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A report compiled by the Center for Defense Information, co-sponsored by the Union of Concerned Scientists and Council for a Livable World, and released by Senator Jack Reed's office reveals that the problems that have plagued missile defense since the 1980s have persisted to today. The report was compiled by Victoria Samson, research analyst for CDI.
Independent Review Team Findings and Recommendations Presented to Director, Missile Defense Agency, March 31, 2005
http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/irt.pdf
Quote: “[T]he Independent Review Team recommends the Ground-based Midcourse Defense Program enter a new phase focused on Performance and Reliability Verification, in which the Missile Defense Agency makes test and mission success the primary objective. The new phase should validate the technical baseline, and be event-driven rather than schedule-driven.”
Missile Defense: The Current Debate, Congressional Research Service, Updated March 23, 2005.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL31111.pdf
Quote: “The development and deployment of missile defenses has not only been elusive, but has proven to be one of the most divisive issues of the past generation.”
Defense Acquisitions: Status of Missile Defense Programs in 2004, Government Accountability Office, GAO-05-243, March 31, 2005
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05243.pdf
Quote: “[T]he performance of the system remains uncertain and unverified, because a number of flight tests slipped into fiscal year 2005 and MDA has not successfully conducted an end-to-end flight test using operationally-representative hardware and software. Additionally…the development of the BMDS elements cost approximately $370 million more than planned during fiscal year 2004.”
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation FY2004 Annual Report, February 1, 2005 http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/DOTE_FY04.pdf
Quote: “Numerous ground tests and exercises have demonstrated system interconnectivity and limited interoperability. However, the components of BMDS remain immature. It is not possible to estimate the current mission capability of the BMDS with high confidence.”
Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and Accountability, Government Accountability Office, GAO-04-409, April 23, 2004
http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d04409high.pdf
Quote: “[T]he GMD element has not been tested under unscripted, operationally realistic conditions. Therefore, MDA faces the challenge of demonstrating whether the capabilities being fielded, consisting primarily of the GMD element, will perform as intended when the system becomes operational in 2004.”
Missile Defense: Actions Being Taken to Address Testing Recommendations, but Updated Assessment Needed, Government Accountability Office, GAO-04-254, February 26, 2004
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04254.pdf
Quote: “Predictions of how well the system will defeat long-range ballistic missiles are based on limited data. No component of the system to be fielded by September 2004 has been flight-tested in its deployed configuration. Significant uncertainties surround the capability to be fielded by September.”
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation FY2003 Annual Report, February 1, 2004
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/
budget/fy2003/fy03_DOTE_Annual_Report.pdf
Quote: “Due to the immature nature of the systems they emulate, models and simulations of the BMDS cannot be adequately validated at this time. Confidence in assessed capabilities will improve as more system performance data is gathered to anchor the simulations or directly demonstrate these capabilities.” Missile Defense: Additional Knowledge Needed in Developing System for Intercepting Long-Range Missiles, Government Accountability Office, GAO-03-600, August 21, 2003http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03600.pdf Quote: “Because the President directed DOD to begin fielding a ballistic missile defense system in 2004, MDA began GMD system integration with technologies whose maturity has not been demonstrated. As a result, there is a greater likelihood that critical technologies will not work as intended in planned flight tests. If this occurs, MDA may have to spend additional funds in an attempt to identify and correct problems by September 2004 or accept a less capable system.”
Information on Cancelled Integrated Flight Test-16 for Ground-based Midcourse Defense Element, Government Accountability Office, GAO-03-767R, May 8, 2003
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03767r.pdf
Quote: “[W]ith the cancellation of IFT-16, MDA expects to have a 13-month gap between IFT-15, planned for January 2004, and IFT-17, planned for February 2005.”
Knowledge-Based Practices are Being Adopted, but Risks Remain, Government Accountability Office, GAO-03-441, April 30, 2003
http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d03441high.pdf
Quote: “[T]he President’s directive to being fielding a missile defense capability by 2004 places MDA in danger of getting off track early and impairing the effort over the long term. This danger is highlighted by MDA’s decision to not follow some of its knowledge-based practices as it develops the first block of the system…While doing so may help MDA meet the President’s deadline, it also increases the potential that some elements may not work as intended.”
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation FY2002 Annual Report, February 1, 2003 http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/bmds.cfm
Quote: “Currently the planned test bed infrastructure for Block 2004 includes hardware and software components that are in active development. As the test bed matures and capabilities are demonstrated, an inherent defensive capability will develop. However, it will be very difficult to estimate operational availability or performance in real engagement conditions. This is a test bed, first and foremost.”
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Report in Support of the National Missile Defense Deployment Readiness Review, also known as the “Coyle report,” August 10, 2000
http://www.cdi.org/news/missile-defense/coyle.pdf
Quote: “The NMD program has experienced significant delays in development and testing. Unless the program is restructured, the proposed deployment schedule is not likely to be realized.”
Report of the National Missile Defense Review Committee, also known as the “second Welch report,” November 16, 1999
http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/report/1999/welsh.pdf
Quote: “It will take strong program management and top-level support to ensure that the performance requirements and basic system engineering and design functions are not sacrificed to the calendar since no decision will produce successful deployment until the system can be shown to perform as required.”
National Missile Defense: Even With Increased Funding Technical and Schedule Risks are High, Government Accountability Office, GAO/NSIAD-98-153, June 23, 1998
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/ns98153.pdf
Quote: “Since our December 1997 report, DOD has increased funding and revised NMD program plans to mitigate schedule and technical risks. However, program officials told us that even with the mitigation actions resulting from the increased funding, schedule and technical risks associated with a 2003 deployment remain high.”
Report of the Panel on Reducing Risk In Ballistic Missile Defense Flight Test Programs, also known as the “Welch report,” February 27, 1998
http://fas.org/spp/starwars/program/welch/index.html
Quote: “The rush to failure in flight testing has been partially caused by a fundamental misunderstanding of the purpose of developmental testing. Some of these tests were treated as demonstrations of known capabilities where ‘fly to verify’ was the purpose. The ‘demonstration mindset’ was evident in flight tests conducted without complete component qualification and ground testing. In practice, the unknowns made them ‘fly to learn’ experiences. One program office espoused the concept of ‘test a little, learn a lot.’ The drive for early capability based on minimum capability demonstration has been a factor in this ‘key demonstration’ mentality that is, a single success is regarded as a large step forward and becomes the criteria for a key program decision, such as exercising an option to buy operational missiles. This approach and mindset are sharp departures from experience on successful flight test programs that have followed the practice of ‘learn a lot’ and then ‘test to verify.’”
National Missile Defense: Schedule and Technical Risks Represent Significant Development Challenges, Government Accountability Office, GAO/NSIAD-98-28, December 12, 1997
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/ns98028.pdf
Quote: “DOD faces significant challenges in the NMD program because of high schedule and technical risks. Schedule risk is high because the schedule requires a large number of activities to be completed in a relatively short amount of time…Technical risks are high because the compressed development schedule only allows limited testing…If subsequent tests reveal problems, costly redesign or modification of already produced hardware may be required.”
Strategic Defense Initiative: Some Claims Overstated for Early Flight Tests of Interceptors, Government Accountability Office, GAO/NSIAD-92-282, September 8, 1992
http://archive.gao.gov/d35t11/147563.pdf
Quote: “From January 1990 through March 1992, the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) conducted seven flight tests of early experimental versions…SDIO claimed that five of the seven flight tests were successes and the other two were failures. GAO concluded that SDIO inaccurately described some results of four of the seven tests.”
Strategic Defense Initiative: Changing Design and Technological Uncertainties Create Significant Risk, Government Accountability Office, GAO/IMTEC-92-18, February 19, 1992
http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat6/146113.pdf
Quote: “To proceed with a system that uses both ground- and space-based interceptors, SDIO must overcome tremendous technical challenges. Such a system will push the cutting edge of technology. SDIO must rely on some technologies that are as yet unproven, and learn how to integrate them into a reliable system. Designing, developing, and deploying a system with these uncertainties increases the risk that the system will not provide the level of protection SDIO currently promises.”
Strategic Defense System: Adequate Testing Must Precede Decision to Deploy Government Accountability Office, GAO/IMTEC-90-61, July 6, 1990
http://archive.gao.gov/d23t8/141805.pdf
Quote: “The Strategic Defense System is being developed in several phases. Phase I will be built using existing technologies…Phase I has not received the scrutiny and oversight that Defense initially envisioned…The lack of effective agency oversight has contributed to the failure of other automated weapons systems, none of which matched the scale and technological complexity of Phase I. Consequently, any executive decision in 1993 to deploy Phase 1 would be premature and fraught with high risk . . .
“SDIO has not yet solidified the role of Brilliant Pebbles or what elements will be in the final design. This causes problems because without a stable design detailed Strategic Defense System requirements cannot be determined…Further, an unstable design increases the probability that system requirements will not be adequately determined and sufficient testing will not be performed to ensure that the system works.”
Strategic Defense Initiative Program: Better Management Direction and Controls Needed, Government Accountability Office, GAO/NSIAD-88-26, November 27, 1987
http://archive.gao.gov/d29t5/134496.pdf
Quote: “The Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense, House Committee on Appropriations, asked GAO to assess the SDI Organization’s (SDIO) management of the Systems Analysis and Battle Management (SABM) program element, particularly as it related to the BM/C3 component…SDIO needs to improve its ability to provide timely and effective management direction and oversight of the SABM program. It has experienced several problems that result from inefficiencies in contracting, inadequate oversight related to existing work directives, and limited progress in integrating system and battle management architectures. The problem, if not corrected, could reduce SDIO’s ability to provide needed information for an informed systems development decision planned for the early 1990s.”
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