As multilateral engagement of the Iranian nuclear controversy continues to unfold, the Iranian regime remains defiant in the face of an Aug. 31, 2006, deadline set out in the UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1696 to suspend proliferation-sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities and cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  Iran’s uranium reprocessing and enrichment is one of the major concerns, because taken to one level, the process could produce reactor fuel and, taken to higher levels of enrichment, could produce weapons-grade material suitable for an atomic bomb.

When it passed Resolution 1696 on July 31, 2006, the UNSC took the historically rare step of invoking UN Charter Chapter VII to make clear that the resolution was binding under international law. 

[To read about Resolution 1696 in greater detail, including key passages, click here for a short backgrounder.]

[To read the text of Resolution 1696 in PDF format click here.]

As forecast by Resolution 1696 and confirmed by diplomats, the next step in what has been a gradual, incremental multilateral approach most likely will be efforts to adopt unified international economic sanctions that go beyond the prohibition on proliferation-sensitive trade already required by Resolution 1696.  Major powers reportedly will meet next week for discussion of the “way forward” on sanctions.

A popular interpretation of the deadline was that the Iranian regime was given until Aug. 31, 2006, to suspend uranium reprocessing and enrichment.  Under the text of Resolution 1696, however, Iran itself was given no leeway to delay at all.  The Aug. 31 date was not a deadline for Iranian compliance, but rather for the IAEA to report back on whether Iranian compliance had been forthcoming.  The new IAEA report has been made but has not yet been de-restricted for dissemination to the public (see links below for access to a leaked version).

In addition to a suspension of reprocessing and enrichment, Resolution 1696 requires Iran to cooperate with essentially whatever transparency measures are demanded by the IAEA.  It also incorporated by reference an IAEA board resolution that, among other things, asked Iran to reconsider a heavy water reactor, which when completed could serve as a source of plutonium for atomic weapons.  Construction on an Iranian heavy water reactor is reportedly still underway.

Multilateral engagement of the matter has been gradual and incremental, and within the UN system now involves UN partners, the UNSC and the IAEA, acting in synergy and partnership, with the IAEA reporting in parallel to both.  The UNSC has acted to reinforce the IAEA, throwing its legal and political authority behind the IAEA to bolster the IAEA beyond its traditionally more limited authority and functions.  Especially in unique cases like Iran, where bad faith has been shown by now-admitted past years of concealment, the key will be the extent to which the IAEA can function more like a proactive watchdog, rather than simply an accountant auditing a narrow range of previously revealed activities.  In addition to UN-based engagement, a multilateral diplomatic initiative by the “P5+1,” spearheaded by Europe’s EU-3, Britain, France and Germany, also has been endorsed by the UNSC in Resolution 1696, as well as the G8 countries at the recent G8 summit.  P5+1 refers to the five veto-wielding permanent members of the UNSC -- Britain, France, the United States, Russia and China -- plus non-UNSC member Germany. 

The prospect has been raised that Germany and Japan be made UNSC permanent members, and it bears noting that, with nonproliferation among the most urgent international security issues facing the UNSC, Germany has helped provide leadership addressing the Iranian matter while Japan has participated in six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear program, and helped provide leadership on passing a UNSC resolution on North Korean missile tests.

The P5+1 diplomatic initiative includes an offer of incentives, such as assistance with an Iranian civilian nuclear energy program, in exchange for Iranian cooperation and Iran’s acceptance that it will not have an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle.  Iranian suspension of uranium reprocessing and enrichment is a precondition to a resumption of formal talks.

[Click here to read the text of "P-5+1" offer to Iran.]

Iran persists in arguing that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) grants it an unconditional right to proliferation-sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities, despite the treaty’s primary focus on nonproliferation, the conditioning of access to a nuclear energy program on nonproliferation and cooperation with nonproliferation safeguards, and the fact that, even where compliance with safeguards means there might be a right to nuclear energy, nowhere in the NPT or NPT safeguards regime is there explicit reference to the notion that a right to nuclear energy includes a right to the entire nuclear fuel cycle, or those portions of a nuclear fuel cycle which, if unrestricted, by their very nature could defeat the entire purpose of the NPT.

Under the UN Charter the UNSC, as the UN organ with competence to address matters impacting peace and security, can impose obligations on member states.  As mentioned above, in this case the UNSC took the historically rare step of explicitly invoking UN Charter Chapter VII, which international legal scholars generally would regard as making clear that a resolution was binding under international law.

Further reading:

Daniel Dombey and Stephen Fidler, “US says Iran must face ‘consequences’,” Financial Times, Aug. 31, 2006, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/95b60d46-3909-11db-
a21d-0000779e2340.html

Mark Heinrich, “UN body says Iran fails to meet deadline,” Reuters, Aug. 31, 2006, http://today.reuters.com/misc/PrinterFriendlyPopup.aspx?type=
topNews&storyID=2006-08-31T170054Z_01_L29427617_
RTRUKOC_0_US-NUCLEAR-IRAN.xml

Kenneth Katzman, “Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses,” Congressional Research Service, July 31, 2006, Order Code RL32048, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL32048.pdf

[New non-public IAEA report on Iranian nuclear Program:] “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director General,” International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2006/53, Aug. 31, 2006,
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/
iran/IAEAreport31August2006.pdf

Patrick Donahue, “Iran Pursues Uranium Enrichment, UN Inspectors Say (Update2),” Bloomberg, Aug. 31, 2006, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=
aQGQKOSAOVQo&refer=home#

Text of "P-5+1" offer to Iran, http://www.iranwatch.org/international/UNSC/
unsc-p6proposal-s2006521-071306.pdf

“Timeline: Iran Nuclear Crisis,” Fox News, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,211517,00.html

United Nations Charter, Chapter 6, http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter6.htm

United Nations Charter, Chapter 7, http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm

Steven C. Welsh, “Iranian Nuclear Program: UN Security Council Resolution requires Iran to suspend uranium efforts,” Center for Defense Information, Aug. 7, 2006, http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?
documentID=3610&from_page=../program/document.cfm