:

“Early Capability Delivery (ECD) is based on completion of the element-level test campaign and analysis; sufficient confidence that the capability will operate safely, and having logistics support in place for contingency operations of limited duration.

“Partial Capability Delivery (PCD) is based on completion of the BMDS-level test campaign and analysis; support of the war fighter’s partial military capability objectives; and logistics support in place to achieve defensive operations.

“Full Capability Delivery (FCD) is based on completion of an assessment of system performance against technical objectives and goals; fulfillment of the war fighter’s military capability objectives, completion of the BMDS-level test campaign and analysis, and having logistics support in place for a sustained defensive operations.”

The Sea-based X-band radar (SBX), which is already out in the field, does not have a lead service yet. 

On the plus side, MDA states that it intends this month to “report to the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, on our detailed plan, including the steps related to acquisition program baselines, unit cost reporting, independent cost estimates performed by the Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG), and operational testing.” Furthermore, MDA plans to “establish newly formulated schedule, budget, and performance baselines based on fielded Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) capabilities against specified threats,” and to “explain any significant variances from expected outcomes.”  There will now be a BMDS portion to the Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) that will presumably follow any cost growths and developmental delays. 

And perhaps not surprisingly, the Space Test Bed shows up again, despite having been zeroed out by Congress during the FY 08 budget negotiations.  NFIRE, another controversial program worried by some to have latent space weapons capabilities, apparently is planned to continue this year and then stop abruptly. 

Whether that will actually happen remains to be seen. Much can change with the entire missile defense program in the next year, no matter who wins the race to the White House. By dumping money into a colossally confusing pot, this lame duck presidency is trying to create institutional momentum for missile defense programs, and in the process of doing so, is ensuring that little oversight for can take place.  MDA’s latest budgetary arrangement may just be replaced by a new administration eager to put its own mark on missile defense.  In the meantime, Congress will have wasted a whole year trying to figure this tangled mess out.