Introduction :: Chapter VII :: Enrichment suspension issue and recent steps :: Details of recent IAEA and UNSC actions :: Draft resolution :: Lead actors, P5+1 and UNSC members :: Military Action

[Click here for short related article on flexible UN Security Council authorities under Chapter VII of the UN Charter]

Introduction

Efforts to draft a UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution on Iran may still be in a holding pattern amid European efforts to offer a package of “carrots and sticks,” one reportedly including the offer of a European light water nuclear reactor and a demand that Iran give up an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle, already ridiculed in blustery fashion by Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.  UNSC permanent members, along with Germany, are to discuss the Iranian matter in London on May 19, 2006.  According to May 12, 2006, news reports, anonymous diplomats have alleged that IAEA environmental sampling has detected new traces of highly enriched uranium in Iran, implying the existence of further undeclared nuclear activity.  The level of enrichment reportedly is higher than levels associated with nuclear reactor fuel, and closer to levels suitable for nuclear warheads. 

Meanwhile, continuing to praise Libya for abandoning its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and longer-range missiles, the United States is undertaking a process to reestablish normal relations with the oil-rich North African nation.

The United States, Britain and France, working with China, Russia, and non-UNSC member Germany, most likely will be seeking consensus on a UNSC resolution calling for Iran to halt uranium enrichment and cooperate more fully with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) investigations.  An early draft would also caution states to avoid proliferation-sensitive trade with Iran.  Under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) a “right” to nuclear energy is conditioned upon nonproliferation and compliance with NPT safeguards under the watch of the IAEA, a UNSC partner within the UN system.  In the case of Iran the key will be whether Iran, a state sponsor of terrorism already in past NPT noncompliance, can develop nuclear energy in a manner consistent with international law and concerns for international peace and security.

One long-term question relevant not just to Iran, but the vitality of the UN system and its capacity to promote international peace and security, is the degree to which the UNSC helps the IAEA be more of a proactive nuclear watchdog, not just an auditor of a limited range of known nuclear materials and activities that sometimes follows additional leads.  The Iranian track record with IAEA investigations in recent years has been a pattern of partial cooperation and foot-dragging, following what was revealed to previously have been decades of concealment and deception.  At the same time, even limited IAEA access, combined with leaks by opposition groups, has provided the IAEA with periodic breakthroughs.  It would be interesting to see if even partial renewed cooperation by Iran, forced by the UNSC bolstering IAEA authority, unwittingly provided additional IAEA-led progress.

Recall that the current chapter in the Iranian saga started with IAEA environmental sampling detecting evidence of enriched uranium, forcing Iran to admit to having concealed a centrifuge program, and then only because this was the easiest way to explain away the environmental findings, when Iran argued that the contamination was from activities carried out elsewhere on imported centrifuges (an issue still yet to be fully settled).  The need for more aggressive IAEA investigative powers, however, has been confirmed again and again, with apparent Iranian efforts to stymie even existing IAEA efforts at places like the old military site at Lavizan I.  When, after uncovering documentation for equipment that was both useful to a nuclear weapons program and inconsistent with Iranian representations about the site, the IAEA requested a visit.  Iran responded by refusing and then delaying the visit, in the meantime hauling off all the site’s equipment, tearing down the buildings, hauling off the rubble, scraping away a layer of earth, and hauling off the dirt.  Such moves prompted speculation Iran had something to hide and that Iran feared the IAEA’s prowess at, for example, environmental sampling.  The latest leaks by diplomats, however, suggest Iran’s efforts may not have been enough, with traces of enriched uranium allegedly found on equipment associated with that site that the IAEA apparently might have been able to track down after all.

Chapter VII

The proposed UNSC resolution would be brought under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and be legally binding.  While Chapter VII includes provisions authorizing the UNSC to take a flexible range of investigative and other nonmilitary and military measures to address matters impacting peace and security, the resolution at present might not be envisioned as calling for sanctions or the use of force.  Whether the current, next stage, or any stage of UNSC resolutions involves sanctions is a subject of controversy.

A legally binding UNSC resolution of any kind would be the next step in what has been a gradual, incremental process aimed at building greater synergy between the UNSC and IAEA. The UNSC and IAEA are partners within the UN system, and the UNSC has the capacity to bolster and augment the IAEA’s capacity to address the challenge posed by Iran.

While the IAEA has lamented that the customary scope of its legal authority and investigative activities are not sufficient to fully address the Iranian controversy, the UNSC can use its broader, more flexible authority under the UN Charter to bolster and augment the IAEA, in effect adding its own authority to, and reinforcing, that of the IAEA.  For example, the UNSC can require special steps of Iran and look to the IAEA to help carry them out.  As such the involvement of the UNSC and IAEA is not an “either-or” proposition.

[Click here for short related article on flexible UN Security Council authorities under Chapter VII of the UN Charter]

Consensus on the Iran resolution does not appear imminent and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice previously mentioned the prospect of investing weeks in developing the resolution and assuring its passage.

Suspension of enrichment and recent steps

The proposed UNSC resolution comes amidst continued Iranian intransigence in the face of a March 29, 2006, UNSC Presidential Statement that endorsed calls by the IAEA Board of Governors for Iran to suspend uranium enrichment and take other measures. 

While Iran insists its nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes, uranium enrichment has long been a focus of European and U.S. attention as one crucial, dangerous step in any potential Iranian nuclear weapons program.  The same nuclear fuel cycle that can produce material suitable for a nuclear reactor for power generation can, if used to enrich uranium to higher levels, be used to produce weapons-grade material suitable for a warhead.  As mentioned above, one of the developments that led to the unveiling of decades of Iranian concealment and deception was IAEA environmental sampling in Iran that detected evidence of enrichment.  To explain away the evidence, Iran was forced to admit it had imported centrifuges from an outside source as part of activities it had never admitted to previously.  In that instance Iran argued that contamination on the centrifuges was from enrichment activity that had occurred before the centrifuges arrived, one of a variety of questions that still have not been answered fully. 

Iranian President Ahmadinejad, a foreign policy neophyte with a background in local politics and the Revolutionary Guards, on May 8, 2006, sent a letter to President George W. Bush through Swiss intermediaries, possibly aimed at reestablishing or enhancing relations between their two countries.  It also comes amid recent efforts by media, claiming to have connections to the Iranian regime, to become active in Washington, D.C.  But the Ahmadinejad letter does not propose solutions to the nuclear controversy.  At the same time, setting aside its rambling, blustery nature, the gesture itself may hint at Iranian nervousness over U.S. intentions. 

Iran’s greatest solace in the current controversy ironically may turn out to be UNSC involvement.  Continued UN Security Council-IAEA engagement of the Iranian issue has the potential, and is called, to provide a robust multilateral diplomatic, investigative and proactive alternative to preemptive unilateralism.

Details of recent IAEA-UNSC steps

In the present case the IAEA and UNSC already have undertaken the following: 

• the IAEA Board of Governors in its most recent resolutions spelled out some of what it needs from Iran and included these steps in its UNSC referral of the Iranian matter;
• the UNSC, acting by consensus, issued a March 29, 2006, Presidential Statement reinforcing the IAEA board by indicating its agreement with those steps;
• the UNSC in that statement called on Iran to comply, albeit not yet in a legally binding UNSC resolution; and
• the IAEA and UNSC are now part of the same information flow, with IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei reporting in parallel to both bodies.

Steps called for by Iran

The IAEA Board of Governors indicated, and the UNSC Presidential Statement endorsed, that Iran should:

• suspend uranium processing and enrichment (a continuum which starts with uranium and ends with enriched uranium that, enriched to one level, provides reactor fuel and, enriched to a higher level, can provide weapons-grade uranium suitable for a nuclear warhead);
• reconsider the construction of a heavy-water reactor, which also can be used to produce weapons-grade material, in the form of plutonium;
• ratify and implement the Additional Protocol, providing somewhat more extensive inspections than traditional IAEA safeguards agreements, and in the meantime act as if the Additional Protocol is already in force; and
• essentially provide the IAEA whatever access and assistance it deems necessary:
  
   

implement transparency measures, as requested by the Director General, including in GOV/2005/67, which extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, and include such access to individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military-owned workshops and research and development as the Agency may request in support of its ongoing investigations.[1]

(emphasis added)

UNSC-IAEA partnership and UN legal frameworks 

The IAEA and UNSC partnership is a manifestation of legal frameworks defining the UN system, such as the UN Charter and Statute of the IAEA.  While the Presidential Statement gave a strong, unified message, the UNSC resolution currently under consideration would be legally binding, brought under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the part of the Charter also granting the UNSC flexible authority and discretion to proactively address matters impacting international peace and security with a range of options.  The Statute of the IAEA mandates notification or reporting to the UNSC of matters impacting peace and security as well as noncompliance with IAEA safeguards.  The UN framework therefore envisions a cooperative arrangement between the IAEA and UNSC on security matters and other circumstances involving safeguards noncompliance.  At the same time, note that under Chapter VII force is not an option of first-consideration.

[Click here for short related article on flexible UN Security Council authorities under Chapter VII of the UN Charter]

While Iran claims a “right” to nuclear energy, under the NPT such a right is conditioned upon nonproliferation and compliance with IAEA safeguards, with which Iran has been in breach in the past.

Draft UNSC resolution

The resolution would require suspension of enrichment and call upon the international community to exercise care not to trade with Iran in goods with proliferation implications.  Such a resolution, like the March 29, 2006, UNSC Presidential Statement issued by consensus, would have as its aim the reinforcement of the IAEA and effective ratification of steps required of Iran by the IAEA Board of Governors. 

What the resolution apparently would not do is impose sanctions or authorize force.  It would draw a “line in the sand” which, if Iran crosses it, would represent a violation of international law, one more definitively and publicly established than, for example, whether Iran is, in fact, currently working on nuclear warheads.

Violation of a legally binding UNSC resolution might then lead to efforts to further restrict economic and material relationships with Iran, through mandatory sanctions, especially in areas potentially relevant to proliferation. 

Lead actors: P5+1 and UNSC non-permanent members 

UNSC referral has meant an even stronger role for the “P5+1.”  The P5 are the five veto-wielding UNSC permanent members: Britain, France and the United States, along with Russia and China.  Russia and China, of course, are Iranian economic partners, with Russia also being an Iranian nuclear contractor.  The “+1” is Germany which, along with Britain and France, has been part of the “EU-3” taking the lead in diplomatic engagement with Iran, including the 2004 Paris Agreement to suspend Iranian uranium enrichment, an agreement Iran later abrogated.  The P5+1 already have worked closely at the IAEA level, meeting separately as a group to discuss how to proceed within the IAEA Board of Governors.  Similarly, the progress of the current draft UNSC resolution is being accompanied by P5+1 discussions, including a May 8, 2006, dinner.

Germany’s involvement arguably serves as a reminder of the potential for future moves, as part of broader UN reform, for Germany to become a permanent member of the UNSC, perhaps accompanied by Japan, who by coincidence is presently a non-permanent member of the UNSC. 

The entire list of non-permanent members of the UNSC follows, along with the year in which their membership expires:

• Japan (2006)
• Qatar (2007)
• Greece (2006) 
• Slovakia (2007)           
• Denmark (2006)          
• Argentina (2006)
• Peru (2007)
• Congo (Republic of the) (2007)           
• United Republic of Tanzania (2006)
• Ghana (2007)              

Passage of a UNSC resolution on Iran would require the “yes” votes of a majority of UNSC members, and that all permanent members either vote “yes” or abstain.

Military Action

Hypothetical military action against an emerging threat, if brought under the UNSC framework, theoretically could be preemptive or preventive, but would require international consensus through a UNSC vote, and as mentioned above could not be taken as a strategy of first-consideration. 

Moreover, if a first-strike were to be undertaken at an earlier stage in the formation of a threat, when the prospect of the threat turning into a future attack was still nebulous, accurate threat assessment and accurate intelligence would be even more critical and could be all the more difficult to obtain.

Unilateral action against Iran under the current circumstances could strain the traditional concept of state-centered anticipatory self-defense, arguably beyond its previously understood limits.  Traditionally the concept of anticipatory self-defense by a state, the use of a first-strike against an enemy that, for its part, had not yet attacked, focused on the notion of being a defense against an attack by the enemy that itself was imminent and forthcoming. 

When the UN Charter raised the prospect of preemptive or preventive steps against a still-emerging threat by the UNSC, it did not extend that concept to preemptive actions by individual states.  Instead it reserved to individual states, in Article 51, an explicit right of self-defense, with anticipatory self-defense only implied.  And anticipatory self-defense traditionally has involved the concept of a first-strike being defensive if it is to forestall an attack that is imminent.

All leading parties involved continue to call for diplomatic solutions to the Iranian nuclear matter, and it should be remembered that the UNSC is, in fact, a diplomatic forum.  Europe, moreover, reportedly once again is seeking to prepare a package of “carrots and sticks” in parallel to engage the Iranians and encourage Iranian cooperation.  At the same time, additional investigation or a more robust nature is called for to create a better understanding of what goes on “on the ground” inside Iran, and to build trust and confidence.

Further Reading

President Mahmood Ahmadi-Najad, correspondence to President George W. Bush, undated (apparently sent May 8, 2006), http://medias.lemonde.fr/mmpub/edt/doc/20060509/769629
_lettre.pdf

Richard Beeston, “Don't treat Iran like a child, angry president tells Europe,” London Times Online, May 18, 2006,  http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,251-2185495,00.html

Edmund Blair, “Bush declines to exclude nuclear strike on Iran,” Reuters, April 18, 2006, http://today.reuters.com/news/newsArticle.aspx?
type=worldNews&storyID=2006-04-18T150711Z
_01_L17370115_RTRUKOC_0_US-NUCLEAR-IRAN.xml

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns, “United States Policy Toward Iran,” Opening Statement before the House International Relations Committee, March 8, 2006, http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2006/62779.htm

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns and Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph, “Briefing on the Iran Nuclear Issue,” April 21, 2006, http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2006/64945.htm

President George W. Bush, “President Bush Nominates Rob Portman as OMB Director and Susan Schwab for USTR ,” news conference, Washington, D.C., April 18, 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/04/20060418-1.html

Louis Charbonneau, “EU powers to offer Iran reactor for atom deal: sources,” Reuters, May 16, 2006, http://today.reuters.com/misc/PrinterFriendlyPopup.aspx?type=
topNews&storyID=2006-05-16T185617Z_01_L13443169
_RTRUKOC_0_US-NUCLEAR-IRAN.xml

“Hiroshima and Nagasaki Yields,” Secrecy News, Federation of American Scientists, Aug. 4, 2005, http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/2005/08/080405.html#3

“Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report of the Director General,” GOV/2006/27, International Atomic Energy Agency, April 28, 2006, http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/
IAEAreport28Apr06.pdf

“In Focus: IAEA and Iran,” International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran News Center home page, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/index.shtml

“ISIS Imagery Brief: Destruction at Iranian Site Raises New Questions About Iran's Nuclear Activities,” June 17, 2004, Institute for Science and International Security, http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/lavizanshian.html

Evelyn Leopold and Carol Giacomo, “Major powers back to drawing board on Iran,” Reuters, May 9, 2006, http://today.reuters.com/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=
topNews&storyID=2006-05-09T192356Z_01_N09243624_
RTRUKOC_0_US-NUCLEAR-IRAN.xml

“Libya’s Decision To Eliminate WMD and MTCR-Class Missile Programs: An International Model,” State Department fact sheet, May 15, 2006, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/66245.htm

“Membership in 2006,” UN Security Council, http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp

“Nagasaki remembers atomic attack,” BBC, Aug. 9, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4133572.stm

“Nuclear Weapon Database: United States Arsenal: Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons Systems,” Center for Defense Information, http://www.cdi.org/issues/nukef&f/
database/usnukes.html#nonstrat

Pham-Duy Nguyen, Mark Shenk, “Gold Tops $700, Oil Exceeds $71 on Iran Nuclear Plan Concern,” Bloomberg, May 9, 2006, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=71000001&refer
=home&sid=aRBWQjrIpx.E

Lisa Schein, “US Continues to Seek Diplomatic Solution to Iran Nuclear Issue,” Voice of America, May 9, 2006, http://voanews.com/english/2006-05-09-voa38.cfm

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America [2002], Section V, Sept. 17, 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss5.html

The National Security of the United States of America [2006], Section VI, March 16, 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/sectionV.html

“Security Council, in Presidential Statement, Underlines Important of Iran’s Re-Establishing Fully, Sustained Suspension of Uranium-Enrichment Activities: Calls on Iran to Take Steps Required by IAEA Board Of Governors; Requests Report from IAEA Director General in 30 Days,” UN Security Council news release (including text of Presidential Statement itself), March 29, 2006, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8679.doc.htm

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Interview with the Associated Press Editorial Board, State Department transcript, May 9, 2006, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/65975.htm#iran

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, “Remarks With Javier Solana, Secretary General of the Council of the European Union and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Before Their Meeting,” State Department transcript, May 10, 2006, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/66069.htm

Emma Thomasson, “ElBaradei urges compromise on Iran,” Reuters, May 11, 2006, http://today.reuters.com/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=
topNews&storyID=2006-05-11T145327Z_01_
L11713188_RTRUKOC_0_US-NUCLEAR-IRAN.xml

Jonathan Tirone, “Iran May Be Offered EU Reactor to End Uranium Work (Update3),” Bloomberg, May 16, 2006, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=71000001&refer
=europe&sid=aTBcQ2_c3WXA

United Nations Charter, Chapter 7, http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm

Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs C. David Welch, Coordinator for Counterterrorism Henry A. Crumpton, and Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance and Implementation Paula A. DeSutter, “Issues Related to United States Relations With Libya,” State Department transcript, May 15, 2006, http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/2006/66268.htm

Steven C. Welsh, “IAEA formally refers Iranian matter to UN Security Council,” Center for Defense Information, International Security Law Project, Feb. 27, 2006, http://www.cdi.org/news/law/iran-iaea-referral.cfm

Steven C. Welsh, “IAEA on Iran: recent and pending action and legal parameters,” Center for Defense Information, International Security Law Project, Feb. 2, 2006, http://www.cdi.org/news/law/iran-iaea-020206.cfm

Steven C. Welsh, “Iran reportedly beefing up against preemptive strikes on nuclear facilities; Revolutionary Guard lawyers pushing construction contracts,” Center for Defense Information, International Security Law Project, Jan. 31, 2006, http://www.cdi.org/news/law/iran-bunkers.cfm

Steven C. Welsh, “Iran’s Nuclear Program and International Legal Instruments: IAEA Statute,” Center for Defense Information, International Security Law Project, Nov. 24, 2004, http://www.cdi.org/news/law/iaea-statute.cfm

Steven C. Welsh, “Iranian Nuclear Activities: IAEA Board of Governors Considers UN Security Council Notification,” Center for Defense Information, International Security Law Project, Sept. 23, 2005, http://www.cdi.org/news/law/iran-nuclear-0905.cfm

Steven C. Welsh, “The Iranian Nuclear Program, International Law, and Russia,” Center for Defense Information, International Security Law Project, Nov. 23, 2004, http://www.cdi.org/news/law/iran-russia-nuclear.cfm

Steven C. Welsh, “Newest IAEA report on Iran cites continued concerns in anticipation of full UNSC consideration,” Center for Defense Information, International Security Law Project, March 3, 2006, http://www.cdi.org/news/law/iran-iaea-030306.cfm

Steven C. Welsh, “Preemptive War, International Law & the 2006 National Security Strategy,” Center for Defense Information, International Security Law Project, March 16, 2006, http://www.cdi.org/news/law/preemptive-war-031606.cfm

Steven C. Welsh, “Preemptive War and International Law,” Center for Defense Information, International Security Law Project, Dec. 5, 2003, http://www.cdi.org/news/law/preemptive-war.cfm

“Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),” http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Treaties/npt.html