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When the
Issue is Acceptable Deaths,
'Taboo or Not Taboo – That is the Question'
~ #36
By
Alan F. Kay, PhD
© 2004, (fair use with attribution and copy to author)
April 14, 2004 |
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My colleagues and I came upon an unusual opportunity to ask
a couple of taboo questions, Q71 and Q72, in ATI# 16 (June 1991) that came in
part from the question-set dubbed "the People's Military Policy,” described in
"The Polling Critic" Column # 22, "How Bush Lost Non-U.S. Public Opinion," June
5, 2003. Questions on how many deaths are acceptable in a military intervention
were asked only once, 13 years ago. It would be difficult, if not impossible,
to get reliable, meaningful data on such questions now. Nevertheless, the
findings are extremely critical to decisions that are going to be made on
terrorism in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the United States, but affecting the whole
world, particularly the monotheistic world of Christians, Muslims and Jews.
Thirteen years ago in ATI#16, a battery of six items,
Q63-68, had this frame:
From time to time the behavior of dictators, like Manuel
Noriega in Panama and Saddam Hussein in Iraq, threatens U.S. and international
security. I am going to read you some things that dictators may do. For each
one, please tell me whether you agree or disagree that the United States and the
United Nations should take clear action to stop it.
First/(How about) [asked in random
order]
|
Q63-68
A dictator who _______ |
Collapsed
Agree |
| . . . sponsors terrorism around the world |
90% |
| . . . acquires chemical, nuclear and biological weapons |
88% |
| . . . violates fundamental human rights, including torturing and
murdering many of his own citizens. |
87% |
| . . . invades and occupies by force some part of a neighboring
country |
85% |
|
. . . got aid and support from the United
States in the past but then turns against us and supports our
enemies.
|
82% |
| . . . engages in a major arms build-up beyond what's needed for
defending his own country |
80% |
Over 98%, an amazingly large percentage, of the sample (986
out of 1002 respondents) agreed, somewhat or strongly, that the United States
and the United Nations should take clear action to stop at least one of
the six dictator actions. I have never seen such a high percentage of agreement
with any proposal before or since.
The 986 were then asked in two half samples, A
(Q69) and B (Q70), nearly identical questions,
In some cases, you were willing to support clear action
to stop what a dictator was doing. Please tell me which of the following two
actions is closer to what you would favor:
| |
|
A |
B |
| 1. |
First, diplomatic initiatives and economic sanctions
but not the use of military force |
19% |
20% |
| 2. |
Second, if economic sanctions and diplomatic
initiatives don't work, then the use of military intervention and combat
_____ |
|
|
| |
A half sample: if necessary |
79% |
|
| |
B half sample: that does not involve too much
loss of life. |
|
79% |
| |
Don't Know |
2% |
2% |
The closeness in results from the two half samples tells us
that the different wordings did not make any significant difference in findings,
which seems sensible. It is reasonable and not a surprise that a respondent
favoring military intervention and combat accepts that some loss of life would
be inevitable. These responses practically begged ATI to let the next questions
go after what people consider an acceptable loss of life. Still, how to do that
successfully was not easy to figure out. The ATI survey design team chose for
all 986 respondents to ask first question Q71 and then Q72, as follows:
I would like to get some idea of what you think "too
much loss of life" is in a military intervention [Rotate items in Q71 and in
Q72]
First think about___/ Next think about____
What would be the rough figure you would use as a limit
to an acceptable number of___ [Q71] U.S. deaths / [Q72] deaths of
citizens of the dictator's country?
Just stop me when I reach the limit you would use.
[read list and stop when respondent makes choice]
Here are the responses
| |
Acceptable deaths: |
U.S. |
non-U.S. |
| 1. |
Zero/None [not read] |
12% |
9% |
| 2. |
One |
22% |
18% |
| 3. |
10 |
9% |
6% |
| 4. |
100 |
16% |
14% |
| 5. |
1,000 |
16% |
16% |
| 6. |
10,000 |
10% |
13% |
| 7. |
100,000 |
3% |
6% |
| 8. |
1 million |
1% |
2% |
| 9. |
No limit |
4% |
7% |
| |
Refused/Don't Know |
7% |
10% |
Item 1 was not read, but volunteered by respondents. The
options offered, in the order of asking, were items 2 through 9, the size of
which increased by a factor of 10 from each item to the next. Remarkably, every
statement in the following paragraph is true for both the U.S. and non-U.S.
data.
"Not more than one death" had the most support, and
combined with volunteered item 1, essentially meant that no deaths were
acceptable to about one-third of the 79% of the public willing to use military
force (46% of the total public). Roughly two-thirds of those willing to use
military force (a majority of about 53% of the total public) had no such
squeamishness. They were ready to give numerical estimates. Of the percentages
who voiced an acceptance of the various choices offered regarding death tolls,
the maximum was 16% for both U.S. and non-U.S. deaths (at 1,000), and
this 16% was a larger aggregation than those who refused or gave no answer. For
both U.S. and non-U.S. deaths above "1,000," support fell off from the
16% maximum reaching a minimum of 1% or 2% at 1,000,000, but rose again
with the No limit option to a support level that was less than the
support for 10,000 and more than for 100,000. Both for U.S. and
non-U.S. deaths in the order that items were asked, following an initial
increase from zero/none to one acceptance switches exactly four times:
decrease, increase, decrease, increase. This is a most complex behavior of
findings on the relationship between one variable (here the number of deaths)
and another (percent accepting the deaths), and as far from the "normal"
bell-shaped curve as I have ever seen.
Beyond all that, there is a perhaps surprisingly small
difference between U.S. and non-U.S. deaths found acceptable. The data tells us
that, on a net basis, a large fraction, 87% or 88%, of respondents did not make
a distinction between U.S. and non-U.S. death acceptability, while 12% or 13%
did, including about a 3% increase in those saying "Don't Know," or not giving a
substantive answer, who did deal with the acceptability of U.S. deaths, but
could not do so for non-U.S. deaths.
Although there are many other ways one might try to phrase
questions on this subject, to my knowledge no other pollster has ever probed
"acceptability" of deaths. Should it be a taboo? I do not know. As a result
of a personal commitment to work only for clearly beneficial social and
environmental change, a commitment that was not so important to me in 1991 but
is now, I will certainly not participate again in any survey that asks questions
on the acceptability of deaths.
It is
nonetheless true that one could hardly imagine a question that would be more on
the mind of most people than how long the Middle-East coalition forces, the
public, and all others involved will continue to accept the kind of hard-line
behavior that is the hallmark of this administration as it urges all to stay the
course. Though it is unpopular to say so, acceptance of casualties will not
continue forever.
No polling can anticipate whether and how the
public will turn on this issue during the coming months. We have never been
quite this way before and there are a number of choices the administration and
the election campaigns may make that are somewhat unknowable, yet bare on the
outcome.
o - o - o - o - o - o - o - o
Alan F. Kay is a mathematician, social scientist and pioneer of public-interest polling. He has authored
Locating Consensus for Democracy and numerous public policy articles and holds several patents. (see
www.publicinterestpolling.com)
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