Director General Mohamed ElBaradei has issued a brief report updating the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors on IAEA activities relating to Iran since his last report of April 28, 2006, which also contains some fresh revelations.   The report comes in anticipation of an IAEA Board of Governors meeting set to begin June 12, 2006, in Vienna, Austria. 

The report, not yet made public, indicates the resumption of Iranian nuclear fuel cycle activities, as well as the detection of a small number of particles of natural and highly enriched uranium apparently not previously uncovered.   In addition, as the Iranian regime continues to review an EU-U.S. proposal offering incentives to abandon some of the more proliferation-sensitive aspects of the Iranian nuclear program, it appears Iran’s relationship with the IAEA continues to be marked by partial cooperation and stonewalling, perhaps dialed back further in retaliation for the IAEA working in partnership with the UN Security Council (UNSC).  In addition to the involvement of IAEA, and efforts to resume other multilateral diplomatic engagement, the Iranian matter still remains before the UNSC.

A U.S. State Department spokesman has suggested the prospect of Iran taking weeks, not months, to review the EU-U.S. proposal.

Highlights of the June 8, 2006, IAEA Report and link to text

Some highlights of the latest IAEA report follow.  [click here to read the text of the June 8, 2006, IAEA report (PDF) in its entirety]

HEU contamination detected on equipment, connection to Lavizan-Shian site

The IAEA reports that environmental sampling on equipment at a technical university, apparently connected with a scientist who had headed up the Physics Research Centre at the Lavizan-Shian site, has turned up evidence of natural and highly enriched uranium, despite Iranian claims the equipment was not associated with nuclear activities.  The IAEA notes that Iran is still trying to discern how to answer the findings, while not being forthcoming at providing assistance in investigating activities at the old Physics Research Centre:

16. With reference to the environmental samples taken from some equipment at a technical university in January 2006 mentioned in paragraph 25 of GOV/2006/27, analysis of those samples showed a small number of particles of natural and high enriched uranium. On 16 May 2006, Iran responded to the Agency’s requests for clarification stating, inter alia, that, as mentioned during the visit of inspectors to Tehran on 27 January 2006, the equipment had not been acquired for or used in the field of nuclear activities. Iran indicated that it was, however, investigating how such particles might have been found in the equipment.

17. Iran has not yet responded to the Agency’s requests for clarifications concerning, and access to carry out environmental sampling of, other equipment and materials related to the Physics Research Centre (PHRC) (see GOV/2006/27, paras 24–25). Iran has also not provided the Agency access to interview the other former Head of the PHRC. The clarification and access sought by the Agency have taken on added importance in light of the results of the environmental sampling referred to in paragraph 16 above.

Report by the Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2006/38, June 8, 2006, http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/IAEAreport8June06.pdf (emphasis added).

Document on processing uranium metal into hemispheres for nuclear weapons component

Previous IAEA reports revealed the discovery in Iran of a document describing procedures for developing uranium metal into hemispheres in connection with the fabrication of nuclear weapons components.  The IAEA previously reported Iran’s willingness to examine the document and place it under IAEA seal, but continues to complain that Iran will not furnish a copy:

7. With the assistance of some Member States, the Agency is carrying out investigations on information and documentation which may have been provided to Iran by foreign intermediaries (GOV/2006/27, paras 15–16). To understand the full scope of the offers made by the intermediaries to Iran, it is still necessary for the Agency to have a copy of the 15-page document describing the procedures for the reduction of UF6 to uranium metal and the casting and machining of enriched and depleted uranium metal into hemispheres. Iran has yet to provide the Agency with a copy of that document.

Report by the Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2006/38, June 8, 2006, http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/IAEAreport8June06.pdf 

Timetable for cooperation not forthcoming

Iran sent the IAEA an April 28, 2006, letter promising to provide, within three weeks, a timetable under which Iran would resolve remaining outstanding issues raised by the IAEA.  No such timetable has been provided.  Note that Iran’s letter apparently attempted to condition Iranian cooperation upon Iran’s nuclear dossier remaining, in full, within the IAEA framework, and the Iranian matter now not only remains with the IAEA but also is before the UNSC.

Earlier-detected contamination

The IAEA reports no further progress resolving issues relating to previously detected contamination indicating the presence of enriched uranium.  It adds that Iran’s decision to stop complying with the signed but unratified Additional Protocol, providing somewhat more intrusive inspections, impedes efforts to assure the international community that there are not undeclared Iranian nuclear activities:

4. There has been no further progress on the resolution of the contamination issue (GOV/2006/27, paras 8–9). As indicated in the Director General’s previous report, given the difficulty of establishing a definitive conclusion in connection with this long outstanding issue, a full understanding of the scope and chronology of Iran’s centrifuge enrichment programme, as well as full implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency the Additional Protocol, are necessary for the Agency to be able to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.

The contamination at issue most likely is connected to the investigations that “blew the lid” on the secret Iranian nuclear program in the first place.  When IAEA environmental sampling revealed the process of enriched uranium inside Iran, Tehran, in order to explain away the findings, had been forced to disclose previously concealed imports of centrifuges, arguing the contamination related to nuclear fuel cycle activities occurring on the equipment before it got to Iran.

Additional centrifuge issues

Iran has not provided any additional information on P-1 and P-2 centrifuge technology but the IAEA has continued efforts to investigate.

Iranian officials made public statements about work on new types of centrifuges prompting the IAEA to seek clarification as to what was happening.  Iran has not responded to an April 24, 2006, IAEA letter on the matter.

Plutonium separation

The IAEA in a May 5, 2006, letter pointed out inconsistencies between Iranian explanations over plutonium separation experiments in an April 17, 2006, letter and the IAEA’s actual findings.  Iran on June 6, 2006, provided fresh explanations and a researcher’s logbook, both now are undergoing further IAEA assessment.

Heavy water reactor at Arak site

The IAEA notes the continued construction of Iran’s heavy water reactor, a reactor of a type that can result in the creation of weapons-grade plutonium, distinct from the light-water reactors reportedly being offered in the EU-U.S. incentives package.

Uranium processing and enrichment

Uranium conversion facility

The IAEA reports that it has been inspecting Iran’s publicly declared uranium conversion facility (UCF) and that all uranium hexafluoride at the facility is under IAEA containment and surveillance, that assessment and analysis is still being completed, but that Iran on June 6, 2006, initiated a new uranium conversion campaign.

Pilot fuel enrichment plant

It further reports that has inspected Iran’s pilot fuel enrichment plant (PFEP), where it has been taking samples to determine the level of enrichment that has been occurring.

At PFEP Iran has:

• fed uranium hexafluoride into a single centrifuge
• fed uranium hexafluoride into a 10-centrifuge cascade
• started feeding uranium hexafluoride into a 164-centrifuge cascade
• continued installing additional 164-centrifuge cascades

The IAEA notes that Iran is permitting some IAEA safeguards at the PFEP but that the IAEA wants more:

12. The enrichment process and product at PFEP, including the feed and withdrawal stations, are covered by Agency containment and surveillance measures. However, Iran has thus far declined to discuss implementation at PFEP of remote monitoring, which is an important verification measure in certain enrichment facilities.

Fuel enrichment plant

The IAEA notes that Iran continues construction of its larger scale fuel enrichment plant (FEP) at Natanz, where it has been permitted to conduct design information verification.

Additional protocol

The IAEA points out that Iran has not been implementing provisions of the signed but unratified Additional Protocol since Feb. 5, 2006.

Additional reading:

Edmund Blair, “Iran says threats will not work in nuclear talks,” Reuters, June 8, 2006, http://today.reuters.com/misc/PrinterFriendlyPopup.aspx?type=
topNews&storyID=2006-06-08T174504Z_01_L13443169
_RTRUKOC_0_US-NUCLEAR-IRAN.xml

Paul Brannan and David Albright, “ISIS Imagery Brief: Update on Construction Activities at Arak 40 MW Heavy Water Reactor,” Institute for Science and International Security, April 21, 2006, http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/arakupdate.pdf

Sean McCormack, Spokesman, Daily Press Briefing, State Department, June 7, 2006, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2006/67690.htm

“Press Arrangements for IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Starting 12 June 2006,” International Atomic Energy Agency, Media Advisory 2006/07, May 31, 2006, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/MediaAdvisory/2006/MA200607.html

Report by the Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2006/15, Feb. 27, 2006, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-15.pdf

Report by the Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2006/27, April 26, 2006, http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/IAEAreport28Apr06.pdf

Report by the Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2006/38, June 8, 2006, http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/IAEAreport8June06.pdf