




MALI

Background

Colonized by the French at the beginning of the 20th century, Mali gained significant autonomy in 1946 –when the French Constitution opened the door for more decentralized control of its African colonies – and by 1960, Mali had achieved full independence. Mali was established as a one-party socialist state but a failing economy exacerbated by a serious drought prompted a 1968 coup that established a military committee to govern Mali.



However, the committee likewise failed to revitalize the economy, and the military officers in charge opted to create a new constitution in 1974. The new constitution established a transition to civilian rule and created a new national political party – the Democratic Union of the Malian People (UDPM). However, Mali remained a one-party state and the president of the military committee, Gen. Moussa Traore, was elected president of the civilian government in elections held in 1979. Traore, who survived three coup attempts, proceeded to consolidate his power even further, violently crushing anti-government demonstrations. Traore’s grasp on power lasted more than a decade, facilitated in part by economic reform and moderate liberalization of the political sphere that quieted some public discontent with the government. However, public demands for a functioning multi-party democracy continued to grow and large-scale demonstrations and rioting took place in 1991; security forces were unable to stop the rioting and killed roughly 100 demonstrators in the attempt to do so. Traore was arrested by military officers and a primarily civilian committee, the Transitional Committee for the

Salvation of the People, took over the government and set about creating a new draft constitution, a charter for political parties and an electoral code.

Alpha Oumar Konare, the leader of the main opposition movement – the Alliance for Democracy In Mali – won the first presidential election under Mali’s new constitution in April 1992 and served the maximum of two, five-year terms. In 2002, retired Gen. Amadou Toumani Toure became the country's second democratically elected president. Toure had briefly served as the head of Mali after the 1991 arrest of Moussa Traore until democratic elections were held. The presidential election and legislative elections held in the same year were considered free and fair. Toure’s first term as president will end in 2007, though he is expected to seek reelection.

In its 2005 report on human rights, the U.S. State Department noted that the Malian government “generally respected its citizens’ human rights,” but that problems persist in some areas. The government allows for unrestricted freedom of speech and the press and citizens can exercise freedom of assembly without interference. However, members of the security forces occasionally physically abuse detainees or arbitrarily detain citizens and corruption exists within the police force. The executive branch exerts an undue amount of control over the judiciary and corruption persists within the government, posing a challenge to development and reform of the country.

The State Department’s terrorism report noted that in 2005, the “fundraising, terrorist recruiting, and other support activities of al-Qaida and affiliated persons and groups in South Africa, Nigeria, and across the Trans-Sahara region remained a serious concern.” The Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), an Algerian terrorist group, continues to conduct recruiting operations within Algeria and in neighboring Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. Designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the State Department, the GSPC is a splinter group of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), one of the principal Islamist militant groups that fought against the government during the Algerian civil war. The GSPC has recently allied itself with al-Qaida and has begun adapting its tactics to those favored by insurgents in Iraq, including roadside bomb attacks. The U.S. military is currently embarking on a long-term initiative to counter what it sees as a growing terrorist presence in the predominantly Muslim regions of Africa, facilitated by ungoverned stretches of border and desert terrain. The Pentagon hopes to train thousands of African troops in counterinsurgency tactics and cross-border cooperation and communication as part of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI), which includes Mali as well as Algeria, Chad, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia.

The nomadic Tuareg have engaged in armed conflict with the government of Mali since the country first became independent over their exclusion from the government and policies that infringed on their traditional land use. The severe drought that contributed to political instability in Mali in the 1960s caused a substantial amount of the Tuareg population to leave the country, where they subsisted by raising livestock, for neighboring countries. However, the conflict flared up again in the 1990s when Tuareg separatists from the north of the country launched attacks against government targets in an attempt to win greater autonomy from Mali. The government acted forcefully to put down the rebellion and Mali fell into a five-year civil war. The tribes and the government signed a peace agreement in 1995 ending major hostilities and held a symbolic burning of the Tuareg’s weapons to signify the end of the conflict. Former Tuareg rebels were integrated into the national armed forces and the government attempted to better integrate the Tuareg into all areas of Malian life. However, a Tuareg attack on military barracks in the summer of 2006 hints at continuing tensions between the government and the nomadic tribes. In the peace agreement signed with the rebels behind the attacks,

the government once again pledged to commit more resources toward development of the Tuareg lands in the north of the country.

U.S. Military Assistance Prior to Sept. 11, 2001

Mali does not participate in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and did not import any major conventional weapons systems from the United States between 1990 and 2001.

Between fiscal year 1990 (FY 90) and FY 01, International Military Education and Training (IMET) for Mali was funded at fairly consistent levels, totaling \$2.6 million during this time period. In the late 1990s, IMET funding began to increase as Mali consolidated its democratic political system. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) appropriations were sporadic, ranging from \$100,000 in FY 92 to \$1.6 million in FY 98, and totaled \$3.2 million between FY 90 and FY 01.

Few Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) were concluded with the United States. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) were more consistently concluded, although no high-price items were purchased; the defense articles and services purchased through the FMS program consisted mostly of military training, aircraft spare parts, and equipment repair. Mali received no U.S. weaponry through the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program during this period.

U.S. Military Assistance Since Sept. 11, 2001

Before resigning as U.S. Secretary of Defense in late 2006, Donald Rumsfeld laid out his vision for an Africa Command that would be added to the existing U.S. military commands in order to maintain order and stability in the often-overlooked continent. As such, the U.S. government has worked on increasing engagement with the governments of Africa. The FY 07 congressional budget justification for foreign operations describes Mali as “an active partner in the war against terrorism” and “a model for democracy in the region.” However, U.S. engagement with Mali and the levels of military assistance provided to Mali since Sept. 11, 2001, have not been consistent.

Mali received over \$300,000 in IMET funding in both FY 02 and FY 03, but this funding ceased during FY 04 and FY 05. The American Servicemembers Protection Act, passed in 2002, required all states party to the International Criminal Court (ICC) to sign a Bilateral Immunity Agreement (BIA) with the United States, granting U.S. soldiers immunity from court proceedings or have military assistance withheld. As Mali had ratified the ICC and refused to sign a BIA with the United States, IMET and FMF were withheld and Mali was not eligible to receive U.S. defense articles through the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program. In October 2006, however, President George W. Bush issued a waiver allowing 21 countries that have not signed BIAs to begin receiving military assistance again. The waiver occurred amidst criticism from the Pentagon that critical counterterrorism assistance was being curtailed by the ban and that China was training African militaries in the United States' absence. Substantially smaller IMET allocations of less than \$50,000 have been requested in FY 06 and FY 07, but no FMF has been requested for Mali.

Without FMF available to finance weapons purchases from the United States, FMS has been minimal and, as before Sept. 11, 2001, have consisted mostly of training, spare parts, and maintenance. No DCS was concluded with the United States except for \$10,000 in FY 04.

Although funding through the five main military assistance programs has been less than robust, the United States has provided Mali with counterterrorism training and funding through other programs. Mali is a beneficiary of the Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) and received \$200,000 in FY 05, with \$150,000 budgeted in FY 06 and \$100,000 slated for FY 07. Since FY 05, Mali has also received funding to expand its counterterrorism capabilities through the Foreign Operations budget's Anti-Terrorism Assistance program (NADR-ATA), which is part of the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Activities account. Mali received \$1.2 million from this account in FY 05 and is slated to receive \$1.5 million in FY 06 and \$954,000 in FY 07.

In 2003, the State Department launched the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), designed to foster counterterrorism cooperation among the United States and the Saharan countries of Mali, Niger, Chad, and Mauritania. Under the PSI, the U.S. military trained local forces to work together to counter known terrorist incursions as well as trafficking of people and illicit materials. In 2005, the PSI was expanded, funded with \$125 million, and renamed the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI). The TSCTI added five more countries to the list of participants (Algeria, Morocco, Senegal, Nigeria, and Tunisia) and intends to greatly augment the region's indigenous capacity to effectively fight terrorism. TSCTI commenced in June 2005 with Operation Flintlock, which trained 3,000 African soldiers from nine different countries alongside U.S. forces in skills ranging from basic marksmanship to human rights law. In FY 07, the TSCTI was added to the Foreign Operations budget for regular funding and received \$7.2 million from the NADR-ATA account and \$16.8 million from the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account. The Section 1206 authority from the Operations and Maintenance title of the defense budget may also contribute funding to the TSCTI in FY 07.

U.S. Military Assistance and Sales to Mali, FY 90 - FY 08					
	IMET	FMF	DCS	FMS	EDA
1990	\$161,000	\$0	\$0	\$0	n/a
1991	\$245,000	\$0	\$2,000	\$16,000	n/a
1992	\$121,000	\$100,000	\$1,000	\$72,000	n/a
1993	\$198,000	\$747,000	\$1,000	\$37,000	\$0
1994	\$134,000	\$0	\$0	\$88,000	\$0
1995	\$163,000	\$0	\$1,000	\$19,000	\$0
1996	\$155,000	\$0	\$0	\$27,000	\$0
1997	\$152,000	\$0	\$0	\$21,000	\$0
1998	\$275,000	\$1,600,000	\$0	\$54,000	\$0
1999	\$374,000	\$600,000	\$0	\$965,000	\$0
2000	\$270,000	\$0	\$0	\$316,000	\$0
2001	\$355,000	\$200,000	\$0	\$833,000	\$0
1990-2001	\$2,603,000	\$3,247,000	\$5,000	\$2,448,000	\$0
1997-2001	\$1,426,000	\$2,400,000	\$0	\$2,189,000	\$0
2002	\$342,000	\$0	\$0	\$6,000	\$0
2003	\$309,000	\$0	\$0	\$95,000	\$0
2004	\$0	\$0	\$10,000	\$15,000	\$0
2005	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
2006	\$0	\$0	\$74,000	\$0	\$0
2002-2006	\$651,000	\$0	\$84,000	\$116,000	\$0
2007	\$45,000	\$0	\$807,000	\$0	\$0
2008	\$250,000	\$0	\$37,000	\$0	n/a

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