The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) is a mysterious creature among Palestine's militant rejectionist groups. Like Hamas, Islamic Jihad carries out suicide bombings and other attacks against Israeli targets, and hopes to establish an Islamic Palestinian state. But Islamic Jihad is much smaller and cannot claim Hamas' level of support or its social and political role. Nevertheless, the PIJ invokes the ideology of jihad (holy struggle) in its violent efforts to liberate Palestine "from the river to the sea" and eradicate the Israeli state. In the mid-1970s, the PIJ was little more than an amorphous collection of factions. Like Hamas, the group can trace its ancestry back to the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine and Egypt. The PIJ took its inspiration from the Jihad movement in Egypt, which sought to replace the secular government in Cairo with an Islamic alternative. The Jihad movements rejected the belief, prevalent in the Arab world at the time, that the unification of the Islamic world was a prerequisite for the liberation of Palestine. This position was most associated with Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, himself no friend of underground Islamic movements. Groups like the PIJ represented a shift away from this thinking, stressing a nationalist rather than a pan-Arab or pan-Islamic approach to jihad. Priority was given to the struggle against Israel and the liberation of Palestine. Moreover, Palestinian nationalists asserted that the struggle against the "Zionist entity" would serve to unite the Arab world.

The Islamic Jihad believes it is in the vanguard of a pan-Islamic revolution that began with the revolution in Iran. Despite its Shia orientation, the Iranian revolution provided a powerful model for the PIJ, and the group has proven flexible in its adaptation of some Shi'ite beliefs. Adherents hope to "Islamize" society quickly from above, and they accept the concept of rule by the clergy. The PIJ opposes moderate secular Arab regimes, which are seen as corrupt and contaminated by Western secular values.

Two individuals have played prominent roles in the PIJ's history. Fathi Shaqaqi was disappointed by the moderation of the Muslim Brotherhood and its reformist agenda. Egyptian authorities expelled Shaqaqi from Egypt with other Islamic radicals after the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1981. He returned to the Gaza Strip to form the Palestinian Islamic Jihad thereafter. In 1988, Israeli authorities expelled Shaqaqi to Lebanon. While in Lebanon, he is believed to have solidified contacts with Syria and Iran, as well as Hezbollah. The group also received training and equipment from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards who had come to Lebanon in support of Hezbollah. It was during this time that the Palestinian Islamic Jihad was fully integrated into the rejectionist front confronting Israel. Shaqiqi was assassinated in Malta in 1995, most likely by Israeli intelligence agents.

Dr. Ramadan Abdallah Shalah, a close confidant of Fathi Shaqaqi, stepped in to lead the PIJ after Shaqaqi's assassination. Shalah handled the PIJ's propaganda activities while a student in England. He lectured on the Middle East at the University of South Florida in Tampa during the early 1990s. During his stay in the United States, he also directed the World and Islam Studies Enterprise, a think tank devoted to issues championed by the PIJ. Dr. Shalah returned to lead the PIJ from Damascus where the group is now headquartered.

The PIJ is affiliated with several lesser Jihad groups. These include the Islamic Jihad Organization — the al Aqsa Battalions, the Islamic Jihad — the Temple, and the Islamic Jihad Squad. All of these groups share the PIJ's jihad ideology and militant commitment. The PIJ and Hamas are thought to have been competitors during their formative years in the 1980s. However, the evolution of the Middle East peace process and their shared Islamic orientation have helped to foster some cooperation between the two groups.

At the beginning of the first Intifada, the PIJ has perhaps as many as 250 militants, though figures are difficult to verify. Today, the strength of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad's operatives is unknown, but the organization grew considerably in the 1990s and sympathizers are believed to number in the thousands. The PIJ finds support in the universities and mosques. The group allegedly maintains offices in Beirut, Damascus, Tehran, and Khartoum.

Like Hamas, the PIJ adopted the use of suicide bombers following their contact with Hezbollah. The group is responsible for dozens of attacks and traditionally strikes at Israeli targets on the anniversary of Fathi Shaqaqi's assassination. The PIJ has never struck directly at the United States. However, the group has threatened to target U.S. interests if the United States moves its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

Sources:

April 2001, "Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2000," United States Department of State.

Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.

M. Ehsan Ahrari, "Jihadi Groups, Nuclear Pakistan, and the Great Game," Srategic Studies Institute: U.S. Army War College, August 2001.