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Along the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir, over a million Pakistani and Indian troops await a war. This disputed region set off two of the three wars India and Pakistan have fought since they emerged out of the remnants of the British Empire in 1947. India won all three, and since the latest war in 1971, the conflict has smoldered on, driven by Pakistan's support for the Kashmiri insurgency since 1989. The situation grew exponentially more dangerous when each state deployed nuclear weapons, revealed to the world in tit-for-tat nuclear tests in the spring of 1998. Though U.S.-led efforts to head off war seem to be making headway, historical animus and nuclear weapons will sustain the potential for disastrous conflict.
Many political theorists argue that the presence of nuclear weapons on both sides will prevent another major war. By making the risks of war unthinkable, the logic goes, nuclear weapons create a balance of terror, sobering leaders and necessitating dialogue, as in the Cold War.
Yet today in Kashmir the threat of war looms despite these weapons. Are nuclear weapons then containing or causing conflict in Kashmir? Perhaps both. Because both states have nuclear weapons, neither is likely to intentionally launch an all-out war. But nuclear weapons permit the states to take lesser violent actions - risks that attempt to exploit the chance of catastrophe for strategic gain.
In 1999, over 1,000 Pakistan-based militants and Pakistani regulars crossed the Line of Control into the Indian Kargil area and seized Indian army outposts in a surprise attack.
The Indian army regrouped, driving the Pakistani forces back. As the Indians attacked, Pakistan prepared its intermediate-range missiles for nuclear strikes, perhaps to deter India from attacking Pakistani territory. U.S. diplomacy helped persuade Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to pull his troops out of India and temporarily head off full-scale war.
Months later, General Pervez Musharraf, widely held to be the architect of the Kargil offensive, deposed Sharif.
Tensions mounted again in December, 2001, when five militants attacked the Indian Parliament, killing 14, leading India to mass its army along the Line of Control. Pakistan responded by massing its forces and, under international pressure, announcing a crackdown on Islamic militants infiltrating from Pakistan to Kashmir. But on May 14, three infiltrators killed 32 people, mostly the families of Indian soldiers, near Jammu. Recent reports indicate that Pakistan-based militants may have joined forces with al Qaeda terrorists driven out of Afghanistan by the U.S. military.
The lessons of the Kargil conflict inform events today. In sending troops over the Line of Control in 1999, Pakistan gambled that its nuclear weapons would prevent India from responding with an invasion of Pakistan. Pakistani leaders may believe that the Kargil conflict revealed that they could allow the militant infiltrators to attack India without provoking a major Indian military response - although publicly Musharraf has promised to stop infiltrations.
Pakistan's refusal to institute a no-first use policy for its nuclear weapons (India has such a policy) is designed to keep Indians guessing about when Pakistan might use its nuclear weapons, preventing a major conventional attack against the inferior Pakistani army. In February, Pakistani General Khalid Kidwai, chief of Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division, which controls Pakistan's nuclear weapons, said that should India threaten to conquer a large portion of Pakistan (including Azad, Pakistan's portion of Kashmir), destroy the Pakistani army, strangle Pakistan economically, or politically destabilize Pakistan, Pakistan might use nuclear weapons.
Any Indian attack into Pakistan could lead to some of those scenarios. Nonetheless, Indian leaders reason that since their nuclear arsenal would survive a Pakistani first strike and hit back, Pakistan would never order a nuclear strike unless its very existence was at stake. Should the infiltrations continue, India might then attack the militant's bases across the Line of Control, calling Pakistan's bluff. One danger in that strategy is that Pakistan might construe even a limited Indian offensive into Pakistan as a threat to its national existence and use nuclear weapons, starting a nuclear exchange that kills millions.
Even assuming that such a scenario is impossible, that a rational leader like Musharraf would never intentionally start a nuclear war in the face of a conventional attack, a number of paths could still lead to a nuclear war. The problem with the nuclear brinkmanship that presumes a limited war can be fought under the nuclear umbrella is that it assumes the prevalence of rational decision-making, transparent intentions, and perfect command and control. In a crisis, such assumptions may not hold.
Unlike the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War who had enough weapons to destroy the opposing nation several times over after surviving a nuclear strike, India and Pakistan have relatively few nuclear weapons. Pakistan is generally estimated to have between 25 and 50 nuclear weapons, with some designated for delivery by its F-16s and some outfitted for its missiles. India likely has between 30 and 60 nuclear weapons, also available for planes and missiles. Each leader, despite public assurances to the contrary, may worry that the other nation could destroy its nuclear arsenal with a surprise first strike, necessitating quick trigger fingers. This problem is of greater concern for Pakistan, because without its nuclear weapons, the weaker Pakistani army might be at India's mercy.
This instability is exacerbated by proximity. As neighbors, nuclear missiles would arrive in minutes in an attack, meaning the leaders have little time to verify intelligence about the other's intentions. Given the fear of having his small arsenal destroyed and the short decision timetable, either nation's leader might then order a nuclear attack based on faulty reports that the other is preparing to strike. For instance, although both sides generally keep their warheads stored separately from the delivery vehicles, during a crisis like the current one, this may change. The need to quickly arm the weapons might be misconstrued by the other side as presaging an imminent launch, leading that state to launch. Moreover, the risk of a disarming first strike might lead one side to delegate launch authority to military leaders in the field who lack their leader's discretion. A conventional Indian attack that severed Pakistani command and control might lead a rogue Pakistani military officer to launch a nuclear attack on his own. Additionally, a stunning military victory by India might lead the extremists within the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies to unseat Musharraf. Islamic extremists might not be deterred by the prospect of nuclear war.
These are only a few of catastrophic scenarios that could play out in between India and Pakistan, possibly as a result of the ongoing conflict in Kashmir. Nuclear weapons may help prevent a fourth India-Pakistan war, but they also may embolden their keepers to take grave risks for strategic gains. Such gains, purchased through nuclear blackmail, will be worthless if error or treachery deliver the potential disaster they exploit.
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