On Dec. 6, an unofficial Iraq Study Group (ISG), spawned by a group of members of Congress on March 15, 2006, will issue a report on Iraqi nation-building that aspires to provide bipartisan, independent views on the strategic environment in Iraq and its surrounding region, as well as ways to enhance Iraqi security and economic and political development, reportedly including views on U.S. force posture and potential future draw-downs.  (The ISG will hold a press conference at 11:00 a.m. and release a PDF version of the report on several web sites, including http://www.usip.org/isg/index.html).

As a practical matter the ISG may also represent a forum for highlighting the input of non-governmental think tanks, academics and big business, to the extent that the ISG process reportedly has included 31 analytical and policy papers provided to the ISG from working groups that included contributors with such affiliations. 

But despite the fact that nine of the ten members of the ISG itself are attorneys, and the fact that lawlessness, including violence, is one of the major root problems undermining Iraqi nation-building, leading up to the issuance of the report there is no mention of Iraqi rule of law in the ISG website.

Secretary of defense nominee Dr. Robert M. Gates, who had been part of the ISG but left Nov. 8, 2006, before it began its deliberations, suggested in his Dec. 5, 2006, confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee that the ISG report would be very important and should be paid attention to, and that serious people were putting it together, but that it would not be “the last word on the matter.”  Gates argued that there probably were no new ideas on Iraq, that the question was finding ways putting “the pieces together” to provide a path forward, and that the ISG might come up with one way, while, for example, the chiefs “put it together” in a different way, while commanders on the ground might have other perspectives.

Unlike the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the “9-11 Commission”), which has a co-chair in common with the ISG, the ISG has no legal mandate, no foundation in legislation, and no legal authority to take or compel testimony.  Nevertheless, a public “searching for answers” may look to it as another “blue-ribbon” panel, purporting to be expert, thorough and “above the fray,” to address another challenging and complex problem.

Rule of law and other issues

It will be important to note if and how the ISG addresses issues of lawlessness and rule of law in Iraq.  Lawlessness is arguably the seminal problem in Iraq, manifested, for example, by the exertion of force by entities and individuals lacking lawful authority, and/or exerted in a manner violating basic rights and norms, the use of criminal activity such as smuggling to finance, and the weakness of governmental structures and frameworks.  Rule of law therefore is key to Iraq’s future as a nation, not simply in the narrow but crucial sense of developing reliable judicial, law enforcement and other governmental systems, but also in the broad sense of frameworks for society, accountability, and legal foundations for, and limits, on governmental and individual behavior grounded in respect for human life and the rights, dignity and value of the human person.  It will be important to note how the ISG addresses the need for, and possible ways to enhance rule of law, as the necessary foundation for the fullest realization of Iraqi sovereignty, security peace and prosperity, a way of life making more possible each individual’s fullest contribution to Iraq’s future.

It bears noting that, in the United States, a diverse society not defined as a nation by ethnicity or even territory to the same extent as other nations, rule of law, the concept of a “government of laws and not of men,” has not only fostered greater stability, and predictable outcomes for behavior enabling development, growth and prosperity.  The concept of a society defined by constitutional democracy has provided a framework, a template helping define national identity.  Given Iraq’s diversity, in the absence of government by tyranny, it will be important to see how rule of law can help unify Iraq and provide a framework for peaceful dialog and trust among competing factions.

Beyond controversy over the Iraq invasion, Iraq has a duly constituted, democratically elected government, with overwhelming turnout for both governmental elections and the approval by national referendum of Iraq’s constitution, even with variations by province or governorate. 

As a result, coalition forces presently are in Iraq by invitation of the Iraqi government, undertaking development projects while seeking to “stand up” the indigenous Iraqi government, including its military and police forces.

Among some of the “bottom line” concerns include: violence inflicting U.S., Iraqi, and allied casualties, and other disruption of development projects which in turn further impact Iraqi quality of life and economic growth; a “cocktail” of anti-government insurgents, sectarian militias and death squads, criminals and some number of foreign terrorists; crime such as smuggling supporting violent conflict; infiltration of Iraqi government entities, such as the police, by militia members; questions over Iraqi federalism, with respect to whether Iraq can remain unified and not partitioned, how power is shared with the governorates, and how oil revenue is shared; how to bring about conflict resolution among competing factions, including disarmament of unauthorized armed groups; how to accelerate development of Iraqi institutions, including an effective, professional and law-abiding police force not infiltrated by violent factions; what may turn out to be basic managerial questions about how to run development projects more effectively, as a general matter and given the existence of a dangerous security environment; and questions over how to innovate to meet asymmetric threats, still including even issues over equipment.  Troops continue to perish, for example, because of the widespread use of vehicles that cannot adequately protect them against roadside bombs. 

While an overriding question seems to be about how long U.S. forces remain the real question is over casualties, given that there are not similar questions over U.S. withdrawal from bases in peaceful locations. 

Even with respect to the prospect of “permanent” U.S. bases, or a long-term presence, it bears noting that while Vietnam’s strategic value was negligible Iraq’s is enormous.  For better or, as many would put it, for worse, the U.S. presence represents a strategic forward presence in the heart of the Middle East and, at the cost of losses approaching 3,000 dead, a large force of U.S. troops who now have experience being deployed in that environment, encountering its peoples, and to whatever extent are facing combat or other grave danger. 

Also lurking in the background is Iran, with periodic issues raised over Iranian involvement with aspects of the Iraqi conflict, such as suspected Iranian origins of more powerful “improvised” explosive devices (IED’s), and with secretary of defense nominee Gates raising the prospect in his confirmation that Iranian proxy Hizbollah is training militants associated with some of the Iraqi factions.  Concerns over the Iranian nuclear program and the role of Hizbollah in Lebanon arguably make even more multifaceted the question of the impact of a large U.S. presence in Iraq.

But one overriding question with the Iraq conflict undoubtedly will be one of perspective, and what different kinds of lessons might be drawn from diverse realities “on the ground,” for example with some areas of Iraq more peaceful and others more violent.

More on the ISG

Headed by former Secretary of State James E. Baker, III, and former Congressman Lee H. Hamilton, and also referred to as the “Baker-Hamilton Commission,” the ISG includes:

• former Secretary of State James A. Baker, III
• former Congressman Lee H. Hamilton
• former Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger
• former presidential advisor Vernon E. Jordan, Jr.
• former Attorney General Edwin Meese III
• former Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
• former Office of Management and Budget Director Leon E. Panetta
• former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry
• former Senator Charles S. Robb
• former Senator Alan K. Simpson.

As a practical matter it may represent an opportunity to more greatly infuse into public policy the views of non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) such as think tanks and university departments.

The ISG is being “facilitated” by the United States Institute of Peace” (USIP), a taxpayer funded “Quango” or “Quasi-NGO,” with the support of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a nonprofit think tank, the Center for the Study of the Presidency, another nonprofit, and the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University.

Panels of contributors providing analytic reports to the ISG included persons affiliated with:

• Citigroup, Inc.
• Bechtel Corporation
• Cambridge Energy Research Associates
• PFC Energy
• BKSH & Associates
• RAND Corporation

• Nixon Center
• Heritage Foundation
• American Enterprise Institute (AEI)
• Hudson Institute
• International Republican Institute
• Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)
• Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)
• Strategic Studies Institute
• Foundation for the Defense of Democracies
• Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
• The Henry L. Stimson Center
• Brookings Institution
• USIP
• The Iraq Memory Foundation
• The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
• The Middle East Institute
• The Middle East Institute
• Middle East Policy Council

• Rice University
• Stanford University
• Princeton University
• Boston University
• University of Virginia
• University of Maryland
• Georgetown University

• National Defense University
• Naval Postgraduate School

• freelance commentator on Middle East
• former National Security Council analyst

Retired military advisors included a retired U.S. Navy admiral, two retired U.S. Army generals, a retired U.S. Air Force general and a retired U.S. Army Lt. General

The ISG indicates it has met with an array of interviewees, mostly including select Iraqi and U.S. administrative officials, members of Congress, and some senior members of the U.S. military, intelligence and diplomatic communities.  But while several U.S. military experts cited are said to have served in Iraq, it is unclear how extensive ISG contact has been with a wider variety of “boots on the ground” with direct experience of the conflict.

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