First appeared in In the Winter/Spring 2005 edition of SAIS Review, http://www.saisreview.org/sr_current_issue.html

Abstract

The illicit trafficking in small arms is a trans-national phenomenon. This trade arms terrorists and terrorist groups operating around the world and is central to the U.S. global war on terror. The line between the legal and illicit trades in small arms is often blurred, fuelled by the lack of strict international criteria and controls. Around the world, the illegal income generated by exploiting resources such as timber, drugs, diamonds, and other minerals perpetuates conflicts and corruption. Arms brokers can operate because they are able to circumvent national arms controls and international arms embargoes or obtain official protection. Developing policies to address the illicit trafficking in small arms cannot be done in a vacuum or by the United States unilaterally. Other countries, on a national, regional and international level, must develop stronger controls on legal sales and increase and enhance international cooperation.

According to experts on illicit black markets, clandestine business has broken through the constraints once thought to be imposed by regulatory institutions and has spread throughout the international socio-economic environment, with a high level of technical and commercial sophistication. “From recreational drugs to counterfeit credit cards, from fake designer watches to stolen diamonds, it is no longer a case of the operation of this or that isolated black market, but rather the emergence of an international underground economy. That economy consists of a set of interrelated black markets supported by their own systems of information, their own sources of supply, their own distribution networks, and their own modes of financing.”[1]
 

This trade encompasses illicit trafficking in small arms, the exchange of weapons for money, drugs and other commodities that crosses national borders and spans the globe. These arms are not only the weapons of choice in the majority of today’s regional conflicts but also for many terrorists and terrorist groups operating around the world. This fact makes them central to the U.S. global war on terror, and shutting down the global network, or at least limiting its reach, would provide a tangible achievement in an otherwise nebulous fight.

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates that between 25 and 30 non-state groups spread throughout the world possess shoulder-fired missiles,[2] and small arms, in general, are ubiquitous. The proliferation of these weapons contributes to violence and lawlessness, which create conditions of chaos that allow terrorist networks to emerge and thrive.

In order to create adequate strategies that foster global peace and security, governments and international law enforcement must tackle the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. While the United States has some of the best arms export, end-use monitoring and brokering laws on the books, it has a vested interest in ensuring that other countries improve their national legislation and that international and regional measures are developed and strengthened. Without concrete improvements, small arms networks will continue to operate with impunity, adding fuel to many already tenuous or enflamed situations all over the world.

Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Post-Cold War World

In order to understand just how these networks work and what steps authorities can take to fight them, it is necessary to look at the changes brought by the end of the Cold War regarding global conflict. The bi-polar conflict that had consumed international affairs is over, and the post-Cold War era has seen new kinds of conflicts, many ethnic or religious in nature and more often intra-state than inter-state. These new conflicts are fought with small arms and light weapons, not the heavy conventional weapons or threat of weapons of mass destruction representative of the Cold War.

Small arms and light weapons are defined as any that one or two people can carry, can be mounted on a vehicle, or loaded onto a pack animal. This classification ranges from machine guns to stinger missiles and includes rocket-propelled grenades and mortars. Cold War weapons, made surplus or obsolete by new supplies, became ready stockpiles for legal and illicit markets, available for purchase or exchange for a variety of commodities.

Small arms and light weapons are the weapons of choice of warring parties today, be they government armies, rebel forces or terrorists, and help prolong conflicts around the world. Small arms are also persistent, often remaining behind at the end of conflict, and provide easy armaments for any party wanting to reignite a conflict or engage a neighboring country. Even when further fighting does not materialize, small arms can be employed in other forms of criminal violence, disruption of development efforts, or interference with efforts to deliver humanitarian aid.

Why have small arms become such useful tools of violence? There are several advantages to small arms, as compared to heavy conventional weapons. They are cheap, widely available, lethal, simple to use, durable, portable, concealable, and have legitimate military, police, and civilian uses, making them easy to cross borders, legally and illicitly.[3] These weapons are used [RS2] to fight low-intensity conflicts, and they are responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths every year. In some conflicts, up to 80 percent of the casualties are attributable to small arms and light weapons fire.

For these reasons, the acquisition of small arms is a top priority for warring parties around the world, and as with any market good, the availability and cost of small arms is driven by supply and demand. As small arms have legitimate uses, they are available in the legal marketplace even if used for illegal purposes or by illegal end-users. When legal channels are unavailable, interested parties can turn to a thriving international black market to meet their needs. With an estimated 639 million small arms and light weapons in worldwide circulation, supply is never a problem. While nowhere near the dollar value of the heavy conventional arms market, the small arms trade is still big business. The legal global small arms market is estimated at $4 billion a year, and the illegal small arms trade is estimated at close to $1 billion.[4]

The Legal vs. Illicit Trade

To understand how small arms are acquired on the illicit market, we must also look at the legal trade, since the majority of small arms on the black market began as part of the legal trade. First, we must define what makes a small arms trade illicit or legal. According to the Small Arms Survey, an independent research project that produces an annual yearbook on small arms,

A transfer generally is legal if it fully conforms to international law and the national laws of both the exporting and importing states. An illicit transfer breaks either international or national laws. This simple division often blurs in practice, especially in ambiguous cases where legal or policy exceptions are exploited. Another source of controversy arises from transfers that are legal by these criteria – for example, which do not violate international arms embargoes or sanctions – but not in terms of international humanitarian or human rights law.[5]

But the lines blur between the legal and illicit trades, fuelled by the lack of strict international criteria and controls. The resulting weak national, regional and international controls and oversight for the legal trade in arms is a significant contributor to the illicit trade, as “an increasingly large body of evidence indicates that the primary method by which actors obtain arms for misuse is through diversion.”[6] Diversion is defined as the act of shifting small arms from legal to illicit markets. The Small Arms Survey defines this term further, explaining that diversion “can be authorized, or unauthorized, intentional or unintentional, since in the broadest sense diversion is simply the movement of a weapon from legal origins to the illicit realm.”[7] Legal transfers are diverted to the illicit market in a variety of ways, but few of these movements would be possible without the complicity of government actors. Either through genuine corruption or willful neglect, government agents allow millions of weapons to enter the black market. And even without explicit government involvement, small arms can still enter the black market.

Small arms can enter illicit networks from the legal trade in nine distinct ways. First, states, companies or individuals can violate national, regional or international sanctions and embargoes in order to ship weapons to barred countries or parties. The U.N. sanctions panels on Angola and Liberia reported the most widely known flouting of such international controls, describing numerous examples of government contravention of arms embargoes by supplier states and those that allow their countries to be used as trans-shipment points.[8]

Second, corrupt government officials allow weapons exports from or through a country where it would otherwise be difficult or illegal to do so. Government officials may accept bribes to provide export licenses to those ineligible due to domestic or international laws, and customs officials and other relevant government workers may accept payoffs to look the other way as weapons are shipped from or through ports. Cash payouts are common in countries where government workers receive meager salaries or indefinitely delayed wages.

Third, inadequate weapons stockpile security and management allow small arms to flow out of government arsenals into the networks of shady arms brokers or organized crime syndicates, terrorists, pariah governments, and insurgent groups. These insecure stockpiles carry the risk of theft and are vulnerable to accidental loss. Indeed, looted arsenals provide the bulk of diverted weapons.

Fourth, opportunists raid national arsenals and weapons caches during periods of instability or rampant crime. In 1997, Albanian government arsenals emptied as the country descended into chaos and more than half a million weapons flowed into the hands of Albanian citizens. Many of these guns made their way throughout the Balkans and into other regions. Today in Iraq, insurgents routinely steal former military caches for use against U.S. soldiers and Iraqi civilians.

Fifth, small arms are misplaced or lost from government and military stocks. Each year, an estimated 1 million light weapons are stolen or lost around the world.[9] Rarely recovered, these weapons make their way into illicit trafficking networks and are sold on the black market.

Sixth, in countries where surplus weapons remain in insecure stockpiles and soldiers have not received salaries or are sympathetic to a specific group, soldiers may sell their weapons for cash. Israeli soldiers are known to sell weapons to Palestinians with the full understanding that these weapons will be used against Israeli soldiers and citizens.[10]

Seventh, weapons are stolen from legitimate owners. In the United States alone, approximately 500,000 small arms enter the black market every year due to theft from private citizens.[11]

Eighth, ambiguous or ineffective domestic laws concerning the purchase of small arms can contribute to the quantity of small arms available on the black market. If there are no limits to how many guns a person may own or buy at one time, “straw purchasers” can buy several weapons at once and then illegally resell them. These illegal weapons are often sold across international borders from a country with lax regulations to one with quite strict gun laws, as is common between the United States, Mexico and Canada.

Lastly, individuals or organizations make their own weapons for sale on the illicit market, a process referred to as “craft production.” Craft production is a “low-scale, low-profile, informal, and illegal economic activity, carried out in small private workshops, garages, huts, or backyards.”[12] Although “in economic terms, craft production is a minor, but not negligible, segment of global small arms production,” in some areas even a small number of weapons can successfully destabilize a government or facilitate violence.[13]

Using Illicit Markets

On Feb. 5, 2003, an Antonov aircraft departed Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, at 3:58 a.m. and arrived at Robertsfield airstrip in Liberia at 12:32 a.m. the next day, loaded with a consignment of weapons.[14] This particular shipment was just one of several well-documented examples of illegal arms trafficking that entered Liberia in direct violation of international and regional arms embargoes. Non-governmental organizations, such as Global Witness and Human Rights Watch, and the United Nations as part of their Experts Panels on Liberia, have monitored and documented such transactions. Significant and well-publicized evidence indicates that arms brokers are able to act with relative impunity in Liberia, and, unfortunately, the country is not alone in the frequency of arms embargo violations.

Once brokers acquire the small arms and light weapons, they enter the shadowy world of the black market and become difficult for law enforcement to recover or track. There is no separate market for each commodity. Rather, weapons become one part of an illicit network that deals in drugs, guns, jewels, art, humans, and anything else worth trading through unofficial channels. While some dealers may specialize in weapons, most are plugged into the general international underground economy. These networks operate across borders with an international cast of characters, staying one step ahead of the law. However, the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons is central to many of these networks, and in many cases, weapons are not only the desired commodity but also the method of payment.

The illicit trade in small arms uses existing infrastructures. Illegal trades in diamonds flow between governments in Liberia, Togo and Burkina Faso to private arms smugglers in Bulgaria, Ukraine and Russia and diamond dealers in Antwerp and Tel Aviv. Rebel groups and terrorist organizations take advantage of these illegal networks by using the commodities they have available to procure weapons to finance their activities. For example, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) earns approximately $500 million per year from the drug trade, including unofficial tax revenue from farmers and traffickers. It also exchanges drugs for weapons. As part of their protracted war against the FARC, Colombia’s military seized more than 15,000 small arms along with 2.5 million rounds of ammunition from the group between 1995 and 2001.[15]

Around the world, the illegal incomes generated by exploiting resources such as timber, drugs, diamonds, and other minerals perpetuate conflicts, which promote the black market in arms and strengthen the international networks. The illicit trafficking in small arms is inextricably linked with resource wars.[16] The interconnectedness of these networks makes it impossible for policymakers to simply pursue the black market in arms. These intricate networks prosper because international agents performing interchangeable functions maneuver around legal systems. The inability of law enforcement to focus on more than one commodity at a time allows the most notorious arms brokers to remain slippery, channeling several different goods and services through the black market.

The Shady World of Arms Brokers

While the types of conflict may have changed since the Cold War, legacies of Cold War alliances remain. During the ideological struggle between communism and democracy, governments used private arms brokers to facilitate covert arms deals. With the end of the Cold War, these traffickers remained active, and their pipelines continue to operate. However, instead of supplying satellites of the United States or Soviet Union, these brokers – many of whom operated during the Cold War – work for themselves or on behalf of sanctioned governments or rebel groups. The arms brokers of the past have also branched out and are using their existing networks to move drugs, endangered animal species and products, minerals, timber, and other valuable commodities.[17]

These networks represent the worst of globalization. For example, flights originate in Belgium or South Africa, carry weapons supplied by former Soviet bloc countries, and deliver them to buyers in conflict zones from Congo to Colombia. While many of these brokers operate outside the knowledge of law enforcement, some – such as Victor Bout – have grown famous and are known to police forces and international agencies.[18] Bout, an ethnic Russian who is fluent in at least eight languages, has made a career arming rebels around the world, is thought to head the world’s largest arms smuggling network and is sought by Interpol.[19] Experts believe that veteran soldiers, former arms company executives, ex-intelligence operatives, or even war correspondents no longer dominate the ranks of arms brokers who are experts in the most up-to-date black-market methods.[20]

Arms brokers are able to operate because they can circumvent national arms controls and international arms embargoes or under cover of official protection. Private arms brokers use counterfeit documents or legitimate documents acquired through corrupt practices to find clandestine transport and to develop business relationships with corrupt officials. Indeed, many governments have allowed notorious arms brokers to operate within their borders and are uninterested in breaking up known trafficking networks or arresting habitual violators. Bout, for example, lives in Moscow and is able to operate his clandestine businesses with impunity. A lack of concerted international cooperation and intelligence sharing has also allowed arms brokers to act without fear of capture or punishment.[21]

Arms brokers often disguise their weapons shipments as humanitarian aid or other supplies. They transport weapons using false documents – bills of lading, fake end-use certificates, incomplete manifests – and circuitous routes through “friendly” trans-shipment countries, which are willing to look the other way in exchange for payment, sometimes cash or a share of the weapons.

Just like trade in legal goods, illicit small arms shipments can travel by air, ground or sea. As the world of shipping and transporting goods has grown more complex, small arms agents have become adept at using trading networks for illicit means. Experts have found that “cross-border mergers between airlines, marketing alliances, leasing, chartering, franchising and offshore registration of fleets, crews, and companies, all make it even more difficult to monitor and regulate the airspace and freighting industry.”[22]

What can be done?

Developing policies to address the illicit trafficking in small arms cannot be done in a vacuum, nor can it be done by the United States unilaterally. While the United States has some of the strongest national legislation on arms brokering and export controls, the United States must also ensure that other countries, on a national, regional, and international level, develop stronger controls on legal sales and must work to increase and enhance international cooperation. In addition, the international community must assess illicit arms trafficking networks and develop comprehensive, multi-layered strategies that take into account the illegal trade in other commodities.

As such, specific actions can be taken to minimize illicit arms trafficking and the likelihood that these weapons will be used to devastate entire societies, countries or regions. First, in order to prevent weapons from ending up in the hands of those prohibited from receiving them, governments must adhere to regional and international arms embargoes. They must start to punish violators, as contraveners of arms embargoes are now able to act with impunity. The United Nations should develop an arms embargo-monitoring unit in order to provide the infrastructure to monitor compliance, supervise enforcement, and suggest punitive measures for violations.

Second, to ensure the ability to track weapons to their sources, there must be a common international system for the marking and tracing of weapons. Under current international law, states may adopt different weapons marking systems, complicating the identification of the country-of-origin of a weapon. An international treaty on marking and tracing would require every country to adopt the same standard. If done properly, this system would allow investigators to identify sources and routes of weapons in case of criminal diversion and allow law enforcement to punish those responsible. The international community must also create an international clearinghouse, where weapons can be registered, recovered and traced, allowing states to identify seized small arms and to verify the legality of the trade.

Third, to end the impunity under which arms brokers operate, states should adopt an international treaty, or at the very least common international standards, regarding the practices of arms brokers. As there is no uniform international law, arms brokers can change locations to avoid prosecution under one country’s laws by doing business in and through other, less-regulated countries. Such a treaty would ensure that middlemen cannot move weapons from conflict to conflict without fear of prosecution. International attention is focused on arms brokers, and 23 countries now have some manner of national brokering legislation. National laws, however, are only the first step in ensuring that these brokers cannot act with impunity.

Fourth, an international treaty or, at the very least, agreed-upon common international export criteria, is needed in order to prevent arms from getting into the hands of human rights and international humanitarian law abusers. International standards that determine eligibility requirements for arms exports would prevent arms from entering the legal market and falling into the hands of those likely to divert them or use them for unintended purposes.

Fifth, national governments, especially arms-exporting states, must strengthen end-use monitoring (EUM) in order to prevent legal sales from being diverted into the black market. EUM ensures that exported weapons are used properly and that exporters follow all laws, policies, regulations, and procedures to verify that a foreign government or the authorized foreign recipient of defense articles is using and controlling them in accordance with the terms and conditions of a transfer. Because many countries have non-existent or weak end-use monitoring provisions, international standards that require end-use monitoring on a more systematic and complete basis – at both pre-shipment and post-shipment points – are required. In addition, a common, international end-user certificate that cannot be easily forged or duplicated must be developed.

Sixth, as the looting of the al Qaqaa weapons cache in Iraq in 2004 demonstrated, global small arms stockpiles need adequate security and management. Iraq is not a unique example of the dangers of an unsecured weapons cache. Many countries have no system to ensure that they have secured weapons depots. States need both systemized infrastructure and protected physical structures to secure weapons. Moreover, law enforcement and military training must equip personnel to prevent theft and mismanagement of stockpiles. While bi-lateral and multi-lateral programs on stockpile management and security have been developed, these programs must be implemented on a regular and international, rather than ad hoc and local, basis.

Seventh, once countries secure their weapons stockpiles, they must also begin to destroy surplus and obsolete weapons, particularly in conflict areas, to ensure that these weapons are not diverted to the black market. Many countries already have programs that provide technical and financial destruction assistance to those states eager to destroy their weapons. However, these programs require expansion, additional funding and outside assistance to any country needing help.

Eighth, in order to assist in the apprehension and prosecution of illicit arms brokers and recovery of illicit weapons, governments and national, regional, and multi-lateral institutions must enhance their cooperation and information exchanges. Rather than competing, all government agencies, including law enforcement, border security, and customs officials, must work together to identify and eliminate trafficking routes and apprehend illicit arms brokers. These agencies must use this intelligence to seize weapons at their points of entry and transshipment and quickly identify false end-user certificates to avoid holding up legal shipments.

Ninth, governments must strengthen their oversight of weapons issued to individuals – both civilian and military – to avoid the temptation of selling weapons on the black market. Governments must regularly account for military stocks and holdings, and legal small arms owners must report stolen or lost weapons to the proper authorities in a timely manner.

Lastly, states must work to eliminate craft production from within their borders and prevent these weapons from entering the black market. While the illicit production of small arms may be undertaken on only a small scale, even a small number of weapons can tip the balance of power and destabilize governments and contribute to conflict, violence, and increased crime.

The illicit trafficking in small arms is a trans-national phenomenon that requires trans-national solutions. The United States cannot solve the problems of illicit trafficking in small arms alone. Only with the political will and commitment of states to address their own legal trades in these weapons will any meaningful change occur.