



DJIBOUTI


Background

Djibouti, a French colony since the start of the 20th century, was granted autonomy from France in 1957, along with many other French African colonies. The country gained full independence in June 1977 and Hassan Gouled Aptidon became the first president of Djibouti after independence. The country was established as a one-party state, with the goal of the only party – the People’s Progress Assembly – being to

establish unity between the country’s two main ethnic groups – the Issa and the Afar. Aptidon was re-elected in 1981, 1987 and 1993, finishing his third six-year term as president in 1999. Political parties were not legalized in Djibouti until 1992, when four official parties were created to provide a stepping stone towards a multi-party democracy.

In 1977, Djibouti’s first prime minister, Ahmed Dini, resigned along with four other Cabinet members, citing discrimination against the Afar people within the government. In 1991, ethnic tensions between the Issa-dominated government and the minority Afars led to an outbreak of violence that lasted for more than a decade. On Dec. 26, 1994, a peace agreement was signed between the government and the Afar guerrilla movement, known as the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD), which allowed for greater power sharing between Afars and Issas within the government. However, an armed faction of the FRUD (FRUD-Dini) – which was led by former prime minister Ahmed Dini and opposed the peace process – continued engaging in violence against the government, mainly in the areas along the Djibouti-Ethiopia border.

**U.S. Military Assistance and Sales to Djibouti,
Pre-Sept. 11 vs. Post-Sept. 11**



In 1999, Ismail Omar Guelleh – the nephew of Hassan Gouled Aptidon – became the second president of Djibouti. Guelleh’s party, the People’s Rally for Progress (RPP) was supported by the FRUD. Guelleh presided over the signing of the May 12, 2001, peace accord between the Djiboutian government and the radical wing of the FRUD, which officially ended the decade-long civil war. In 2002, all remaining restrictions on political parties were lifted and any party – not just the three additional parties established in 1992 – were allowed to field candidates for office. Although the 2005 presidential elections were Djibouti’s first free, multi-party elections, Guelleh ran unopposed and opposition parties boycotted the elections, citing unresolved disputes over electoral reform.

In its 2006 report on human rights, the U.S. State Department described Djibouti’s human rights record as poor, and noted that the government continued to commit serious abuses against its citizens. Government security forces beat detainees and use excessive force against demonstrators, which has led to the injury and death of citizens. Citizens are occasionally arbitrarily detained and police are able to act with impunity and are not punished for such abuses. The executive remains the most powerful branch of the government, and the judiciary is not functionally independent of the executive. Additionally, the judiciary is corrupt and inefficient. During 2005, the government did make improvements in terms of prosecuting corruption within the government, and several high-level officials were arrested for embezzling and accepting bribes.

The government does not respect its citizens’ right to privacy and monitors political opponents and citizens who attend public demonstrations against the government. Independent media exists in Djibouti, and though freedom of speech and the press are provided for under the constitution, most journalists exercise self-censorship. The government is known to monitor or remove the publications of journalists who are critical of the government. All public gatherings and demonstrations require permits from the government and all organizations must be registered with the Ministry of the Interior. Although Djibouti is technically a multi-party democracy, the State Department reported that the citizens’ right to change their government is restricted in practice. Minorities continue to be under-represented within the government, and the president’s own ethnic group – a subset of the majority Issas – was over-represented within the government. The most recent presidential elections, held in 2005, were considered to have been procedurally fair and free, although the opposition boycott meant that incumbent president Guelleh was the only candidate.

Although considered one of the closest U.S. allies in Africa, U.S.-Djiboutian relations became strained in late 2006 over the ongoing conflict in Somalia. In 2002, the United States established the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti. Composed of over 1,000 U.S. soldiers based at Camp Lemonier, the mission of the CJTF-HOA is to train the region’s militaries in order to expand their counterterrorism capabilities. In January 2007, the Djiboutian government condemned U.S. air strikes that were launched from Camp Lemonier following a ground invasion into Somalia by Ethiopian troops; Djibouti was not informed of the strikes in advance. Djibouti’s condemnation followed the November 2006 UN report that alleges Djibouti had supplied weapons to the Islamic Courts’ movement in Somalia in direct violation of a standing UN arms embargo.

U.S. Military Assistance Prior to Sept. 11, 2001

U.S. military assistance to Djibouti between fiscal year 1990 (FY 90) and FY 01 was related to U.S. priorities in the region and not tied specifically to U.S. goals in Djibouti. The U.S. removed its defense attaché from Djibouti following the pull-out from Somalia in 1993, and military assistance throughout

the mid-and late-1990s was minimal. In October 2000, the United States closed its embassy and temporarily suspended its presence in Djibouti (and Kenya) in the wake of the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in the Gulf of Aden, which followed the dual bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 by al-Qaida.

Between FY 90 and FY 01, Djibouti concluded a total of \$7.2 million in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and \$61,000 in Direct Commercial Sales (DCS). These military sales consisted mostly of vehicle spare parts and technical assistance. Additionally, Djibouti received 30 cargo trucks through the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program in FY 95. Between 1993 and 2001, Djibouti did not report any imports of major U.S. conventional weapons systems to the UN Register of Conventional Arms.

Djibouti received funding for International Military Education and Training (IMET) consistently between FY 90 and FY 01, totaling \$1.6 million. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) was only appropriated during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, during which Djibouti supported the U.S.-led coalition. During FY 90 and FY 91, Djibouti received \$3.5 million in FMF, but did not receive further FMF until FY 01.

U.S. Military Assistance Since Sept. 11, 2001

Before resigning as U.S. Secretary of Defense in late 2006, Donald Rumsfeld laid out his vision for an Africa Command that would be added to the existing U.S. military commands, in order to maintain order and stability in the often overlooked continent. After Sept. 11, 2001, the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia and Yemen) was specifically identified as the area of Africa most at risk for becoming a safe haven for terrorists. Moreover, the region is saturated with small arms and light weapons – the weapons of choice for terrorists. The U.S. government has increasingly sought out African allies to train in counterterrorism, due to the potential threat terrorists could pose in the absence of such bolstered capacity. Strategically located on both the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea in the Horn of Africa, Djibouti is considered a “frontline state in the war on terrorism,” and has supported U.S. counterterrorism efforts by sharing intelligence, providing overflight rights, and granting access to airfields and bases. Djibouti also hosts the only U.S. military base in Africa, Camp Lemonier, which bases the soldiers of the CJTF-HOA. The State Department’s 2006 report on terrorism noted that the government of Djibouti was, “highly receptive and responsive to U.S. requests for cooperation,” and this cooperation has yielded an increase in U.S. military assistance for Djibouti since Sept. 11, 2001.

In the five years since Sept. 11, Djibouti received more than forty times the amount of military assistance it received in the five years prior. The largest influx of post-Sept. 11 military assistance to Djibouti has come through the FMF program. Since FY 03, Djibouti has received several million dollars in FMF each year, with \$4 million estimated for FY 07 and \$3.2 requested for FY 08. IMET appropriations have been on the increase over the past few years, and Djibouti is slated to receive roughly \$350,000 in FY 07 and in FY 08

Total military sales to Djibouti in the five years since Sept. 11 have totaled more than 18 times the value of arms sales in the five years prior. Post-Sept. 11 arms sales have included rifles and ammunition, trucks, construction equipment, and radar systems; the majority of these sales were concluded in FY 05. Arms sale projections for FY 07 and FY 08 include \$8 million in FMS and an

additional \$1.5 million in DCS. Djibouti has not received any U.S. defense articles through the EDA program during this period.

To bolster Djibouti's counterterrorism capacity, the United States has provided training and funding specifically for this purpose. In FY 06, Djibouti was included in budget requests for funding to expand its counterterrorism capabilities, through the Foreign Operations budget's Anti-Terrorism Assistance program (ATA), which is part of the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Activities (NADR) account. Djibouti received \$120,000 in FY 06 and \$400,000 was estimated for FY 07, but no funding has been requested in FY 08. In December 2002, 2,400 U.S. troops based on ships off Djibouti's coast conducted military exercises in Djibouti in preparation for war with Iraq. In addition to housing the CJTF-HOA and training with the troops at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti is a participant in the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI), launched in 2004. Like the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative, EACTI is designed to improve regional capacity and cooperation in carrying out counterterrorism operations.

U.S. Military Assistance and Sales to Djibouti, FY 90 - FY 08					
	IMET	FMF	DCS	FMS	EDA
1990	\$133,000	\$2,076,000	\$42,000	\$1,436,000	n/a
1991	\$208,000	\$1,505,000	\$0	\$752,000	n/a
1992	\$46,000	\$0	\$19,000	\$2,096,000	n/a
1993	\$206,000	\$0	\$0	\$677,000	\$0
1994	\$106,000	\$0	\$0	\$875,000	\$0
1995	\$125,000	\$0	\$0	\$399,000	\$1,254,660
1996	\$150,000	\$0	\$0	\$283,000	\$0
1997	\$94,000	\$0	\$0	\$49,000	\$0
1998	\$103,000	\$0	\$0	\$359,000	\$0
1999	\$123,000	\$0	\$0	\$241,000	\$0
2000	\$163,000	\$0	\$0	\$12,000	\$0
2001	\$132,000	\$100,000	\$0	\$60,000	\$0
1990-2001	\$1,589,000	\$3,681,000	\$61,000	\$7,239,000	\$1,254,660
1997-2001	\$615,000	\$100,000	\$0	\$721,000	\$0
2002	\$163,000	\$1,500,000	\$0	\$56,000	\$0
2003	\$154,000	\$13,400,000	\$102,000	\$30,000	\$0
2004	\$381,000	\$6,378,000	\$0	\$919,000	\$0
2005	\$239,000	\$4,468,000	\$4,661,000	\$5,921,000	\$0
2006	\$307,000	\$3,960,000	\$2,521,000	\$171,000	\$0
2002-2006	\$1,244,000	\$29,706,000	\$7,284,000	\$7,097,000	\$0
2007	\$345,000	\$4,000,000	\$438,000	\$4,000,000	\$0
2008	\$350,000	\$3,200,000	\$1,084,000	\$4,000,000	n/a

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