Introduction

Overshadowed by the U.S.-led war in Iraq, the conflict in Afghanistan quietly suffered through its most deadly year since the start of operations in late 2001. Similar to the war in Iraq, the original victory and quick defeat of the former government has transformed into a dangerous insurgent war. Higher casualty rates in Afghanistan last year created skepticism amongst analysts over statements made by U.S. military officials in Afghanistan claiming that the Taliban threat was nearing its end. If the statistics serve as a valid indicator, then concern over the ‘resurging Taliban threat’ in Afghanistan is legitimate. Despite this concern, 2006 will reveal if the Taliban are actually making a comeback. After being easily overpowered and sent deep into the Hindu-Kush mountains by U.S. forces in 2001 and 2002, the Taliban were finally able to regroup and conduct a full year of insurgent warfare in 2005.  Another full year of Taliban insurgency will offer analysts a true perspective on who is winning the battle over Afghan security, the U.S. and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) forces or the Taliban and their allies.

Terrorist/Taliban Tactics Intensify and Transform in 2005

The death toll of all war related deaths in Afghanistan is consistently reported at nearing 1,500 for the year the 2005, making it by far the most deadly year since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom in late 2001.

The swift initial U.S. victory in 2001 and consequent Taliban exodus is a faint memory when compared to the dangerous threat the ‘enemies of Afghanistan’ posed in 2005. (‘Enemies of Afghanistan’ is a termed used by Afghan government officials to describe the Taliban and other affiliated groups such as al-Qaida and Hezb-i-Islami.) On Dec. 9, 2003, the United States launched a major ground assault in the eastern and southern provinces of Afghanistan.[1] Two years later, these mountainous and lawless regions still provide the necessary terrain to hide from advancing U.S. forces. The ground offensive that began over two years ago continues amidst Taliban guerillas whom are increasingly deadly and progressive.

U.S. troop deaths in Afghanistan increased nearly two fold in 2005, from 51 deaths in 2004 to 99 in 2005. ISAF forces also suffered an increase in troop deaths despite NATO’s sole confinement to peacekeeping missions focused around military and civilian Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), as compared to the U.S. forces that conduct highly dangerous anti-insurgency operations. ISAF suffered the loss of 30 soldiers last year compared to nine in 2004. [2]

U.S. military officials recognize the recent trend of Taliban attacks. Col. Jim Yonts, the U.S. military spokesman in Afghanistan, explained that the Taliban are using suicide attacks and improvised explosive devices (IED) “out of desperation” as U.S. forces continue to take ground in the hostile eastern and southern provinces. Yonts added that the Taliban “only lose one person in a suicide attack, not 10 or 15,” as they might lose when facing coalition forces in more conventional fighting.[3]

For U.S. officials, this trend is a sign of desperation from a severely weakened enemy. Critics of this view argue that the individual strike insurgency plan is only strengthening the resolve of the Taliban, and allows it to recruit and grow in numbers and influence.

Meanwhile, U.S. forces continue their relentless pursuit of the Taliban in the mountain provinces east and south of Kabul and are not allowing them to gain back any physical territory. Clearly, conventional conflict with coalition forces isn’t a viable option for the outmatched Taliban, if they intend to survive. That said, it is clear that the Taliban have regrouped since being pushed out of Afghanistan. The increase in hostile actions and rising death toll of 2005 is evidence of a full-fledged insurgency finally taking form. Until midway through 2004, for example, there were only three IED attack related deaths in Afghanistan. Since then, there have been 33 IED attack related deaths; 12 in 2004 and 21 in 2005.[4]

The ground gained by the Taliban in 2005 is therefore not physical, but psychological. The suicide attacks, abductions and IED threat are a daily worry for security forces and Afghan citizens. Recently, the Dutch government has seriously considered reversing an agreement to send more troops for a scheduled move to the southern Uruzgan province because of the rising threat, especially the recent spike of attacks targeting ISAF forces over the past few months.[5]

Similarly, Afghan citizens must deal with the consequences of the resurgent Taliban. In places like Helmand province in southern Afghanistan, where security forces are lower in numbers than other areas, the Taliban use fear to motivate rural citizens to do their will. Recently, in the town of Khanishin, a message appeared one morning on the doors of all the buildings in town saying “Cultivate the poppy or we will come and kill you.” It was signed “The Taliban.” [6]

This latter report demonstrates that the Taliban, who once banned opium production when they controlled Afghanistan, are now using its proceeds to buy weapons. With minimal security and unhindered poppy production in Helmand province, not much will change until ISAF forces arrive in bigger numbers next year. U.S. Gen. James L. Jones, the top U.S. NATO military officer, argues that “the number one problem in Afghanistan is drugs.”[7] The destabilizing drug quandary matched with Taliban rebels terrorizing rural townships reveal that there is still much to be done on Afghanistan’s security checklist.

The head of the French Army, Gen. Henri Bentegeat, has noted that another key problem is foreign fighters. He argues, “The threat has changed. Today there are no longer the groups of organized terrorists that move around in gangs as was the case only one year ago. Instead, what has appeared and poses today a general problem of security is the individual attacks, suicide attacks or attacks with homemade bombs or mines.” For Bentegeat the increase in suicide attacks is evidence that foreign fighters are returning to Afghanistan to support the Taliban cause. He said, “Suicide attacks are not at all an Afghan practice.” [8] This statement is often made because the majority of Afghan Islamic leaders disprove of such a practice.

For many analysts, the emergence of IED and suicide attacks point towards the ‘Iraqisation’ of Afghanistan; i.e., the shift toward Iraqi insurgency tactics. Yet, this comparison does not address or accurately represent the threat in Afghanistan. In Iraq during 2005, there were 428 IED attack deaths for U.S. forces compared to just 21 for both U.S. and ISAF troops in Afghanistan.[9] Still, government officials and military leaders in Afghanistan confront the changed nature of the violence there with concern, desiring to quell the current trend before the day comes when a realistic comparison can be made between the Afghan security situation and that in Iraq.

Afghanistan Police Take the Brunt of Taliban Assaults.

The rash of suicide bombings and fatal IED blasts, and the focus by coalition leaders on the changed nature of the insurgency in 2005, unfortunately served to overshadow the heavy casualties incurred by the Afghan National Police (ANP).

The most devastating of these attacks occurred the night of Oct. 11 when Taliban rebels ambushed a police convoy in Helmand province. During the night-long fire fight, 19 police officers were killed, including the deputy police chief from Helmand province.  Another five individuals were kidnapped and almost certainly subsequently killed. The Taliban escaped, most likely to the rugged mountain terrain along the Afghan-Pakistan border.

This type of hit and run attack is becoming familiar for the ANP. Of the seven major reports of Taliban and Afghan police confrontations in October, six were ambush attacks. Five of these were deadly assaults targeting police vehicle convoys.

For the time being, the Taliban have seemingly found a soft military target in the ANP -- and are increasingly taking advantage. For example, in August 2005, 12 Afghan police were killed in conflict with Taliban forces; in September that number increased to 28; and in October, the toll rose to 47 Afghan police officers and 17 wounded.[10]

There are two reasons for the rising casualty rate among the ANP.

First, Afghan police forces provide an easier target compared to the highly trained and effective U.S. soldiers and their Afghan counterparts. The Task Force Police training unit continued to offer a five week illiterate police course until January of 2006.  With the arrival of 2006, all training courses will be literate-based and last nine weeks. The reading course is beneficial because trainees who can study security related materials on their own have increased potential to obtain a greater wealth of security-related knowledge that can be taken to the field and disseminated to other police. Not to mention that there are disadvantages in teaching and instructing people who can’t read.

Yet, even with the longer training the Afghan police security mandate is still a perilous task considering that the police are not only charged to maintain rule of law in Afghanistan’s historically militant society, but they also have to face the Taliban intrusions into local cities and villages. And unlike the Afghan National Army (ANA), the ANP do not work along side experienced U.S. soldiers on a daily basis.

 Secondly, the presence of Afghan police in the local setting in Afghanistan directly conflicts with the goals of the Taliban; controlling and influencing the smaller rural towns throughout Afghanistan, especially in the southeast.

Afghan police forces are commissioned to provide local public security in their provinces. The chief of the ISAF Police Operation Division, U.S. Army Col. Barringer Wingard explained that: "A police force that has the public's support will better serve and protect the Afghan people.” He added, "The stability of Afghanistan depends on these new police officers.”[11] Obviously, therefore, the basic mission of the Afghan police forces clashes with Taliban objectives of controlling local townships and villages outside the range of U.S. and ISAF forces.

Just as obviously, the hopes of the insurgency to bleeding government and supporting forces, resources and public support becomes more difficult to accomplish with the presence of a functioning national police force. Consistently engaging U.S. and Afghan soldiers has proven to be too difficult and deadly of a target to confront. Additionally, attacking too many citizens and community leaders directly could easily create a backlash from the public rather than support.

Therefore, Afghanistan’s police force provides a more natural and strategic target for the Taliban. In the coming year, increased police training initiatives and practical experience will help the young Afghan police force defend itself, and the population. Indeed, November 2005 already showed that some progress was being made, with the ANP foiling two Taliban ambush efforts. As noted by Wingard, strengthening the nascent police force is a critical initial step in Afghanistan’s civil society reconstruction process.

NATO to Expand Role in Afghanistan Despite Reservations

Despite concern over the intensification of Taliban attacks, NATO foreign ministers on Dec. 8, 2005 authorized a plan to expand NATO’s peacekeeping role in Afghanistan. NATO decided to send British, Canadian and Dutch troops into Afghanistan’s hostile southern provinces.

This decision marks the beginning of Stage 3 in NATO’s Afghan plan. The Stage 3 advancement will add an additional six provinces to routine NATO patrols, and at least four Provincial Reconstruction Teams and 6,000 more troops. These moves will bring NATO’s total troop number up to 15,000 and expand its operation to three-fourths of the country.[12]

NATO’s decision does not come without opposition in Europe. The Netherlands and the United Kingdom both have experienced internal government discord over expanding their roles into the hostile south. The concern stems from the high probability that NATO troops will potentially face frontline combat situations, whereas the NATO mandate is supposedly limited to a peacekeeping role. One NATO source said the Dutch wanted reassurance that they will have quick support from the United States, particularly and when the Taliban attack.[13] The view from the Netherlands is a sign in itself that the Taliban threat is being greeted with grave concern.

Taliban leaders, quick to recognize political weakness, are bound to focus their attacks on NATO forces moving into the south, hoping to cause political turmoil back in Europe. Before NATO’s Dec. 8 decision, a large spike of Taliban attacks on NATO forces demonstrated that the Taliban will do what they can to fuel concern among foreign governments with the hope of an eventual retraction of foreign troops.

In response to NATO’s decision to expand operations into southern Afghanistan, the United States decided to scale back its presence by about 2,500 troops from the current 19,000 troop deployment. [14] The U.S. withdrawal, according to U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, will not hinder nor detract from the offensive U.S. operations in the mountainous eastern provinces, where Taliban and al-Qaida forces hide out.

A main question for consideration in 2006 will revolve around the response by the European NATO forces and governments to an almost assured increase in casualty numbers as they move into the south. One source suggested that the Netherlands is already planning a pull out of military forces because of warning from military intelligence about the risks.[15]

British intelligence officials similarly warned that British troops in the southern Afghan provinces could sustain losses on a scale not seen since the Falklands war, where 255 British soldiers died in 1982. The reports apparently indicated that troops should prepare for a large offensive by al-Qaida and the Taliban, backed by sophisticated weapons and training from Iran.[16] 

In fact, the Dutch indecision over troop deployment to the hostile southern regions has overshadowed what has been similar British indecision. In November 2005, initial estimates of the 2006 British troop deployment reached upwards of 4,000 with heavy technical support, but now recent estimates suggest that only up to 1,200 soldiers will be deployed, with much less support. One source suggested that the main reason for the change in plans is the British government’s concern over possible casualties and the subsequent public reaction.[17]

Troops from Canada are in the process of transferring their main base into Kandahar; and the Canadian military fully realizes the different scope of the new southern Afghan mission. Canadian Col. S.J. Bowes said says Canada is prepared to handle the offensive nature of the operation. He said, "It's clear that this is not a peacekeeping mission."[18]  

Any signification reduction of NATO troops would be a serious blow to the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan and a moral victory that would only strengthen Taliban resolve. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams have real potential to help the Afghan people to step out of a society built on hundreds of years of corruption, wars and militant dictatorship. The southern provinces are currently a hotbed for the production of poppies and the corresponding illicit drug trade. Without NATO countries attempting to curb the reliance of opium production then the security threat will remain and increase. Needless to say, NATO’s continued advancement and efforts in southern Afghanistan could prove to be a real turning point in the country’s reconstruction.

Conclusion

At this stage in the reconstruction process, the future success is still largely dependent on the reduction of militant violence, whether by the Taliban or between long lasting localized militias. This security conflict with the Taliban during 2006 will set the tone for the pace and scope of civil society reconstruction over the next decade. This year’s events will reveal if the insurgency is truly growing in strength, influence and threat, or if the U.S. and international forces are actually providing the necessary security for an environment conducive to the growth of civil society in Afghanistan.