The following reflections are provoked by the dramatic shift of internal Russian debates on Russian-Japanese relations, which is, in the opinion of this author, nothing more or less than the last piece of the puzzle of Russian foreign policy’s new look.

Through the 1990s, Russian foreign policy was volatile. But volatile within the trend inherited from the late Soviet Union. This trend was formed by a number of questions – such as arms control and nuclear security, NATO enlargement and European security – which dominated the Russian foreign policy agenda and consumed most of the time and effort in decision-making and policy implementation. However, by the late 1990s, the traditional foreign policy agenda was regarded not only as routine, but also the impression was growing that Russia was trapped within this dominating agenda. Arms control and European security issues, based on a number of treaties concluded by different Soviet and Russian administrations, were constantly reinterpreted to fit the all the time changing accents in Russian foreign policy.

Consequently, step by step, the administration of President Vladimir Putin traded off the usual foreign policy agenda. Slight changes of wording on the ABM Treaty and NATO enlargement – which were first considered by many as tiny nuances, then were swallowed as a big opportunity to overcome boring Russian resistance to both the dismantlement of some past arms control concepts and NATO expansion – in fact turned out to be a complete shift of the foreign policy trend. Concessions associated with both the ABM and NATO compromises (in the first case, in the form of agreeing to disagree) looked unacceptable to many Russian hardliners and raised the eyebrows of Western diplomats and politicians, but were interpreted as either evidence of Putins’s rationality, or of mistakes resulting from his lack of policy experience or his deeply hidden liberalism and pro-Western sympathy.

None of these explanations will survive in time, except pragmatism. Still, even the pragmatism behind these decisions needs clarification. What was gained? Free hands. Thus, such concessions on long-lasting political and military “bright-lines” do not seem that high if taken as a kind of “commission” for “cashing” these issues – leading to an interruption of the trend within which Russia was constantly loosing face or bids (depending on the political choice of the moment) and was unable to make political and military motivations meet. With the growing, and at some point already prevailing, feeling that Russia was trapped within the traditional 1990s foreign policy agenda, the escape with a “commission” (in the form of slight concessions) was not a bad choice.

Now, Russia seems ready to address the last long-lasting turmoil in its foreign policy – the Kuril Island conflict. Unpleasantly for Japan, this is the first troublesome foreign policy issue where Russia feels strong enough to address the problem without giving concessions. While Russia is currently using similar tactics as in the past, in this case, discussing a peace treaty, the reality is that Moscow does not need such a treaty. There is not a single pragmatic reason why Russia should want a peace treaty with Japan. Embassies are fully operating; economic relations are growing. And would Japan want to put this good relationship at stake to ask for a peace treaty that does no more than arrange affairs after a war that today’s generation of businessmen knows mostly from movies?

Just like in previous cases, Russia may decide to jettison its past agenda and simply quit any bargaining on the Kuril Islands – negotiations that give Moscow only the opportunity to make new concessions without any hope for gain. Alternatively, Russia may propose to Japan the signing of another treaty on cooperation, where Moscow may find it has room for gain.

Japan may feel betrayed by this new reality.  But Japan isn’t alone in facing this new Russian challenge. Already, many European and U.S. diplomats and experts realize that Russia is more difficult to deal with – something that is usually attributed to Putin’s personal characteristics or revived Russian independence stemming from high oil prices cash inflow. Both rationales are partly true, but the overarching truth is that Russia simply has abandoned the foreign policy agenda it increasingly found uncomfortable. 

By doing so, however, Russia now faces new challenges as well. Where will the “cash” and “free hands” gained by its new tactics be invested now? They should be invested somewhere. Otherwise, in this dynamic world these resources may lose value through “inflation” – that is, becoming less worthwhile as chits on the foreign policy stage as stakes in the game get higher.  Unfortunately, with the lack of expert and open public debates on important strategic issues in Russia, it is questionable whether any new investments made in the near-term would be either rational or wise.