"View from Washington" column, originally published in Russian by Izvestia, Nov. 15, 2004

Americans are troubled by the country’s deep-seated division following the outcome of the Nov. 2 elections. But if only they knew how things looked on the ground in Russia! The division there is even greater. As public opinion polls indicated, everyday people were rooting for John Kerry, while the Kremlin openly expressed its support for George Bush. At least the American people were split over their own candidates. But what could have motivated Russia’s leadership to so unabashedly place its bets on the Republican president? Do they really think that Russia’s fate is in better hands with Bush at the helm, so much so that they completely turned their backs on the Democrats? Apparently, the Kremlin’s ill-famed pragmatism failed them. Instead, plain old egotism won the day.

While congratulating Bush on his victory, President Putin said affairs between the two countries had noticeably improved. Evidently, he didn’t have the United States and Russia in mind, because, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, their relations have reached an all-time low. Moscow’s congratulatory words served merely to illustrate how fragile and unreliable those relations are and how narrow and personalized the foundation is on which they are built. While the Kremlin looked on passively over the past four years, Washington managed to whittle down bilateral cooperation to its politico-military aspect only. Bush needed an ally in the Kremlin for little more than his war on terrorism, and by showering copious amounts of empty flattery on Mr. Putin, he has achieved this.  Simultaneously, the White House did nothing for Russia; on the contrary, it went to great lengths to prevent relations from deepening or becoming more strategic.

Bush’s expressions of praise addressed to his Russian partner have in no way kept America from squeezing Moscow out of almost every sphere of international authority; neither have they compelled Washington to consider Russia’s interests, especially as they relate to the former Soviet Union. With the exception of Belarus, Moscow has lost military, socio-political and economic influence over practically all parts of the world where it once enjoyed it.  Today, Russia means less to the world and to Bush than it did four years ago, and this process continues. If it were not for oil and Iran, Russia would be even less relevant.

Still reeling over their defeat, the Democrats offered to return the United States to its traditional foreign policy course. They believe that American leadership can only be achieved by creating a network of strategic allies with which America cooperates on the basis of common values. This is, after all, the way America reached world domination. Democrats are interested in Russia as a potential ally; hence, their interest in what is happening inside the country. George Bush, who has rejected any kind of alliance, doesn’t see Russia this way at all. His policies are predicated on the sole power of the United States, which has no need for strategic support from others. Of course, America may receive assistance within a framework of temporary alliances. But tomorrow these countries may just as quickly become irrelevant for America, or even become its enemies. This is how Washington and Moscow currently operate. Such a myopic approach is not in Russia’s national interests.

We can be certain that, just like in the past, Bush in his second term will prevent opening wider dialogue with Moscow and reject making long-term guarantees. Nor will he sign any bilateral agreements. Russia’s economy and socio-political development will not be among his priorities. All Bush really needs from Russia is that it stand shoulder to shoulder in America’s war on terror, which, in turn, is the principal value the Kremlin sees in Bush. In this way, it is counting on keeping its hands untied in its own domestic affairs.

However, there is in fact no guarantee that its hands will remain free. In the United States, foreign policy is not determined by the president alone. The Congress, nongovernmental organizations, the business community, the media and even the neoconservative and more pragmatic elements of the Bush Administration will do everything in their power to influence official policy outcomes. In the aggregate, their power is much greater than that of the White House alone.  And the last thing Republican leaders want in the 2008 elections is for their party to be accused of “loosing Russia,” that is, of overlooking the disintegration of democracy in the former Soviet Union while working to build it in the Middle East.

It will now be easier than before for Bush to change his position vis a vis Russia; all the more so, as some of his policies have already been modified since the Beslan tragedy. The White House’s isolation from most of the American establishment, with respect to Washington’s position on Russia alone, could complicate Bush’s task of resolving a whole number of other issues. For the Neocons, Russia’s movement away from democracy represents a major defeat, which they will attempt to counter any way possible. Politically, they are more globalist than traditional Democrats. World democracy for them is paramount, loftier than the war on terrorism, more important than befriending Russia. Knowing Bush’s messianic nature and his policies, we can assume that he will be receptive to this argument.

During his second term, it will be important for Bush not only to focus on his main task: spreading democracy and freedom throughout the world, but also rallying his party around this mission and, simultaneously, attracting uncommitted Democrats and independents to his cause. Bush secured his victory on a platform combining political, moral and ethical values, which was supported by a record number of American voters. Russia is distancing itself from exactly these values, and by doing so, is growing further apart from Mr. Bush and America. President Putin’s backing of the White House did nothing to help the American incumbent get reelected, but it did turn off the Democrats. For the Kremlin, four more years of Bush can be compared to the high price of oil: seemingly straightforward and advantageous, yet representing no real economic improvement.  

Translated by Scott Stephens, CDI research assistant.