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“A Big Image Problem Down There”: Prospects for an African Headquarters for AFRICOM


Considered at “initial operating capacity” on Oct. 1st of this year, the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) lays the groundwork for ambitious goals: to improve security mechanisms, military professionalism, set up accountable governance where lacking, and to work in conjunction with African states and regional organizations in deterring aggression and responding to crises.¹ For fiscal year 2007-2008, AFRICOM has a budget of \$50 million, and it is predicted the command will eventually have a budget of \$250 million, which would comprise 3 percent of U.S. government spending on Africa.² The doctrine for the command proposes an unprecedented level of U.S. interagency cooperation, with the aim of supporting other agencies in implementing security policies and strategies.³ AFRICOM also aims to establish regional headquarters on the African continent, which would make the command one of only two U.S. Combatant Commands with headquarters outside of the continental United States. For the present, AFRICOM operates out of Stuttgart, Germany, which also hosts the U.S. European Command headquarters.

AFRICOM’s goal of establishing a U.S. continental presence in Africa is proving to be a challenging feat. A State Department official has acknowledged: “We’ve got a big image problem down there. Public opinion is really against getting in bed with the U.S. They just don’t trust the U.S.”⁴ After much negative reaction by African states to the official announcement of AFRICOM in February 2007, there is evidence to predict the United States will encounter a number of impediments to its ambitions and timelines.

Although many had initially predicted that questions regarding the locale of an AFRICOM headquarters would be decided by the end of 2007, that timeline has been pushed back significantly. In this report, we provide an overview of the goals, timelines and criticisms in determining a headquarters for AFRICOM: what questions remain, what setbacks have already been encountered and most importantly, how African states have responded to the announcement of AFRICOM and the prospects for their cooperation.

The issue of the headquarters locations is the figurehead of the larger discussion between the United States and the African continent on the desirability of a U.S. military command in Africa. Many African countries have rejected the presence of U.S. military personnel or facilities on their territories because of concerns about neocolonialism or American military involvement in regime change in Iraq and Afghanistan as a form of imperialism. When measuring the potential capability for AFRICOM to achieve its operational goals, substantial weight is given to if and when the United States is able to secure and setup headquarters locations in Africa. AFRICOM officials have emphasized that a physical presence in Africa will bring a “value added”⁵ to the success of the command. How and when AFRICOM will move from Germany to Africa is an important aspect to consider in the command’s development.

The United States Africa Command (AFRICOM)



Background

The U.S. Africa Command proposes to establish a “distributed headquarters” throughout the continent, a unique approach to ensure interagency and interstate cooperation. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs Theresa Whelan compares the plan to have a staff presence in each of Africa’s five regional economic communities to “integrated product teams.”⁶ She notes that the distributed headquarters will only have a staff presence, specifying that the Department of Defense (DOD) has no intention of basing operational forces in Africa, except for those already at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, serving as part of the Combined Joint Task Force on the Horn of Africa.⁷

Whelan confirms that each location will host a “fairly small staff” of 10 to 20 personnel. The core of the headquarters staff will be formed by the U.S. Africa Command Transition Team, which is largely military personnel.⁸ It is reported the Command will employ 800 or more in total, including active-duty personnel and civilians. Vince Crawley, a Transition Team spokesperson, says that 80 percent of the Command personnel will be based outside of the continent.⁹ Rear Adm. Robert Moeller, executive director of the Transition Team and AFRICOM deputy for Military Operations, says the goal is to fill 25 percent of AFRICOM’s billets with non-defense civilians,¹⁰ from USAID, and departments of State, Agriculture, Treasury, and Commerce. A Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) report notes that the small size of such departments compared to the Department of Defense (DOD) makes assembling a non-military staff for AFRICOM a huge challenge.¹¹ Other departments may find it hard to spare the number of employees needed to fill AFRICOM’s billets.

The distributed headquarters approach is being pursued for two reasons. Where the headquarters is located may determine the command’s “strategic influence and effectiveness going forward.”¹² Distributing the headquarters throughout the continent seeks to project a much broader presence and influence in each region. In addition, a Congressional Research Service (CRS) AFRICOM report, “Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa,” asserts that having a distributed headquarters approach ensures a lessened sense of any one country bearing the burden, particularly the political burden, of having AFRICOM headquarters within their borders. CRS also notes speculation that the U.S. will co-locate AFRICOM headquarters with regional and sub-regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) headquarters, whose headquarters are in Ethiopia.¹³

The DOD has articulated the criteria – developed with the State Department – for designating headquarters. Some conditions are non-negotiable, such as the exemption from International Criminal Court prosecution for U.S. personnel working for the command.¹⁴ But some may not be easily achieved, such as a location with a satisfactory human rights record. The criteria includes political stability, security factors, access to regional and intercontinental transportation, accessible infrastructure, quality of life, proximity to the AU and other regional organizations, proximity to U.S. government hubs, and adequate Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs).¹⁵ *Attajdid*, a Moroccan newspaper, also adds that the United States seeks a site with good health and education services, a low level of bribery, and a good human rights record.¹⁶

The decision of headquarters locations naturally depends on which countries offer to host. The fact that several prospective countries have stated their opposition to U.S. military in Africa is certainly problematic. However, negotiations between Africa and the United States are not the only factor in the decision. The Department of Defense must also reconcile opposing interests within its services. It has been suggested that the Army would like a large military headquarters on the continent, while the Navy desires a largely sea-based presence.¹⁷ However, the Navy may already be pursuing its goal with the seven-month deployment the USS Ft. McHenry's to the Gulf of Guinea.¹⁸ In December, the Air Force will also stand up an air arm for the command, likely to be called the 17th Air Force; eventually around 300 airmen will be assigned to AFRICOM.¹⁹

Timeline

The Command is set to be fully operational by Oct. 1, 2008. However, the meaning of “fully operational” has not been ascertained. Furthermore, it is still unknown whether there will be Command presence on the continent or if the headquarters location will even be determined is still unknown.

In her testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in August 2007, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Fraser stated that “it is AFRICOM’s plan to establish an initial headquarters presence on the continent by October 2008.”²⁰ However, in testimony to the House Armed Services Committee on Nov. 14, AFRICOM Commander General William E. Ward said he “could not put a timeline” on when the decisions of the headquarters location could be made.²¹ It is uncertain if this disparity reflects miscommunication, simple disagreement, or a shift in plans.

At the House hearing, the headquarters issue was at the forefront of many members’ questions and concerns. Chairman Ike Skelton, D-Mo., asked for a time frame on the headquarters decision and Rep. Silvestre Reyes, D-Texas, expressed his desire for the decision to be made quickly. On the other hand, Rep. John Kline, R-Minn., questioned why AFRICOM ever had to leave its temporary headquarters in Europe, Rep. Joe Wilson, R-S.C., invited the headquarters to be located in Charleston, South Carolina, and Rep. Carol Shea-Porter, D-N.H., said she would like to see the headquarters located anywhere but on the African continent.²²

To return to the rhetoric offered at AFRICOM’s inception, on Feb. 9, 2007, shortly after the official AFRICOM announcement was made, Adm. Moeller stated:

We anticipate beginning soon within a matter of weeks, most likely, a series of detailed conversations with countries around the continent to kind of get their perspective on this idea of a headquarters location on the continent. [...] I would anticipate probably later this year, [we will] have a much better perspective on where, in fact, it may be feasible to locate the headquarters.²³

This statement appeared to indicate there would be significant progress on the headquarters issue in the *immediate* future. Moeller is not the only individual to speculate that locations for headquarters would be at least internally determined sometime in 2007. The State Department reported in July that the Pentagon would

like the new AFRICOM chief to establish a “personal presence on the continent” soon after being confirmed.²⁴ Ward was confirmed on Sept. 28. Although, a “personal presence” may not mean setting up a headquarters, it is planned for the commander to be stationed on the continent as early as 2008 and joined possibly by some senior staff in a temporary location in Africa.²⁵

As news releases indicate, there have been mixed reports on what progress has actually been made in establishing locales for AFRICOM. Ward stated on Oct. 15 that negotiations with African states *have not even begun* – “I have not entered into any discussions about a basing – correction, a headquarters location on the continent.”²⁶ He proceeded to end his statement by saying “that’s work that’s down the road.”

Nevertheless, Whelan appears to be offering a differing perspective, asserting on Oct. 11 that “we have pretty much got a potential location in each region.” She noted that “a couple countries have approached us about hosting and we’ve responded with preliminary dialogue.”²⁷ Whelan also confirmed on Oct. 18 her hopes of having preliminary decisions made within the next two to three months, but noted that the State Department has the lead in the negotiations. She added, “We are comfortable with our timelines.”²⁸ CRS, however, reports that “a move to the continent is not expected for several years.”²⁹

It is likely, as former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker predicts, that the Transition Team will “talk less [in public] and consult quietly” behind the scenes with African leaders.³⁰ Crocker sees this as a remedy to how the idea of AFRICOM was introduced. “Maybe it was a mistake to start by saying, ‘we’re going to have an AfriCom and we’re going to put it right in your face – in Africa.’”³¹

Progress and Discussed Locations

Though there are varying reports on how much progress has actually been made during negotiations on potential locales for the command, Ward has confirmed that 23 separate African ambassadors to the AU have voiced overwhelming support for AFRICOM’s objectives.³² Several visits were made by U.S. officials since AFRICOM’s announcement. Major visits were made to Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia, Ghana and Senegal in April and to Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Egypt and Djibouti in June. The United States has also conferred with AU officials.³³ Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Ryan Henry noted that the countries they have visited are simply, “the ones we courted now.”³⁴

Addressing the substance and outcome of these visits, Henry stated in July, “In our consultations, we have neither asked nor discussed with anyone where the headquarters will be.”³⁵ He added that U.S. officials received positive feedback and that “no countries have declined to meet with us.”³⁶ Whelan later echoed this summation, stating that no African country has said, “No, we do not want to have mil-to-mil relations with you.”³⁷ The DOD concedes that there have been “initial misconceptions” but not “specific resistance.”³⁸

As noted by Crocker, for the benefit of fruitful negotiations, it is wise to keep the process of negotiating headquarters locations guarded. However, for those who desire insight into the process, many scholars have offered insight on what countries would be most suitable to host AFRICOM and media outlets, more notably African news sources, have also offered some insight on the African perspective.

In February, *Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy* declared Morocco to be “the only geographically and politically viable location” for a headquarters, citing that it is a neutral Muslim state with significant influence on the continent and has proven willing to work with the United States to combat radical Islamism in Africa. It was speculated that Algeria was competing with Morocco for AFRICOM involvement, though Algeria has less influence in sub-Saharan Africa than Morocco. This publication contends that in the Gulf of Guinea, cooperation with Nigeria is highly desired, as Nigeria provides 24 percent of U.S. oil imports, almost as much as Saudi Arabia.³⁹ In the south, a site more neutral than South Africa is preferred. In the east, Kenya is considered viable, as diplomacy with regard to Somalia is already handled there.⁴⁰ CFR deemed Ethiopia as the most viable locale in the east, as it has close United States relations and hosts the AU headquarters.⁴¹

Newsweek reported in September that the nations most often mentioned for AFRICOM headquarters are Ghana, Liberia, Tanzania and Ethiopia. However, it highlighted significant concerns over Ethiopia being selected to host, due to its poor human rights records.⁴² *Africa Energy Intelligence* noted that the regional headquarters for the Gulf of Guinea region could be São Tomé and Príncipe.⁴³ Collectively, Mauro De Lorenzo of American Enterprise Institute, Greg Mills of Brenthurst Foundation, and Terence McNamee of the Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies stated that Tunisia is a possible location in the north, Ghana, Liberia, or Senegal in the west, Djibouti in the east, and Botswana in the south.⁴⁴

CRS reports that DOD has allegedly received headquarters offers from Botswana and Liberia. The report also notes that the United States currently has access to “lily pads,” otherwise known as cooperative security locations, in Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Algeria, Sierra Leone, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Tunisia, Uganda, Botswana, and Zambia⁴⁵ -- which might serve as considering factors when making a headquarters bid.

African Perspectives

Anyone keeping up with AFRICOM headlines since the official announcement in February 2007 would note a striking contrast between U.S. government press releases and the statements of African leaders and people. Before detailing various African responses, it is worth highlighting Whelan’s response to such disparities in reporting, as she cautions:

What you should note about the ‘African media’ quote unquote, is it tends to be incestuous. They pick up the same story and repeat it over and over – it’s not necessarily a very sophisticated media out there and it also tends to be dominated by – in the West Africa area, the Nigerian media; Southern Africa, the South African media; and in the East, the Kenyan media. And they all tend to deal in rumor oftentimes more than fact.⁴⁶

Despite Whelan’s – seemingly condescendingly expressed – concerns, African media sources are certainly an important source of information and opinion and are worth taking note of. Often they have more sway on a populace and/or are more representative of public sentiments than the government is. Since AFRICOM’s announcement, African newspapers have aptly captured the comments and concerns that Africans have voiced about the command.

There are many reasons why African states might feel uncertain about hosting a U.S. military presence. One concern is the threat of being targeted for terrorism, as in the 1998 al-Qaida bombings of embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Another is the fear of losing regional influence. For instance, the *South African Daily News* observes, “AFRICOM seems to be clashing with South Africa’s sense of itself as an emerging African power.”⁴⁷ There is also the fear that AFRICOM will result in the militarization of U.S. policy in Africa, or even worse, revive neocolonialism. Wafula Okumu of South Africa’s Institute for Security Studies says, “We’re concerned, because why use the military? Why not use other effective methods, like USAID, or even the Peace Corps, who used to be very effective in winning the hearts and the minds of the African people.”⁴⁸ Lastly, African states are apprehensive that the United States will posit itself unilaterally as the best arbitrator of African security priorities and policies.

As AFRICOM’s inception coincides with China’s increasing engagement in Africa many believe that AFRICOM will bring about a scramble for resources on the continent. Brig. Gen. Robert Winful of the Ghana armed forces asks, “What happens if China wants an AFRICOM?” He believes it would lead to a new Cold War scenario played out in Africa.⁴⁹ African leaders have expressed frustration that AFRICOM’s mission and operations have not been explained thoroughly enough for them to determine if it would fit in the interests of African security priorities. Therefore, they feel it is prudent to be cautious before cooperating.

Though the U.S. government has stated that several countries have offered to host AFRICOM, only Liberia has publicly confirmed an offer. In June, Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf urged African states to consider the benefits AFRICOM could bring. “Africom is undeniably about the projection of American interests,” she acknowledged, “but this does not mean that it is to the exclusion of African ones.” She stated that AFRICOM seeks to empower “African partners to develop a healthy security environment through embracing good governance, building security capacity, and developing good civil-military relationships.”⁵⁰

Popular responses in Liberia are not wholly in line with Sirleaf. Emira Woods of the Institute of Policy Studies says her country entered a “26-year descent into chaos” because of U.S. military support for the dictator Samuel K. Doe (1980-1990).⁵¹ Liberian diplomat William T. Bull has called for a national referendum on AFRICOM, warning that hosting the headquarters could incite Islamic fundamentalists, and put Liberia at risk for terrorism.⁵² Additionally, *Les Depeches de Brazzaville* (Congo) argues that Liberia’s “chronic instability” does not make it an ideal location for a U.S. headquarters.⁵³

Also potentially obstructing Liberia’s bid to host AFRICOM is a November statement by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) that U.S. plans for AFRICOM have “not been fully understood” by African leaders and that “further sensitization by the United States authorities at the highest political level is needed,” because consultations by U.S. officials have been insufficient in explaining the relocation of forces or operations from Europe to Africa.⁵⁴ ECOWAS Chief of Defense General Andrew Azazi declared that ECOWAS has the final say on a member state offering to host. Sirleaf responded by saying Liberia would seek advice from ECOWAS: “If it is good we will take it, but if not we will not take it.”⁵⁵

Two other countries that have reportedly been receptive to hosting headquarters have faced similar backlash: Morocco and Botswana. Moroccan Islamist newspaper *Attajdid* reported speculation that the government offered in June to host,⁵⁶ but since then the Foreign Ministry has fiercely asserted that claims of a deal being struck are “baseless.”⁵⁷ Botswana has been fending off similar claims. *Mmegi* (Botswana) reports that President Festus Mogae is still considering Botswana’s position and an editorial urges Botswana not to host AFRICOM or to trust the United States.⁵⁸ Botswana politician Oebile Gaborone was “hailed as a hero” at the Pan-Africa Parliament in October for “leading an onslaught against the proposed US Africa Command.”⁵⁹

Botswana faces pressure not only internally but also from the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which according to South African Defence Minister Mosiuoa Lekota, has adopted a position of refusing to host foreign armed forces.⁶⁰ *Daily News* (South Africa) reports Lekota warned that any SADC country offering to host would “suffer negative consequences from SADC fellows.”⁶¹ Contrary to Henry’s statement that no country has declined to meet with U.S. officials, U.S. Ambassador Eric Bost complained that Lekota and senior South African officials have refused to meet with Gen. Ward.⁶²

Zambia is another SADC country asked to participate in AFRICOM. *The Post* (Zambia) reports on September 17th that U.S. Ambassador Carmen Martinez confirmed Zambia was approached about setting up an Africa Command Office, an administrative office for crisis management. In response, Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa assured that he would not allow a U.S. military base in the country.⁶³ On the same date, an editorial in *The Post* stated “now that the U.S. has made it clear that it is seeking to establish an African Command Office in Zambia, the Zambian government and the Zambian people must make it very clear to them that whatever this means or entails, it is equally not acceptable.”⁶⁴

Outside the SADC, Algeria and Nigeria have led AFRICOM opposition. Both had been considered viable locations for the command. *Al Jazeera* quotes Algerian Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci stressing his country’s rejection of any military deployment on its soil within the context of the “war on terrorism.”⁶⁵ U.S. diplomats were disappointed neither Algeria nor Libya offered to host and that the two expressed opposition to their neighbors hosting.⁶⁶ Also, along with Mauritania, Morocco, Libya, and Tunisia, Algeria is a member of the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), which has declared its opposition to foreign military forces operating in

Africa. Nigerian Foreign Affairs Minister Ojo Mauekwe is quoted in *Leadership Nigeria* stating, “If the command is about stationing US troops on African soil, we feel there is no need for that.”⁶⁷ Nigeria has worked to block any headquarters from being established in the Gulf of Guinea region.⁶⁸

Additionally, Uganda’s Prime Minister Yoweri Museveni has asserted concerns about protecting sovereignty, and for this reason, has said would allow AFRICOM on Ugandan soil only on a “temporary basis” and only for a mission that is “acceptable to the [Ugandan] government.”⁶⁹

Some African leaders expressed the desire that the AU would unilaterally condemn the hosting of AFRICOM in African territories, arguing AFRICOM would undercut the AU’s efforts to develop its own security capabilities.⁷⁰ Lekota expected that the AU would uphold the SADC decision, because “as far as we are aware the majority of the regions on the continent have taken that [the SADC] position.”⁷¹ The AU, however, has not dictated a pro or con stance. AU Deputy Chairperson Patrick Mazimhaka states:

As a concept we’ve talked about it with U.S. officials. Its strategies have been explained to us. We’ve discussed its form and its objectives. But all we’ve had is tentative discussions; we have yet to work out the details. Now the next step is to take what has been presented to us about Africom and present it to our member states in a way that is clear to them and see what they think.⁷²

This leaves the possibility that, with more dialogue and clarification, the AU may be able to give AFRICOM its support. If this occurred, it could lead to some African nations being more open to collaboration. Though some countries may not desire to host, they may consider involvement in AFRICOM activities. Even outspoken critics like Nigeria may welcome the beneficial American military training programs.⁷³

There are already examples of countries becoming more amenable to AFRICOM after U.S. officials thoroughly consulted with their leaders on the command’s specific intentions. After Ward met with officials in Ethiopia this November, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zanawi stated Ethiopia is ready to work with AFRICOM and that the command could contribute a lot to ensuring peace and stability in Africa.⁷⁴ Ghana, often mentioned as a potential headquarters location is another example. Air Vice Marshall Julius Boateng confirms Ghana has had serious doubts about AFRICOM, but says “I have had had a chance to hear [U.S. official] explain what is the reasoning behind the command, and it’s all about partnership.”⁷⁵

Conclusions

Many African leaders continue to reiterate their objections to new U.S. “bases” or “deployments,” though U.S. officials have spent months stressing that neither new bases nor deployments are intended. Whelan stated in October that if the need for U.S. troops arises, they would be deployed from U.S. bases in North America or other U.S. Commands.⁷⁶ This obvious discrepancy in intent needs to be addressed and communications between U.S. officials and African leaders must be streamlined, so that they feel AFRICOM operational objectives are not a threat to their governments.

As a result of the negative reactions to AFRICOM’s inception, American leaders have tried to address specific myths, complaints, and concerns about the command, as well as offer more details on what the command will actually be set up to do. A number of top-level U.S. officials have also been on several delegations to Africa this fall. Gen. Ward and his deputies, Amb. Yates and Adm. Moeller have been visitors to the continent, as well as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. On these consultations, they have emphasized that they are eager to receive African insight on the command. Gen. Ward stated in Botswana in December, “I am here to listen.”⁷⁷

During consultations with African leaders, U.S. officials emphasize that AFRICOM is a “win-win” situation that is about building partnerships for humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and crisis response missions. They have also stressed how the U.S. State Department will still have the lead in implementing foreign policy. Sec. Gates observed that the Joint Task Force on the Horn of Africa is a good model for AFRICOM, with its focus on military cooperation, military-to-military training, and humanitarian assistance.⁷⁸

Lastly, they have downplayed headquarters talk. Though AFRICOM officials are still actively engaged in the process of securing a headquarters, they have realized that this contentious issue has tied up the discussion. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen said in November, “Right now, it’s headquartered in Europe. And as we stand this up, that’s fine. My view is that it is more important that we engage and do it in a way to assist where asked, and to invest where asked.” The immediate focus seems to be finding issues on which cooperation is possible and likely.

During a panel discussion in September at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), several African leaders offered recommendations on how the United States can improve African perceptions of AFRICOM. Rwandan Ambassador to the U.S. James Kimonyo noted the importance of explaining that the United States will not make decisions or engage in combat on behalf of African forces. Liberian Minister of Defense Brownie J. Samukai suggested that more needs to be done on the ground to explain to the African people, not just the leaders, what the goals and mission of AFRICOM really are.


Also noted by Lt. Gen. Daniel I. Opande (Ret.) of Kenya was the need for the U.S. to tailor its approach to each individual African region. Because there are different threats and interests in each region, desired partnerships with AFRICOM must also vary by region. Lastly, Lt. Gen. Tsadkan Gebretensae of Ethiopia stressed that the United States must take into account that its interests are not always African interests (and vice versa), so AFRICOM must build on common interests between the two.⁷⁹

This report has sought not to be critical of AFRICOM’s development or U.S. personnel leading the transition process, but rather to stress the importance of considering African viewpoints. The African Command will not be a success if the United States does not make a *realistic* assessment of African perspectives and concerns. By characterizing African dissent as merely “initial misperception,” the serious criticisms and concerns of African states are marginalized. The Transition Team should continue to dialogue frequently with African leaders to ascertain what they would like AFRICOM to be, on what initiatives they would be eager to cooperate and with what kind of headquarters structure they would be comfortable. The United States will not receive a universal approval for AFRICOM at the outset, but if it makes it a top priority to respond to African interests and ideas, then it may win over many countries that are simply waiting for evidence that their sovereignty will be respected and their security capacities enriched.

U.S. Africa Command: U.S. Visits and African Response

The following map highlights which countries have already met with U.S. officials in regards to AFRICOM. In addition, the map illustrates the reported response of a number of African countries to AFRICOM's intent to set up headquarters on the continent – listing the country's declared position for or against serving as an AFRICOM host.

Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) countries are noted as having rejected the presence of U.S. troops in their states. Where media reports and statements of African political leaders indicate a negative reaction to hosting AFRICOM, countries are identified as “reportedly negative,” and if an openness to dialogue has been reported, they can be identified as “reportedly amenable.” Speculation by media and scholars as to which countries are viable for headquarters is also indicated. Lastly, the locations of U.S. military cooperative security locations (“lily pads”) and Camp Lemonier in Djibouti are noted. Sources and information utilized range from February to November 2007. Most importantly, please note areas of contradicting reports indicated on the map, such as Morocco and Botswana, both reporting to be positively and negatively disposed to hosting AFRICOM.



- ¹ Lauren Ploch, "Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa," *Congressional Research Service* (CRS), July 6, 2007, 1-2, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34003.pdf.
- ² Todd Pitman, "Skepticism, distrust greet America's new military command in Africa," *Associated Press*, November 5, 2007; Peter Heinlein, "Africom Commander Rejects Militarization Charge," *Voice of America*, November 8, 2007.
- ³ From the Department of Defense (DOD) U.S. African Command homepage: www.africom.mil/.
- ⁴ Simon Tisdall, "African States Oppose US Presence," *Guardian Unlimited*, June 25, 2007.
- ⁵ Robert Moeller, "Department of Defense Pentagon Bloggers Roundtable," November 20, 2007.
- ⁶ Theresa Whelan, conference call, October 18, 2007.
- ⁷ See Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa DOD homepage, www.hoa.centcom.mil/.
- ⁸ Stephanie Hanson, "The Pentagon's New Africa Command," *Council on Foreign Relations* (CFR), May 3, 2007, www.cfr.org/publication/13255/pentagons_new_africa_command.html.
- ⁹ Charlie Coons, "New Africom Staff To Be Mainly Situated Outside Africa," *European Stars and Stripes*, September 25, 2007.
- ¹⁰ William H. McMichael, "Plans for AFRICOM Tentative, But Underway," *Defense News*, May 28, 2007.
- ¹¹ Hanson, *CFR*, May 3, 2007.
- ¹² "AFRICOM: Positioning the HQ Will be Everything," *Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy*, February 2007.
- ¹³ Ploch, *CRS*, 9.
- ¹⁴ ICC exemption, or "bilateral and non-surrender agreements," is a provision of Article 98 of the Rome Statute (1998) of the International Criminal Court that the U.S. uses in negotiating SOFA agreements.
- ¹⁵ DOD U.S. Africa Command Homepage, www.africom.mil/africomFAQs.asp.
- ¹⁶ "Morocco offers to be the base of the America military command in Africa," *Attajdid* (Arabic), June 4, 2007.
- ¹⁷ "Morning Edition," *National Public Radio*, October 18, 2007.
- ¹⁸ The U.S.S. Fort McHenry is deployed to provide education and training for the African Partnership Station Initiative, which organizes cooperation and promotes maritime security in Western Africa. See DOD USS Fort McHenry Homepage, www.fort-mchenry.navy.mil/default.aspx.
- ¹⁹ Marcus Weisgerber, "USAF to Begin Formal Stand Up of AFRICOM Air Arm in December," *Inside the Air Force*, November 16, 2007.
- ²⁰ Jendayi Fraser, testimony, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Exploring the U.S. Africa Command and a New Strategic Relationship with Africa*, August 1, 2007, <http://foreign.senate.gov/hearings/2007/hr070801a.html>.
- ²¹ William Ward, testimony, U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, *Hearing on the United States Africa Command*, November 14, 2007, http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/FC111407/Ward_Testimony111407.pdf.
- ²² Transcript, U.S. *Federal News Service*, U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, *Hearing on the United States Africa Command*, November 14, 2007.
- ²³ "U.S. to Establish a New Africa Command (AFRICOM)," Foreign Press Center Briefing with Secretary Whelan, Rear Adm. Moeller, and Amb. Robert Loftis, Washington, D.C., February 9, 2007.
- ²⁴ "Africom Chief Nominated for Unique New Command," U.S. Department of State Bureau of International Information Programs, July 12, 2007.
- ²⁵ Ploch, *CRS*, 10.
- ²⁶ Special DOD Briefing from the Pentagon, October 15, 2007.
- ²⁷ Carlo Munez, "Pentagon Evaluates Potential Locations for New African Command," *Inside the Pentagon*, October 11, 2007.
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