On Oct. 26, 2006, the United Nations voted to “establish a group of governmental experts [GGE]… “to examine the feasibility, scope, and draft parameters for a comprehensive, legally binding instrument establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms.” The resolution, which passed by a vote of 139 -1 (with 24 abstentions) is the first step towards an international arms trade treaty (ATT).

The resolution emerged from years of work by governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Over a decade ago, a group of Nobel Laureates, led by former Costa Rican President Oscar Arias, developed the idea of an international code of conduct, which would outline state responsibilities for completing arms transfers. In the intervening years, governments and NGOs have developed draft treaty texts and some overarching global principles on arms transfers based on states’ existing obligations under international law. While the actual content of the treaty has not yet been determined, proponents hope that the text will reflect principles of existing human rights and international humanitarian law and apply them to arms export decisions.

The governments of Australia, Argentina, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan, Kenya, and the United Kingdom have spearheaded the effort among governments, and have been encouraged by NGO participants, including an ATT Steering Committee and the associated Control Arms Campaign (launched by Oxfam, Amnesty International, and the International Action Network on Small Arms). Together, these leading governments and organizations have worked diligently to push states to create binding international standards and norms on global arms transfers to which states can be held accountable.

While the benefits of an arms trade treaty seem obvious and central to international security – preventing arms sales from being used for human rights abuses or to wage war, and to increase transparency in the global arms trade to ensure that countries are not engaging in destabilizing arms build-ups – the ATT is not without its opponents. Although Britain and France both supported the resolution, Russia, China, and the United States have been lukewarm at best about the idea of an ATT. While the support of the P-5 is not necessary for the actual development of the treaty, their support will be necessary for such a treaty to be effective, as these five countries alone are responsible for the majority of the global arms trade.  According to extrapolated data from the U.S. Congressional Research Service, in 2005, the P-5 accounted for approximately 75 percent of the 2005 global arms trade, and were the top suppliers of arms sales worldwide, making nearly $33 billion worth of new arm sales agreements. 

At the First Committee, Russia and China took a “wait and see” view towards the ATT in the UN resolution – by abstaining instead of opposing. The United States, however, took a more vitriolic attitude and was the only country to vote against the UN’s feasibility study, which makes little sense from policy, political, and practical perspectives.

From a policy viewpoint, the U.S. vote is in direct contradiction with existing U.S. law. Under the 1999 International Code of Conduct passed by the U.S. Congress, the United States is required to begin negotiations for an agreement that restricts or prohibits arms sales to countries that do not promote democracy, do not respect human rights, are engaged in certain acts of armed aggression, and do not participate in the UN Register of Conventional Arms. These negotiations were never begun, yet certainly, the feasibility study would go a long way towards meeting such obligations.

From a political perspective, the U.S. position is in clear contrast with the positions of its closest allies. Instead of voting with NATO allies, for example, the United States stood alone, joining such strange bedfellows as Iran and Venezuela, who have expressed skepticism towards the treaty (although in the end the two countries abstained). Moreover, in voting against the resolution, the United States stands in opposition to a priority of the British government, arguably the United States’ closest ally and one that has taken unpopular domestic and international positions out of allegiance to the United States. Indeed, the U.S. vote is in direct contrast to what the State Department told Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., in a letter dated Jan. 26, 2006, in which the United States says it will actively support the United Kingdom’s Transfer Control Initiative (a precursor to the Arms Trade Treaty). In addition, the letter states that the United States “will encourage further discussion on transfer controls” and notes that such endeavors are “the cornerstone of any successful effort to curb the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.”

Lastly, from a practical perspective, the United States position is not consistent with current U.S. arms trade procedures. U.S export control laws are some of the strongest in the world. According to standing tenets of U.S. arms export policy and law, arms transfers should not undermine long-term security and stability, weaken democratic movements, support military coups, escalate arms races, exacerbate ongoing conflicts, cause arms build-ups in unstable regions, or be used to commit human rights abuses. This translates into comprehensive and longstanding U.S. practices that ensure that weapons are used in accordance with U.S. law and that transfers occur with the highest levels of security and scrutiny. The United States has an entire bureaucracy – namely the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls – in place to oversee much of this vast export regime. The United States maintains national arms embargoes in accordance with and beyond UN arms embargoes and has one of the most transparent export control regimes in the world – the United States regularly publishes arms export data, license notifications, and changes in U.S. law and practice. Instead of discouraging efforts for developing international controls, the United States should be encouraging stronger global standards on arms transfers in order to prevent worrisome transfers that its own laws would not permit. The United States should want to increase the oversight of the arms trade, not sustain an existing system that allows arms to flow to abusive regimes with impunity.

Moreover, the negative U.S. vote is inconsistent with existing U.S. practice in dealing with controversial UN issues, particularly those pertaining to the arms trade. The United States often takes internationally unpalatable positions towards the United Nations and shields its opposition on certain topics by claiming insufficient room in the budget for such endeavors. The budgetary justification often appeases politicians and the public in the United States that are suspicious of UN initiatives.  However, in this case, the United States did not utilize their typical budget concerns, as it did in July 2006 when it refused to allow consensus on holding future UN conferences on small arms. Instead, Richard Grenell, the spokesman for the U.S. mission to the UN is reported to have said, “The only way for a global arms trade treaty to work is to have every country agree on a standard. For us, that standard would be so far below what we are already required to do under U.S. law that we had to vote against it in order to maintain our higher standards.”  Such statements dooming the ATT before the feasibility study has even begun seem illogical and irresponsible, especially, when in private conversations, U.S. officials have said they will be part of the GGE when it begins its work.

The UN feasibility study on the ATT will commence sometime during 2008. States are now beginning to develop their policies and stated views towards an arms trade treaty and the United Nations is beginning informal consultations. International consensus is moving in the direction of creating international standards and norms for global arms transfers and the international community will pursue the creation of these standards with or without the United States. The United States would be better served working to ensure the highest possible standards for such a treaty, rather than remaining outside of the process.  Not only is the ATT consistent with U.S. law, policy, and practice, it is the right thing to do.

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