North Korea's Nuclear Program:
Analyzing "Confessional Diplomacy"

The U.S. State Department's Oct. 16, 2002, announcement that North Korea had acknowledged its continued covert nuclear development program has many geostrategic implications in and out of East Asia. According to the statement http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/14432.htm and media reports that followed, the DPRK has not only continued efforts to develop nuclear weapons but also "more powerful" arms, presumably other types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) — biological and/or chemical weapons — for the last several years. ¹  

On Oct. 3-5, 2002, an eight-member American delegation led by Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly confronted its counterparts in Pyongyang with intelligence reports that North Korea was gathering high-strength aluminum for gas centrifuges used to enrich uranium. The North Korean officials admitted that the allegations were correct.

As indicated in the Oct. 16 statement, North Korea has, by its own admission, violated a series of agreements ranging from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreement to the 1992 Joint North-South Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In response, on Oct. 19, it was reported that the United States might abandon the 1994 Agreed Framework, ²   in which Pyongyang had pledged to stop enriching plutonium for nuclear weapons in exchange for fuel oil and construction of two light-water reactors under the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), a multilateral energy consortium. Ironically, U.S. Ambassador for North Korean Affairs Jack Pritchard had just attended a KEDO ceremony on Aug. 7, 2002, in North Korea to mark the pouring of the concrete foundation for the first reactor. ³  

In his recent article published by the Financial Times, CDI Senior Fellow John Newhouse offers three explanations for North Korea's continuation of its nuclear program. It exists, he pointed out, 1) as a means of increasing diplomatic and commercial bargaining leverage, 2) to raise cash through the sale of its missile technology, and 3) for deterrence against such neighboring countries as South Korea and Japan, as well as U.S. forces stationed in the region. ⁴  

While leader Kim Jung Il's true rationale for confessing remains unknown, there are at least two possible reasons for his actions. First, Kim decided to use nuclear blackmail, combined with threats to proliferate fissile material, in order to maximize his chances of maintaining power by eliciting international political and economic concessions. ⁵   But these attempts at extortion, if that was his intent, seem to have failed, given that the administration of President George W. Bush has in response suggested to abandon the Agreed Framework — an important economic resource for North Korea. Further, Pyongyang has openly violated the Denuclearization Declaration, a bilateral agreement with South Korea that is the basis for a vast majority of the DPRK's financial assistance. ⁶   Moreover, the admission came when Japan was preparing to provide new economic aid on condition that talks on normalization of relations with North Korea go smoothly.

Second, Kim admitted to the existence of the program under the assumption that the United States could not afford another war politically and militarily (other than against Iraq). Given the general international support for multilateral approaches toward problems related to WMD, the North Koreans hoped to make a "soft landing" on the nuclear issue now, rather than later when they might have to deal with possibly greater and more severe consequences. With Japan and South Korea preoccupied with normalization talks and engagement with the DPRK, respectively, Washington would have difficulty choosing war over diplomacy, leaving the military option literally as a last resort. This whole calculation had given Kim enough guts to joke that he should even "try nuclear exchanges" with the United States when he met with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on Sep. 17 [http://www.cdi.org/weekly/2002/issue31.html]. ⁷  

The Bush administration's initial response to the "confession" was to seek a multilateral diplomatic solution — such as coalitions, arms control efforts, and weapons inspections — as Pyongyang may well have expected, with Kelly and Undersecretary of State John Bolton traveling from East to West to rally support for international pressure on the DPRK. But from a broader perspective, diplomacy with Kim is a double-edged sword for Bush. That is, a successful nonmilitary solution to the North's program would affirm the value of diplomacy and thus undermine his case for military strikes on Iraq. Conversely, a failure of diplomacy would strengthen a case for an attack on North Korea, which, along with Iran and Iraq, constitutes the "axis of evil," at a time when Bush seems reluctant to use force on the Peninsula, even if he is ready to do so in other parts of the world.

America's allies in the region are also committed to finding a diplomatic solution, although to varying degrees. Washington faces a danger of developing policy gaps across the Pacific. For example, while the United States is focused on solving the nuclear problem, Japan's current interests are broader, including finding a resolution to the issue of its citizens kidnapped by the North during the 1970s [http://www.cdi.org/weekly/2002/issue31.html]. It is evident that Tokyo has only reluctantly adopted what is referred to as a "Two Major Theater Strategy," a strategy that came as a result of strong American pressure to link the nuclear problem with the abduction issue and declared that it would not normalize relations with North Korea until the nuclear issue was resolved. ⁸   Japan's commitment will be tested at the Japan-North Korea normalization talks to be held on Oct. 29-30, 2002, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, where Ambassador for North Korean Normalization Negotiation Katsuya Suzuki will lead the 13-member Japanese delegation.

South Korea, on the other hand, seeks to avoid military confrontation with the North by any means and seeks peaceful resolution of volatile issues via engagement, as evidenced by Unification Minister Jeong Se-hyun's visit to Pyongyang on Oct. 19. And as the country gears up for the upcoming presidential election, a confrontation with the North is an undesirable option, leaving diplomatic efforts as the only choice, particularly until its own abduction cases are resolved. ⁹  

The delay of the State Department's announcement, made 12 days after the confession was induced, is understandable — it gave Washington time to come up with a game plan. But behind-the-scenes a gap emerged across the Pacific when Kelly urged the allies not to disclose the news until Washington did. To Seoul and Tokyo, the delay implied that the United States wanted to discourage rapprochement by slowing down their own diplomatic efforts with the DPRK. In this sense, North Korea's "confessional diplomacy" had the potential of driving a wedge between Washington on one hand and Seoul and Tokyo on the other. One nightmare for Bush would be if Kim offered to visit Seoul for rapprochement when Washington's priority rests in resolving the nuclear problem through multilateral initiatives. ¹⁰  

For Bush, moreover, the announcement was made at a difficult time as he was seeking to build both international and domestic support for military action against Iraq. Still, the timing of the announcement was carefully intended not only to encourage a diplomatic solution to North Korea's nuclear problem but also to achieve three other critical goals.

First, the timing can be seen as calculated to pave the way for congressional passage of a resolution permitting the use of force against Iraq. Selected members of Congress considered likely supporters of a war on Iraq were reported to have been briefed before the announcement was made, but only after the Iraq war resolution was passed and Bush had signed it. ¹¹   In other words, if the North Korean nuclear issue had been put on display before the votes, the Bush administration feared that things might have gone badly, particularly in light of international opposition to its willingness to deal unilaterally with Iraq.

Second, as one of North Korea's few friends in the region, China's support in pressuring the DPRK was important to Bush. It has been reported that the Bush administration suspects that Chinese companies performed a role in providing nuclear technology for North Korea. ¹²   By timing the announcement a week before the Oct. 25 summit meeting in Crawford, Texas, Bush provided Chinese President Jiang Zemin with a diplomatic role to play, while simultaneously suggesting that unless Jiang supported a resolution on Iraq, China may have to deal with American attacks on North Korea and subsequent instability in the Korean Peninsula. ¹³   The outcome of the summit meeting was a bilateral cooperation to solve the nuclear problem.

Finally, Pakistan has been criticized via press leaks for assisting North Korea to acquire nuclear equipment, most notably gas centrifuge separators used to create weapons-grade uranium, in exchange for missile technology as part of a 1997 bilateral trade agreement. ¹⁴   Before Pakistan's Oct. 11 democratic election, Washington gave itself time to plan ahead on how to deal with President Pervez Musharraf, who is supportive of Operation Enduring Freedom. It was only after the election that showed an increase in the seats of Islamic representatives sympathetic to the former Taliban and al Qaeda that Pakistan was openly criticized and Musharraf urged to restrain from further nuclear dealings with Kim. In other words, Bush timed the announcement about the North's nuclear program so as to renew its pressure on Islamabad to remain supportive of Washington in the war against terrorism. ¹⁵  

Given Bush's preference for diplomatic efforts to solve the nuclear problem in East Asia, North Korea seems likely to survive, at least for the time being. That is evident by the outcome of the Oct. 26 meeting of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, in which Bush, Koizumi, and South Korean President Kim Dae Jung issued a joint statement to solve the nuclear problem peacefully via disarmament. ¹⁶   In his Oct. 27 op-ed in The New York Times, furthermore, former President Jimmy Carter calls for an end to the state of "armistice and the consummation of a comprehensive and permanent peace agreement." ¹⁷  

The United States, on the other hand, may have difficulty explaining the difference of its approach towards two "rogue" states that constitute major pillars of the "axis of evil," when it looks for international support for military strikes against Iraq. In the long run, North Korea's existing nuclear program might goad the United States into similar action against the DPRK. As Brookings Senior Fellow Michael O'Hanlon suggests, the status quo is unsupportable for Bush in the long run, prompting action possibly more than mere diplomatic efforts. ¹⁸  

¹  The U.S. State Department, North Korean Nuclear Program, Press Statement made by Richard Boucher, Oct. 16, 2002 [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/14432.htm].

²  David E. Sanger, "U.S. to Withdraw from Arms Accord with North Korea," The New York Times, Oct. 20, 2002.

³  Paul Kerr, "KEDO Pours Concrete for North Korean Nuclear Reactor," Arms Control Today, September 2002 [http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_09/kedo_sept02.asp].

⁴  John Newhouse, "Bring North Korea in from the Cold," The Financial Times, Oct. 18, 2002.

⁵  Howard W. French, "North Korea's Confession: Why?" The New York Times, Oct. 21, 2002 [http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/21/international/asia/21STRA.html]; Andrew Mack, "North Korea's Latest Nuclear Gambit," Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network Special Report, Oct. 21, 2002 [http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security%5C0205A_Andrew.html] .

⁶  Chuck Downs, "Kim Jong Il: Unfit Even for Dictatorship," The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 21, 2002.

⁷  "No One Knows until a Nuclear War is Waged with the United States," Sankei Shimbun, Oct. 18, 2002.

⁸  "Upon North Korea's Nuclear Development, Government Seeks Maintaining the Agreed Framework at Normalization Talks," Asahi Shimbun, Oct. 18, 2002; Tim Weiner, "3 Nations Put Pressure on North Korea," The New York Times, Oct. 27, 2002 [http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/27/international/27SUMM.html].

⁹  Don Kirk, "Seoul to Urge Talks To Deal With A-Arms In North Korea," The New York Times, Oct. 24, 2002; Doug Struck, "Asian Allies Resist Bush Stand on North Korea," The Washington Post, Oct. 25, 2002 [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A16480-2002Oct25.html]

¹⁰  "North Korea: Why Diplomacy is Bush's Only Weapon," Business Week, Nov. 4, 2002; Sonni Efron, "U.S. is Willing to Listen to N. Korea," The Los Angeles Times, Oct. 25, 2002; Carla Anne Robbins, David Cloud, and Greg Jaffe, "North Korea Complicates Bush 'Axis Of Evil' Strategy," The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 18, 2002; Charles Hutzler, Sebastian Moffett, John Larkin, and David Cloud, "North Korea Admits Existence of Nuclear-Weapons Program," The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 18, 2002.

¹¹  Peter Slevin and Glenn Kessler, "Bush Emphasizes Diplomacy toward North Korea," The Washington Post, Oct. 18, 2002 [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A43722-2002Oct17.html]; Michael A. Fletcher, "Powell, Rice Say Withholding N. Korea Information Was Not Political," The Washington Post, Oct. 21, 2002 [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A57148-2002Oct20.html].

¹²  David E. Sanger, "Bush and Jiang Vow to Cooperate on North Korea Issue," The New York Times, Oct. 26, 2002 [http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/26/international/asia/26PREX.html].

¹³  "North Korea's Nuclear Admission: U.S. Times Announcement to Pressure China," Stratfor.com, Oct. 17, 2002.

¹⁴  "Analysis: North Korean Nuclear Admission, the United States Feared Concentrated Attention on the Abduction Issue," Yomiuri Shimbun, Oct. 26, 2002. Yomiuri reports that in Pyongyang on Oct. 4 Kelly confronted the North Koreans with a receipt of their purchase of gas centrifuge separators. See also David E. Sanger and James Dao, "U.S. Says Pakistan Gave Technology to North Korea," The New York Times, Oct. 18, 2002 [http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/18/international/asia/18KORE.html]; "Pyongyang Bought N-Components in '97," Yomiuri Shimbun, Oct. 23, 2002.

¹⁵  "U.S. Sends Subtle Warning to Pakistan," Stratfor.com, Oct. 18, 2002.

¹⁶  Weiner, "3 Nations Put Pressure on North Korea" [http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/27/international/27SUMM.html].

¹⁷  Jimmy Carter, "Engaging North Korea," The New York Times, Oct. 27, 2002 [http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/27/opinion/27CART.html]

¹⁸  O'Hanlon, "North Korea is No Iraq" [http://www.brook.edu/views/op-ed/ohanlon/20021021.htm].

By Noriyuki Katagiri CDI Research Assistant nkatagiri@cdi.org

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